Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature

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Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature

Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative, Volume 4

Edited by

Koen De Temmerman
Evert van Emde Boas

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Contents

Preface IX
Note on Citation and Abbreviations XI
Glossary XII

Character and Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: An Introduction 1
Koen De Temmerman and Evert van Emde Boas

PART 1
Epic and Elegiac Poetry

1 Homer 27
Irene de Jong

2 Hesiod 46
Hugo Koning

3 The Homeric Hymns 64
Irene de Jong

4 Apollonius of Rhodes 80
Jacqueline Klooster

5 Callimachus 100
Annette Harder

6 Theocritus 116
Jacqueline Klooster

PART 2
Historiography

7 Herodotus 135
Mathieu de Bakker

8 **Thucydides** 153
Tim Rood

9 **Xenophon** 172
Tim Rood

10 **Polybius** 191
Luke Pitcher

11 **Appian** 207
Luke Pitcher

12 **Cassius Dio** 221
Luke Pitcher

13 **Herodian** 236
Luke Pitcher

14 **Josephus** 251
Jan Willem van Henten and Luuk Huitink

15 **Pausanias** 271
Maria Pretzler

PART 3
Choral Lyric

16 **Pindar and Bacchylides** 293
Bruno Currie

PART 4
Drama

17 **Aeschylus** 317
Evert van Emde Boas

18 **Sophocles** 337
Michael Lloyd

19 **Euripides** 355
Evert van Emde Boas

20 **Aristophanes** 375
Angus Bowie

21 **Menander** 391
Peter Brown

PART 5
Oratory

22 **Lysias** 409
Mathieu de Bakker

23 **Aeschines and Demosthenes** 428
Nancy Worman

PART 6
Philosophy

24 **Plato** 445
Kathryn Morgan

PART 7
Biography

25 **Xenophon** 467
Luuk Huitink

26 **Plutarch** 486
Judith Mossman

27 **Philostratus** 503
Kristoffel Demoen

PART 8
Between Philosophy and Rhetoric

28 **Dio Chrysostom** 523
Dimitri Kasprzyk

29 **Lucian** 542
Owen Hodkinson

PART 9
The Novel

30 **Chariton** 561
Koen De Temmerman

31 **Xenophon of Ephesus** 578
Koen De Temmerman

32 **Achilles Tatius** 591
Koen De Temmerman

33 **Longus** 608
J.R. Morgan

34 **Heliodorus** 628
J.R. Morgan

Epilogue 650
Koen De Temmerman and Evert van Emde Boas

Bibliography 655
Index 698

Preface

This is the fourth volume of *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* (*SAGN*). As the General Introduction to the first volume in the series explains, this series aims to investigate 'the forms and functions of the main devices which narratology has defined for us, such as the narrator and his narratees, time, focalization, characterization, description, speech, and plot' (*SAGN* 1: xii, de Jong). The first three volumes covered narrators, narratees and narratives (2004), time (2007) and space (2012) respectively; this volume deals with characterization.

In line with the overall aim of the series to focus 'on the *formal devices within a text* which authors employ to enchant or persuade their audiences' (*SAGN* 1: xii), our contributors have been asked to examine *by whom*, *when* and, mainly, *how* characters are constructed. Through the use of which narrative techniques are characteristics or traits ascribed to characters throughout narrative texts? Who is responsible for the ascription of those traits, i.e. who characterizes? How are instances of characterization distributed over the narrative as a whole? What are the different effects of the different techniques of characterization? A second cluster of questions concern the 'what' rather than the 'how'. Which characteristics or traits, in the sense of relatively stable or abiding personal qualities, are attributed to characters? Which aspects and connotations evoked by the notion of character are explored through the attribution of these characteristics?

Following the plan of previous volumes, our contributors evaluate these questions with regard to individual Greek authors spanning a large historical period and a variety of literary genres. With respect to the delineation and organization of the corpus we have aimed primarily to preserve the continuity built over the first three volumes. This should enable users to compare aspects of individual authors' narrative practices, as well as to compare such practices within and across genres and periods. On this last point we must note, however, that diachronic developments have not been as central a focus of our investigation as they were in previous volumes of *SAGN* (though they are sometimes touched upon): we come back to this point in our Epilogue. In other instances, too, we have not fully adhered to editorial choices made in previous volumes: we have, for instance, adopted a somewhat more liberal policy as to what 'counts' as narrative (we elaborate on this point in our Introduction), and we have introduced some minor changes of format, foremost among which is that chapters in previous *SAGN*-volumes are now cited with their authors' names, so as to give full credit where it is due. We have not—though we were

tempted to do so—deviated from the policy of citing Greek only in transliteration, in order to enable non-specialists to use the volume.

We owe thanks to many friends and colleagues. Above all we are grateful to Irene de Jong for entrusting to our care the continuation of the series which she conceptualized, initiated, and edited until this volume (she will be back at the helm, together with Mathieu de Bakker, for the fifth volume on speech). We also thank her for much-appreciated advice, both conceptual and practical, along the way. Warmest thanks also go to all our contributors—some of them experienced *SAGN*-hands, others new to the project. Working with them has been a rich and rewarding experience for us and we have profited enormously from their hard work and sharp insights.

First drafts of chapters were discussed during a workshop held in the *Koninklijke Academie voor Nederlandse Taal- & Letterkunde* (*KANTL*) in Ghent (Belgium) on 31 January and 1 February 2014. We owe thanks to Geert Roskam, Koen Vanhaegendoren and Bart Vervaeck for their support of this inspiring event and to Anne-Marie Doyen, Luc Herman and Luc Van der Stockt for their insightful contributions to it. We also thank Julie Van Pelt for organizational help; and the Flemish Research Council (F.W.O.-Vlaanderen) and the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy of Ghent University for their generous financial support.

The book was prepared and finalized partly with the support, for KDT, of the European Research Council Starting Grant *Novel Saints* (Grant agreement 337344) at Ghent University, and for EvEB, of the Calleva Research Centre at Magdalen College, Oxford.

Tessel Jonquière and Giulia Moriconi, successive Brill editors for Classical Studies, deserve our thanks for their efficient and careful coordination of the publication process. So too does the anonymous referee, whose comments and suggestions improved the quality of the final version. Patrick Hogan carefully copy-edited the manuscript. Last but by no means least, we owe thanks to Emma Vanden Berghe for her diligent work in stylistically finalizing the manuscript and preparing the index.

KDT and EvEB
Ghent/Oxford, February 2017

Note on Citation and Abbreviations

Ancient Greek texts and authors are cited for the most part using the conventions of the *Greek–English Lexicon* edited by Liddell, Scott, Jones, and McKenzie (*LSJ*). A list of these abbreviations may easily be found online by searching for 'LSJ abbreviations'.

References to chapters in previous volumes of the *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* series follow the format '*SAGN* 1: 13–24 (de Jong)'. References to other chapters in the present volume use an arrow: e.g. 'as in the case of Homer's *Iliad* (→)' or simply 'Homer, →'.

In the bibliography, abbreviations of periodicals used are those of *L'Année Philologique*, adding the following:

RE *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*

Glossary

characterization by **ACTION** (*praxis*, pl. *praxeis*): a form of **indirect**, **metonymical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a character's actions and behaviour.

ALTERO-CHARACTERIZATION (also **other-characterization**): characterization by one character of another character; contrast **auto-characterization**.

ANALEPSIS (flashback, *Rückwendung*): the narration of an event which took place earlier than the point in the story where we are. A distinction can be made between *narratorial* (made by the primary narrator) and *actorial* analepses (made by secondary, internal narrators), *internal* analepses (falling within the timespan of the **main story)** and *external* analepses (falling outside that timespan), and, in the case of internal analepses, between *repeating* analepses (repeating what has already been told elsewhere) and *completing* analepses (providing new information).

ANTONOMASIA: the substitution of a proper name by a word or paraphrase, which may have characterizing effect; see also **name/naming**.

characterization by **APPEARANCE**: a form of **indirect**, **metonymical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a character's physical appearance (body, dress, etc.).

AUTO-CHARACTERIZATION (also **self-characterization**): characterization by a character of him/herself; contrast **altero-characterization**.

BOTTOM-UP CHARACTERIZATION: the gradual accumulation of information about an individual's character which cannot immediately be connected to pre-existing schemas, categories, or types, contributing to the construction of a composite *mental model* of that character.

CHARACTER (as count noun, e.g. 'a character', 'characters'): (the representation of) a human(-like) individual in a literary text.

CHARACTER (as mass noun, e.g. 'his character'): the sum of relatively stable moral, mental and social traits and dispositions pertaining to an individual.

CHARACTERIZATION: the ways in which traits and dispositions of any kind are ascribed by a narrator to a character, and the processes by which those traits and dispositions are interpreted by narratees as pertaining to that character.

characterization by **COMPARISON**: see **metaphorical characterization**.

COMPRESSION: characterization which boils down to one outstanding trait or disposition, which substitutes for a fuller, more complex personality.

characterization by **CONTRAST**: see **metaphorical characterization**; a common type of characterization by contrast is by the use of a *foil*, a character

that serves to highlight certain traits or dispositions of another more central character by providing a contrast with respect to those traits or dispositions.

COVERT NARRATEES: narratees whose presence in the text is not clearly or explicitly marked.

COVERT NARRATOR: a narrator who does not explicitly or openly refer to his own activities as narrator and/or gives expression to his emotions concerning what he narrates.

DESCRIPTION (EKPHRASIS): the detailed description of a place, object, person, or even (typical) event, such as a storm.

DIRECT CHARACTERIZATION: the direct verbal ascription of relatively stable traits and dispositions to a character, or the overt moral evaluation of that character, by the primary narrator or a character.

EMBEDDED NARRATIVE: a narrative which is embedded in the **main story**; it is either told by the **primary narrator** or by a character acting as **secondary narrator**. It usually takes the form of an **analepsis** or **prolepsis**.

EMBEDDED or SECONDARY FOCALIZATION: when the **narrator** represents in the **narrator-text** a character's focalization, i.e. his perceptions, thoughts, emotions, or words (indirect speech). Embedded focalization can be *explicit* (when there is a 'shifter' in the form of a verb of seeing, thinking, or a subordinator followed by subjunctive or optative) or *implicit*.

characterization by EMOTION (*pathos*, pl. *pathē*): a form of **indirect**, **metonymical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a character's transient emotional states (as revealed by a narrator).

EXTERNAL NARRATEES: narratees who do not play a role in the story told.

EXTERNAL NARRATOR: a narrator who does not play a role in his own story.

FABULA: all events which are recounted in the **story**, abstracted from their positioning in the **text** and reconstructed in their chronological order.

characterization by FOCALIZATION: a form of **indirect**, **metonymical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from the way in which character perceives situations and other characters; see also **embedded focalization**.

FOCALIZER: the person (the narrator or a character) through whose 'eyes' the events and persons of a narrative are 'seen'.

FRAME NARRATIVE: a (typically primary) narrative which hosts an embedded narrative or a series of embedded narratives forming the bulk of the text.

characterization by GROUP MEMBERSHIP: a form of (typically) **indirect**, **metonymical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a character's associations with certain macro-social, micro-social, and educative-intellectual groups (such associations may include those of ethnicity, gender, age, religious group, class, family, wealth, etc.).

INDIRECT CHARACTERIZATION: any form of characterization where traits and dispositions are not explicitly and directly ascribed to a character but have to be inferred on the basis of other information.

INTERNAL NARRATEES: narratees who play a role in the story told.

INTERNAL NARRATOR: a narrator who plays a role in his own story.

INTERTEXTUAL CHARACTERIZATION: a form of **indirect**, **metaphorical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a **contrast** or **comparison** with the same character (see also **transtextual character**) or another character in a different text.

INTRATEXTUAL CHARACTERIZATION: a form of **indirect**, **metaphorical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a **contrast** or **comparison** with another character in the same text.

MAIN STORY: the events which are told by the primary **narrator** (minus **external analepses** and **prolepses**).

METAPHORICAL CHARACTERIZATION: forms of **indirect** characterization which rely on the alignment or opposition of a character (the *comparandum*) with someone or something else (the *comparans*), with respect to a certain point of resemblance or difference (the *tertium comparationis*); metaphorical characterization may be *explicit* (in similes, comparisons, etc.) or *implicit*; it may function on the basis of **comparison** or of **contrast**; in some cases it is **intertextual** (the *comparans* is a character of the same name (or another character) in a different text) or **intratextual** (the *comparans* is another character in the same text).

METONYMICAL CHARACTERIZATION: forms of **indirect** characterization which rely on the inference of traits or dispositions from aspects that are (interpreted as) *causally related* to those traits or dispositions (e.g. the inference of a character's violent nature from his or her violent actions, a character's intelligence from his speech, etc.).

characterization by NAME/NAMING (or SPEAKING NAMES): the inference of traits or dispositions from the literal meaning or (folk) etymology of (the component parts of) a character's proper name; see also **antonomasia.**

NARRATEES: the addressees of the narrator. We may distinguish between **external** and **internal**, **primary** and **secondary** (tertiary etc.), and **overt** and **covert** narratees. Compare **narrator.**

NARRATOR: the person who recounts the events of the **story** and thus turns them into a **text.** We may distinguish between **external narrators** (who are not a character in the story they tell) and **internal narrators** (who are), **primary narrators** (who recount the **main story**) and **secondary** (tertiary, etc.) **narrators** (who recount **embedded narratives**), **overt narrators** (who

refer to themselves and their narrating activity, tell us about themselves, and openly comment upon their story) and **covert narrators**. All narrators are also **focalizers**.

NARRATOR-TEXT: those parts of the text which are presented by the **primary narrator**, i.e. the parts between the speeches. We may further distinguish between simple narrator-text (when the narrator presents his own focalization) and **embedded focalization** (when the narrator presents focalization of a character).

ORDER: the chronological order of the **fabula** may be changed in the **story**, for instance to create **prolepses** and **analepses** or any other anachrony.

OTHER-CHARACTERIZATION: see **altero-characterization**.

OVERT NARRATEES: narratees whose presence in the text is clearly and explicitly marked.

OVERT NARRATOR: a narrator who explicitly refers to his activities as narrator and gives expression to his emotions concerning what he tells.

PARALEPSIS: a speaker provides *more* information than, strictly speaking, he could, e.g. when the narrator intrudes with his superior knowledge into the embedded focalization of a character or when a character knows more than is logically possible; contrast **paralipsis**.

PARALIPSIS: a speaker provides *less* information than he could: details or events are left out, in some cases to be told at a later, more effective place (this is also known as delay); contrast **paralepsis**.

PERSONIFICATION (or PATHETIC FALLACY): the projection of qualities normally associated with human beings upon inanimate objects or nature.

PRIMACY: the effect that information about a character which is presented first (i.e. soon after the character's introduction in the story) will strongly determine the narratees' view of that character unless considerable contrasting information is presented.

PRIMARY NARRATOR: the narrator who recounts the **main story** (unless we are dealing with a **frame narrative**); usually the first narrator we encounter in a text.

PRIMARY NARRATEES: the addressees of the **primary narrator**.

PROLEPSIS (foreshadowing, *Vorauswendung*): the narration of an event which will take place later than the point of the story where we are. We may distinguish between *internal* prolepses (referring to events which fall within the time limits of the **main story**) and *external* prolepses (which refer to events which fall outside those time limits), and between *narratorial* and *actorial* prolepses. See also **seed**.

REPORTED NARRATORS: when a primary narrator introduces characters as narrators, in indirect speech.

RHYTHM: the relation between **story**-time and **fabula**-time, which is usually measured in the amount of **text**. An event may be told as a *scene* (story-time = fabula-time), *summary* (story-time < fabula-time), *slow-down* (story-time > fabula-time), and *ellipsis*, i.e. not told at all (no story-time matches fabula-time). Finally, there may be a *pause*, when the action is suspended to make room for an extended description (no fabula-time matches story-time).

SECONDARY NARRATEES: the addressees of a secondary narrator.

SECONDARY NARRATOR: a character in the story of the primary narrator, who recounts a narrative (in direct speech).

SEED (hint, advance mention): the insertion of a piece of information, the relevance of which will become clear only later. The later event thus prepared for becomes more natural, logical, or plausible.

SELF-CHARACTERIZATION: see **auto-characterization**.

characterization by SETTING: a form of **indirect** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from the fact that a character is found in certain spatial surroundings; character by setting may be **metonymical** (when a character's whereabouts are causally related to his/her traits or dispositions, e.g. Paris in the women's quarters) or **metaphorical** (when a setting symbolically represents traits or dispositions, e.g. dark clouds reflecting anger).

characterization by SPEECH (*ēthopoiia*): a form of **indirect**, **metonymical** characterization; traits and dispositions are inferred from a character's speech (both style and content); a particularly frequent method is the use of generalizations and maxims (*gnōmai*).

STORY: the events as positioned and ordered in the **text** (contrast: **fabula**). The story consists of the **main story** + **embedded narratives**. In comparison to the fabula, the events in the story may differ in **frequency** (they may be told more than once), **rhythm** (they may be told at great length or quickly), and **order** (the chronological order may be changed).

TEXT: the verbal representation of the **story** (and hence **fabula**) by a **narrator**.

TOP-DOWN CHARACTERIZATION: the construction of a *mental model* of a character on the basis of pre-existing types or categories (both literary and 'real'); one piece of information about the character activates a 'package' of corresponding expectations and knowledge about that character's traits and dispositions.

TRANSTEXTUAL CHARACTER: a character that appears in different texts (i.e. character by the same name and referring to the same mythical or historical person); through **intertextual characterization**, one instantiation of the character may reflect on another.

Character and Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature: An Introduction

*Koen De Temmerman and Evert van Emde Boas**

1 Conceptualization, Questions, Plan of the Book

'When we think of the works of Tolstoy or George Eliot, we are not remembering Tolstoy and George Eliot, we are remembering Dolly, Kitty, Stiva, Dorothea and Casaubon'. These words by Iris Murdoch (1959: 266) underline the central thematic importance of characters in narrative.[1] Yet for all its importance, 'character' is a notoriously slippery concept: the continuing lack of a comprehensive theory of character has during the last few decades become something of a *topos* in literary theory.[2] Literary character is difficult to define and grasp: it cannot be pinpointed as a delineated, autonomous or homogeneous part of the text, nor can it be reduced to a fixed number of passages.

A study of characterization, then, inevitably raises questions about conceptualization. The topic (or rather, complex of topics) is fraught with terminological and methodological issues, which are compounded in our case by the fact that we are dealing with the literature of a culture at some historical and linguistic remove. The conceptual difficulties involved are such that, for example, Budelmann and Easterling have suggested avoiding the language of character altogether and focusing instead on 'reading minds', because 'this is a language … that does not carry the same baggage as the language of "character". For instance, a focus on reading minds allows us to sidestep questions of consis-

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* For insightful comments on earlier versions of this chapter, the authors thank Lars Bernaerts, Julie Van Pelt, the participants of the *SAGN* 4 workshop in Ghent (January–February 2014), and the members of the *Amsterdamse Hellenistenclub* (June 2013). The chapter was written partly with the support of the European Research Council Starting Grant *Novel Saints* (Grant agreement 337344) and the Calleva Research Centre at Magdalen College, Oxford.

1 For similar assessments, see e.g. Brooks and Warren 1959: 171; Hochmann 1985: 7; Glaudes and Reuter 1996: 6–7; Zunshine 2006.

2 See, for example, Frow 2014: vi on literary character as 'this most inadequately theorized of literary concepts'. Similar observations in, among others, O'Neill 1994: 49; Glaudes and Reuter 1996: 8; Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002: 2; Jannidis 2004: 1–7. The complaint, as this catalogue makes clear, is regularly rehearsed, but, as Palmer points out (2004: 37), somewhat overstated given recent work by (e.g.) Margolin, for which, see § 4 below.

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tency and development, since “mind”, unlike “character”, does not come with assumptions of permanence’ (2010: 291). Mind-reading (or ‘Theory of Mind’) is indeed a crucial concept in much recent work about literary characterization, and we will engage with this strand of research ourselves below: yet we are not quite ready to give up on ‘character’ as a critical concept altogether. This introduction is concerned with navigating a number of important issues evoked by the language of character, as well as outlining a program for the rest of the book.

We begin with some deceptively basic definitions—fully aware that reducing these terms to single-sentence descriptions is to seriously misrepresent their complexity:

– We define ‘**character**’ very roughly as the *relatively stable* moral, mental, social and personal traits which pertain to an individual.
– ‘A **character**’ (with the article, or plural ‘**characters**’) is the representation of a human or human-like[3] individual in/by a (literary) text.
– ‘**Characterization**’ refers both to the ways in which traits (of all kinds) are ascribed to a character in a text, and to the interpretative processes by which readers[4] of a text form an idea of that character.

As will become clear in the following pages, each of these definitions is rather more inclusive than in some (or even most) other treatments: under ‘character’, for instance, we lump together categories which have usefully been distinguished by Gill (1983: 470–473, 1986, 1990) as ‘character’ and ‘personality’ (see below for this distinction); among ‘characters’, in contrast with some modern definitions, we include representations of historical persons next to mythological and fictional people;[5] and ‘characterization’ we define as the ascription of not only psychological and social traits but also details about outward appear-

3 This includes gods (discussed in some chapters in this volume) as well as, for example, the animals in Aesop’s fables (although we shall not be interested in the latter).

4 Throughout this introduction, we will use ‘readers’ as shorthand for readers, spectators, jury members, etc. We deliberately use ‘reader’ instead of ‘narratee’ (for which see *SAGN* 1: 4–6, de Jong): the distinction is often negligible (not to say forced), but the interpretative processes we are interested in are often to be ascribed to the ‘users’ of texts rather than the (constructed) addressees of narrative communication.

5 For more restrictive definitions of ‘a character’, see e.g. Jannidis 2009: 14 (‘The term ‘character’ is used to refer to participants in storyworlds created by various media … in contrast to ‘persons’ as individuals in the real world.’) and Eder et al. 2010a: 7 (on characters as *fictional* analoga to human beings).

ance and physiology, habitual actions, circumstances and relationships, and we include the activity of the reader.[6] In part, our terminological inclusiveness on all these levels mirrors our outlook and approach, which we will motivate below; in part, it is simply a matter of shorthand.

This book is, in some respects, specifically about the third concept, characterization. As befits the series of which it forms a part, we are interested in the *textual devices* used by ancient Greek authors for purposes of characterization, particularly when those devices can be ascribed to a narrator.[7] But given the intractability of the concepts, to investigate the one without the others—that is, to look at characterization techniques without regard for underlying notions of what 'character' meant—would seem all too crude. Our aim is not only to describe a series of textual phenomena, but also to investigate the effects of those phenomena and the implications of their use.

Throughout this book, then, we focus on two clusters of questions concerning characterization:

How?
- Through the use of which narrative techniques are characteristics or traits ascribed to characters throughout narrative texts?
- Who is responsible for the ascription of those traits, i.e. who characterizes? The primary narrator? A character?
- What are the different effects of the different techniques?

What?
- Which characteristics or traits, in the sense of relatively stable or abiding personal qualities, are attributed to characters?
- Which aspects and connotations evoked by the notion of character (such as performance/observability, permanence, given at birth vs. shapeability/external influence, habituation, distinctiveness vs. typification, etc.; see § 3 below on all of these) are explored through the attribution of these characteristics?

Following the plan of previous volumes of the *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* series, our contributors will evaluate these clusters of questions with regard to individual Greek authors spanning a large historical period and in a variety

6 For an example of a restrictive definition see Chatman 1978: 121–138; for a more inclusive definition, see e.g. Jannidis 2009: 21–22. For a survey of definitions of the term in literary theory, see Eder et al. 2010a: 30–32.

7 For narrators, see *SAGN* 1: 1–4 (de Jong).

of literary genres. This wide range of genres comes with its own complications for the study of characterization, and we will briefly discuss these first (§ 2), before moving on, in the bulk of this introductory chapter, to contextualize both sets of questions identified above. As for the 'what'-questions, we will first discuss ancient notions of character and a number of concepts bound up with it in ancient discourse (§ 3). We subsequently focus on various theoretical approaches to characterization in narrative (§ 4) and finally, moving on to the 'how'-questions, we will formulate a narratological model of different techniques of characterization (§ 5).

2 Genre and the Delineation of Narrative

In dealing with literary characters, there is a need to revisit some of the genre-related issues which were explored in the introduction to the first volume in this series (*SAGN* 1: 6–9, de Jong). This discussion is prompted in part by seemingly conflicting considerations like the following two—one from the epilogue to *SAGN* 2, one from the preface to a previous volume on characterization in Greek literature:

> [M]ost narratological categories are not bound by genre: the same devices occur in different genres, and genres are not homogeneous where the use of narrative devices is concerned.
>
> *SAGN* 2: 522, DE JONG

> [D]iscussions of practice and principle are … rather genre-dependent …: questions of self-consciousness and identity have for instance tended to be asked more of epic, and in a different sense of the lyric poets; while issues of psychological depth have tended to focus on tragedy, as has that of the relation between art and life …
>
> PELLING 1990a: vi

Character and characterization are, *prima facie*, topics where de Jong's point about genre-independence may not be wholly applicable, and how much we are dealing with genre-bound factors is an issue which the present volume sets out to explore.

A first issue raised by genre is the fact that, in many cases, we are not even dealing with 'characters' according to many modern definitions of the term (§ 1 above): historiography, biography, and oratory (to list only the most clear-cut cases) all deal with real-life people, which tend to be excluded from the

category. Whether the Greeks would make a similar distinction is a matter for debate, and in any case Greek authors could clearly show an interest in the 'character' of such people, and use certain characterizing devices which are also found in, for example, epic and novels. To what extent there is, then, a distinction between the treatment of Greek fictional and historical figures is a question which deserves investigation. If Cohn's dictum that 'the minds of imaginary figures can be known in ways that those of real persons cannot' also holds for Greek literature,[8] this may have significant consequences for the techniques of characterization which narrators could use.

Of course, in Greek literature the division between fictional vs. non-fictional characters needs to be complicated in an important way: several genres feature characters from myth. Like historical persons, such mythological figures come with a set of pre-determined features, which both constrain the ways in which an author can represent them—though Greek authors were clearly interested in testing the limits of such constraints—and automatically steer their interpretation by readers. Mythological characters nearly always (and real-life characters often) are **transtextual** (i.e., occur in more than one text),[9] and their characterization often hinges on their relationship to predecessors of the same name (the tragic Ajax and Electra spring to mind; the Thucydidean Themistocles may be informed not only by the real Themistocles but also by the Herodotean one).

The topic of characterization also invites a reconsideration of the series' editorial policy on what 'counts' as narrative, or rather, the extent to which the delineation of narrative determines the scope of our investigation. To take drama as an example, even if we agree that there is no primary narrator in plays (see *SAGN* 1: 8, de Jong), it appears unduly restrictive to focus solely (as was the policy in *SAGN* 1 and *SAGN* 2) on the narrative portions 'proper' of the texts (i.e. narrative prologues, messenger speeches, choral narratives, etc.). Some of the techniques of characterization employed by (primary) narrators in full-fledged narrative genres are also used to characterize tragic figures (e.g. characterization by action and speech), and a great deal of 'altero-characterization' (see below) takes place in non-narrative parts of drama. Moreover, characterization

8 Cohn 1999: 118. De Jong argues against Cohn as part of a wider case for the 'narrativity' of Greek historiography and biography (*SAGN* 1: 8–9). But this leaves open, to our mind, the possibility that there will be real qualitative differences between the treatment of fictional and non-fictional characters in Greek literature.

9 For an approach to transtextual characters in modern literature, see e.g. B. Richardson 2010. This kind of relationship between characters across texts could be seen as a very specific type of intertextual comparison, for which see § 5 below.

which *does* occur in the narration of off-stage and past events often interacts in vital ways with the characterization that takes place on stage.

Oratory presents a similar set of problems. Here, too, a great deal of characterization (for instance, of a speaker's opponent) will occur in passages which are not narrative in nature, and characterization that does occur in narrative passages can hardly be taken as unrelated to those non-narrative moments. In addition there are the ways in which the speakers of speeches are characterized by their speaking styles—the *ēthopoiia* for which, for example, Lysias was praised by Dionysius of Halicarnassus;[10] few would argue that Lysias should in such cases be considered a 'narrator', and the speakers characters in his 'narrative'.

Such issues could be multiplied in the genres mentioned and others, and accordingly it seems best to proceed with a fairly tolerant outlook on where certain kinds of characterization can be found to operate. On the other hand, de Jong is justifiably on guard against a policy which 'dilutes the specificity of narratology and stretches its concepts to such a degree that they become meaningless' (*SAGN* 1: 7). Our line, then, will be to formulate (below, § 5) a model of characterization specifically for narrative texts, with respect to the *techniques and methods* used for characterization in narrative, and with an eye to the specific significance for narrative of the question '*who characterizes?*'. Taking that model as our point of departure, the extent to which characterization in non-narrative texts can fruitfully be described by it, and conversely, the ways in which it resists such description, may in themselves shed some light on the narrative mode.

3 Ancient Notions of Character

Our modern term 'character' derives from the Greek verb *kharassō* ('to engrave').[11] It etymologically privileges a connotation of distinctive, visible mark that already in Aeschylus and Herodotus is semantically transferred to the realm of moral depiction.[12] When it comes to literary analysis, then, 'charac-

10 D.H. *Lys.* 8.2. See also Hagen 1966: 37–39; Bruss 2013.

11 Most of the ancient notions of character discussed in this chapter are also addressed (to varying degrees and in different ways) in De Temmerman 2014: 5–14, 18–26.

12 See Frow 2014: 7 and Worman 2002: 32–33. For a history of the meaning of the term, see Körte 1928. On the common German term for (literary) character, 'Figur', which etymologically (*figura*, Lat.) also suggests a shape or form in contrast with a background, see Eder et al. 2010a: 7.

terization' to most modern readers in Western cultures[13] may imply complex and individualized psychological motifs and peculiar, idiosyncratic characteristics. In such a conception of character, the self is seen as a strictly inner, private and unique locus of awareness, emotion, conscious deliberation and unconscious impulses. But, as scholars of Greek literature have well established over the last few decades, character needs to be approached as culturally determined, and it would be misguided to simply transpose our conceptual vocabulary, with all its implied associations, into the ancient Greek context.[14] Crucially, no ancient term offers a straightforward equivalent of our modern notion of 'character' or of related terms such as 'individuality', 'personality', 'self', or 'identity', which are all more or less heavily burdened with modern connotations of idiosyncrasy, singularity, uniqueness, complexity and originality.[15] The nearest Greek equivalent, *ēthos*, in fact seems to convey none of these, but rather a number of other aspects. In its ancient use the term regularly privileges notions of outward performance and display. As one of Aristotle's three rhetorical techniques of persuasion, it designates the morally and intellectually positive self-portrayal that an orator constructs in speech in order to enhance his credibility.[16] In later rhetorical treatises, *ēthos* can designate a specific stylistic category (*idea*) which again implies an appreciation of speech as a performative tool used to display character.[17] Along these lines, then, character is something to be displayed by the self, particularly through speech, and observed by others.[18]

Moral Character

The character to be displayed and observed was, apparently, evaluated primarily along *ethical* lines. This is what Stephen Halliwell has called 'the most important fact about Greek conceptions of character' (1990: 50)—and it is an area where modern and ancient conceptualizations have been seen to fundamentally diverge. Character was assessed mostly in terms of right and wrong: revealed by actions that result from conscious, moral choice (*prohaire-*

13 On Greek notions of character aligning more closely with the Hindu than the Western experience, see Pelling 1990c: 248.

14 See Gill 1996: 3; Halliwell 1990: 33; Pelling 1990c: 253; Goldhill 1990: 100–105.

15 Gill 2006: xiv.

16 Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.3–6, 2.1.1–6. See e.g. Patillon 1993: 222–223; Garver 2004: 1–12; Robinson 2006.

17 As in Hermog. *Id.* and Ps.-Aristid. *Rh.* On this category: Kennedy 1983: 100; Patillon 1988: 250.

18 On performance generally, Goldhill 1999.

sis), it was taken to essentially conform to or diverge from moral standards, and was described in terms of the possession or lack of *aretai* (excellences or virtues).[19]

Along similar lines, Christopher Gill has distinguished 'character' (revolving primarily around *moral judgement*) from 'personality' (revolving around *understanding* an individual's qualities), and influentially mapped this opposition onto differences between ancient ('objective') conceptions of character and modern ('subjective') concerns with personality (for which Cartesian philosophy of mind is foundational).[20] A related point is that characters and their ethical choices are, according to Gill, typically defined through their conformity to social and/or religious norms and codes. This is what Gill calls the 'participant' strand of ancient character (as opposed to the 'individualist' strand of modern, Kantian thinking, which regards the 'I' as the centre of ethical thought and as a self-determining decision-maker, and which highlights individuality as seen *against* the social background).[21]

It is worth noting that Gill's views have been challenged and moderated by scholars working on a range of authors and genres in Greek literature, typically to show that ancient authors *did* show an interest in 'personality' and psychology,[22] even if the resulting portraits are quite different from what we today might expect from individual and psychological introspection. As part of our 'what'-question, this debate about the moral overtones of character will be re-opened in many of this volume's chapters, as our contributors assess (variously, we will find) the balance between moral and psychological evaluation, and between judgement and understanding.

Typification versus Individuation

As Gill's distinction between 'objective-participant' and 'subjective-individual' strands already suggests, the apparently predominant moral connotation of character in antiquity has important implications for the possibility of individuation in characterization. The interest in the ethically exemplary may impede a taste for individual differences: our hankering for the idiosyncratic has rightly been called 'a strange and recent prejudice' (Pelling 1990c: 253). This notion is borne out in much of ancient literary criticism, where characters' behaviour is typically explained not by pointing to unique features of the individual character, but with recourse to commonsensical notions of psychology and typi-

19 See also *OCD* s.v. character, Gill 1984: 151.
20 Gill 1983: 473–478, 1996: 1–18, 2006: 338–342.
21 Gill 1996: 1–18, 2006: 338–342.
22 For a general critique of Gill, see Sorabji 2006: ch. 1.

cal human behaviour.[23] Similar explanatory models were operative in ancient rhetoric, which first described and later theorized aspects of literary character.[24]

Ancient literature is indeed replete with examples of what Woloch calls '**compression**' (2003: 69): one outstanding (and often morally relevant) quality is substituted for an entire personality. Examples of such types include Idomeneus' depictions of the coward (*deilos*) and the brave man (*alkimos*) in an ambush in the *Iliad* (13.276–286), Herodotus' description of the monarch (3.80), and the claim of Plato's Ion that he knows 'what is appropriate for a man to say, for a woman, for a slave, for a free person, for a subject and for a ruler' (Pl. *Ion* 540b), and—a particularly significant example—Theophrastus' exploration of the behaviour of thirty character types in his *Characters*.[25] Such subsumption of individual character to categories of typical and recognizable behaviour is often realized by conforming characters to pre-existing literary, mythological, historical or socially recognizable (and often morally significant) types. As various contributors in this volume point out, this and other forms of typification are often instrumental in generating authenticity, credibility and persuasion.[26] At the same time, it will be shown that and how forms of individuality nevertheless have a role to play, and that characterization often holds a reasonable middle ground between typification and differentiation—another insight in line with recent scholarship on the topic.

Static and Dynamic Character

Characterization is also a matter of depicting (or not) character *over time* and thus incorporating (or not) notions of consistency, change and predictability of behaviour. In modern literary theory, the distinction between 'static' and 'dynamic' character (not changing throughout the story versus changing on one or more levels) has become standard. The ancient evidence on such issues is mixed. On the one hand, scholars have traditionally argued that ancient genres as diverse as oratory, historiography and biography presented character as something fixed, given at birth and unchangeable during life.[27]

23 See e.g. Nünlist 2009: 252–253.

24 On importance of character construction to both poetics and rhetoric, see Kennedy 1999: 135–136; Russell 1983: 37–39.

25 See Diggle 2004: 5–9 and Volt 2007: 24–32 for detailed discussion of these (and other) examples.

26 Aristotle, too, comments on types and credibility in literary discourse: Arist. *Po*. 1451b8–10, 1454a23–36.

27 See, for example, Fuhrer 1989: 69, who calls the notion of *Charakterentwicklung* anachro-

This conceptualization chimes with the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of stable (adult) character, which is the result of the confluent effects of inborn nature, habituation, and reasoned choice,[28] and therefore relatively permanent.[29]

On the other hand, ancient writers were aware of controversy about the possibility of character change and appear to have been troubled by the question. Plutarch, for example, reports that Theophrastus is undecided (*Per.* 38.2) about the matter. One regularly suggested alternative to the possibility of character change is the notion of (more or less gradual) character *revelation*, which assumes that the characteristics of a person have always been there but remain hidden until circumstances provide an external stimulus. Tacitus, for example, states that Tiberius veiled his debaucheries (*obtectis libidinibus*) before he plunged into (*prorupit*) every wickedness (*Ann.* 6.51).[30] Plutarch gives a similar explanation in the case of Philip V (*Arat.* 51.3).

Ancient writers also explore the notion of genuine character *change*. In Stoic-Epicurean philosophy, for example, formation of character is conceived as the product of a process of perfection, which involves progressive development. And even though the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of adult character is, as we have seen, informed primarily by the notion of stability, the *creation* of character before adulthood is conceptualized as a process allowing change, as it involves formation, education and the influence of individuals such as parents and teachers, as well as society at large.[31] In literature (particularly biography and historiography), there is frequently the idea that an innate essence (*phusis*), even if relatively stable, may change, and in any case is not the only ele-

nistic. Other examples are May 1988: 6, 16, 22, 75, 163; Riggsby 2004; Syme 1958: 421; Goodyear 1972: 37–40; Martin 1981: 105; Dihle 1956: 76–77 (but 81–82 give a more nuanced view).

28 On the importance of Aristotelian theory for ancient biography, see e.g. Dihle 1956: 57–87. On character (*ēthos*) as formed by habit (*ĕthos*): Pl. *Lg.* 792e, Arist. *EN* 1103a11–b25, *EE* 1220a38–b7, *MM* 1185b38–1186a8 and Plu. *De sera num.* 551e–f (with Duff 1999: 74 n. 6; Miller 1974; Smith 1996).

29 This assumption is present in ancient literary criticism as well: Aristotle (*Po.* 1454a32) adduces Iphigenia in *Iphigenia in Aulis* as an example of inconsistency (*tou anōmalou*) because as a suppliant she 'is nothing like the *later* Iphigenia'. For further discussion of ancient literary critics' treatment of consistency, see Nünlist 2009: 249–252.

30 On the possible dynamics between a person's 'root tendencies' and circumstantial, external factors in historiography, see Pitcher 2007: 116.

31 On these notions of character change in ancient philosophy, see e.g. Gill 1983: 469, 2006: 127–203, 413–414.

ment to determine character.[32] Just as in ethical philosophy, character in youth and childhood is assumed to be in the process of formation, and character in adulthood can change as a result of external influences, social factors, chance (*tukhē*) and environmental circumstances.[33] Plutarch, for instance, argues that Sertorius' cruel treatment of hostages did not expose his earlier mildness as a calculated pose, but was rather an instance of character changed because of adverse circumstances (*Sert.* 10.5–6).[34]

All these issues themselves presuppose that Greek literature should in its portrayal of character evince a sense of *realistic* consistency (either in stability or explicable change). This seems true of most narrative genres covered in this book, but cannot simply be taken for granted in all of them. Ancient Greek comedy, for instance, regularly seems to work with a poetics that builds character on a logic of *in*consistency.[35]

Questions of static and dynamic character are addressed in many of the contributions in this volume, together with a number of contingent questions: *how* does one's character change (suddenly or gradually)? Is real character change possible at all, or is character considered to be stable and permanent? How can a change of character be distinguished from a (more superficial) change in behaviour (for example as the result of specific circumstances)? How do narrators address character change as opposed to character *revelation*?

4 Characters in Modern Literary Criticism

The topics of character and characterization have given rise to a sprawling debate in literary criticism, and the boundaries between narratology and other subdisciplines of literary theory are (on this issue, at least) not straight-

32 Duff 2008a: 22–23 observes that static and developmental models of character coexist in Plutarch's *Lives*. On multiple elements informing character, see Gill 1983: 473–474; Halliwell 1990: 32–33.

33 On formation, see e.g. Shipley 1997: 67–68; Duff 2008a: 2. On external influences, Swain 1992: 102; Pelling 1988a: 258. On social factors, Swain 1989a: 63–64. On chance and environment, Swain 1992: 102, 1989a: 64–65, 1989b on *tukhē*.

34 On (other examples of) character change in Plutarch, see Tröster 2008: 52; Duff 2003: 95, 1999: 25; Swain 1989a: 65–68; Pelling 1988b: 16; Gill 1983: 473–475; Polman 1974: 176–177; Russell 1966: 144–147; Bergen 1962: 62–94.

35 The standard reference on this topic is Silk 1990, revised as 2000: 207–255. See also Bowie on Aristophanes (→) in this volume. On consistency as a criterion in ancient literary criticism, see n. 29 above.

forwardly drawn. We will, then, in our discussion of modern theoretical approaches to these issues,[36] draw on a fairly wide range of strands. Our focus is, moreover, not only on characterization as a 'property' of texts, but also on the ways in which characters are interpreted by readers: recent work influenced by the cognitive sciences plays a significant role here.

Actantial, Semiotic, Mimetic and Mixed Approaches

It has become standard in literary theory to foreground as the central ambiguity of characters their duality between mimetic (or 'person-like') and textual qualities.[37] Nevertheless, much earlier theory emphasized yet another quality of literary characters altogether: their function as narrative agents (i.e. their function of and in a given plot-type). This notion, originating with Aristotle's conception of characters as 'doers' (*hoi prattontes*, *Po*. 1449b31; *hoi drōntes*, 1448a28) was taken as a starting point by formalists, most notably Propp (1968: 25–65), who analyses Russian folk tale characters as acting agencies that drive the plot by fulfilling a number of fundamental functions (hero, helper, adversary, etc.).[38] For Lotman (1977: 352–354), comparably, characters are relevant insofar as they fulfil one of several functions by performing certain, boundary-crossing actions. Like Russian formalists, French structuralists basically reject 'mimetic' approaches to character: for them, character is not (or in any case not in the first place) a *semantically* invested concept but an element in a *narrative syntax* that carries forward the action of the plot.[39]

The extent to which these early approaches ignore the representational complexity of characters has sometimes been overstated: the appreciation of such complexity can be found in embryonic form as early as Russian formalism itself. Tomasjevski, for example, distinguishes between a character's func-

36 For ancient literary criticism on characterization, see Nünlist 2009: ch. 11.

37 On these two poles ('people' vs. 'words'), see Frow 2014: 25; Eder 2008: 373–425; Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002: 31–34; Margolin 1989: 2–5, 2007, 2010. See Heidbrink 2010: 72–79 for an overview of scholarship informed by this duality. A related issue, which we will not discuss here at length but which has attracted considerable attention, is that of ontology, i.e. the question *where* and *how* characters exist. For discussion and bibliography, see e.g. Reicher 2010. For the most recent critical overview of theory of character, see Frow 2014: 1–24.

38 Souriau's (1950) conception of character in his discussion of drama texts similarly distinguishes a number of such functions or roles.

39 On 'syntactic narrative theories' as opposed to 'semantic narrative theories', see Punday 1998: 895–896; on 'doing' v. 'being', Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002: 34–36; and on 'action' v. 'character', Porter Abbott 2002: 123–126. Heidbrink 2010: 79–85 offers a discussion of scholarship on both positions.

tion as a narrative agent and the characteristics of his 'psyche', which, he is careful to stipulate, are by no means necessary for the plot progression.[40] The semantic dimension of character is also touched upon, if only minimally, by French structuralists. In his famous actantial model, Greimas (1967: 225–228) distinguishes not just 'actants' (abstract forces operating on a syntagmatic level) but also 'acteurs' (semantic units invested with, among other things, social status: father, eldest brother, etc.).[41] Bremond too, although he regards characters essentially as constituents of narrative roles, claims that the organization of their actions cannot be adequately analysed without making reference to their qualitative features.[42] Two of the narrative roles that he identifies, for example, that of the 'influenceur' ('informateur' or 'incitateur') and 'rétributeur' ('gratificateur' or 'châtieur'), interconnect with issues of motivation and moral evaluation.[43]

Nevertheless, in the view of much 20th-century criticism, mimetic approaches to character ultimately represent a misguided search for meaning, and critics who approached literary characters as 'real people' were a target of ridicule—with L.C. Knights' essay 'How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?' (1933) serving as a popular point of reference.[44] Yet despite this criticism, the reduction of characters to 'just words' proved unsatisfactory to many—rightly, in our view—if only because of the 'sense that ... fictional characters are uncannily similar to people' (Martin 1986: 120). In the last few decades of the 20th century, then, 'mixed' approaches, which considered characters as a matter both of 'people' and of 'words', became more prominent. Roland Barthes, though often mentioned in one breath with strictly structuralist theorists, in fact argued for

40 'Le héros n'est guère nécessaire à la fable. La fable comme système de motifs peut entièrement se passer du héros *et de ses traits caractéristiques*.' (1965: 296, our italics). See also Chatman 1972: 58–59.

41 See also Queffélec 1991: 239; Punday 1998: 896–897.

42 'La fonction d'une action ne peut être définie que dans la perspective sous-jacente des *intérêts ou des initiatives d'un personnage*, qui en est la patient ou l'agent.' (1973: 132–133; our italics). See also Glaudes and Reuter 1998: 50; Rutten 1978: 76. On Bremond as representative of the structuralist focus on action and narrative progression, on the other hand, see Vlasselaers 1989: 28; Glaudes and Reuters 1998: 41–42.

43 For more detailed overviews of conceptions of character in structuralist literary theory, see Chatman 1972: 57–68; Culler 1975: 230–238; Hochman 1985: 17–21; Margolin 1989; Glaudes and Reuter 1998: 41–73.

44 An extreme form of opposition to mimetic readings is the post-structuralist denial of any semantic presence of character altogether: cf. e.g. Weinsheimer 1979: 187 on Jane Austen's Emma: 'Emma Woodhouse is not a woman nor need be described as if *it* were' (our italics). Other examples: Cixous 1974; Hull 1992.

something very much like this by noting that from a critical point of view, it is as wrong to suppress character as it is to take it off the page and turn it into a psychological being (1970: 184).[45] Character and discourse, in his famous *dictum*, are each other's 'accomplices'.

Chatman was the first to give such an approach a theoretical underpinning, and made it central to his conceptualization of character (1972, 1978: 127). In his view, character is a 'vertical assemblage intersecting the syntagmatic chain of events that comprise the plot'; the assemblage consists of 'personal traits that delineate him, set him apart from the others, make him memorable to us' (1972: 63). Another significant aspect of Chatman's approach is the role he carves out for reader interpretation. The vertical assemblage of traits unfolds before the reader in the course of a narrative, thus requiring a continuous process of negotiation, revision and redefinition: the reader acquires new information about the characters throughout his/her reading of the story and accommodates it (or not) against the set of traits established thus far. For Chatman, reader interpretation is situated within the bounds of narrative (a structuralist notion), but at the same time it is an open concept, subject to speculation, enrichment and revision.[46]

The complexities involved in reader interpretation have been discussed in most detail by Margolin, undoubtedly the most influential recent thinker on character and characterization in literature. In a long series of articles,[47] Margolin both acutely assesses the various textual approaches to characterization, and sets out his own rigorous and comprehensive framework. Margolin's work combines elements of structuralism, the theory of possible worlds,[48] and (especially in his later articles) reader-response theory and cognitive narratology—an area to which we now turn.

45 For discussion of the misunderstanding of Barthes, see Goldhill 1990.

46 On narrative progression as fundamental for the construction of character, see also Phelan 1987, 1989a: 1–23, 26–60, 165–188, 1989b.

47 A non-exhaustive list: Margolin 1983, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2003, 2007.

48 Possible worlds theory has been used by critics particularly with respect to the problematic ontological status of characters. The theory allows scholars to circumvent this problem by postulating that characters in literature are *non-actual* individuals (but individuals nevertheless). For possible worlds theory and literature, see e.g. Ryan 2015: 69–75; for characters as non-actual individuals, see also Palmer 2004.

Cognitive Approaches

The 'cognitive turn' in narratology of the last two decades[49] has been felt particularly keenly in the study of character and characterization:[50] indeed, some outcomes have been so widely accepted that the author of a recent handbook entry could claim 'there is now a consensus on some aspects of character in narrative' (Jannidis 2009: 16). Cognitive narratology investigates the mental processes that readers (and authors) use in their comprehension (and creation) of narrative texts, normally with a basic premise that such processes are fundamentally the same as—if modulated versions of—the ones they use to make sense of the world around them. In the case of literary characters, this amounts to the claim that

> the cognitive structures and inferential mechanisms that readers have already developed for real-life people [are] used in their comprehension of characters. However, an awareness that character stems from a fictional text means that we might modify our interpretative procedures. For example … we may make particular predictions about a character … because we assume them to belong to a particular fictional role.
>
> CULPEPER 2001: 10–11

Such an approach has immediate consequences for several of the issues treated above, such as the 'location' and ontological status of characters, and their relation to real people. In contrast to structuralist or semiotic theories which (in their strictest form) define characters as signs or structures *in the text*, cognitive approaches assume that characters are representations of (fictional) beings *in the minds of readers*. More important for our purposes is the point that inferencing about characters is based on readers' knowledge about the actual world, especially the social world—that there is, in other words, a very fundamental relationship between characters and real people (for discussion of this view, see e.g. Jannidis 2004: 177–184).

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49 For an overview see e.g. Herman 2013a. Some key publications are Fludernik 1996; Herman 2000, 2003; Eder 2003; Vervaeck et al. 2013; Zunshine 2015: chs. 4–9. Attempts to underpin this work with findings from empirical research are growing in number: see e.g. Bortolussi and Dixon 2003, and the journal *Scientific Study of Literature*.

50 For cognitive approaches to character/characterization, see e.g. Gerrig and Albritton 1990 (modified in Gerrig 2010); Culpeper 2000, 2001, 2002, 2009; Schneider 2000, 2001; Bortolussi and Dixon 2003: ch. 5; Eder 2003; Jannidis 2004; Palmer 2004, 2010; Grabes 2004; Zunshine 2006; Margolin 2007; many of the articles in Eder et al. 2010; Vermeule 2010; Oatley 2011: ch. 4; Leverage et al. 2011: part II; Herman 2011, 2013b; Cave 2016: ch. 7.

The 'cognitive structures and inferential mechanisms' involved in character interpretation are manifold and complex. Two areas of psychology offer particular insight: first, Theory of Mind (ToM, or mind-reading),[51] the basic human capacity (indeed, instinct), developed from early childhood, to attribute mind-states to other people, including mind-states about mind-states (recursive embedding plays a large role in ToM-research). This concept, combined with what Dennett has called the 'intentional stance'[52]—the tendency to treat even non-human objects as intentional, rational agents (even though they do not have actual intention or agency)—explains readers' consistent urge to engage with the minds (the inner worlds) of textual characters. Secondly, there is attribution, a central concept in social psychology.[53] Attribution theory deals with the particular kinds of explanation that humans use to explain the behaviour of others and themselves. A basic distinction is that between internal, dispositional attributions (which seek causes for behaviour in an agent's personality, ability, etc.) and external attributions (which seek those causes in external influences such as situational factors or the compulsion of other actors). Obviously, the dispositional inferences of readers are a critical component in forming a sense of characters' (relatively stable) traits.

An important aspect of a cognitive approach is that it emphasizes the *dynamic nature of characterization*: at the first introduction of a character a reader will create a mental model for that character, and subsequently, while using the inferential mechanisms outlined above to 'read for character', integrate each successive new piece of character-information into the model. Sometimes this process results in a significant modification of the original model (but not necessarily, see below on flat characters and on primacy); such modifications may, in turn, result in the idea that a character is subject to change, or if a coherent model can no longer be constructed, in the idea that a character is inconsistent.

This integrative process is a mix of **top-down** and **bottom-up** processes. Top-down processing involves the activation, triggered by a piece of textual infor-

51 For the state of the art on mind-reading, see e.g. Apperly 2011. The concept is beginning to be applied to interesting effect within classics, e.g. Budelmann and Easterling 2010; Sluiter et al. 2013. Some influential works on Theory of Mind in literature: Zunshine 2006; Vermeule 2010; Leverage et al. 2011.

52 Dennett 1987.

53 See e.g. Hewstone et al. 2015: ch. 3. For the application of attribution theory to characters in literature see e.g. Culpeper 2001: ch. 3; Palmer 2007; for Greek literature, see e.g. Pelling 1990c: 247–249 (where he rightly notes that styles of attribution may be culturally determined); Budelmann et al. 2013.

mation, of knowledge structures (i.e. character schemas, categories, stereotypes, etc.) stored in long-term memory; the activated knowledge structure(s) will then guide further processing as long as possible. Bottom-up processing involves the gradual accumulation in working memory of new information which does not immediately fit into a mental model, until it can be connected with prior knowledge or turned into a schema or category itself. Characterization which is primarily driven by top-down processing tends to result in 'categorized' characters ('flat' characters, in the traditional terminology of Forster 1927) whereas characterization which involves a great deal of bottom-up processing tend to be more 'personalized' (or: 'round' characters).

The knowledge that readers use in their processing of literary characters is stored in meaningful memory structures, variously called 'schemas', 'frames', or 'scripts'. These are organized clusters of related information which allow people to quickly and economically[54] make sense of the world around them. Schemas involved in social cognition include those for different personality types, social roles, professions, etc., entailing not only descriptions but also evaluations of behaviour (e.g. as socially acceptable or unacceptable). Such schemas will vary from person to person and society to society, and they are subject to change, although societies and sub-groups within societies will often share certain relatively stable schemas (stereotypes). Just as someone will ascribe the behaviour of others to their character/personality (i.e. attribution) using these categories, so readers will bring them to bear on their comprehension of literary characters if they find that a character's traits and behaviour agrees with their social schemas. Additionally, readers utilize schemas relating not to the actual social world but to literature: knowledge of genre conventions, stock characters, fictional roles, etc., interacts in various ways with social knowledge in the construction of a character model. Again, such literature-based schemas will vary strongly between (groups of) readers, especially given the fact that readers may come from different literary cultures and may have different levels of literary 'training'.

What is the upshot of all this for an analysis of characterization in ancient Greek literature? If it can be assumed that the cognitive (mind-reading) processes of a Greek mind were not fundamentally different from those of present-day minds,[55] the following practical and theoretical conclusions present themselves:

54 The human mind is geared to exerting as little cognitive effort as possible in making sense of the world: see e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995.

55 This assumption seems reasonable, if only because, as Budelmann and Easterling have shown (2010), we can 'see' characters in Greek literature perform exactly the kinds of

- Since characterization is a dynamic and integrative process, the order in which and frequency with which character-information is presented is significant. In this regard, the cognitive effect known as **primacy** is of some importance: information about a character which is given early on will strongly determine the mental model of a character formed, and a reader will be willing to abandon or fundamentally modify that model only if presented with information that is significantly (in quantity or quality) inconsistent with it.[56]
- The question whether a certain Greek author, in creating characters, dealt (only) in types or in individualized people with inward depth needs to be problematized in several ways: first, because we are not dealing with a binary opposition but with a scale (depending on the amount of top-down vs. bottom-up processing a particular character elicits); second, because we necessarily use categories and types in our interpretation of real people as much as when interpreting literary characters (this to some extent implodes the distinction).[57] That said, it is of course entirely possible that we find different emphases from author to author, genre to genre, and indeed (as § 3 has suggested) culture to culture.[58]
- Overly rigid notions that character is entirely subordinated to plot or rhetoric, in any author or genre,[59] are likely to misrepresent the manner in which literary figures are interpreted at least by most readers. Readers will not easily shut off the cognitive processes which impel them to link a character's behaviour to patterns recognizable from their interaction with real people, even if they are simultaneously aware that they are not actually dealing with

mind-reading processes meant. Note that, given the cultural specificity of schemas, this assumption does not mean that the results of such cognitive processes will have been the same.

56 See e.g. Fludernik 2009: 19. Of course, much depends on the manner and source of the initial presentation of traits (the question 'who characterizes?' is highly pertinent here).

57 Indeed, it has been argued that, in spite of their ontological incompleteness, fictional characters are in fact often *more accessible* to readers than flesh-and-blood people, in part because narrators may allow us to enter upon characters' inner mental states, something which is not possible in the same way with real people (Cohn 1999; similar arguments in Bortolussi and Dixon 2003: 139–140, and (on Greek tragedy) Easterling 1990: 89–90).

58 For this point made with respect to Greek literature, see e.g. Halliwell 1990: 56–59.

59 Tragedy is central here, and Aristotle obviously looms large, as does 'Tychoism' (cf. Goldhill 1990: 111 n. 32). But the type of argument can easily be parallelled in other genres: see e.g. Wilamowitz 1912: 12 and Kirk 1962: 265 on Homer, Jebb 1907: 404 on Thucydides.

real people. Again, it must be added that culturally different conceptions of character may have significant bearing on this issue.[60]

– An investigation of characterization in Greek literature involves reconstructing the schemas—both social and literary—that would likely have been available to Greek authors and readers (see above on Greek conceptions of character for our evidence for such schemas; of course, much of classical scholarship has been occupied precisely with this kind of reconstructive work).

5 The Construction of Characters by Narrators: Techniques of Characterization

In order to disentangle the web of complicity between characters and discourse (to stick with Barthes' metaphor cited above), this volume will examine a number of textual techniques adopted by narrators to construct character. We will refer to these as 'techniques of characterization'. These techniques take their cue from literary semiotics,[61] which regard literary characters as 'signifieds' (*signifiés*) to which reference is made by various 'signifiers'.[62]

Proper names and pronominal references are among the most obvious of such signifiers, but regularly included as well are descriptions and biographical information.[63] Margolin (1986a: 206–208) is even more inclusive and lists as signifiers statements about (1) so-called 'dynamic mimetic elements' (i.e. verbal, mental and physical actions of characters), (2) so-called 'static mimetic elements' (i.e. a character's name, appearance, habits and setting), and (3) formal textual patterns (i.e. the presence of contrast, analogy, etc.).

These elements also surface in structuralist and post-structuralist narratology, albeit in different constellations and under different names.[64] Most of them, as it happens, were theorized already in antiquity, and we will include some relevant terms from Greek literary theory below.[65]

60 For a cognitive perspective on such cultural differences, see e.g. Gerrig 2010: 367–369.

61 See Lotman 1977: 23; Mukarovsky 1974: 146.

62 See Hamon 1972: 96, 1983: 157.

63 Hamon 1983: 157 labels the totality of signifiers as 'l'étiquette du personnage', which he defines as 'un ensemble stylistique dont les unités forment l'effet-personnage: nom, prénom, surnoms, titres (*appellations*), portrait et fiche biographique (*description*)'.

64 See, for example, Jannidis 2004: 198–207, 219–221 on 'Figureninformationen'.

65 For a fuller treatment, contextualization of these techniques in ancient narrative literature and further references, both to primary texts and secondary literature, we refer to De Temmerman 2014: 35–41.

A first item that returns in any such typology is the **proper name**. Especially in the case of fictional characters, name-giving can convey information about one's character. Conversely, the rhetorical trope of **antonomasia** (i.e. the substitution of a proper name by a word or paraphrase) can be equally relevant to characterization.[66]

Among remaining elements, virtually all systems of classification distinguish between two types of techniques of characterization: **direct** (or explicit) and **indirect** (or implicit) ones.[67] Whereas direct techniques characterize through overt evaluations, indirect ones depict characters by registering Margolin's static or dynamic mimetic elements: what characters do, say or think, what they look like and in which setting(s) they are depicted. Such techniques may be further subdivided into two groups: those operating on the basis of metonymy (i.e. a characteristic is replaced by an attribute related to it by contiguity: speech, action, setting etc.) on the one hand and those operating on the basis of metaphor (i.e. a character is aligned/compared/contrasted with someone or something, either explicitly or implicitly, on the basis of a certain resemblance) on the other.[68]

The distinction between **metonymical characterization** and **metaphorical characterization** allows us to conceptualize indirect characterization techniques more accurately than is often the case in literary theory. In his chapter on character in the *Living Handbook of Narratology*, for example, Jannidis (2009) singles out three types of techniques of characterization: (a) textually *explicit* ascriptions of properties to characters, (b) inferences that can be drawn from textual cues (his example is 'she smiled nervously') and (c) inferences based on information which is not associated with the character by the text itself but through reference to historically and culturally variable real-world conventions (he adduces two examples: the appearance of a room, which reveals something about the person living there; and the weather, which expresses the feelings of the protagonist).

This classification is inadequate for two reasons. First, techniques that bear the same, metonymical, relation to character (the act of smiling nervously and the room in which the character appears) are allocated to different categories (b and c). It is of course true that in the example given ('smiling nervously'), the narrator adds an interpretation ('textual cue') to the character's

66 On various types of denominations, see Cordoba 1984: 33; Danon-Boileau 1982: 42; Corblin 1983: 199.

67 The distinction is old and widespread: for references, see De Temmerman 2014: 29 n. 188.

68 For discussion of both groups of techniques and their grounding in ancient rhetoric, see De Temmerman 2010, 2014: 26–41.

act of smiling, whereas such interpretation may be absent from an objective description of one's room; but on the other hand, any detail given about such a room will inevitably function as a 'textual cue' for the reader just as information about someone's smile will. And, conversely, there is no reason to assume that reader interpretation of a character's 'nervous' smile is less dependent on 'variable real-world conventions' than that of a description of the room in which that character lives (the only difference being that such conventions might in this case be psychologically rather than 'historically and culturally' informed).

The second reason why Jannidis' classification is inadequate is that he also lumps together very different techniques in the same category (c). This is illustrated by his two examples of how **setting** contributes to characterization: the appearance of a room may characterize a character metonymically insofar as it implies (and appeals to readers' awareness of) a *causal* connection between a character and a room that is also operative in real-life inference. In the *Iliad*, for example, Paris is often depicted in the women's quarters rather than on the battlefield, which documents his predilection for female company and his problematic *ēthos* as a warrior; he prefers to be in a certain place *because of* his character.[69] But of course, the weather can by no means be connected to character in the same way as it implies no such real-life relationship; here, any association (for example, between dark clouds and a character's dark thoughts) works metaphorically and, unlike metonymical techniques, exclusively on the literary level.

The difference between the two types of settings captures the different interpretative strategies required by metonymical and metaphorical characterization: metaphorical techniques function at the level of *literary* construction. They are established by explicit or implicit comparison, or by reference to a paradigm: both align a *comparandum* with a *comparans* on the basis of a *tertium comparationis*. Often, such alignments activate intertextual resonances, which in the case of historiography and biography raises crucial issues about the conflation of historical persons with literary models.[70] But of course, characters can also be aligned with models taken from broader narrative or mythological cycles or traditions rather than specific intertexts ('internarrativity'). And finally, metaphorical characterization can also function *intra*textually: characters are associated with (or dissociated from) other characters within the same work.

69 See also ch. 1 on Homer (→).

70 See De Temmerman 2016 on biography.

Moving on to metonymical characterization, we distinguish seven relevant techniques: emotion, group membership, action, speech, focalization, appearance, and setting (already discussed above). We briefly present each:

(1) **Emotions**: in ancient ethics and rhetoric there is a traditional distinction between *ēthē* (permanent characteristics) and *pathē* (emotions, temporary feelings more easily influenced than *ēthos*).[71] The emotions displayed by characters and ascribed to characters by narrators can tell us something about their mental qualities or psychological outlook.

(2) **Group-membership** anchors characters in their social contexts.[72] Characters can be presented as belonging to a macro-social group (e.g. one's fatherland, city), a micro-social group (e.g. one's noble birth, social station, parents, and wealth), and/or an educated-intellectual peer group (e.g. one's *paideia* and education).

(3) That **action** (*praxis*) and behaviour are among the most prominent indications of one's character is an insight widely present in narrative literature and ethical theory alike.[73] This technique will be the subject of extensive discussion throughout this volume.

(4) The notion that **speech** indicates character is also very common, and central to the ancient concept of *ēthopoiia*. In its broadest sense, this term refers to the construction (*poiia*) of *ēthos* in general, i.e. both direct and indirect characterization in all its forms. But in practice, the notion of characterization through speech is usually central:[74] the term can refer, among other things, to an orator's ability to depict himself in his speech as good and trustworthy and, perhaps most famously, to a rhetorical exercise (*progumnasma*) that trained students to speak 'in character' of a (possibly fictitious) person. One speech device used particularly frequently for the

71 Gill 1984 discusses this distinction in ancient literary criticism.

72 The idea that characters are not autonomous entities, but embedded in societal norms and codes is captured by what Gill calls the 'participant' strand of (ancient) character (see § 3 above). In modern literary theory too, Woloch 2003 offers a compatible theoretical approach to character in narrative as part of and defined by society.

73 Ethical theory presents *ēthos* as inferable from observable *praxis* (see e.g. Russell 1966: 144–147; Halliwell 1990: 32–33, 46–47), and makes action as determined by character relevant to moral responsibility (see e.g. Meyer 1993). Aristotle (*Po.* 1449b35–1450a7, 1454a17–19) is explicit that in tragedy the qualities (*poious tinas*) regarding character (*ēthos*) and disposition (*dianoia*) are revealed by action.

74 For further discussion, see Ventrella 2005: 179–212; De Temmerman 2010: 34–36; Bruss 2013.

purpose of (moral) characterization is the use of maxims (*gnōmai*, Latin *sententiae*).

(5) **Focalization** as defined by Bal as the way in which a character views, interprets, visualizes, makes sense of reality can function as a metonymical technique characterizing the focalizer just as speech functions as such a technique characterizing the speaker: the way in which someone sees or interprets events or other persons is often contiguously related to his/her character just as his/her actions or words are.[75]

(6) **Physical appearance** can act as an indication of character (the central premise of ancient physiognomy,[76] which provides a set of instruments geared towards such inference). In narrative, both invariable and variable physical characteristics (body-language) are relevant.

To conclude the chapter, we simply list the various techniques of characterization outlined above:

I. Name-giving and *antonomasia*
II. Direct characterization (*kharaktērismos*)
III. Indirect characterization
  IIIa. Metaphorical characterization: explicit or implicit comparison (*sunkrisis*, *parabolē*) and paradigm (*paradeigma*); intertextual (e.g. conflation of historical persons with literary models in historiography and biography), 'internarrative' and intratextual similarities and contrasts.
  IIIb. Metonymical characterization:
    (1) emotions (*pathē*)
    (2) membership of a specific group (macro-social, micro-social, educative-intellectual)
    (3) action (*praxis*)
    (4) speech (*ēthopoiia*, *gnōmai*)
    (5) focalization
    (6) appearance (guidelines from physiognomy: invariable and variable physical characteristics)
    (7) setting (e.g. Paris in the women's quarters; setting may also be metaphorically relevant, e.g. dark clouds).

75 Bal [1985] 2009: 145–165. See Margolin 2007: 73 and, in a different context, Gill's 1990: 4 emphasis on the importance of the 'adoption of perspective'.

76 See Boys-Stones 2007 and Elsner 2007 for introductions. All extant physiognomic treatises are edited by Förster 1893 (and some more recently in Swain 2007).

PART 1

Epic and Elegiac Poetry

CHAPTER 1

Homer

*Irene de Jong**

Introduction

If the topic of characterization in literature is in general a complex one, this is all the more true for the Homeric epics. There are a number of reasons which seem to preclude the Homeric narrator from paying much attention to characterization, or his narratees from detecting it in his epics. First, different theories about the genesis of the epics agree in the denial of consistent or refined characterization. For analysts, separate authorship of the different parts of the poems could only lead to inconsistent characterization, while for oralists the ubiquity of the formulaic system prevented the narrator-singer from giving his heroes an individual shape.[1] Second, for a literary critic like Auerbach it is Homer's narrative style, as contrasted to that of the Old Testament, which led to characters without any depth. Since the 'subjectivistic-perspectivistic procedure, creating a foreground and a background, resulting in the present lying open to the depths of the past, is entirely foreign to the Homeric style', Homeric characters are said to experience a mere succession and alternation of emotion but no simultaneous conflict of feelings. Likewise, 'Achilles and Odysseus are splendidly described in many well-ordered words, epithets cling to them, their emotions are constantly displayed in their words and deeds—but they have no development, and their life-histories are clearly set forth once and for all … Even Odysseus, in whose case the long lapse of time and the many events which occurred offer so much opportunity for biographical development, shows almost nothing of it. Odysseus, on his return, is exactly the same as he was when he left Ithaca two decades earlier'.[2] Finally, Snell argues that the concept of the 'I', of an individual and autonomous identity, was only 'discovered' after Homer, hence Homeric heroes are not real characters yet: 'there is no denying that the great heroes of the Homeric poems are drawn in firm outline; and yet the reactions of an Achilles, however grand and

* I wish to thank Michael Lloyd, Evert van Emde Boas, Koen De Temmerman for their suggestions, and Nina King for her polishing of my English.

1 See e.g. Kirk 1962: 265.

2 Auerbach [1946] 1968: 3–23, quotations from p. 7.

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signified, are not explicitly presented in their volitional or intellectual form as a character'.[3] All in all, it would seem that Homeric characters in all senses of the word are 'flat': they have no individuality, lack inner lives, cannot express themselves in an individual style, and do not develop.

All these negative qualifications have in recent decades come to be considerably modified, the chapter of Griffin in his *Homer on Life and Death* from 1980 being a milestone.[4] In this chapter I will revisit most of these issues, using narratological lenses and methods, and I hope to draw a nuanced balance.[5] I will start with the techniques of characterization and end with their effects: what kind of characters did Homer draw?

Types of Characters and Explicit Characterization

It may be useful to start with a brief parade of the different types of characters that people the Homeric epics, since the way in which characters are presented is different for different groups. In the first place there are the main characters, who are only rarely characterized in the form of a block of explicit characterization of some length, and certainly not at their first appearance. The first reference to the two protagonists of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon and Achilles, merely mentions their names (*Il.* 1.7), while the main character of the *Odyssey* is introduced only via a circumlocution (*antonomasia*), 'the man who …' (*Od.* 1.1–9), his proper name following ten lines later. These casual introductions may be due to the fact that the Homeric epics tell traditional tales, the main storylines and characters of which the narratees were supposed to know. But the changeability of traditional characters in later Greek literature, as demonstrated seminally e.g. for the figure of Odysseus by Stanford,[6] perhaps was at play in the early stages too. In that case we would have to conclude that the Homeric narrator intentionally opts for the gradual characterization of (his versions of) traditional characters. The gods, likewise, do not receive elaborate characterizations. Again, it could be argued that their nature in a sense was 'given', i.e. related to their cultic roles, and hence did not need extensive introduction. But their anthropomorphic outward forms (dark-browed Zeus,

3 Snell [1946] 1953: 1–29.

4 Griffin 1980: 50–80.

5 I leave aside the ('Snellian') question of the autonomy of Homeric persons, which would need a chapter of its own. Important studies on this topic include Latacz 1984; Halliwell 1990; Williams 1993: 21–49; and Gill 1996: 29–93.

6 Stanford 1963.

limping Hephaestus, storm-footed Iris) and characters (nagging Hera, favourite daughter Athena, stern Apollo, and whimpering Aphrodite) seem to be largely the Homeric narrator's invention, as Herodotus (*Histories* 2.53) suggested.[7]

In the second place, there are the minor characters, most of which are never characterized at all but are merely listed in one of the many catalogues.[8] Some are given an explicit introduction, and here we can be sure that this is due to their being the narrator's invention. Such introductions may be 'advertised' as introductions, when they take the form of the 'there was a man X' motif (*ēn/eske de tis*).[9] In the *Iliad* minor characters mainly serve as cannon-fodder and their brief biographical vignettes actually are necrologies, e.g. 13.171–176:

> (Teucer kills Imbrius), son of Mentor rich in horses. He lived in Pedaeum before the sons of the Achaeans came, and he was married to a bastard daughter of Priam, Medesicate; but when the curved ships of the Danaans came, he went back to Troy, and was a leading man among the Trojans, and lived with Priam, who honoured him like his own children.[10]

The minor characters of the *Odyssey* are, typically, servants. They are explicitly characterized by the narrator, e.g. Euryclea (1.429–433), or by themselves, e.g. Eumaeus (15.403–484), whose biography of a prince becoming a swineherd of course has thematic parallels with Odysseus acting the role of beggar.[11]

A third type of character is that of the anonymous collective of soldiers (in the *Iliad*) or suitors (in the *Odyssey*), which from time to time is allowed to present its view of events, e.g. at *Il.* 4.81–85:[12]

> (Athena has descended down to earth like a star) the horse-taming Trojans and the well-greaved Greeks looked on in amazement; and one would glance at his neighbour and say: 'There will surely be grim war again and the horror of battle, or Zeus is setting friendship between the two parties, Zeus who is the referee of men's wars.'

7 A discussion of the Homeric gods as literary characters is a desideratum. Some beginnings in Erbse 1986; Kearns 2004; and Heath 2005: 39–78.

8 For catalogues, see Sammons 2010.

9 See *Il.* 5.9; 10.314; 13.663; 17.575; *Od.* 9.508–510; 10.552–553; 15.417–418; 19.353; 20.287–288.

10 See Griffin 1980: 103–143 and Stoevesandt 2004: 126–159. Xenophon (→) also makes ample use of the obituary as characterizing device.

11 Eumaeus' biographical tale is discussed e.g. by Minchin 1992.

12 See de Jong 1987a and Schneider 1996.

Here we get an interesting alternative take on heroic battle: the common soldiers dislike it and hope for Zeus to put an end to it. This device of the collective voice will be taken over later by Pindar (→) and historiographical narrators.

A fourth type of character is that of the silent character or *kōphon prosōpon*.[13] An example is Chryseis, the bone of contention of the first book of the *Iliad*, who is sometimes evoked though a deictic pronoun (*tēnde*: 1.127) but never heard speaking herself.

Finally, the Homeric epics feature so-called character doublets, when the narrator uses 'two persons of a single type where he might conceivably have used one', whereby one of the two is usually slightly more important: e.g. the pair of good servants Euryclea and Eurynome or bad servants Melantho and Melantheus.[14] Such doublings are an offshoot of the oral epic's general tendency to repeat, but they also perform important functions within the story. For instance, the activities of Euryclea as Odysseus' servant and Eurynome as Penelope's servant in the final scenes of the *Odyssey* underline and reflect the reunion of husband and wife.

When are Characters Explicitly Characterized?

In the previous section it was remarked that only minor characters receive explicit characterizations. These are inserted either at their one and only moment of action (the 'little fighters' acting as cannon-fodder), or at their entrance in the story (Euryclea), or when they perform a crucial action.[15] An example of the last category is the Trojan Polydamas who, after three earlier interventions, is explicitly (and positively) characterized at the moment when he gives Hector the advice to withdraw his troops into the city (*Il.* 18.249–252). In this way the narrator marks his advice as important and prepares for its rejection by Hector, to his own cost and that of many other Trojans. Even major characters may receive such 'plugs' when they are about to make an important speech. Thus we hear about Nestor's age and sweet voice at the very moment when he tries to reconcile Achilles and Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.247–252).

If the primary narrator is chary with explicit characterization of his main characters, characters are more prone to express themselves about others. Thus

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13 See de Jong 1987b and cf. the AbT-scholion ad *Il.* 1.332.

14 Discussed by Fenik 1974: 172–207; quotation from p. 172.

15 See discussion in Richardson 1990: 36–50.

Patroclus refers to Achilles as 'a forbidding man, and quick to anger' and 'a terrible man' who is likely 'to blame even the blameless' (*Il.* 11.649, 654). Telemachus is informed about the qualities of his father Odysseus, whom he has never (consciously) seen himself, through the qualifications of others: Nestor tells him that Odysseus surpassed all in cunning (*Od.* 3.120–122), while Helen and Menelaus stress his endurance (4.269–270, 340–342). In his *Apologue* Odysseus starts each adventure with a synoptic introduction of the exotic people and persons he meets on his way home, and in this way biases 'his narratees against his opponents', increases 'their admiration for the way in which he succeeds in overcoming them', and gains 'their sympathy when he loses some of his men to them.'[16]

Two small-scale forms of explicit characterization are found throughout the story: epithets and speaking names. A Homeric character is regularly accompanied by the same epithet, which is used either for other characters too (in which case it characterizes him as belonging to a certain class of people; e.g. *dios*, 'noble') or only for him/herself (e.g. *podarkēs*, 'swift-footed' Achilles). The widespread use of epithets is arguably related to the oral background of the Homeric epics (although they are found in written texts like the *Gilgamesh-epic* too) and their interpretation is a matter of much debate from antiquity onwards (are they merely line-fillers or do they have their own significance?). The effect of Penelope being systematically called *periphrōn*, 'circumspect', or Hector *koruthaiolos*, 'with glittering helmet' cannot be overestimated, however.[17] Indeed, characters can even 'grow into' their epithet, as will be set out below for Telemachus.

Names in Homer are often taken as meaningful, by narrator and characters alike.[18] An example is the name of Astyanax, explained by Andromache at *Il.* 6.402–403:

> Him Hector called Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax: for Hector alone protected Troy.

The Trojans give Scamandrius 'Astyanax' as a nickname because his father Hector is the king and protector (*anax*) of the city (*astu*). Throughout the *Odyssey* the name of Odysseus is associated with *odussomai*, 'be angry at', and

16 De Jong 2001: 225–226.

17 For the use of epithets as a form of characterization, see e.g. Whallon 1969.

18 This section is based on Louden 1995, who also discusses the abundant older literature. See also Higbie 1995.

with words containing the sounds *dus*-, 'ill', and *odu*-, 'weep'. Athena's evocation of him towards Zeus is a prime example (1.48–62):

> But my heart is torn in me for skilled Odysseus, ill-fated [*dusmorōi*], … (Calypso) detains the wretched man who is weeping [*dustēnon oduromenon*] … Did not Odysseus repeatedly do you a favour by bringing sacrifices to you beside the Achaeans' ships in the spacious country of Troy? Why did you conceive such anger against him [*ōdusao*], Zeus?

The associations delineate Odysseus' nature and circumstances: he is a man who has incurred the anger of one of the gods (not so much Zeus, as the god himself will correct Athena, but Poseidon) and who therefore suffers and weeps.[19] The device of the 'speaking name' will know a long history in Greek narrative, especially in Hesiod (→), Callimachus (→), Theocritus (→), Aeschylus, (→), Sophocles (→), Euripides (→), Aristophanes (→), Achilles Tatius (→), and Longus (→).

Although the main Homeric characters are only rarely described at length at their first occurrence in the story, the principle of primacy (Introduction, →), information about a character that is given early on strongly determining the narratees' conception of that character, does play a role. Race has argued that 'first appearances' in the *Odyssey* may have a characterizing force: the narrator uses 'a variety of means—arrivals, dramatic encounters, descriptions of actions and settings, background information, words, actions, emotions—to reveal essential characteristics the very first time we encounter a person, thus providing a sample of the character's ethos that will be extended and deepened in the course of the epic.'[20] A clear example is the minor character Pisistratus, one of Nestor's sons. When Telemachus and 'Mentor'/Athena arrive in Pylos, they are greeted first not by Nestor, as one would expect seeing that the youth had been sent out specifically to visit the old man, but by Pisistratus (3.36–37). When suggesting to the guests to bring a libation to the gods Pisistratus thoughtfully gives the cup first to 'Mentor'/Athena. His prominence in the arrival scene and tactfulness with elders single him out as the one who will accompany Telemachus on his trip to Sparta and it gives a glimpse of his subsequent role as facilitator between Telemachus and people much older than himself. Likewise, the first two books of the *Iliad* acquaint the narratees with

19 Odysseus' name is explicitly etymologized at 19.407–409. See Dimock 1989. There may also be another association with Odysseus' name, namely as a man who is angry at and inflicts sorrows upon others (the Trojans and the suitors).

20 Race 1993, quotation from p. 79.

the main cast, Achilles, Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Nestor (as Homer wants to present them).

The device of the 'first appearance' largely works with *implicit* forms of characterization, and these deserve closer scrutiny, since they are in fact the ones most often used by the Homeric narrator.

Metonymical Characterization

Action and Speech

Homeric characters famously are 'speakers of words and doers of deeds' (*Il.* 9.443). Accordingly, the Homeric narrator, rather than explicitly characterizing his main characters himself, lets them show their mettle through their actions and speeches.[21] Achilles has been called 'swift-footed' throughout the *Iliad*, and this characteristic of his is employed in the spectacular race of life and death with Hector in book 22. Nestor's conciliatory and sensible speeches characterize him as the typical wise old man and advisor. Odysseus fully confirms his characteristics of being *polutlas* and *polumētis* in the *Odyssey*, where we see him not only inventing one clever device after another but also enduring storms sent by his arch-enemy Poseidon and the humiliations of his own countrymen. Not only the 'what' but also the 'how' of their speeches characterize Homeric characters.

If individual characterization in Homer has seemed impossible for critics for so long, the claim of characterization *through speech* has been even more of an anathema. The one who stated this most clearly was Adam Parry in a short but influential paper called 'The Language of Achilles'.[22] The formulaic nature of the Homeric epics means that 'everything in the world is regularly presented as all men (all men within the poem, that is) commonly perceive it' and that narrators and characters alike can only say 'the same things about the same things'. When a hero like Achilles wants to question the heroic code, he can only do so by misusing the formulaic language, a misuse which, moreover, the narratees themselves must read into his words. Thus when he says, after killing Hector, 'we have won great glory' (22.393), this is what the formulaic language of the epics dictates he should say, while his heart would have liked him to say that he killed Hector to avenge his friend and that he is not interested in winning glory at all.

21 Cf. Fränkel [1951] 1969: 41.

22 Parry 1956, quotations from pp. 3 and 4.

This thesis has been challenged in various ways. First, since formulas are a way of communication they must be open to different meanings in different contexts.[23] Second, it is a matter of much debate whether, as Parry claims, Achilles wants to question the heroic code; to request that we read misuse into his words is a questionable method.[24] Third, scholars have detected individual linguistic registers for individual characters, notably that same Achilles.[25] He has his own rhetoric (a predilection for similes, richness of descriptive detail, cumulative images, and hypothetical images), syntax (a predilection for asyndeton, subjunctives, emotive particles, and vocatives), and lexicon (101 words are used exclusively by him). The existence of individual styles is confirmed by Homeric characters themselves, e.g. when the Trojan Antenor distinguishes Menelaus' way of speaking from that of Odysseus (*Il.* 3.212–224). Recalling the dictum that heroes should be 'speakers of words', Martin rightly suggests that individual styles are only to be expected in such a competitive society as a means to win individual distinction and status.[26]

Further Metonymical Techniques

Apart from their words and deeds, the narrator has other means of metonymical characterization. The first is setting, including objects.[27] When Hector finds Paris 'in his bedroom' sitting amongst the women and fussing over his armour (*Il.* 6.321–324), this is just as revealing of this hero as his 'wearing a leopard skin' when challenging the Greeks on the battlefield (3.17). The Phaeacians' isolated location (*Od.* 6.8) and the golden watch-dogs and paradisiacal gardens of their ruler (7.91–94, 112–132) characterize them as slightly unworldly. And Ajax' massive shield 'like a tower' (7.219–225) symbolizes his status as a warrior on whom the others can rely and who will fight to the utmost to protect his men and ships, as he does when the Greeks are oppressed by Hector (15.727–746).

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23 This is the line of Claus 1975.

24 This is the line of Reeve 1973 and see note 52 below.

25 See Friedrich and Redfield 1978; Griffin 1986; and Martin 1989: 89–230. The findings of Friedrich and Redfield were questioned by Messing 1981, who (too) much reverts to the blockades of earlier scholarship: cf. 891: 'It is a commonplace in all the histories of Greek literature that authors dealt in types rather than in individuals' and 894: 'Minutely accurate, finicky choice of words and turns, as required according to F&R's dictum, is simply not to be reconciled with the known stress of oral composition; and it would make overly great demands on the audience'.

26 Martin 1989: 96.

27 See Griffin 1980: 1–49. For the characterizing function of setting in Homer, see *SAGN* 3: 35–36 (de Jong).

A second device is outward appearance as a signal of moral (inward) quality.[28] Since the Homeric narrator pays only little attention to the actual looks of his heroes and heroines (was Helen, the most famous beauty of antiquity blond?), we cannot say that the doctrine of physiognomy—assessing a person's qualities from appearance—started here. But the description of Homeric characters, however brief, usually makes a match between beautiful appearance and good inner qualities: thus a stock qualification of heroes in the *Iliad* is 'brave and huge' (e.g. 2.653 and *passim*), and when Priam, in the Teichoskopia, sees a 'brave and huge man', who is 'the most beautiful and dignified man he has ever seen', he can only conclude that this is a king (3.167–170). Conversely, the exceptionally long and explicit introduction of Thersites at *Il.* 2.212–223 stresses his ugliness and hence characterizes him at least as non-heroic but probably, much more negatively, as someone despised not only by the heroes but by the common soldiers and narrator too.[29] The ideal association between beauty and nobility is also confirmed *e contrario* when heroes do *not* live up to this ideal. Thus when Paris first steps forward to fight but quickly shrinks back at the sight of his opponent Menelaus, he is chided by his brother Hector (3.43–45):

> 'Surely the long-haired Greeks are cackling at this, saying that you are our champion because of your beauty but are lacking in strength and courage.'

In the *Odyssey* the ideal world of the *Iliad* seems to be replaced by a more realistic one in that characters show an awareness that beauty is not a sure sign of nobility while, conversely, a man who is not good-looking can be an excellent speaker (8.167–177; 17.454). Scholars tend to interpret such differences in terms of the *Odyssey* being the later text with a new world-view, but it seems safer to connect them with differences in plot: the *Iliad* deals with an open conflict between two men, the *Odyssey* with the secret return of a hero.[30]

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28 What follows is largely based on Bernsdorff 1992.

29 Most scholars adhere to the second option, e.g. Ebert 1969; Rankin 1972; Bernsdorff 1992: 38–40; and Scodel 2002: 204–209; the first position is defended by Postlethwaite 1988 (Thersites' speech 'reflects the attitude of the ordinary non-heroic Achaians to the quarrel in condemning Agamemnon's treatment of Achilleus'). Thalmann 1988 argues that there is not one perspective on Thersites fixed in the text; the scene is meant to elicit different responses and hence illustrates 'the indeterminacies of lived experience' (28).

30 In the *Iliad* too, we already come across the idea that an unimpressive looking man may yet be a good speaker (3.216–224).

Metaphorical Characterization

Another type of implicit or indirect characterization is metaphorical characterization. In Homer this often takes the form of persons from the past being held up as models.[31] Diomedes is, no less than three times, compared with or compares himself with his father Tydeus (*Il.* 4.372–398; 5.802–808; 10.285–290), old Nestor repeatedly holds up his own younger self as an example to his fellow Greeks (*Il.* 1.259–273; 7.132–156; 11.605–803; 23.629–645), and Telemachus is given another youth, Orestes, as his model (*Od.* 1.288–302). Penelope compares herself to one of the daughters of Pandareus, who inadvertently killed her own son and was transformed into a nightingale who perpetually mourns her child (*Od.* 19.518–529); both women share the grief over a (in the case of Penelope, supposedly) lost beloved one.

Another form of metaphorical characterization is the simile. The martial spirit of heroes is suggested by their being compared to lions, while the repeated comparison of the Trojans with deer subtly suggests that they are less courageous than their Greek opponents.[32] The series of 'parents-children' similes connected to Achilles and Patroclus in *Iliad* 16.7; 17.4, 133, 755; 18.56–57, 318, 23.222 evokes the more gentle and caring sides of Achilles' character.[33] The technique of characterization via similes will be taken up by Hesiod (→), Aeschylus (→), Apollonius of Rhodes (→), and Callimachus (→).

Reading between the Lines?

A perennial problem in discussing literary characterization is how far we may go in reading psychology into a story, that is, in approaching literary characters as real people and speculating about their motives and feelings when these are not expressed in the text. Kakridis in a study significantly called 'Dichterische Gestalten und wirkliche Menschen bei Homer' ('Poetic Figures and Real People') strongly condemns all forms of 'anthropomorphism', as he calls it (the 'mimetic' approach of the Introduction, →): 'outside the poetical space, poetical characters do not exist at all' (my translation).[34] One of the examples where

31 On paradigmatic tales in Homer, see e.g. d'Arms and Hulley 1946; Gaisser 1969; Andersen 1987; Olson 1995: 24–42; and Alden 2000.

32 See Stoevesandt 2004: 253–266.

33 See Moulton 1977: 99–106; the discussion forms part of a whole chapter devoted to 'similes and characterization' (88–116).

34 Kakridis 1970 ('ausserhalb des poetische Raums existieren die poetischen Gestalten über-

he thinks that scholars have gone too far in their 'reading between the lines' is Penelope's alleged recognition of Odysseus in Book 19: although she, shrewdly, nowhere says so, her acts and words would suggest that during her nightly conversation with 'the beggar' she has already recognized Odysseus, well before her reunion with him in book 23. Set out for the first time in 1950 by Harsh, this thesis has become something of a *cause célèbre* in Homeric scholarship.[35] To discuss arguments pro and contra far exceeds the limits of this chapter, and this is one of those cases where every narratee has to make his or her own decision. In my view, we do the narrator most justice when we see the reunion of Odysseus and Penelope as the longest and most intricate instance of the 'delayed recognition' story pattern,[36] and hence do *not* assume Penelope has recognized Odysseus and thereafter harboured this secret in her mind for four books. But my position in this particular case does not mean that, with Kakridis, I think we should necessarily forbid *all* filling up of gaps in the text by narratees.

Firstly, there is the phenomenon of characters in their speeches glossing over certain points, which may give us an indication of their mood or feelings. Occasionally, the Homeric narrator himself explicitly notes that a character does not say aloud what he or she really thinks, e.g. when Nausicaa asks her father for a wagon to wash the clothes of her brothers with an eye on their wanting to dance, while the real—but unexpressed—reason for her sudden inclination to do the laundry is her hope for a speedy wedding, an idea fostered by the dream/Athena, who had visited her just before. The narrator caps her speech at *Od.* 6.66–67 with an explicit reference to her reticence: 'for she was too shy to mention her joyful marriage to her dear father'.

From a case like this and other similar ones[37] it seems a small and acceptable step also to read significance into silences that are *not* flagged by the narrator.[38] Besslich (1966), for example, spots many instances of 'speaking' silences. An

haupt nicht'), quotation from p. 60. Cf. also Redfield [1975] 1994: 20: 'Homeric man, being objective, has no innerness … he has no hidden depths or secret motives; he says and does what he is' and Auerbach, quoted in the introduction to this chapter.

35 See the special issue of *College Literature* 38.2 (2011), with extensive bibliography.

36 See de Jong 2001: 458–459.

37 See e.g. the many instances of 'hidden thoughts' in the *Odyssey*, when the narrator reveals only to the narratees the emotions and thoughts that a character does not express in spoken words (e.g. 14.109–110; 17.235–238,463–465; 18.90–94, 281–283; 20.10–16, 300–302; 23.85–95; 24.235–240), discussed in de Jong [1994] 2009.

38 Similarly Griffin 1980: 61–66, esp. 65: 'This brief survey has shown that the *Odyssey* contains passages in which the poet explicitly tells of the psychology which we are to see underlying the words and acts of characters, and also that other passages, where this is not explicit, come so close to them in nature that we can have no reasonable doubt that

example occurs when the Phaeacian king Alcinous says that 'the stranger' (Odysseus) might be a god, thereby actually inquiring after the latter's identity. In his answer Odysseus bitterly rejects Alcinous' suggestion but does not reveal his name. His silence has been convincingly read as revealing his wily character and present mood. He knows that it is often safer not to disclose one's name to strangers. And the experiences of the past ten years and the losses he has incurred (of men, ships, and booty) have undermined his heroic self-confidence. Thus, rather than thumping his chest and proudly revealing his name, he just wants to be left in peace and return home.

Another well-known—but not unproblematic—area where scholars have read psychology into the Homeric text is the simile. Similes often explicitly illustrate a character's feelings, e.g. when Agamemnon, at a loss as to how to deal with the Trojans' sudden superiority, is compared to two different winds whipping up the sea (*Il.* 9.4–8). But there are also similes that seem to invite the narratees to fill in gaps.[39] One example is the simile found at the moment when Telemachus enters the hut of Eumaeus, where his father Odysseus finds himself. Upon seeing the youth, Eumaeus kisses his face and hands and starts weeping (16.17–21):

> As a father, full of love, greets his son, who returns in the tenth year from a far country, his only son, late-born, about whom he has worried much, so the excellent swineherd then kissed godlike Telemachus, clinging to him, as if he had escaped death.

This simile foremost—and explicitly—illustrates Eumaeus' feelings: he loves Telemachus as if he was his own son, and he has worried about him, he who had gone away to distant countries for quite some time and had been awaited upon his return by the suitors in an ambush. Thus Eumaeus had feared that he would never see Telemachus again. But to a careful narratee the simile also suggests the emotions which (we can imagine) are raging inside Telemachus' real father Odysseus but which he has to suppress in order not to reveal his true identity. In particular the detail of 'his only son' (*mounon*) specifically points at Odysseus. Shortly afterwards Telemachus will explain that it is a characteristic of his family to have 'only sons' (118–120):

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there, too, the instinctive response of the audience, to interpret the passages in the light of the psychology of human beings, is sound.'

39 What follows are basically the interpretations I gave in de Jong 2001: *ad locc.*, where further bibliography may also be found.

> Arcesius begot Laertes as his only son (*mounon*), his father begot Odysseus as his only son (*mounon*), and Odysseus, having begotten me as his only son (*mounon*), left and did not profit from me.

Eumaeus' fatherly feelings for Telemachus can easily be taken to suggest those of his real father Odysseus.

Things are perhaps more open to discussion in another intriguing simile. Upon hearing Demodocus' song about the Wooden Horse and the fall of Troy, Odysseus starts weeping and is given the following simile (8.523–531):

> As when a woman weeps, throwing herself over her dear husband who has fallen in front of his city and men, trying to ward off the pitiless day for his city and children. She sees him gasping for breath and dying and folding herself over him she weeps loudly. But behind her they beat her back and shoulders with their spears, and carry her off into slavery, to have hard work and misery. And her cheeks are wasted through her most pitiable sorrow. So Odysseus shed piteous tears from his eyes.

The point of comparison, as so often in Homer, is 'advertised' through the verbal echo of 'most pitiable' (*eleeinotatōi*) in 'piteous' (*eleeinon*): the weeping of Odysseus/the woman is such as to evoke the pity of those who see them, and indeed Alcinous is moved by the stranger's tears and once again inquires after his 'sorrow'. But many scholars have read more into this simile. It seems to suggest that Odysseus feels more like a victim than a victor. Although notably the victor in the Trojan war (just before evoked by Demodocus' song), the aftermath of that war, his years of wanderings, has brought him only 'hard work and misery'. His long separation from his wife, child and home seems to have engendered some sensitivity for the price paid by families, both those of the victor and of the victim, for warfare, normally one of the undisputed occupations of heroic warriors. In short, his experiences have changed his outlook on life.[40] This brings us to the question as to whether Homeric characters can change.

40 Not all commentators are equally convinced of this reading between the lines. Thus Hainsworth 1988: *ad* 523–530 writes: 'It is not easy for the modern reader to separate the anonymous woman from the Trojan captives implicit in 516. There would be a bitter irony in the equation of the *ptoliporthos* himself and his victim; *but we should expect the poet to mark a connection which he wished to be significant*.' (my italics).

Dynamic Characters

As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, Auerbach claims that Achilles and Odysseus 'show no development'.[41] There are at least two Homeric characters which modify this claim, the one a fairly undisputed example (Telemachus), the other at least a plausible one (Odysseus).

That Telemachus would be hailed as 'the only character in Greek literature who shows any development'[42] need not come as a surprise since he is young and ancient conceptions of character concur in seeing character as partly given at birth but needing to be realized and fulfilled through nurture and education.[43] A number of studies have shown how Telemachus in the course of the *Odyssey* and of course especially as a result of his journey to Pylos and Sparta changes from a shy, inactive, uncertain youth into a young man who takes initiatives, speaks out and assumes responsibility. In the end, he is considered mature enough by Athena and Odysseus to be introduced to their scheme of Odysseus' incognito return at an early stage (before Eumaeus, Penelope, and Laertes). Homer is too fine a narrator to give Telemachus' development a linear trajectory: his first performance as a man vis-à-vis his mother and the suitors (1.345–419) is followed by his being 'tucked in' by his old nurse Euryclea (1.436–442). Even after he has given his maiden speech in the Ithacan assembly, he admits to being nervous when he is about to face the venerable old man Nestor, since he is 'not yet experienced in sensible speeches' (3.23). And when he is incited by Athena to return home from Sparta it is Pisistratus who must check his youthful impatience (15.49–55).

Some characteristics, however, Telemachus does seem to possess from the start. Thus already in book 1 he displays the typical wiliness of his father when he does not tell the suitors about the exact content of his conversation with 'Mentes' nor about his inference that his guest had in fact been a god (1.417–419). Likewise, his very first actions in the story show him to be a good host (1.119–120).

Given Telemachus' development, it may seem odd that he is given the epithet *pepnumenos* right from the start (the first time at 1.213), for this perfect

41 Cf. also Finley [1965] 1975: 16: 'Historical husbands and wives grow old, but the plain fact is that neither Odysseus nor Penelope has changed one bit; they have neither developed nor deteriorated, nor does anyone else in the epic.'

42 Millar and Carmichael 1954: 58. Cf. also Rose 1967; Austin 1969; Scheid-Tissinier 1993; Roisman 1994; and Heath 2001. *Contra* Olson 1995: 65–90.

43 See Introduction (→) and Halliwell 1990.

participle refers to 'a wisdom that comes through experience and age' and is used of mature men like Diomedes, Nestor, Menelaus, Odysseus, Tiresias and Laertes.[44] Heath convincingly argues, however, that 'Telemachus' maturation [...] can be seen as his acceptance of his heritage, and this is revealed at least partially through his development into the *pepnumenos* son of Odysseus his epithet has promised he would become'.[45]

Turning now to Odysseus, a strong case for this hero's development in the *Odyssey* has been made by Rutherford.[46] In his early adventures Odysseus is 'still something of a dashing buccaneer', but gradually he learns to curb his heroic impulses and his curiosity. His ability to restrain and control his emotions (of which he gave an early demonstration when sitting inside the Wooden Horse: 4.284–288) maximally comes to the fore during his incognito stay in his own palace, when he must restrain both anger (vis-à-vis the suitors: e.g. 17.446–492) and pity (vis-à-vis Penelope: 19.209–212). Of course, he never forgets the older, craftier side of his character but his lying tales now also convey a serious, moral lesson. The suitors may think that man can misbehave without punishment, but 'the beggar', from his own experience, knows better (18.130–140):

> 'For as long as the gods grant him [a mortal] prosperity, as long as his limbs are swift, he thinks that he will never suffer misfortune. But when the blessed gods send him sorrow, that too he has to bear, under compulsion, with enduring heart. Such must be the mind of men, as the father of gods makes each day after the other. I too once was destined to be a fortunate man, but I did many reckless deeds, yielding to my strength and power, putting great faith in my father and brothers.'

Odysseus' ten years of wanderings when he got to know 'the cities and mentality of many men', were seen by many ancients as a moral training and testing-ground for virtue, and the story of his development hence as a lesson for Homer's narratees. Thus, Horace in his *Epistles* 1.2.17–18, writes that 'of the power of virtue and wisdom, he [Homer] has put before us Ulixes as a useful example'. In that same letter he claims that Homer 'tells us what is fair, what

44 Heath 2001: 133.

45 Heath 2001: 155.

46 Rutherford 1986. Other studies on the figure of Odysseus in the *Odyssey* include Stanford [1954] 1963: 8–89; Finkelberg 1995 and Seidensticker 2001.

is foul, what is helpful, what not, more plainly and better than Chrysippus or Crantor' (3–4), and this brings us to the topic of the moral evaluation of Homeric characters.

The Moral Evaluation of Homeric Characters

An important observation to start with is that the covert Homeric narrator largely refrains from explicitly evaluating his characters. Only exceptionally does he call characters *nēpios/nēpioi*, and this word most of the time has a sympathetic undertone, stressing the tragic 'blindness' of mortals (e.g. Patroclus: 16.46 or Andromache: 22.445–446), sometimes a critical connotation, when mortals do foolish or even depraved things despite being warned not to (e.g. Odysseus' companions: *Od.* 1.8 or the Suitors: 22.32–33). Other evaluations of characters found in the narrative parts should be ascribed to the embedded focalization of another character. Thus it is Menelaus who considers Paris a 'sinner' (*Il.* 3.28), Telemachus the suitors 'overbearing' (*Od.* 1.134).

Does this reticence of the Homeric narrator mean that he does not intend his characters to be morally judged by his narratees? This seems hardly plausible. Rather, as in the case of explicit characterization, the narrator leaves it to his characters to do the job. One example is Agamemnon's judgement on Penelope (*Od.* 24.194–202):

> 'How loyal (*agathai*, lit. good) was the heart of excellent (*amumoni*) Penelope, daughter of Icarius. How well did she keep the memory of Odysseus, her wedded husband. So the fame of her virtue (*aretēs*) will never die, and the immortal gods will make a song about graceful, steadfast Penelope for the men on earth. Very differently the daughter of Tyndareos devised evil things, killing her lawful husband, and her song will be hateful among men.'

The narrator's avoidance of explicit moral guidance does result, however, in Homeric characters being open to *widely diverging* (moral) interpretations. Is Penelope a paragon of marital fidelity or is she playing games (and even flirting) with her suitors?[47] Are Hector and Patroclus mere pawns on the divine chess-board or do they themselves 'earn' their death by overestimating their own strength and not listening to good advice (of Polydamas in Hector's case,

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47 For discussions of Penelope, see e.g. Katz 1991 and Felson-Rubin 1994.

of Achilles in that of Patroclus)?[48] And is Helen really the passive victim of Aphrodite's wiles she claims to be?[49] The bibliography on most Homeric figures is substantial and can only be listed here.[50]

Surely the most intriguing and controversial Homeric character is Achilles, and it seems fitting to end this chapter with him.[51] Unlike Hector and Patroclus, he is nowhere explicitly said to make a moral error, either by one of the characters or by the narrator. But some of his deeds have been seen as errors *by implication*: his quarrel with Agamemnon in book 1 and resulting prolonged *mēnis*; his rejection of the embassy in book 9; and his extreme revenge on Hector, which includes the killing of countless Trojans and the mutilation of his opponent's body.[52]

Regarding the quarrel we can be brief: it is Athena herself who identifies Agamemnon's behaviour as *hubris* (1.214) and thereby signals that Achilles' anger is justified. His angry withdrawal from battle is the kind of heroic behaviour known also from other heroes (Meleager: *Il.* 9.524–599; Aeneas: 13.459–461). The crucial question is, of course, how long such anger should last, especially when it leads to so much harm to one's *philoi*.

Here the scene of the embassy in book 9 is crucial. When diplomatic Odysseus presents Agamemnon's offer and appeals to Achilles' desire to win glory (now he could kill Hector), old Phoenix tells an allegory (about Prayers, daughters of Zeus) and adduces a paradigm (Meleager), and Ajax, the sturdy warrior, appeals to Achilles' solidarity towards his fellow warriors, Achilles does not give up his *mēnis*. Many scholars have seen this as a tragic mistake for which he is punished by the death of Patroclus. Just as Meleager only relented and re-entered battle when his wife Cleopatra asked him but did not get the promised reward, Achilles will give in to Patroclus (letting him go to war in his place) but when he himself re-enters battle to avenge his friend he will take no pleasure in Agamemnon's conciliatory gifts. Just as the allegorical Prayers, when not

48 For discussions of Hector, see e.g. Schadewaldt [1956] 1970: 21–38; Metz 1990; and de Romilly 1997.

49 For discussions of Helen, see e.g. Reckford 1964; Austin 1994; and Roisman 2006.

50 For Nestor see e.g. Dickson 1995 and Frame 2009; for Agamemnon van Erp Taalman Kip [1971] 1999 and Taplin 1990.

51 Critical studies on Achilles include Bassett 1934; Redfield [1975] 1994; Effe 1988; Erbse 2001; positive ones: Yamagata 1991; Latacz 1995; and Gill 1996: 94–174. The following discussion is essentially that of de Jong 2012: 16–18.

52 A related debate which for reasons of space I do not take into consideration here is whether Achilles rejects or embraces the heroic values of the society he lives in; see e.g. Zanker 1994, who also discusses other literature.

treated with respect by a man, beg Zeus to visit that man with Folly, 'so that he pays with his own hurt', Achilles' rejection of the prayers of the ambassadors will lead to the death of his best friend and, eventually, his own death. There are strong indications, however, that Agamemnon's gesture of reconciliation simply was not good enough: he should have come himself and publicly admitted his earlier error in taking away Achilles' prize Briseis and hence dishonouring him. That this would have been the right course of action becomes clear from book 19, where we see Agamemnon doing exactly this. As regards the allegory and mythical paradigm, only the narratees, who know from Zeus' announcement at 8.473–477 that Achilles will re-enter battle because of Patroclus' death, can 'read' these later events in Phoenix's stories; the characters cannot.

Lastly, there is Achilles' bloody revenge. His rampage in books 20–22 is naturally criticized by the Trojan river god Scamander (21.213–221), but it is not condemned by the narrator, and the hero is duly saved from drowning in the river's streams by Poseidon and Athena. Many have taken the reference to Achilles' treatment of Hector's body as *aeikea erga* (22.395) as a sign of criticism on the part of the narrator. But it should be realized that this means 'disfiguring deeds' and does not so much imply wrong deeds (for Achilles to commit) as shameful deeds (for Hector to suffer). Moreover, *aeikea erga* is part of Achilles' focalization, who earlier had announced that he intended to let dogs maul his opponent *aikōs* (22.335–336). Finally, the narrator indicates that it is *Zeus* who allows his enemies to disfigure (*aeikissasthai*) Hector (22.403–404).

The case against Achilles, thus, can be countered on all points. And there is also positive evidence about his character. We may think here of his unquestioning loyalty to (some will say love for) Patroclus. When his mother Thetis warns him that avenging his friend will mean death, he accepts this verdict without flinching: 'Then let me die directly, since I was not destined to help my friend when he was killed' (18.198–199). But above all there is his impressive behaviour in the final book of the *Iliad*. It would certainly be misleading to see the humanity and gentleness he displays there as a *development* of his character.[53] Rather it is stressed more than once that he always was a temperate warrior, who spared his defeated opponents or treated them with respect (cf., e.g. 6.414–420; 21.76–82). It is only the death of Patroclus that unleashed an exceptional and terrible, but temporary, anger and harshness in him. When he has returned to his normal self again, it is Achilles who is chosen by the Homeric

53 Heath 2005: 119–163 suggests that Achilles develops into a more effective speaker in the *Iliad*.

narrator to voice the memorable speech on the *condition humaine*, the fellowship of suffering which links friend and foe, Greek and Trojan (24.518–551).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that Homeric characters are more individualized and have more depth than Homeric scholarship believed some half century ago.

Homeric characters show different moods (notably Achilles, who changes from clemency to harshness and back to clemency again in the *Iliad*) and some even develop, performing *rite de passage*-like actions such as going abroad or making public speeches (Telemachus) or learning from their experiences during prolonged travels to exotic lands (Odysseus).

And Homeric characters have secret inner lives. The few places where the narrator explicitly notes that a character does not say what he thinks seems an incitement for the narratees—within reasonable limits—to spot other places where they may read between the lines. A notable example is Odysseus' long silence about his name, which apart from creating suspense also actively engages the narratees and makes them ponder what it means to lose all of one's friends and goods and be away from wife, child, and home for twenty years.

It suits the covert Homeric narrator not to characterize his main characters in the form of explicit blocks of characterization but to let themselves show their virtues (or vices) through their deeds and words. The only small-scale forms of explicit characterization he employs are epithets and speaking names. Implicit characterization, on the other hand, is paramount and involves settings and objects, outward appearances, first appearances, similes, comparisons with persons from the past, and speech.

Homer's reticence has spawned heated scholarly debates on characters like Penelope, Helen, Agamemnon, Odysseus and above all Achilles, but his narrative art at the same time has made them unforgettable to all listeners and readers.

CHAPTER 2

Hesiod

Hugo Koning

Introduction

In order to discuss characterization in Hesiodic narrative, I must first state my position regarding three fundamental issues. The first concerns the difficulty of determining who in Hesiod's poems should be regarded as a character and who should not. The second deals with the question whether or to which degree Hesiodic poetry can be regarded as narrative. The third issue concerns authenticity: which poems to include and which to leave out?

The second of these issues can be addressed rather briefly. Even though it has long been customary to define Hesiodic poetry as 'catalogic' (or 'didactic', often in contrast to the 'narrative' and 'heroic' poems of Homer), and hence lacking in narrative, narratologists have recently turned their eye to Hesiod as well, either focusing on the narrative parts of his poems or simply applying the term narrative in a less rigid way.[1] This approach has been most fruitful,[2] and Hesiodic poetry has been successfully discussed in earlier volumes of *SAGN*.[3]

As to the third issue: so far, narratological analysis of Hesiodic poetry has focused on the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, the poems generally ascribed to Hesiod. In this paper, I would like to be more inclusive and discuss the *Catalogue of Women* as well. This relatively lengthy poem has recently received much scholarly attention and is sometimes considered to be Hesiod's. I will also add the *Shield*, which is generally regarded as composed by a poet other than Hesiod but nonetheless belonging to the Hesiodic tradition.[4] I believe this poem is interesting both by itself and by its obvious quality as a foil to the other three poems. This more inclusive and comparative approach also calls for a thematic discussion, instead of the sequential structure of the previous Hesiod-chapters of *SAGN*.

1 See Hamilton 1989 for an early and excellent division in narrative and non-narrative parts of the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*.

2 See e.g. Stoddard 2004.

3 See Nünlist's chapters in *SAGN* 1 and *SAGN* 2.

4 See for ancient and modern thoughts on the authenticity of the *Catalogue* and the *Shield* Cingano 2009.

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The first issue is the most difficult and relates to the definition of a character, which, obviously, is a protean concept. The rather loose and open conception of character defended in the introduction of this volume has in the case of Hesiodic poetry some interesting consequences. Take the *Theogony*, for instance: this relatively small poem contains about 300 characters. Many of these, naturally, derive this status from the most minimal form of representation, i.e. a name. If one would argue that characters need to actually *do* something, that is, perform a number of acts in a series of chronologically related events,[5] the number drops dramatically (especially if being born and/or mating/marrying and reproducing do not count). Just under twenty characters remain, of which only six can be argued to truly participate in the main narrative thread of the *Theogony*: Uranus, Gaea, Cronus, Zeus, Prometheus and Typhoeus. Obviously, something similar obtains for the *Catalogue of Women* (although the case of that poem is rather more complicated because of its fragmentary nature), but even in the *Works and Days* and *Shield* there are more characters 'by definition' than would probably be regarded as such by readers. This should not be overly problematized—after all, we are studying characterization and will thus focus on the most important characters anyway—but we need to keep it in mind nonetheless.

Definition of character in the Hesiodic poems is further complicated by the author's frequent use of personification. In the *Theogony*, both beings commonly accepted as gods, such as Zeus and Hermes, *and* entities such as Aether, Day, Fear, Justice and Nile are treated as (individual) anthropomorphic beings and, thus, as characters. The overall focus on mating and birth that predominates the *Theogony* contributes to seeing as an individual being everything that in some way manifests itself in the universe; in fact, the cosmos is made up of and inhabited by characters. This particular cosmogonic focus is absent from the *Works and Days*, so Oceanus, Zephyrus and Boreas (who are characters in the *Theogony*) are in this poem presented as natural phenomena (even though this is probably more a case of scale than category). Again, this is not a problem *per se*, but another indication that 'character' is a concept that can change shape according to its wider context.

In this chapter, I hope to offer a nuanced approach that takes that context into account. As I mentioned above, this paper will be structured thematically; I will discuss the Hesiodic poems with respect to the main narratological concepts of characterization.

5 Which is part of the definition of 'character' as given by Bal 1979: 2.

Names

Name-giving is absolutely vital to catalogue-poetry, and this seems to be especially so in Panhellenic poetry such as the Homeric and Hesiodic poems.[6] The Hesiodic poems abound with names, especially the *Theogony* and the *Catalogue*. More often than not, names and (in most cases) parentage are everything we are told about a specific divine or mortal individual. In such catalogic scenes, the mere names of deities and men, women and children, together with the barest outlines of their mutual relationships, function as the individual threads that weave together an overall picture of the genesis of the cosmos or the history of the Age of Heroes. Listening to a bard singing long lists of both familiar and known names on the one hand, and more exotic and mysterious ones on the other, must have been an altogether engaging, enthralling, and perhaps also rather bewildering experience.

One way to help the audience achieve some sort of organized overview, some sense of general structure, is to present characters as members of a group, such as the Muses, the Hundred-handers, the Titans, the Fates, the sons of Neleus, etc. In most cases, the members are individually named and collectively described, such as the Cyclopes (*Th.* 139–148):

> Then she bore the Cyclopes, who have very violent hearts, Brontes and Steropes and strong-spirited Arges, those who gave thunder to Zeus and fashioned the lightning-bolt. These were like the gods in other regards, but only one eye was set in the middle of their foreheads; and they were called Cyclopes by name, since a single circle-shaped eye was set in their foreheads. Strength and force and contrivances were in their works.[7]

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6 In contrast to their usual appraisal by modern readers, original Greek audiences presumably held catalogues in high regard. The fluent and correct performance of elaborate lists of—say—Greek warriors who went to Troy or women loved by gods must have been a clear marker of the singer's poetic, mnemonic and improvisational skill. The audience appreciated both the familiarity of lists of names (which in all likelihood was set up so as to include some of their own ancestors) and their inherently aesthetic value. On the function of catalogues in Homer see Sammons 2010, esp. pp. 15–22. See also Faraone 2013 on the structure of catalogues of names in the *Theogony*. He suggests that lists could be adapted to suit the needs of a particular performance and occasion (313). Unfortunately, he does not discuss catalogues in the *Catalogue of Women*, and focuses little on the aesthetics of catalogues in general.

7 All translations in this contribution come from the Loeb-edition of Most (2007).

Characters that belong to a collective tend to have 'speaking' names, which is a trait that seems to emphasize their attachment to a group. This holds true for the Muses, the Fates and the Cyclopes,[8] and also larger groups such as the Nereids, the fifty daughters of the sea-god Nereus. Their beautiful and meaningful names, such as Galene ('Calm'), Glauce ('Grey'), Cymo ('Wave'), Pherusa ('Carrying'), and Eulimene ('Fine Harbour'), reveal several aspects of the sea, both of its nature and its use to those sailing on it. The narrator, displaying a keen interest in proper names,[9] tries to characterize old Nereus through his offspring: his daughters represent further-developed forms and aspects of the more primal and crude sea-god. Thus, such speaking names play an important role in the (description of the) evolution of the cosmos, where gods of the next generation are presented as more developed and more specific manifestations of earlier powers—a phenomenon present in the *Theogony* as a whole.

Speaking names, mostly absent from the *Catalogue* and *Shield*, are present in the *Works and Days*, though in a different way. This poem has traditionally been subject to a literal-historical reading that focuses on its supposedly real (autobiographical) data, resulting in reconstructions of the family history of Hesiod, his father and his brother Perses. Recent interpretations, however, have come to see such data as part of the poem's rhetorical strategy, and the perspicuous nature of the names of the main characters, Hesiod and Perses, has been put to use here. Perses (*Persēs*) is connected to Greek *perthō* and can be interpreted as 'Destroyer', a suitable name for the no-good rascal who squandered his part of the heritage and has his eye on Hesiod's part, whereas the narrator's name *Hēsiodos* (not mentioned in the *Works and Days* but in the *Theogony*), presumably means 'He who emits the Voice'.[10] In this case, names do not only reveal character, for it obviously belongs to Perses' character that he is destructive, but they also reflect on our reading of the poem as a whole.

Antonomasia is common in epic and rather frequent in Hesiod as well, especially in the *Shield* and the *Catalogue*, where patronymics occur most often. Surely, their use is often prompted by reasons of variation and metrical desirability. On the other hand, in catalogic poetry, the use of patronymics is

8 The Cyclopes' names mean 'thunder', 'lightning' and 'bright', respectively.

9 He occasionally tries his hand at an (etymological) explanation of a name, as in the case of the Cyclopes; see also *Th.* 195–196 for an explanation of Aphrodite from the Greek word for 'foam', *aphros*. This interest in names and naming is also evident in the *Works and Days*, cf. e.g. Claus 1977 and Arrighetti 1996.

10 See Nagy 1979: 296–297; see for other, equally speaking interpretations of his name Meier-Brügger 1990 and Most 2007: xv.

obviously valuable as an efficient tool to organize and structure genealogical records, for both the race of the gods (*Theogony*) and the heroes (*Catalogue*). Moreover, as patronymics contain 'history', they can point back to past events to ground and explain the present.[11] This can best be seen in the *Theogony*, the protagonist of which, Zeus, is often indicated by the patronymic *Kronidēs*, 'son of Cronus'. This name appears most frequently in passages that deal with Zeus' establishment of a new world order after the overthrow of his father Cronus, for instance with his distribution of 'honours' among the gods.[12] The patronymic is significant here and frames his actions in the context of a dynastic struggle: Zeus is the new supreme god of the universe.

Direct Characterization

Characterization is primarily done by the narrator, identified as 'Hesiod' in the *Theogony* (22) and left anonymous in the other poems. In the *Theogony*, he appears as a shepherd who is suddenly inspired by the Muses to sing about the origin of the gods. Apart from this event, mentioned in the proem, the narrator does not partake in the series of births and battles he relates—the *Dichterweihe* is there to tell us how he came by such arcane knowledge. The *Works and Days* is supposedly prompted by a lawsuit brought against the narrator by his no-good brother; there are bits of information concerning his family history elsewhere in the poem as well.[13] The narrator could be regarded as a character here (on this see more below). In the *Catalogue* and *Shield*, the narrator seems to take a more Homeric stand: we learn nothing about him. What is the same, however, is that in these poems too the narrator does most of the characterization, occasionally commenting on persons and actions.

11 See Graziosi and Haubold 2005: 57–58: 'Patronymics constantly remind us of the genealogical structure that underlies the epic world. They assign to each person or god their place in the larger scheme of things and help to frame the narrative by lending it a temporal dimension.'

12 See *Th.* 412 (Zeus honouring Hecate) and *Th.* 450 (Zeus appointing Hecate the nurse of all children); *Th.* 423–425 is an interesting case: it is said here that Hecate is allowed to keep the honours she possessed 'according to the division as it was made at first from the beginning'; her place of honour is thus emphasized by the fact that 'the son of Cronus' does *not* redistribute her prerogatives. See also *Th.* 624, where 'the son of Cronus' releases the Hundred-Handers from the Underworld to help him in his fight against the Titans.

13 See for a discussion of the narrator in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, *SAGN* 1: 25–34 (Nünlist).

Characterization in Hesiod is often direct, mostly through epithets or brief descriptions that can be combined. The heroes in the *Catalogue* can be 'god-like', 'horse-taming', 'glorious' or 'great-spirited', for instance, or 'horse-taming, insatiable for the battle-cry' such as Melas (fr. 10.53).[14] Collective characters too are directly characterized. The daughters of Porthaon, for example, are said to be 'like goddesses, [skilled] in very beautiful [works]' (fr. 23.5–6). Naturally, individual characters in a group can receive separate characterization.[15] As these examples indicate, characterization in the *Catalogue* is usually strongly gendered: men are described in terms of manliness, women with regard to their beauty.[16] This is the way of epic: women attract men who have to suffer and fight for them; they eventually marry, and create a new generation of men and women engaged in love and war. Thus, characterization reflects the natural order.

In the Hesiodic poems, long analyses of character and appearance are absent. We hear nothing about the gods' or heroes' personal interests or dislikes, traumatic and life-changing experiences, or (psychological) strengths and weaknesses; there are no elaborate descriptions of a person's appearance either.[17] Apart from being brief and direct, characterization is also rather static and unambiguous: there are no 'round' characters in Hesiod.[18] This holds true not only for objective or descriptive terms, but also for evaluative and moral

14 The use of more than two epithets is rare (see e.g. the exceptionally long description of Amphiaraus, *Cat.* fr. 22.34–37). References to the *Cat.* follow Most's Loeb edition.

15 See e.g. the three daughters of Thestius: Leda is 'beautiful-haired, like the beams of the moon' (19.8), Althaea is 'dark-eyed' (22.14) and Hypermestra is 'godly' (22.34).

16 See Osborne 2005 for a detailed overview of all epithets applied to women in the *Catalogue*.

17 See de Jong on Homer (→) in this volume.

18 The only exception is Zeus in the *Theogony*, who undergoes significant changes on his path to cosmic supremacy (see further below). There is at least a notion that people can change in the *Works and Days*, where the narrator rebukes his brother Perses, apparently thinking it possible he might in the end forget his evil ways. There is no change of character in the *Shield* or *Catalogue*, unless one would be willing to count Hera, who changed her opinion of Heracles rather drastically: 'Previously the goddess, white-armed Hera, hated him more than any of the blessed gods and any mortal human beings, but now [presumably after he had rescued her during the Gigantomachy] she loves him, and honours him beyond the other immortals, except for Cronus' mighty son himself' (fr. 22.30–33); similarly, but the other way around, Athena helps the hero Periclymenus but then 'became angry with him, she stopped him being the best' (fr. 31.22–23). These last two are probably not cases of round character but rather instances of the gods' general fickleness or incomprehensible behaviour (commented upon by the narrator in the *Op.* as well).

terms: characters are either 'blameless', 'excellent', 'glorious', 'great' and 'godly' or 'evil', 'overweening', 'outrageous' and 'presumptuous', and they stay that way. In keeping with the narrator's overall view on cosmic and human history, in which the Heroic Age is one of relative splendour and nobility (better than both the Bronze Age that went before and the Iron Age that comes after, see *Op.* 258), the heroes and heroines in the *Catalogue* are generally 'excellent', 'beautiful', 'blessed', and the like. There are some exceptions, and in such cases a negative term is immediately explained: Periclymenus is a 'fool' for thinking he could defeat Heracles (fr. 31.28); Salmoneus is 'wicked', an 'arrogant king', who is obliterated by Zeus for the *hubris* of thinking he was the god's equal (fr. 27.15–23); Ceyx and his wife are 'overweening' because they call themselves Zeus and Hera, and are transformed into birds (fr. 16). Hesiod's technique of the quick (but clear) brushstroke seems to be connected to the genre of catalogue-poetry, which demands characters to be drawn with both speed and accuracy.[19]

Since the *Theogony* and *Catalogue* are brimming with epithets, the question of how meaningful such adjectives can be seems justified.[20] Epithets are often non-specific and thus seem to be highly formulaic; on the other hand, many epithets are unique and/or fitting in their specific context. This goes for the gods (only Hera is 'golden-sandaled', only Zeus 'aegis-holding', and only Dionysus 'much-cheering'), and for demi-gods and humans as well. Heracles, for instance, is called 'patient-minded' in the *Catalogue* (fr. 31.28), and suitably so: his troops are being destroyed by Periclymenus, but he is waiting for a chance to meet him in battle and kill him. Similarly, the evil king Eurystheus is 'impious' (*Sc.* 91), Jason's uncle Pelias is 'overweening, arrogant and wicked' (*Th.* 996), Epimetheus is 'mistaken-minded' (*Th.* 511), and so on. In such cases, we can clearly see how epithets connect a particular individual 'to the larger tradition and thus endow it with resonance; … they encapsulate the most deep-seated truths, the essence of particular characters, actions and stories.'[21]

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19 Stoddard (2004: 124), building on observations by Griffin (1986) and de Jong (1997), believes that the frequent use of emotional words (such as 'lovely' or 'terrible'), which appear mostly in character-text in Homer, almost turns the narrator into a character; this 'emotive narrative mode', she argues, reflects a conscious choice to adopt the persona of the hymnic poet, 'a human being singing of the gods'. This is interesting but seems to be at odds with other traits of the narrator (such as his omniscience and omnipresence).

20 For this issue see also de Jong on Homer (→) in this volume.

21 Graziosi and Haubold 2005: 53.

Metaphorical Characterization: Comparisons

Comparisons are a crucial type of characterization in Hesiod. One type of comparison, the use of foils, is employed both on a larger and a smaller scale, and both explicitly and implicitly. One example of such explicit use can be found in the *Shield*, where Alcmena's two children are compared to each other:

> And since she had been overpowered both by a god and by much the best man in seven-gated Thebes, she gave birth to twin boys, not like-minded—brothers they were, but the one was worse, the other man much better, terrible and strong, Heracles' force. To this one she gave birth overpowered by Cronus' black-clouded son, but to Iphicles overpowered by spear-rousing Amphitryon—offspring different from one another, the one because she mingled with a mortal man, the other with Zeus, Cronus' son, the commander of all the gods …[22]

The comparison underscores Heracles' excellence, explained in terms of genealogy (a technique well-known to heroic epic, cf. Achilles and Asteropaeus).[23]

The use of foils forms the backbone of characterization in the *Works and Days*, a poem basically concerned with only two characters: the narrator and the narratee, his brother Perses. The technique of 'othering' by comparison is employed on an elaborate and sustained scale. The qualities most abhorred by the narrator—idleness, procrastination, injustice, lack of foresight, dependence—are projected upon Perses, and thus the narrator is characterized by their opposites: diligence, careful planning, justice, wisdom, and autonomy.[24]

The narrator sometimes characterizes Perses directly, typically by calling him '(great) fool',[25] but it is mostly through comparison that we really get to know him. This is often done rather implicitly, mentioning some of his past achievements (especially cheating the narrator out of his fair share of the heritage), his preferences ('gawking at quarrels and listening to the assembly',

22 *Sc.* 48–56 (note again the use of Zeus' patronymic (here *Kroniōn*) in connection to his function as 'commander' of all the gods, cf. above). This difference is mentioned again by Heracles in his speech to Iolaus (the son of Iphicles), saying 'we were born, your father and I, alike neither in build nor in thought' (88).

23 *Il.* 21.184–199: after Achilles kills Asteropaeus, son of the river Axius, he declares that a river's son could never hope to defeat a great-grandson of Zeus himself.

24 Another instance of such 'othering' is the diptych of the Just and the Unjust city, *Op.* 225–247.

25 *Op.* 286, 397, 633.

Op. 29), his dislikes (especially labour), his current *modus vivendi* (begging); and occasionally appealing directly to Perses when making a point, suggesting that that particular piece of advice is of special importance to him.[26] All such indications of character reflect not only on Perses but on the narrator as well: he is Perses' opposite, and his brother should take care to become more like him.

That the audience should understand the narrator and his brother as foils is encouraged by that other tale of two brothers in the *Works and Days*, one sensible and the other stupid: Prometheus and Epimetheus. The tale of Pandora is narrated both in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, but Epimetheus features only in the second poem, obviously because this creates a parallel for the narrator and Perses. In both cases, the brothers differ greatly, but in terms of reason and not strength (as is the case with Heracles and Iphicles in the 'heroic' *Shield*), and there is no genealogical, 'heroic' explanation for the difference: Epimetheus is not of lesser descent than Prometheus, and the narrator is not genetically superior to Perses (who is even called *dion genos*, 'of divine stock').[27] In the non-heroic *Works and Days*, characters do not excel because of some genetic advantage, but because of intelligence, foresight, and moral fibre. The 'best of the best' is

> the man who thinks of everything by himself, considering what will be better, later and in the end. That man is fine too, the one who is persuaded by someone who speaks well. But whoever neither thinks by himself nor pays heed to what someone else says and lays it to his heart—that man is good for nothing.[28]

Similes are relatively rare in Hesiodic poetry. There are three similes in the *Theogony*, which are not of direct interest to us,[29] and only one in the *Cata-*

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26 For instance, that one should refrain from evil towards parents and brothers (an obvious case in point), or how one should get out of debt (*idem*), or about the rules of seafaring (should be take this to mean Perses lost money on some overseas business adventure?).

27 This is a phrase that has puzzled many scholars. Its apparent unsuitability caused some ancient and modern readers to believe Perses' (and Hesiod's) father was called Dius. Presumably, Hesiod is being ironic.

28 *Op.* 293–297. Obviously, Hesiod instantiates the first category; he leaves Perses the choice between the second and third option.

29 Two deal with events and not characters, i.e. the extreme and cosmic violence of Zeus' battle with the Titans (*Th.* 702–704) and with Typhoeus (*Th.* 862–867). The third is generic, comparing women in general to bees (*Th.* 594–602). See Rood 2007 and Stoddard 2004: 154–161 for a discussion of the similes in the *Theogony*.

logue.[30] There are no similes in the *Works and Days*. The *Shield* is rather different in this respect, containing no less than six full-blown Homeric similes, all placed in the 150 lines of the poem that deal with the fight between Heracles and Cycnus: in 374–379 their clash is compared to boulders bouncing downwards from a mountain; in 386–392 Heracles jumps from his chariot like a boar; in 402–412 the duellists fight like lions and then again like vultures; in 426–435 Heracles' courage is compared to that of a lion; and in 437–442 Ares is compared to a boulder dashing against a hill (Heracles). It is obvious that the narrator inserted as many similes as possible in an attempt to present the battle in its most epic magnitude, commenting on the speed, strength and courage of its participants, especially Heracles.[31]

Metonymical Characterization

Group Membership

The method of characterization through group membership is important to Hesiod, especially in the *Theogony*, which deals with both history and cosmology. As for cosmology: personified natural, biological and cultural phenomena are regularly organized into groups, their nature defined in genealogical terms. The terrible children of Night—Doom, Fate, Death, Sleep, Blame, Distress, etc.—are a good example (*Th.* 211–225), and so are the children of Strife (*Th.* 226–232): the individual group members, who can be regarded as the more specific emanations of a more abstract power, all partake in the nature of their shared parent.[32] As for history: the development of the cosmos must, in order to be comprehensible, be divided into eras: first the primal gods, then the Titans, then the Olympians, then the (beginning of the) race of heroes. These groups have a certain collective quality which partly defines their individual members: the Olympians, for instance, are the blessed ones who rule the universe without toil, threats or cares.[33]

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30 Atalanta is compared to a Harpy because of her speed (fr. 48.43). The image of the Harpy may have come to the narrator's mind because it is the 'seizing' of the (second) apple that is done with such remarkable speed, the name Harpy being associated with 'snatching'.

31 On the 'more is more'-philosophy of the *Shield* see Martin 2005.

32 A suggestion that is strengthened by the fact that both Night and Strife produce their children without a partner.

33 The Titans are an interesting case: we are told that it was Uranus who gave them this name, 'Strainers', 'for he said that they had strained to perform a mighty deed [i.e. their hostile takeover] in their wickedness, and that at some later time there would be vengeance for

A similar historical concern underlies the myth of the five races of human beings in the *Works and Days* (109–201). According to this scheme, mankind is characterized by four metals: gold, silver, bronze and iron, the negative sequence being interrupted by the insertion of the race of heroes after the bronze age.[34] The metals define the human races in different ways: the first race is golden because of their blessed existence, whereas the epithets bronze and iron are used not only metaphorically (since these races are worse in both economic and moral terms, and lead lives of lesser value), but also because those are the metals these people use: 'their weapons were of bronze, bronze were their houses, with bronze they worked, there was not any black iron' (*Op.* 150–151).[35] The iron age is the worst of all, riddled by toil, distress and immorality. Since it is the current age, the narrator belongs to it as well, and so does his audience, including us. Characterization is thus made subject to rhetorical strategy: we had better listen to the narrator's advice, for we live in desperate times.

Characterization by affiliation is extremely important for Zeus, the protagonist of the *Theogony*. He is the only truly round character in the Hesiodic poems, and his growth is described not in terms of internal development but of external affiliation. Zeus' rise to power can be viewed as a direct result of his carefully built network of allies and partners. In a most explicit way, Zeus is supreme and powerful because the personifications Victory, Supremacy and Force are always next to him: they 'have no house apart from Zeus nor any seat, nor any path except that on which the god leads them, but they are always seated next to deep-thundering Zeus' (*Th.* 386–388).[36] They have joined him before the war against the Titans, thus foreshadowing his victory and everlasting rule. The goddesses are the children of Styx, who has chosen Zeus's side and thus retains her honour, just like Hecate; similarly, Zeus reinforces the

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this' (*Th.* 209–210). Not only is the group characterized as 'wicked' (Uranus focalizing), but the Titans are also defined in terms of history: Uranus at the start of their power refers to their downfall later. Thus, the Titans are a doomed set of individuals.

34 Scholars generally agree that the age of heroes was the author's addition to a previously existent (presumably Eastern) metallic sequence, obviously inserted to accord with epic tradition.

35 Why the second race is defined as silver is somewhat of a riddle; see for a recent discussion of the myth of the races and an extensive bibliography Van Noorden 2014, esp. ch. 2.

36 Compare the 'maiden' Justice in the *Works and Days*, who 'whenever someone harms her by crookedly scorning her, [she] sits down at once beside her father Zeus, and proclaims the unjust mind of human beings, so that he will take vengeance upon the people for the wickedness of their kings …' (258–261).

Olympian camp with some of the universe's older forces, such as the Cyclopes (who fashion his thunderbolt) and the Hundred-handers (locked away by the Titans and thus out for vengeance).

Zeus's influence thus grows by the attraction of other powers until he is the dominant factor in the cosmos; when his rule is established, he then consolidates his power through an elaborate string of marriages: first Metis, and then Themis, Eurynome, Demeter, Mnemosyne, Leto, and then (finally) Hera. With all of them, he produces offspring that completes and beautifies the universe: Lawfulness, Justice, Peace, the Destinies, Splendour, Joy, Good Cheer, and the Muses are both his children and manifestations of his power. His ingestion of Metis (Wisdom), his first wife, marks Zeus's progress from a primarily strong and forceful god to one that is also wise and just.

Emotions

In keeping with the rather clear-cut direct characterization described above, the emotions of characters in the *Theogony*, *Catalogue* and *Shield* are mostly unambiguous, often obvious, and generally rather extreme. For instance, Gaea 'rejoiced greatly in her breast' when Cronus offers his help against Uranus; Ares is seized by 'bitter grief' when Athena turns aside the spear he has cast at Heracles; Heracles felt 'unendurable grief' when Periclymenus decimated his troops before Thebes, and the Olympians 'craved war even more than before' after the Hundred-Handers joined their forces.[37] The epic world of gods and heroes is filled with individuals who are driven by powerful emotions that propel them to mighty deeds.

A sure sign of the narrator's interest in powerful emotion is their personification: instead of being a metonymical indication of character, the emotion is itself presented as a character who can seize or get hold of a person. A major example is the prominent place of 'Desire' (Eros) in the *Theogony*, a being born right after Gaea and Tartarus—apart from possible philosophical implications, the prominence of Eros is also a tribute to a force that not simply pervades the world of gods and men but also made possible the *Theogony* and *Catalogue*. Another example is 'Fear' (*Phobos*), called 'terrible' in the *Theogony* and visualized in the *Shield*, where he takes centre-stage on the shield of Heracles (144–148):

> In the middle was Fear, made of adamant, unspeakable, glaring backwards with eyes shining like fire. His mouth was full of white teeth, ter-

37 See *Th.* 173, *Sc.* 457, fr. 31.24, *Th.* 665–666.

> rible, dreadful; and over his grim forehead flew terrible Strife, preparing for the battle-rout of men … .

A personification of this kind, describing Fear's outward appearance, entails analysis of the emotion in question: it is something primal (cf. the fangs of a predator), furious (the shining eyes), and most of all, completely irresistible. The description also provides a context for Fear: it comes with the equally terrible Strife, which causes (armed) conflict. In the *Theogony*, there are many other personifications of emotions, such as 'Desire' (*Himeros*), 'Indignation' (*Nemesis*) and 'Recklessness' (*Atē*), presented and thus partly explained through genealogy.[38] Just like Fear, they are powerful emotions that can take total control over any individual, and they squarely belong to the world of epic.

It seems that the narrator's presentation of emotions in the *Works and Days*, the non-epic poem of Hesiod, is subtler and more qualified. In contrast to the grand and overwhelming emotions that inhabit the world of gods and heroes, humans appear to be subject to more ambiguous emotional states. This more nuanced, human outlook of the *Works and Days* is famously announced by the programmatic duality of Strife, which is apparently not just evil after all (as it is in epic): there is also a good and useful side to it, a positive force of competition that sets people on the path to success and wealth (*Op.* 11–26). This ambiguity can also be seen in an emotional state like 'shame' (*aidōs*): the narrator of the *Works and Days* tells us that this motive—a major catalyst of heroic action in epic, and never qualified or doubted—'greatly harms men and also benefits them' (318), for 'shame is not good at providing for a needy man' (317). This is a more nuanced view, that takes into account one's circumstances and point of view.

This ambiguity also defines the narrator, who can be regarded as one of the two main characters of the *Works and Days*. Throughout the poem, the narrator seeks the moral high ground, which is mainly fuelled by superior wisdom concerning justice and work (the poem's most prominent themes).[39] Nonetheless, he is a human being and so his insight is limited: his poem is concerned with 'works' and when to do them, but 'the mind of aegis-holding Zeus is different at different times, and it is difficult for mortal men to know

38 *Th.* 64 and 201; 223 (and *Op.* 200); 230.

39 This position is advertised in several places: in 286 the narrator describes his own thoughts as 'fine', and in 660–662 he explains that even though he has little experience with ships, he can still, on the subject of seafaring, 'speak forth the mind of aegis-holding Zeus, for the Muses taught me to sing an inconceivable hymn.' Cf. also the narrator's claim to be *panaristos* above.

it.'[40] Similarly, the very same person who lectures his brother on the necessity of justice is occasionally subject to despair: the description of the iron race makes him exclaim that he would rather have 'died first or been born afterwards' (175). In a similar vein, he says that 'right now I myself would not want to be a just man among human beings, neither I nor a son of mine, since it is evil for a man to be just if the more unjust one will receive greater justice' (270–272). Such (presumably carefully crafted) 'moments of weakness' make our narrator all the more recognizable and sympathetic.

Actions

Action naturally reveals character. As noted above, it is action that in the *Theogony* and *Catalogue* reveals the true protagonists of these poems: they are the ones doing more than being born, marrying/mating and producing offspring. The main characters are Zeus, Gaea, Cronus, Uranus and perhaps Typhoeus and Heracles in the *Theogony*; and Zeus, Heracles, and perhaps Poseidon in the *Catalogue*.[41] They appear on and off in the poem, since the poem's genealogical lists alternate with narrative passages featuring the protagonists. As a result, the overall interpretation of these characters requires that material presented in multiple passages is taken into account.[42]

Such a piecemeal presentation of the (activities of the) protagonists also relates to what in the Introduction (→) has been called 'primacy'. In the *Theogony* and *Catalogue*, there are no slow or surprising revelations of character (by action or otherwise). The first time we hear of Zeus in the *Theogony*, for instance, he is already 'Cronus' mighty son', revealing immediately the most crucial information about both the cosmic power struggle and Zeus' character. Similarly, the rest of the proem, dealing mostly with the activities of the Muses, already refers to the completion of the universe by the procreative strategies of 'father Zeus' (of which the Muses are a direct result). This strategy of characterization is perhaps natural to genealogical poetry, with its particular focus on the organization of often complex familial structures—recurring individuals must above all be easily identifiable.[43]

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40 *Op.* 483–484. Cf. the narrator's advice to have only one son, which is immediately qualified with a reference to Zeus: 'And yet Zeus could easily bestow immense wealth upon more people: more hands, more work, and the surplus is bigger' (379–380).

41 In the *Shield*, things are more obvious, since the main action is a duel, involving Heracles with his charioteer Iolaus and patroness Athena on the one hand, versus Cycnus and his father Ares on the other.

42 See for instance the interpretation of Heracles in the *Catalogue* by Haubold 2005.

43 Naturally, the strategy also fits with the 'rhetoric of traditionality' so typical for epic: the

Actions that are important to the narrative are often motivated, albeit briefly. A good example is the basic outline of the succession story in the *Theogony*: Uranus hides his children away 'in a hiding-place in Earth' because he hates them (155); subsequently, Uranus is castrated by Cronus because Gaea is fed up with her 'constriction' and persuades Cronus to take action (159–160); Cronus then devours his own offspring because of a prophecy that he is to be overpowered by a child of his, which in turn makes Rhea feeling 'unremitting grief' (467), as a result of which she hides Zeus so that he can grow up and defeat Cronus. In the *Catalogue* too, important and/or remarkable actions are briefly motivated: Zeus punishes Salmoneus and his entire people for his *hubris* (fr. 27.12–23), Tydeus kills his uncles because they have usurped his father's throne (fr. 10.55–57), Orestes kills his mother in order to avenge his father (fr. 19.26–30), etc. As these examples show, actions that are related to the discontinuity of power usually qualify as important enough to motivate.

Motivation for action can, however, occasionally be omitted. We are not (explicitly) told why Zeus starts a war against the Titans, or why Heracles kills the Nemean lion. This is because in the *Theogony* and *Catalogue*, gods and heroes perform the actions they naturally or typically perform: gods sleep with beautiful girls, punish mortals, argue with each other, help their favourite heroes, and orchestrate natural phenomena. Heroes marry heroines, rob cattle and make war. Lack of motivation is of course also partly caused by the fact that the narrator deals with myth, and many of his characters act along predetermined lines, that are known to the audience.

Speech

It is not just the primary narrator who characterizes, but also the characters in the poems, who do so in speeches. Hesiodic poetry contains only a few speeches, which are rather short, making up 3 percent of the *Theogony*[44] and about 15 percent of the *Shield* (the poem that thus comes closest to heroic, Homeric poetry in this respect as well).[45] The *Works and Days*, of course, can be

narrator's story is placed within a larger narrative framework of traditional tales familiar to the audience.

44 The Muses yelling at Hesiod in 26–28, Gaea asking her children to help her and Cronus responding in 164–166 and 170–172, Zeus talking to Prometheus before and after his deception in 543–544 and 559–560 (with Prometheus responding in 548–549), and Zeus talking to the Hundred-handers in 644–653 (with Cottus responding in 655–663).

45 Heracles talks to his nephew and charioteer Iolaus in 78–100 and 118–121 (with Iolaus responding in 103–114) and speaks to Cycnus in 350–367, and Athena in 327–337 gives Heracles a pep talk and in 446–449 dissuades Ares from participating in the duel.

considered as one big, 'angry' speech directed at Perses;[46] there is some direct speech here as well, but it is very little.[47] The amount of direct speech in the *Catalogue* (32 lines) is similar to that in the *Theogony*, as far as we can make out.

It is remarkable that in the *Shield* only the 'good guys' Heracles, Iolaus and Athena get to speak; Cycnus and Ares, although spoken to, remain silent. Since the speeches of the *Shield* have a particularly martial tone, they foreshadow the outcome of the battle. Direct speech appears to be a privilege of winners. This seems to hold true elsewhere in Hesiodic poetry: in the *Theogony*, Cronus speaks before his confrontation with Uranus (who loses and has indirect speech), but does not speak before his defeat at the hands of Zeus, who *does*, before the battle, deliver a speech to the Hundred-Handers (who also respond). Similarly, in the *Works and Days* it is the hawk who offers direct speech, whereas his antagonist does not speak but merely 'cries out' (207). The future 'winners', moreover, often characterize themselves as superior[48]—the verbal victory precedes the actual one. One wonders whether this reflects on the 'angry speech' that is the *Works and Days* as well.

Speeches offer instances of direct characterization but also reflect on the speaker, a case of metonymical characterization I will now briefly turn to. A clear example of this is Cronus' response to his mother Gaea, who is constricted by Uranus' continuous oppression and calls for help. Cronus answers (*Th.* 170–172):

> 'Mother, I would promise and perform this deed, since I do not care at all about our evil-named father. For he was the first to devise unseemly deeds.'

In this speech, his first in the *Theogony*, Cronus displays some of the traits that determine and continue to mark his character: audacity, decisiveness, ruthlessness, ambition. He was just directly characterized as 'crooked-counselled' two lines before, and the speech immediately justifies the epithet. His words here

46 See Lardinois 2003.

47 About 1.5 per cent. Zeus speaks to Prometheus in 54–58, in 207–211 the hawk speaks to the nightingale, in 453–454 Hesiod provides an imaginary exchange between Perses asking for help and a random villager denying it, and 503 is an exemplary command to a slave.

48 Iolaus describes Heracles and himself as 'eager for war, to raise up battle—what is much dearer to them than a feast!' (*Sc.* 113–114). Heracles asks Cycnus why he is directing his swift horse towards himself and Iolaus, 'towards men who are experts in toil and distress?' (*Sc.* 350–351). The hawk tells the nightingale 'one far superior to you is holding you' (*Op.* 207).

may even hint at his own future acts of cannibalism: since he seems especially indignant about Uranus as a father (the epithet 'evil-named' may mean that he does not properly deserve that name), and knowingly starts a family feud here, we may already surmise that Cronus himself will not be an overly kind father either. Characterization is thus again put to the service of the succession myth.

Setting

Setting is perhaps relatively unimportant in Hesiod; still, it can be said that one's residence reflects on character. It is often said that the gods have their homes on Olympus, the mountain they once chose as their headquarters in the Titanomachy; this stresses their supremacy. Their opponents are all locked away in 'murky' Tartarus, a place as far away from Olympus as possible;[49] this is not just where the Titans are held prisoner, but Tartarus is also the place where all the creepy characters live: 'dark' and 'deadly' Night, the 'terrible gods' Sleep and Death, 'dread' Persephone, the 'terrible dog' (Cerberus) and Styx, 'a great woe for the gods'.[50] These characters obviously belong in a place that is as dark and dangerous as they are.

It is also significant that the narrator of the *Works and Days* informs us that he lives in Ascra, which translates as 'the Barren Oak'.[51] This is a speaking name reflecting on the narrator's persona: he is a hard-working, no-nonsense realist, used to rather unforgiving circumstances. This is confirmed by his description of Ascra as a 'wretched village, evil in winter, distressful in summer, not ever fine' (*Op.* 639–641).[52] The setting of the *Shield* seems important as well: Heracles and Cycnus fight in the precinct of Apollo, which we are told was plundered regularly by Cycnus: his pride and *hubris* are thus underscored by the surroundings; conversely, Heracles is framed as the good guy.[53]

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49 See *Th.* 720: Tartarus is 'as far down beneath the earth as the sky is above the earth', cf. *Th.* 721–725.

50 See *Th.* 721–819 for a description of Tartarus and its inhabitants.

51 Lamberton 1988: 33.

52 It may be that Ascra does not only inform the narrator's character, but that of members of the Iron Age (on which see more below) generally: in that more metaphorical sense, we all live in Ascra.

53 Interestingly enough, this information on Cycnus' impious behaviour is given in the last lines of the poem; we thus understand only in retrospect why 'Phoebus Apollo paid no heed to his prayers, for he himself roused up Heracles' force against him' (68–69).

Conclusion

The narrators of the four Hesiodic poems treated here employ different strategies for characterization in different poems. In the catalogue-poems, the *Theogony* and *Catalogue of Women*, characterization is brief, vivid, and unambiguous; the gods and heroes are presented in accordance with the rules of epic. The scope is vast and the pace is quick, but the narrator still makes the characters' usually strong emotions and usually violent actions motivated and comprehensible. There is little speech. The *Shield* is the most Homeric of the poems: there are relatively many speeches, all decidedly martial in tone, and there are far more similes to characterize its protagonist Heracles. The *Works and Days* is a different poem altogether, being a speech from one brother to another. In contrast to the other poems, there are only humans involved, iron ones like ourselves, which allows for more ambiguous emotional states and more multi-dimensional characterization.

The narrator has a keen interest in names, as a genealogist should, and employs speaking names to elucidate a character's role and place; setting seems to have a similar function. The use of foils is extremely important for characterization, especially in the *Works and Days*. Group membership is a recurrent marker for character, especially when individuals are part of a collective that is understood in terms of relative history, such as the Titans or the race of iron. Affiliation is crucial to understand the only real round character in Hesiod, Zeus. He negotiates with some of the universe's older forces, surrounds himself with personifications of power, and by serial monogamy produces divine offspring to shape the cosmos in accordance with his will. In a sense, the *Theogony*'s history of the universe is the tale of Zeus' transformation into the god of power and justice, whose presence is felt in the other poems as well.

CHAPTER 3

The Homeric Hymns

Irene de Jong

Introduction

One of the most important differences between the Homeric epics and the Homeric hymns concerns their respective protagonists. The Homeric epics 'are not poems about Gods but about human beings. These human beings inhabit a world of which the Gods are an unquestioned part, but still, within each epic, the Gods are there to illuminate, comment on and contrast with the depiction of human actions and the human condition.'[1] In the Homeric hymns the situation is the reverse: these are poems about gods, who inhabit a world 'to which mortals are admitted only as a kind of witnesses'.[2] Of course, the gods' actions always have major consequences for mortals. Thus, almost all hymns are to a greater or lesser degree aetiological, the mortal narrator explaining the origin of religious institutions or rituals, most notably the Eleusinian Mysteries (*HDem.*) or the oracle at Delphi (*HAp.*), to his mortal narratees. But the central concern of the hymnic genre is the celebration of a god or goddess, and this has clear consequences for the forms and functions of characterization, as this chapter will set out to show.

Explicit and Metonymical Characterization

The Homeric Hymns typically focus on one eponymous god or goddess, while the *Hymn to Hermes* also pays lavish attention to Apollo, and the *Hymn to Pan* to Hermes. These divine protagonists interact with other Olympian gods, nymphs (Telphousa), personified places (Delos) or mortals. The mortal characters are sometimes 'upper-class' heroic individuals known from mythology (Anchises in the *HAphr.*; Metanira, Celeus, Iambe, Triptolemus, Diocles, Eumolpus and Polyxenus in the *HDem.*) but more often 'lower-class' anonymous collectives

1 Kearns 2004: 7.

2 Parker 1991: 2.

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(Cretan sailors in *HAp.* or Tyrsenic sailors in *HDion.*)[3] or individuals (an old man at Onchestus in *HHerm.* or a mortal man in Arcadia in *HPan*). These ordinary people allow easy identification for the narratees, a crucial aspect of hymns (see the section on the 'development' of hymnic divine characters below).

All gods, not only the central hymned one, are explicitly characterized. This starts with the attributive part[4] that lists, at the opening of the hymn, the powers and attributes of the eponymous god, e.g. *HAphr.* 1–6:

> Muse, tell me the works of Aphrodite rich in gold, the Cyprian, who arouses sweet desire in gods and subdues the peoples of mortal men, and the birds that fly in heaven and all the wild beasts, as many as the mainland or sea nurture. All of them are concerned with the works of fair-garlanded Cytherea.[5]

The essential nature and character of the eponymous god is then illustrated through a narrative in which the god both characterizes himself through his words and deeds and is explicitly characterized by the hymnic narrator, often, as in the Homeric epics (→), through epithets, which in the hymns typically occur in series, e.g. *HDem.* 30–32:

> Her [Persephone] against her will her father's brother [Hades] carried off with his immortal steeds by Zeus' design, the Major General, the Hospitable One, Cronus' son whose names are many.[6]

Gods are also characterized by their fellow gods, e.g. *HHerm.* 282–288 (Apollo is addressing Hermes):

> 'My dear sly swindler, I reckon you will often be burgling well-built houses by night and leaving more than one man sitting on the floor as you rob his

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3 I largely concentrate on the six larger Homeric hymns: *HDem.* (number 2 in West's Loeb edition), *HAp.* (3), *HHerm.* (4), *HAphr.* (5), *HDion.* (7), and *HPan* (19), since they have a narrative part of some length. Translations are my own but often largely based on those of Martin West in the Loeb.

4 For the different parts of a hymn (invocation—attributive part—narrative—salutation), see Janko 1981 and *SAGN* 1: 35 (Nünlist).

5 Cf. *HAp.* 2–13; *HPan* 2–27. For the disputed interpretation of the gnomic aorists in some of these passages, see Faulkner 2005 (with older literature).

6 For the accumulation of epithets in hymns, see Richardson 1974: *ad* 31.

> house without a sound, to judge from the way you talk. And you will vex many herdsmen who sleep in the open air in mountain glens, whenever you crave meat and come upon their cattle herds and their flocks of sheep.'[7]

The abundant explicit characterization in the Homeric hymns, which makes them markedly different from the more covert Homeric epics, is most likely due to their close relationship with cultic hymns and prayers. In prayers gods are traditionally addressed by appealing to their characteristics, as e.g. in Hom. *Il.* 16.233–235:

> 'Lord Zeus, Dodonian, Pelasgian, you who live far away and rule over wintry Dodona. And the Selli live around you, your prophets, men with unwashed feet who sleep on the ground.'[8]

Next to explicit characterization, metonymical characterization plays a major role in the hymnic narratives: cult places (Eleusis, Delphi, Delos, Paphos), favourite haunts (Apollo: peaks, rivers, headlands and harbours; Hermes: mountainous pastures and plains), typical attributes (lyre, bow) and physiognomy (the smile of Aphrodite *philommeidēs*; the tallness and beauty of gods: *HAphr.* 172–175; *HDem.* 275–280; *HDion.* 3–5) all contribute to the narratees' understanding of a god.[9]

The explicit and metonymical characterization of the Homeric hymns recurs in the hymns that are, by way of *mise en abyme*, embedded in them, e.g. *HPan* 5–7:

> [nymphs tread summits] invoking Pan, the god of pastures, resplendent in his hair, squalid, who has as his lot every snowy hill, the peaks of mountains, and rocky tracks.[10]

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7 Cf. 155–161, 336–339, 436; *HDem.* 268–269; *HAphr.* 258–272 (Aphrodite describes the nymphs of Mount Ida).

8 See Furley and Bremer 2001: 1–64 (esp. 41–43 for the Homeric hymns).

9 For cult places, attributes and favourite haunts, see *SAGN* 3: 39–43 (de Jong).

10 Cf. *HAp.* 158–164 (Deliads hymn Apollo, Leto, and Artemis); *HHerm.* 57–61 (Hermes sings a hymn to himself), 428–433 (Hermes sings hymns to the Olympian gods); *HPan* 27–47 (nymphs sing hymns to Hermes and Pan); and cf. the Muses' songs in the hymnic opening of Hes. *Theogony*. Discussions of the two inset hymns of *HPan* in Thomas 2011.

This ploy of the *mise en abyme* suggests a continuity between hymnic performances of the past (here: by nymphs) and the present (by the hymnic narrator), and thereby adds to the idea, also conveyed by the omnitemporal present tenses of the attributive parts, that the immortal gods are eternally the same. The gods are, therefore, by definition static characters. But most hymns recount a form of development all the same.

The 'Development' of Hymnic Divine Characters

Gods never die, but the theo*gonic* tradition in Greek literature makes their birth, followed by their arrival on Olympus and acquisition of their *timai*—the powers for which they are honoured—central themes of Homeric hymns.[11] The centrality of these theogonic themes appears from the fact that one of the first 'hymns' sung by Hermes on his newly invented lyre has as its subject 'the immortal gods and dark Earth, how they were born and how each received his share (sc. of divine *timai*)' (*HHerm.* 427–428).

The first part of the *Hymn to Apollo* recounts Apollo's birth (*in casu*, the long search by his mother Leto for a place to give birth) and his first words, which immediately make his *timai* clear: 'I want the lyre and the curved bow as my attributes. And I shall prophesy Zeus' unerring will to humankind' (131–132).[12] His arrival on Olympus is, perhaps, evoked in two scenes (1–13 and 186–206): in the first the other gods react with fear at the sight of his bow, and in the second the gods dance and sing to the tunes of his lyre.[13] The two scenes show him exercising two of his three *timai* (archery and music/dance) and wielding his stock attributes, without his acquisition of them having been recounted. The second part of the *Hymn to Apollo* does tell of the acquisition of a *timē*, Apollo's status as god of prophecy. After a long search he founds his oracle in Delphi, selects his ministers, and (perhaps) gives his first oracle.[14] In this

11 For the theme of the acquisition (or readjustment) of *timai* in the Homeric hymns, see esp. Clay 1989 and 2011. She argues that the hymns fill in the gap between the Homeric epics, where the Olympian pantheon is stable and in full swing, and Hesiod's *Theogony*, which recounts the genesis of that pantheon.

12 Like all gods, Apollo displays a miraculous speed of growth; cf. *HHerm.* 17–18.

13 For discussion whether one or both scenes evoke Apollo's *first* arrival on Olympus, see *SAGN* 3: 40 n. 3 (de Jong).

14 Chappell 2006: 333 has suggested that Apollo's threatening words to his Cretan ministers at 540–543, rather than referring to a specific historical event (the First Sacred War), is 'deliberately vague, perhaps appropriately oracular'.

narrative the god also uses his bow (to shoot the serpent 'Pytho': 301–302) and dances (513–516).

In the *Hymn to Pan* nymphs sing a hymn about Pan, in which his conception by Hermes in Arcadia, his birth by the daughter of Dryops, and his arrival on Olympus are recounted (32–47).

The most elaborate instance of the birth-theme is found in the *Hymn to Hermes*, the narrative of which starts with Hermes' birth, and then shows this 'illegitimate' son of Zeus having to work harder than other gods to get to the Olympus and acquire his *timai*. Much of the humour of the narrative derives from Hermes both acting and not acting like a child and both stressing and denying that he is one (cf. 21, 40, 52, 150–153, 163–165, 237–242, 254, 267–268, 293–296, 305–306, 331, 336, 376, 388). His progress is charted by the gradual upgrading of his birthplace, from a cave (6) into a 'temple' (246–251),[15] but above all by his epithets.[16]

At the moment of his birth the narrator calls Hermes 'resourceful, cunning, a robber, a rustler of cattle, a bringer of dreams, a watcher by night and a gate-lurker' (13–15). His resourcefulness is immediately demonstrated by his invention of the lyre, while his cunning and thieving nature come to the fore in his nightly (cf. 67, 68, 97, 141, 155–156) theft of Apollo's cattle (cf. 136) and his trick of making the cattle walk backwards and himself using special sandals (cf. 76). Upon his return from this nightly exploit, his mother greets him with the following words: 'What are you up to, wily one, where have you been in the night-time, clad in shamelessness?' (155–156), whereby her 'wily one' (*poikilomēta*) mirrors the narrator's 'cunning' (*haimulomētēn*) of 13. In his answer Hermes voices his ambitions to get to Olympus and acquire *timai* (166–173):

> 'I am going to embark on the finest of arts, looking after me and you for ever. We won't put up with staying here and being without offerings or prayers alone of all the immortals, as you are suggesting. It is better to spend every day in pleasant chat among the gods, with wealth and riches and substance, than to sit at home in a gloomy cave. As for my honour (*timēs*), I shall acquire the same worship as Apollo has.'

If Zeus will not give him those honours, he will become 'the prince of thieves' (175) and even burgle Apollo's temple in Delphi.

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15 See *SAGN* 3: 42–43 (de Jong).

16 The following discussion is based on Greene 2005.

His claim is fulfilled sooner than expected. Apollo, having found out about Hermes' theft of his cattle, comes to the cave, addresses him as 'my dear sly swindler' (282), and announces that his privilege (*geras*, more or less the same as *timē*) among gods will be to be known as 'the prince of thieves' (292).

They go to the Olympus to have the case of Hermes' theft tried there. Zeus refers to Hermes as 'this newborn child with the build of a herald', and thereby announces one of his other *timai*, that of messenger of the gods (cf. e.g. *Il.* 24.332–345). In his report of the theft Apollo more than once stresses Hermes' thieving nature and calls him 'a thoroughgoing plunderer type' (336). Hermes emphatically denies being 'a rustler of cattle' (377), but his equally emphatic announcement that he will speak the truth alerts the narratees, who know his true nature (and the true course of events), to his deceit. Zeus, too, of course sees through Hermes' lies and good-humouredly focalizes him as a 'wicked boy' (389). He orders Hermes and Apollo to go back to the scene of the crime, with Hermes, 'the go-between' (*diaktoron*: 392), leading the way. Of course, this role is related to the fact that only Hermes can tell where the cows are hidden, but Zeus' use (in indirect speech) of Hermes' stock epithet *diaktoros* (*Il.* 2.103; *Od.* 1.84, etc.) suggests that he is growing into his status as Olympian god.

Hermes gives back the cattle but of course cannot bring back to life the two cows he has slaughtered. In order to pacify Apollo he starts playing his lyre. The epithets that Apollo now bestows on him acquire a new and more positive tone: 'Killer of cows, ingenious inventor, busy companion of the meal' (436). Eager to get this lyre, Apollo promises Hermes to introduce him on Olympus and, still calling him 'thief' (*philēta*), also for the first time addresses him as 'son of Zeus (and Maia)' (446, again at 455). Hermes gives his brother the lyre and claims for himself the role of god of fertility of herds and flocks (491–495). When he arrives at the Olympus again, now officially, the narrator refers to Apollo and him as 'the very beautiful children of Zeus' (504). But Apollo is not yet quite at ease. Addressing Hermes as a 'cunning go-between' (*diaktore poikilomēta*: 514) he asks for an oath that he will never steal from him again, since he has the Zeus-given *timē* of 'performing property-switching' (516–517). We see that Hermes' status as a 'robber' (cf. 13) and 'prince of thieves' (cf. 175, 292) has now been ratified and has become his official *timē*.

Having received the promise, Apollo gives Hermes the famous golden wand which will become his stock attribute (529–530), as is indicated right away by the god addressing him as brother 'with the golden wand' (*khrusorrhapi*, cf. *Od.* 5.87). He also calls Hermes a 'courser-deity among the gods' (551), once more referring to his *timē* as a messenger of the gods, offers him ownership of three prophetic sisters on Mt. Parnassus (533–566) and announces that he

will be god of cattle and flocks (567–568), as Hermes had wished for (491–495). Soon after Zeus ratifies (in indirect speech) Hermes' acquisition of this *timē* and another one: he will 'be lord over all flocks' and 'envoy to Hades' (569–573). The narrator concludes the narrative with a final reference to Hermes' status as god of thieves (576–578):

> He [Hermes] consorts with all mortals and immortals. Rarely he benefits them, but indiscriminately through the dark night he cheats the peoples of mankind.

The omnitemporal present tenses underscore that this status is now permanent.

A variant of the theme of the acquisition of *timai* is found in the *Hymn to Demeter*, where we hear about the adjustment of the goddess' powers. At the start of the narrative Demeter's *timē* is to foster (agricultural) fertility (cf. her epithets *aglaokarpon*, 'with resplendent fruits': 4 and *hōrēphore aglaodōre*, 'bringer of resplendent gifts in season'). Pining for her daughter who has been abducted by Hades, Demeter withholds her power to bring crops (305–309). At last Zeus approves the giving back of her daughter and promises her any *timai* she wishes as compensation for her suffering (460–462). We are not told explicitly what these new *timai* are, but they are probably the Eleusinian Mysteries or the interweaving of Hades and Olympus, with Persephone being queen of Hades but also participating in the assembly of gods on Olympus and the power of Demeter extending to Hades through her provision of mortals after death.[17]

In the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, finally, we see a *timē*, Aphrodite's power to unite gods and mortals in love, curtailed. At the beginning of the narrative Zeus, one of Aphrodite's most frequent 'victims', decides to turn the tables on this goddess and, making her herself fall in love with a mortal and conceive a child, put an end to her boasting about her power over all gods (46–52). At the end of the narrative, Aphrodite herself draws the conclusion that she will no longer pride herself on her ability to couple gods and immortals (252–255).[18]

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17 For the first option, see e.g. Clay 1989: 261–263; for the second, Jaillard 2005.

18 Some scholars argue that Aphrodite here says that she will stop coupling gods and mortals altogether, thereby ending the era of the heroes, offspring of gods and mortals; see van der Ben 1986: 33; Clay 1989: 165–166, 183, 192–193; and Olson 2012: 29. In my view, if this were the message of this hymn it would have been made explicit.

The themes of a god's birth,[19] arrival on the Olympus and acquisition of power turns the hymns into texts that 'tell how gods *came to be* what mortals know them as' and thus presents a uniquely dynamic view of the gods.[20] Another hymnic theme allows mortals, both the mortal characters in the narrative and the mortal narratees, even to get close to the gods: epiphany.

Epiphany as a Characterizing Device

Meetings between gods and mortals, whereby the god assumes a human (in hymns also bestial) identity which he or she sheds at the end of the meeting or which is somehow seen through by the mortal, are a regular part of both epic and hymnic narrative.[21] The moment of the god displaying his or her true identity (epiphany) in the Homeric hymns is much more prominent than in Homer: in Homer only 4 out of 24 meetings between gods and mortals involve—briefly described—epiphanies (Athena: Achilles in *Il.* 1.193–222; Aphrodite: Helen in *Il.* 3.383–420; Athena: Odysseus in *Od.* 13.288–313 and 16.157–177), whereas 4 of the 6 longer hymns have an epiphany and most have even more than one.[22] There is also a difference in the effect of the encounter: in the epics the gods merely help the plot to develop (e.g. Athena/'Mentes' encouraging Telemachus to go out and look for information about his father: *Od.* 1.96–324), while in the hymns the encounter between god and mortals has everlasting results: a temple, altar, festival or heroic lineage. This turns epiphany into *the* central event of most hymnic narratives.[23] Taking my cue from this observation, I will argue that epiphanies are a major form of characterization, and a highly important one at that, since as Platt 2011 has argued convincingly, humans in the real world can only know the invisible gods by means of verbal or visual representations and

19 For another (brief) instance of the birth-theme, see the *Hymn to Athena* (number 28).

20 Parker 1991: 2, my italics.

21 For such scenes in Homeric epic, see de Jong 2001: *ad* 1.96–324, with literature (to which should be added Turkeltaub 2007); in the Homeric hymns, Bremer 1975: 1–12; Sowa 1984: 236–261; Garcia 2002; (in *HHerm.*) Vergados 2011; (in *HDion.*) Jaillard 2011.

22 *HPan* is the only hymn without any reference to a meeting between god and mortal. *HHerm.* has encounters between Hermes and Apollo with the old man at Onchestus but lacks an epiphany. For the suggestion that the *HHerm.* in fact is an indirect epiphany in that the god's works are not only described but also enacted within the hymn's performance, see Vergados 2011.

23 Cf. Bremer 1975: 2: 'Die göttliche Erscheinung steht im Mittelpunkt der *homerischen Hymnen.*' See also Kearns 2004: 71–72 and Parker 1991: 2.

for these representations to be 'compelling and trustworthy they must derive their value and authority from a perceived potentiality for direct engagement with the divine'.[24] The epiphanies within the hymns at the same time construct and confirm the shape of the eponymous gods.

In the *Hymn to Dionysus* Dionysus takes on the mortal disguise of a 'youth in first manhood' with 'beautiful black locks' waving about him (3–5). Tyrsenian pirates, who take him to be the son of a king (11), seize him, but when they try to bind him, he gives a display of his divine powers (a first, partial epiphany): the osiers fall clear away from his hands and feet. Only one of the pirates, the helmsman, realizes that they are dealing with a god: 'This is either Zeus, or Apollo with the silver bow, or Poseidon; he is not like mortal men but like the gods who dwell on Olympus' (19–21). He suggests that the prisoner should be released but the captain and other pirates persist in their plan to sell him. The god then gives a second display of his power, now specifically as god of wine: he makes wine flow over the ship and vine and ivy grow on the mast (34–42). This time all pirates react with the amazement and fear typical of divine epiphany (37, 48), but the angry god does not stop there. Taking on the shape of a lion he seizes (and presumably devours) the captain. His disguise as (or metamorphosis into) a lion at the same time reveals his true nature, in that Dionysus is a god who can take on theriomorphic shapes (at least in the eyes of mortals who are under his influence: see e.g. E. *Ba.* 920–921). The other mariners leap into the sea and are changed into dolphins, but the helmsman is spared and becomes witness to the god's full epiphany: 'I am loud-roaring Dionysus, whom Cadmus' daughter Semele bore after mingling in love with Zeus' (56–57).

In the *Hymn to Apollo*, Apollo, taking on the shape of a dolphin, leaps onto the ship of Cretans whom he has chosen to become the ministers of his oracle in Delphi (400–401). The reaction of the sailors (amazement and fear: 404, 415) suggests that they realize that they are dealing not with an ordinary animal (416–417). Apollo appearing to the men in the shape of a dolphin thus is a first, partial epiphany, and, as in the case of Dionysus the lion, the shape chosen characterizes Apollo. For as the god himself later explains (493–496):

> 'Even as I originally leapt onto your speedy ship in the misty sea in the form of a dolphin, so you are to pray to me as 'the Dolphin god', and the altar itself [which he has just ordered them to build on the shore] will be 'Delphian' and it will be visible for ever.'

24 Platt 2011: 53. Her whole first chapter on 'framing epiphany in art and text', esp. pp. 60–76, has been highly illuminating for writing my chapter.

We see that divine disguises in the Homeric hymns differ from those in the Homeric epics: in the latter gods choose a disguise that suits their addressee (e.g. Athena taking on the identity of a friend of Nausicaa at *Od.* 6.22–23), in the hymns one that suits their true nature.

Apollo then performs a second divine feat: with his breath he effortlessly steers the ship to Crisa, Delphi's port. The omniscient hymnic narrator leaves no doubt about Apollo's (and Zeus') role (427–428, 437), but for the time being records no reaction of the Cretan sailors. How they interpret what happens to them will become clear only later. When they have landed in Crisa Apollo leaves the ship and quickly goes back and forth to his temple in Delphi (the building of which had been recorded earlier in the narrative: 294–299) in a second partial epiphany: he first moves like a star in broad daylight and later lights a flame in the sanctum of his temple (440–444). The women of Crisa react with the fear typical of an epiphany (447), but they also raise a ritual cry (*ololuxan*: 445) and thereby already act as his followers. Light and splendour are common elements in divine epiphany, but they are also special characteristics of Apollo, as is indicated by the narrator at 444 (he lit a flame 'making manifest his signs of divine power') and as appeared earlier at 202–203, when dancing and playing his lyre 'splendour shines about him, and [bright is] the flashing of his feet and well-spun tunic'. Once again, his disguise (a star) suits, indeed reveals his nature.

Apollo, having prepared the temple for the arrival of the ministers who are going to live and work there, returns to the ship and the Cretan sailors, now in the shape of a 'sturdy yeoman in his first prime, his hair falling over his broad shoulders' (449–450). This disguise of Apollo much resembles that of Dionysus at the beginning of the narrative of *HDion.* and sculptures of Apollo in the actual Greek world. Thus it seems to be the mortal shape coming closest to how Greeks thought male gods looked like, and Apollo's disguise is arguably an epiphany. Indeed, the Cretan sailors seeing the youth realize that he is a god and their leader says: 'Stranger, as you do not at all resemble a mortal in body and stature but rather resemble the immortal gods, I bid you all hail and may the gods grant you blessings' (464–466). Looking back on the event of their strange arrival in Crisa, he now detects a divine hand there too: 'now we have landed without our ship, against our will, longing to go home, by another route and by other ways, but one of the gods brought us here, without us wishing it' (471–473). Whether this was their opinion at the moment the mysterious sea voyage took place or is only due to progressive insight must remain open. Finally, Apollo reveals his identity to them: 'I am the son of Zeus and I declare to be Apollo' (480).

In the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, Aphrodite, smitten by Zeus with love for the mortal Anchises, first makes herself as beautiful as possible in Paphos (58–

63) and then presents herself to Anchises in the shape of a highly attractive mortal maiden, a disguise which both suits her identity as goddess of love and her intention to seduce him. But her plan threatens to misfire, since Anchises takes her for a goddess (84–95):

> Anchises, seeing her took stock and was amazed at her build, height, and shining clothes. For the dress which she wore was brighter than fire, and she wore twisted bracelets and shining ear-rings, and around her tender neck there were very beautiful necklaces, fair, of gold, and elaborately wrought. Like the moon it shone around her tender breasts, a wonder to behold. And desire gripped Anchises, and he addressed her: 'Hail, Lady, whoever you are of the blessed ones that arrive at this dwelling, Artemis, or Leto or golden Aphrodite or fair-born Themis or owl-eyed Athena or perhaps you came here one of the Charites, …'

Aphrodite's disguise, thus, ironically works out as a partial epiphany.[25] In order to achieve what she as goddess of love wants to achieve, to go to bed with Anchises, she has to deny her divine identity, for mortals fear to make love to gods (cf. 83 and Anchises' later panic after she has revealed her true identity, 181–183). Hence, she goes on to back up her physical disguise with an invented biography as a Phrygian princess and at the same time exercising her power as goddess of love manages to persuade Anchises to go to bed with her, although, as the narrator notes, he does 'not know for sure' whether she is a mortal or not (167). After the deed Aphrodite resumes her immortal shape and appears to Anchises in a full epiphany (172–175):

> Having dressed herself well all around her body, bright goddess, she stood in the steading, and her head touched the well-fashioned roof, and from her cheeks shone beauty, divine, such as belongs to fair-crowned Cytherea.

Anchises recognizes her as a goddess (perhaps but not necessarily as Aphrodite) and panics (183–190):

> And he covered his handsome face back again in his blanket, and begging her spoke winged words: 'At once when I first saw you, goddess, with my eyes, I knew you were a god; but you did not speak the truth. But

25 Cf. Faulkner 2008: *ad* 83–90: 'partial epiphany is in fact what is happening here'.

> now I beseech you by Zeus holding the aegis: do not leave me to dwell among men as an enfeebled creature, but have pity. For a man loses his procreative forces, who goes to bed with immortal goddesses.'

Aphrodite reassures him and at the end of a long speech also, rather obliquely, reveals her name (287).

The most complex epiphany is that in the *Hymn to Demeter*. When Demeter, travelling the earth in search for her daughter Persephone, arrives in Eleusis, she assumes the shape of 'an ancient woman, who is debarred from motherhood and the gifts of garland-loving Aphrodite, a woman like those who are nurses to the children of lawgiving kings or housekeepers in bustling houses' (101–104). This mortal disguise suits (1) her status as mother-goddess, (2) perhaps her role in the Eleusinian mysteries, where a child is born to the goddess,[26] and (3) of course her ensuing role in the hymnic narrative, when she will become the nurse of the son of the royal family of Eleusis, Demophon. The first mortals who meet her, the four daughters of the king, do not recognize her, as the narrator explicitly notes (111). But when she, upon their invitation and after having offered them her services as a nurse, enters the palace, a partial epiphany takes place (188–190):

> then Demeter stepped onto the threshold; and her head touched the roof, and she filled the doorway with divine radiance. She [queen Metanira] was seized by awe and reverence and pale fear.

We have all the ingredients of an epiphany (height and radiance of god, awe and fear of a mortal), yet in the ensuing dialogue Metanira addresses Demeter as a mortal and nowhere appears to suspect that she might be a god and Demeter answers as a mortal, without revealing her divine identity. Why this partial epiphany which does not influence the plot (as it does in other cases)? For one thing, for the story to develop as it does, Metanira must not know that the old woman is a goddess. But to achieve this effect the narrator might simply have said that the queen, like her daughters, did not recognize the goddess. My suggestion is that since the ensuing section—in which the goddess is received

26 For a discussion of Demeter's nursing of Demophon as an *aition* for part of the ritual of the Mysteries, see Richardson 1974: *ad* 231–255 and update in Richardson 2011: 50–53. Parker 1991: 9–10 sees the event as motivation for the institution of the Mysteries as a whole: 'Deprived of all hopes of immortality (Demophon stands for us all), we are reduced to seeking to improve our prospects for the afterlife by rites.'

in the household of Metanira and Celeus—has an important aetiological function, reflecting as it does the preliminary ritual of the Mysteries,[27] the epiphany is aimed *at the narratees* and serves to remind them of Demeter's true, divine status.

As a result of her not recognizing the goddess, the queen misinterprets Demeter's placing Demophon into the fire (in order to immortalize him) and interrupts her beneficial work. Now the angry goddess reveals her true identity (268–269):

> 'I am Demeter the honoured one, who is the greatest boon and joy to immortals and mortals.'

Her verbal epiphany is followed by a visual one, the fullest in the Homeric epics and hymns (275–280):

> After these words the goddess changed her form and stature, thrusting old age away; beauty wafted all about her. And a lovely fragrance spread from her scented dress, and a radiance shone afar from the immortal body of the goddess; flaxen locks grew down over her shoulders, and the sturdy house was filled with a brilliance of lightning.

As we have seen, radiant light is a stock element of epiphanies, but the stress on light here might also reflect the importance of light for the Mysteries: at the climax of the ceremonies there was the blaze of many torches in the night.

We may conclude that epiphanies play a central role in the characterization of gods in the Homeric hymns. Firstly, the disguises or shapes adopted by the gods at the start of their meetings with men suit their nature and thereby as much reveal as disguise them. Secondly, the moment of epiphany itself is instrumental to the encomiastic aim of hymns, showing as it does the god in his or her full splendour. Making the onlookers of that epiphany not heroes or heroines, as in the Homeric epics, but ordinary people offers the narratees of the hymn a point of reference to identify with and thereby to become, vicariously, witness of the narrated epiphany themselves. The narrated epiphany as it were forms a *mise en abyme* of the epiphany *the hymn itself* is supposed to bring about: the hymn is a gift that the hymnic singer offers, on behalf of a group of people or community, to the god, who is supposed to come and give some form of blessing or help in return for the gift, as the customary salutation

27 For the aetiological nature of this section, see Richardson 1974: *ad* 192–211.

at the end of hymns make clear.[28] The representation of an epiphany inside the hymn helps its listeners to make that epiphany happen (in their fantasy or projected on a cult image).[29]

Moral Evaluation of Hymnic Characters

Hymns being encomia of gods, these gods are, of course, never held up for moral scrutiny. Indeed, even the greatest rascal of all, Hermes, is smiled upon by Zeus (though not by his direct victim Apollo), who vindicates his stealing and lying by making clear that these are this god's *timai*.[30] The mortal characters of the hymns are occasionally evaluated by the narrator (Metanira's spying on Demeter is called 'folly', *aphradiēisin*: *HDem*. 243; the Phlegyae are called 'hybristic men, who disregard Zeus': *HAp*. 278–279) or other characters (Metanira is reviled by Demeter: *HDem*. 256–258, who also uses the word 'folly', *aphradiēisin*; the Tyrsenian pirates by one of their fellow-pirates: *HDion*. 17; and Eos by Aphrodite: *HAphr*. 223; the Cretan sailors/ministers are gently reproached by Apollo: *HAp*. 532–533; and Anchises is warned by Aphrodite not to boast 'with foolish mind', *aphroni tumōi*: *HAphr*. 286).

The hymns do not teach lessons on the basis of the acts of individuals, but they do contain evaluations of the nature of mortals as a collective. Gods and men need each other (men need gifts of the gods like agriculture and prophesy and gods crave the cult and sometimes the physical love of men), but the two worlds and lives are strictly separate. Man cannot become immortal (Demophon) or if he does the experiment is unsuccessful (Tithonus: *HAphr*. 218–238), the one favourable exception being Ganymede (*HAphr*. 202–217). The gulf separating their worlds is symbolized by the dramatic growth of the gods' size at the moment of epiphany, which threatens to exceed the dimensions of the mortals' houses, and the physical reactions of fear, speechlessness or averting of eyes on the part of the mortals. It is, perhaps, most poignantly

28 Note esp. the *khaire* of these salutations, which perhaps is not so much a farewell as a greeting. For the idea that hymns work towards the hymned god's epiphany, see Depew 2000: 73–74; Garcia 2002; Vergados 2011: 85–86; Thomas 2011: 164; and Platt 2011: 61–62.

29 Platt 2011: 68–70 rightly points out, however, that even the epiphanies in the Homeric hymns do not describe in detail how *the bodies* of the gods look: the narrator focuses on their clothes or jewellery but stops at the moment these are taken off or makes the mortal interlocutors avert their eyes.

30 For Delos' enigmatic qualification of Apollo as *atasthalon*, '(potentially) violent' at *HAp*. 67, see N.J. Richardson 2010: ad loc.

illustrated by the fact that the mortals' *condition humaine* is for the gods no more than a song to entertain themselves with (*HAp.* 190–193):

> (the Muses) sing of all the gods' divine gifts and of human sufferings, which they have from the immortal gods and live witless and helpless, and they cannot find a remedy for death or a defence against old age.

If mortals can never become immortal they can, however, benefit from the gods; for this they must show themselves faithful followers. Thus hymnic narratives end with an indication of the 'blessedness' of the god's followers (*HDem.* 480–483, cf. *meg' olbios*; *HDion.* 54: cf. *panolbion*) or, conversely, the pronouncement by the god of a curse for those who do *not* behave properly towards him (*HHermes* 577–578; *HAp.* 540–543), or a comical inversion of the theme (*HHermes* 577–578: Hermes brings mortals *no* profit).

Conclusion

The Homeric hymns are encomia that narrate the *timai* and *erga* of individual gods, often as they are being exercised for the first time after birth. They are, therefore, to a large degree characterizing: the attributive sections, the prolific use of epithets, the gods' fitting anthropomorphic or theriomorphic disguises, and above all the narratives themselves (the god of theft stealing cattle, the goddess of love falling in love, the goddess of agriculture giving or withholding crops, the god of music dancing and playing his lyre) all present detailed and compelling pictures of the gods hymned.

The hymns are an important complement to the Homeric epics where the 'invention' of the Greek gods about which Herodotus speaks is concerned: Demeter and Dionysus do not or hardly figure in the epics, Hermes and Aphrodite only make fleeting appearances, while Apollo's Delphic and prophetic aspect is only briefly touched upon (*Od.* 8.79–81).[31]

The epiphanies in which most hymnic narratives culminate bring the gods close, not only to the characters inside the narrative but also to the mortal narratees of the hymns. They present in narrative form the meeting of god and mortals that the hymn itself aspires to; it is hoped that the god will listen to

31 To what extent divine characters in Greek literature have the same flexible personality as mortal ones, i.e. appear differently in different texts, is a question which merits further investigation.

the hymn and will come to accept it as his gift. If I quoted in my introduction Parker's remark that mortals are only admitted as witnesses in the hymns, we may now revise that remark and leave out the 'only': the mortal characters' role as witnesses is absolutely crucial in understanding the construction of divine character in the hymns.

CHAPTER 4

Apollonius of Rhodes

Jacqueline Klooster

Introduction

The *Argonautica* has often been studied from the point of view of characterization, especially of its two protagonists Jason and Medea. The description of the inner workings of the love-stricken Medea's psyche (book 3) forms a focal point in these studies. This portrayal has even gained Apollonius the fame of being the inventor of the interior monologue, and his epic that of being a precursor of the modern novel.[1] But the characterization of Jason and Medea has also given rise to much perplexity among scholars. In Jason's case this has predominantly centred on the evaluation of his 'problematic' heroism: is he a scoundrel and anti-hero, or merely a human being in an epic scenario, or rather a love-hero and successful diplomat, and thus really a new kind of hero?[2] Medea's portrayal on the other hand has evoked bafflement on account of the perceived inconsistencies in her character and attitude towards Jason: an innocent maiden helplessly in love with the attractive stranger, or rather a fearsome witch with a dark, paranoid and basically cruel nature, whose love has vanished before the epic is over—or again, is she a complex figure, and should the aforementioned polarities not be considered incompatible? It will perhaps not come as a surprise that these issues have negatively influenced the appreciation of Apollonius' epic in the past: Jason was often considered a 'failed' hero and Medea's apparent '*Zwiespalt*' was understood as a result of Apollonius' general inability to create narrative unity.[3]

1 Scholes and Kellog 1966: 181: 'the credit for this development must go to Apollonius Rhodius—a narrative artist who has nothing like his due acclaim—though he undoubtedly learned something from the Greek tragic dramatists.' See on this Papadopoulou 1997: 641–664 and Fusillo 2008: 147–166.

2 See for different appraisals of Jason, with recognition of the ambivalence of his character especially: Lawall 1966: 121–169 (anti-hero/love-hero); Klein 1983: 115–126 (sceptic philosopher); Hunter 1988: 436–453 (textual construct); Jackson 1992: 155–162 (human being in epic scenario); Mori 2008 *passim* (diplomat).

3 Jason: Körte 1929: 183: 'discreet, proper, quite weak and somewhat colorless', Bowra 1933:

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Although such conclusions now hopefully seem wide off the mark, the questions that led to them are not entirely misguided. Instead of *polumētis*, *polutlas* or simply *dios*, Jason's stock epithet is, significantly, the rather unheroic *amēkhanos* (helpless, at a loss). The inscrutability of Medea's motives is in fact given thematic prominence in the opening of the fourth book, where the narrator, invoking the Muse, expresses his own uncertainty as to whether fear or love drove Medea to follow Jason and leave her fatherland (4.1–4). It must be immediately noted that figures of relatively minor importance (such as the Argonauts Heracles, Peleus, Idas, Telamon and Polydeuces but also Hypsipyle, Aeetes and Phineus) are much less ambiguously drawn and accordingly have received less, and less widely varying, appraisals.[4]

The *Argonautica* is an epic that is played out between the twin poles of heroic quest and romance. These two motifs, the adventurous, potentially glamorous task of gaining the Golden Fleece and the first and violent onset of erotic love are of crucial importance for the sketching of the protagonists' characters. Love and quest both function as rites of initiation of a kind, testing grounds for the mettle of young Jason and Medea, into which they have been involuntarily drawn by the scheming of the tyrannical Pelias and the gods. The ways they experience these trials, their emotions and (re)actions, are arguably a central concern of the epic. Heroism and love also represent two seemingly opposite and obviously gendered goals (Jason's ultimate aim is not the winning of the maiden princess' heart; Medea's most heartfelt wish is not to steal the Golden Fleece and gain fame), which are however inseparably linked: one goal cannot be reached without the successful integration of the other.[5] And as it finally turns out heroism is not possible without love, but love is also impossible without sufficient heroism, as the ominous events in book 4 with their overtones of Euripidean tragedy imply.

The intricate way in which Apollonius varies and combines his characterizing devices repays close attention. It may immediately be noted that he often uses a whole array of these techniques all mixed together for an immediate effect in a scene depicting a secondary character (like Amycus, Hypsipyle or Phineus), but that characters are also slowly built up by recurrent, cumulative,

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221, 'uninteresting when he is not repellent', Mooney 1964: 37 'tame and insipid', on Medea's dichotomy: Rohde 1960: 112; Wilamowitz 1924: 12; Christ-Stählin-Schmid 1920: 145; this thesis was revived by Otis 1963: ch. 3. See in general Phinney 1967: 327–334, Hunter 1987: 129–139; Dyck 1989: 455–470.

4 See e.g. Fränkel 1960: 1–20 on Idas; Williams 1996: 463–479 on Aeetes.

5 Cf. the emblematic picture of Aphrodite mirrored in the shield of Ares on Jason's cloak in 1.742–746.

mutually reinforcing or contrasting indications throughout the epic (Jason and Medea) and that to discuss devices separately may not always be representative of Apollonius' use of them. For that reason I will in the following, besides discussion of isolated techniques, also look at how *scenes* are constructed, and give comprehensive overviews of the construction of some minor characters. I finish with a more detailed discussion of the portrayals of Jason and Medea, with special focus on the question of why these protagonists have been open to such different evaluations.

Indirect Characterization through Intertexts with Previous Models (Metaphorical)

As in Homer (→), in the *Argonautica* we are dealing with the material of myth, and, therefore, with a story about well-known heroes. Even more to the point, in Apollonius' age the myths about the Argo's quest had presumably already been treated numerous times by previous or contemporary authors, and, therefore, when the narrator characterizes his protagonists he may count on a deposit of literary associations in the minds of his narratees, which he can activate or manipulate. A case in point is the connection between Euripides' Jason and Medea and Apollonius' characterization of them. It has often been observed that the *Argonautica* is written as a prequel to the Euripidean end-game between the former lovers: working back from the Euripidean data, the poet has tried to imagine what interplay of psychological and situational elements finally led to the tragic outcome.[6] The remarkable effect is that Jason and Medea become more 'real' in this way, since they exist outside of the *Argonautica* as well, and narratees will be tempted to fill in gaps in the epic with their knowledge of this other portrayal of the protagonists. Related in effect is the fact that some of the Argonauts are the fathers of Homeric heroes, which invites comparison with their well-known sons: Peleus (Achilles) and Telamon (Ajax), whose valour is stressed on various occasions, come to mind.

Besides previous literary treatments of his characters, the narrator also invokes more general models and literary stereotypes, mainly by pointedly alluding to Homeric story patterns and vocabulary.[7] Thus Medea is notably linked with Nausicaa (another innocent girl in love with a stranger) and Home-

6 Cf. Hunter 1989: 19; 24.

7 See e.g. Hunter 1987; 1993; Knight 1995; Rengakos 1993.

ric Circe (another potentially dangerous but amorously inclined sorceress), whereas Jason is different from Iliadic heroes like Agamemnon or Achilles (not prone to anger, no prominent physical courage, no real concern for *timē*, *kudos* or *kleos*, no arrogant leadership), but in certain ways very similar to Odysseus (an opportunistic traveller who charms women and has a way with words).[8] The narratees are thus also continually invited to weigh the characters against Homeric foils, a process that enhances depth and complexity: could Medea actually be like Nausicaa, given the circumstances? In what ways is Jason an anti-Achilles, and why?

The complexities of comparisons to mythical and literary predecessors are pointedly reflected in the strategy of self-interpretation attributed to the characters in the epic when Jason, in his courtship of Medea, compares their situation to that of Theseus and Ariadne (3.997–1006). Jason significantly leaves out the bit where Theseus abandons Ariadne, which triggers the narratees to remember his own eventual abandonment of Medea in Corinth in tragedy. Medea, who is unaware of this episode of the myth answers that she will not be another Ariadne (3.1107–1108). Given the context, this apparently means that she does not expect her father to come to terms with Jason (as Minos did with Theseus, in Jason's version). But the narratees are invited to ask in what other ways this may be true (Medea is certainly much more dangerous for Jason than Ariadne was for Theseus), or false (Medea *is* like Ariadne in that she will be abandoned by the man she helps).

Minor Characters

The catalogue of heroes appears very early in the poem (1.22–233), and thus functions as a roll-call (*geneēn te kai ounoma hērōōn* 1.20). From the point of view of characterization, it serves as a presentation of the Argonauts as heroes, brave and famous men, born long ago (cf. *palaigeneōn klea phōtōn* 1.1, *aristēessi sun andrasin* 1.70), which of course creates a certain epic *Erwartungshorizont* for the narratees. The Argonauts generally function as a group, and are at several occasions even apostrophized as such.[9] As a group they are characterized as young, pious and democratic Greek heroes.

The short curriculums of the heroes are in some ways also reminiscent of the obituaries of the Homeric (→) 'little warriors', in that they furnish only

8 Hunter 1989: 29.

9 Cf. Klooster 2013: 151–173.

the briefest of heroic credentials: e.g. their courage, why they participate, their heroic lineage, geographic provenance and supernatural powers (when of divine descent). The description of Polyphemus will serve as an example (1.40–44):

> … from Larisa came Polyphemus, Eilatus' son, who in former times had fought as a young man among the mighty Lapithae when the Lapithae armed themselves against the Centaurs. At this point though, his limbs were already heavy but his heart still remained as warlike as before.[10]

As noted, the secondary figures in the epic are usually characterized in a far more straightforward way than the protagonists. Direct characterization by the narrator (through adjectives or epithets) may at times even seem overdetermined, and caricature-like: the interpretation and appreciation of the narratees is steered very clearly. So for instance the introduction of the king of the Bebrycians, Amycus:

> Here were located the ox stables and sheepfold of Amycus, the haughty (*agēnoros*) king of the Bebrycians, whom the nymph Bithynian Melie, having made love to Poseidon Genethlius once bore, the most arrogant (*huperoplēestaton*) of men, who imposed even on strangers an outrageous (*aeikea*) law that no one could depart before making trial of him in boxing; and many were the neighbours he had killed. And on this occasion he went to the ship and insolently scorned to ask (*huperbasiēisin atissen*) the purpose of their voyage or who they were …
>
> 2.1–9

The image of Amycus as a randomly aggressive brute is subsequently compounded more indirectly, though not at all more subtly, by his speech (referred to by the narrator as spoken in 'arrogance', *mega phroneōn* 2.19). At this point it may be remarked that the narrator of the *Argonautica* practically always qualifies the tone of speech of his characters. It is hardly ever left to the narratee to decide what the tone of a specific utterance is, and often, as here, qualification contains an element of moral evaluation.

Amycus' *hubris* is emphasized again and again in this scene: by the Argonauts' justifiably angry reaction (*agrios … / heile kholos*) and by the detailed contrast in appearance between Amycus and Polydeuces, who accepts his chal-

10 Transl. Race, adapted. All translations are from Race 2008.

lenge. Polydeuces is dressed in a closely woven delicate robe he received as a love gift from one of the Lemnian women; Amycus has a double-folded black cloak, and a knotted staff of mountain olive. As metonymical devices of characterization, these dress-codes tell the narratee much about the level of civilization of the wearers.

> And neither in form nor in stature were the two men alike to behold. The one seemed like the monstrous offspring of deadly Typhoeus or even of Earth herself, like those she had long ago brought forth in anger at Zeus. But Tyndareus' son was like a heavenly star, whose twinkling is most beautiful when it shines through the evening darkness. Such was Zeus' son, still sprouting the first down of a beard, still bright-eyed, but his strength and courage waxed like a wild animal's ... Amycus ... stood back in silence and kept his eyes on him and his heart was pounding in his eagerness to make blood splatter from the other man's chest.
>
> 2.37–50

The similes unambiguously associate Amycus with the chthonic forces of chaos and destruction and Polydeuces with heavenly beauty and harmony. Where we get access to Amycus' thoughts, it becomes clear that (though not why) he wants only to hurt or kill the stranger: he is a random force of savage and senseless violence, and is as such duly dispatched by the young, gallant, civilized Argonaut. Amycus functions as a symbolic foil (chaos) to what the Argonauts represent (harmony), and is in this sense also a forerunner of the Colchian king Aeetes, who is similarly gratuitously aggressive and threatening, and similarly associated with chthonic forces.[11]

The process of Aeetes' characterization is more complex than that of Amycus, though the result is hardly any more ambiguous.[12] It may be noted that his name figures 14 times before he is actually introduced to the Argonauts by Argus: it is practically always to indicate his city, palace, or country, with which he is thus emphatically identified.[13] This may in turn explain why Aeetes is not

11 For the idea of the *Argonautica* as symbolizing on one level the battle between the forces of chaos and harmony, see in particular Clare 2002.

12 *Pace* Williams 1996: 463–479. I do not agree with her conclusion that Aeetes embodies a Homeric type of heroism, whereas the Argonauts embody a 'new, Hellenistic' heroism. Aeetes is too sinister, and too openly characterized negatively by the narrator and characters to evoke Homeric heroes.

13 Cf. Sistakou 2011: 82. Aeetes' name is linked with his land, palace or city 19 times. Equally

usually qualified by epithets:[14] he is the mysterious king of the equally enigmatic Aea, land of the Golden Fleece. Up until the end of the second book, narratees and Argonauts do not receive any information about his character, although the former would of course have expected (from previous versions of the myth) that he was dangerous and hostile to the Argonautic quest, and the Argonauts are worried that he may be. Argus' first outright characterization of him confirms that Aeetes is fearsome:

> 'Aeetes is terrifyingly armed with murderous cruelty,[15] and for that reason I very much fear to make the voyage. He claims to be the son of Helius, and all around dwell countless tribes of Colchians. Even for Ares he would be a match with his terrifying war-cry and mighty strength. No, not even taking the fleece without Aeetes' knowledge is easy, for such is the snake that keeps guard all around it ... which Earth herself produced on the slopes of the Caucasus by the rock of Typhaon, where they say Typhaon dripped warm blood from his head when he was blasted by the thunderbolt of Zeus ...'
>
> 2.1203–1212

As noted, Aeetes shares with Amycus an emphatically negative characterization dominated by savage bloodlust and the association, through his guardian snake, with chthonic forces. That it is Aeetes' grandson Argus, a sympathetic figure for the Argonauts, who characterizes Aeetes in such a way, has the effect of making the characterization trustworthy and simultaneously indicating that Aeetes must be a real monster, if even his grandson speaks of him this way. Plotwise, this of course enhances the suspense: how will the Argonauts achieve their goal in the face of such an obstacle?

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revealing of his importance, and presumably of his power, is the fact that his name predominantly figures in the genitive form (42 times), indicating what and who belong to him, are closely associated with him, or fall under his sway. Besides the items just mentioned, significant objects/persons are the Golden Fleece (twice), Medea (seven times!), Apsyrtus (twice), his wife (once), and his anger (three times).

14 Epithets in the *Argonautica* have long been neglected; I have learned much from A. van den Eersten's 2013 MA-thesis on the topic. Aeetes' qualifying epithets are the geographic *Kutaios* (2.403; 2.1094; 3.228) and evaluative *huperēnōr* (4.212; 4.1051); epithets which indicate his kingly status are *kreiōn* (3.240; 3.1177) and *sēmantora Kolkhōn* (1.175).

15 The alliterations in the Greek might imply that Aeetes' name is etymologized as being related to *aiai*, *ainōs* etc. (2.1203: ***all' ainōs** oloēisin **apēneiēsin arēren** / **Aiētēs***).

In line with the observation that Aeetes is continually metonymically identified with his land or his city, as Sistakou points out, it is in fact his fantastic *palace* (rather than his physical appearance), with its many bronze Hephaestean artefacts, which is described in detail when the Argonauts enter the Colchian realm (3.213–248). This palace illustrates the magical, sinister and tyrannical character of Aeetes: its sheer size amazes the Argonauts (*tethēpotes*, 215); it incorporates magical fountains, many fantastic bronze objects, suggestive of an earlier heroic age, and its layout with large towering rooms for the king and lower buildings for the women and the slaves suggest Aeetes' patriarchal and despotic hold over his family.[16]

Aeetes has a number of speeches that characterize him; these are all concentrated in the scene of the encounter with the Argonauts. Most of them are preceded or concluded with evaluating remarks of the narrator about the (already of itself quite obvious) tone of the speeches, e.g. 3.382: 'Thus he spoke in anger' (*khalēpsamenos*). The king starts by asking his grandsons in an unfriendly way why they are back, and who the strangers are they brought with them (3.304–316). In doing so, he refers to a trip he made in the chariot of his father Helius, which showed him how far away Hellas is; this once more underlines his semi-divine stature. His reaction to Argus' explanation of the Argonauts' request of the Golden Fleece is every bit as unreasonable and threatening as Argus' characterization would have led us to expect. In his paranoid, typically tyrannical rage, Aeetes expresses his belief that the Argonauts have really come to take his throne (3.375–376), and says he would have cut off their hands, had he not just hosted them at his table. Jason, ever the diplomat, nevertheless tries to appease him with gentle words (*meilikhioisin*, 3.385), offering to war down Aeetes' enemies for him. But the only result is that Aeetes 'ponders in his heart whether he should attack and slay them on the spot or should make a test of strength' (3.397–399). The following, lengthy speech in which Aeetes describes how he himself yokes the bronze bulls that graze the plain of Ares and challenges Jason to do the same confirms the sinister supernatural strain in Aeetes' character (3.401–421), and the hopelessness of the Argonauts' plight.

Some further elements in the characterization of Aeetes are not similarly easy to interpret, although they do not undermine the general image of the fearful despot. First are two speeches to the Colchians, relayed at considerable length in *indirect discourse* by the narrator, about Aeetes' plans to trap and punish the Argonauts, before and after the contest of Jason (3.579–609 and

16 Sistakou 2011: 82.

4.228–236). It is unclear why this formal choice is made, but scholars have suggested that the intended effect is that the whole speech would have been 'too long' to represent directly, Aeetes' long-windedness being a sign of tyrannical nature.[17]

There is also a strictly speaking redundant (as Aeetes will not engage in fighting), lengthy Homeric arming scene, in which Aeetes is described as donning the war gear of Ares, and looking like Poseidon: the effect is to create another impressive image of Aeetes as a superhuman and sinister king (3.1225–1245).

Finally a simile likens Aeetes to a desolate farmer whose crops have been destroyed by heavy rains (3.1399–1404). Paradoxically, this last simile seems to invite the narratees' sympathy for cruel and tyrannical Aeetes and his horrific magical creatures. Perhaps we should read a prefiguration of Apsyrtus' murder by Medea into the mutual killing of the Earthborn. Both the arming scene and the simile fit in the generally hyperbolically Iliadic passage (thick with similes) that ends the third book.

Every act of Aeetes is tyrannical, threatening and cruel: he inspires fear and fears for his own power in turn: there is no doubt about the way the narratees are asked to interpret his portrayal. He thus has a clear structural function in the quest-plot, symbolizing the forces of evil and chaos, the opponent that would bar the heroes from obtaining the Fleece. His positive counterparts are the just rulers of the Phaeacians: *polupotnia* (4.1069) Arete and *kreion* (4.1009; 1069) Alcinous,[18] thanks to whose wise intervention Medea will be able to avoid falling into the hands of her murderous father (4.1009–1029; 1069–1110).

I have described the characterization of Amycus and Aeetes at some length in order to show something of the techniques used throughout to characterize the secondary figures. A similar procedure can be found in the portrayals of, for instance, Phineus, Hypsipyle, Idas and Peleus, though on a smaller scale.

Characterization through Intratextual Foils

Whereas the evil figures of Amycus and Aeetes serve to contrast with the valour and piety of the Argonauts as a collective, there is also an amount of intratextual characterization through association or opposition within the group of the Argonauts. Important in this context is the recurrent question (clearly inspired by the *Iliad*) of who 'the best of the Argonauts' is, which is first

17 Cf. Hunter 1989 *ad* 3.579.

18 Note that Alcinous shares this epithet with Aeetes.

broached in *Arg*. 1.332–340, as Jason invites the Argonauts to choose as their leader the 'best man' (*ton ariston*).[19] They choose the established hero Heracles, who refuses and states that the one who gathered the crew should also be their leader. Jason gladly accepts, but on several occasions the Argonauts or others hint that Heracles (who has by then been left behind) should really have accepted this role.[20] Heracles thus on the one hand becomes a kind of looming heroic alternative to Jason, but his portrayal by the narrator is also full of ironies that may make the narratees question his fitness as alternative leader, and see Jason's not always obvious qualities in a new light.

At Lemnos, as practically the whole crew of the Argo is busy making love to the Lemnian women, Heracles stays on board of his own accord, and is finally the one whose reproaches bring the men shamefacedly to leave Lemnos and return to their quest (1.861–874). This would seem to indicate that Heracles is the only one with the right priorities: business goes before pleasure. Shortly afterwards, however, Heracles' single-mindedness and superhuman force quite graphically make him stand apart from the crew, and invite the question whether he can indeed function profitably in any kind of group (1.1167–1172):

> … as Heracles was heaving up furrows in the rough swell, he broke his oar in the middle. Still grasping a piece of it in two hands, he fell sideways while the sea carried the other piece away on its receding wash. He sat up, looking around in silence, for his hands were not used to being idle.

This scene moreover leads up to the episode where Heracles is accidentally left behind because he goes looking for his squire (and probably *erōmenos*) Hylas. Heracles goes completely berserk when he hears that Hylas has disappeared; he is like a mad bull stung by a gadfly. His is apparently an *erotic* madness, as the simile implies by its reference to the *oistros* (1. 1265–1272).[21] What the narratees are left with as a final image is the superhumanly powerful Heracles impotently raging over a lost boy, forgetting the expedition. By contrast, the efficiency with which Jason succeeds in leaving Queen Hypsipyle behind without any drama (1.888–910) reveals that his approach to love, which turns out to be quite opportunistic, is, here at least, after all more practical for the quest.

19 On this theme, see in general Clauss 1992.

20 E.g. when Heracles is left behind, a great strife breaks out among the Argonauts 'to think that they had gone off and left abandoned the *best man* of their comrades' (1.1284–1286).

21 Cf. the simile that likens Eros shooting Medea to a gadfly (*oistros*) at 3.277–278 and the openly erotic version of Theoc. *Id.* 13.

Comparable functions may be attributed to the figures of Idas, Peleus and Telamon in their various ways. Idas stands out by his arrogance, his unwillingness to accept female help, and his lack of respect for the gods,[22] which creates a stark contrast with Jason's submissiveness to fate and his *amēkhaniē*. Peleus and Telamon are champions of purely physical bravery, which is not a natural talent in Jason either.

In the representation of female characters similar processes operate. The parallels and contrasts between Hypsipyle and Medea clarify but also complicate the image the narratees are invited to form of the latter. Both are nubile young virgins of royal birth, but whereas Hypsipyle is the only one of the Lemnian women who apparently abstained from the murder of male kin (a slaughter which was, significantly, caused by frenzied erotic jealousy), Medea will of course be involved in fratricide, and beyond the epic, infanticide, all as a result of her love for Jason. Hypsipyle is erotically involved with Jason (1.887), but seems to accept that he will leave her behind and probably not return, a stance that Jason admires (1.899). Medea, on the other hand, is desperately in love with Jason (*amēkhaniē* also characterizes her once she is struck with love)[23] and moreover clings to him with all her might; at the fear that he may leave her, she starts threatening him with furies and doom (4.379–390).

The Gods

Apollonius' portrayal of the gods is unequally divided over his epic.[24] In most of the epic the gods (notably Apollo and Zeus) remain distant, aloof and enigmatic for the human protagonists, and sometimes even the narrator, contributing to what Feeney calls 'the complex pessimism of the epic … the clammy atmosphere of uncertain confusion' (1991: 89). Yet there is one extended scene portraying the Olympian gods Hera, Athena, Aphrodite and Eros, which has traditionally been lauded as 'typically Hellenistic comedy of manners', but which on closer inspection hardly differs from the Iliadic characterization of the gods as humans without mortal cares. Hera is (as always) the angry spurned woman, Aphrodite deceitful and charming, and Eros an irresponsible, badly behaved and greedy child, who cheats his playmate Ganymede in a game of knucklebones (*astragaloi*).[25] The stark contrast between their light-heartedness and

22 Fränkel 1960: 1–20.

23 3.772; 3.951; 3.1157.

24 See on this topic Klein 1931: 18–65; 216–257 and Feeney 1991.

25 An allusion to Anacreon *PMG* 398.

the wretched suffering of especially Medea, their pawn, is a major theme of the epic. The piety of the Argonauts too is cast in a somewhat ironic light by this divine behaviour.

Complex Characterization

So far I have concentrated on the unambiguous characterization of minor figures and gods, and the way this enhances the intertextual and intratextual mirroring and paralleling that go on in the epic; here and there my discussion has already shown some glimpses of the character of the protagonists. It is their characters that I will now discuss, since they are the most complexly drawn figures in the epic, and their evaluation has been most debated.

Jason

The first glimpse we catch of Jason (1.260–309) is that of a young man, surrounded and clasped by women (his mother Alcimede and the servants), whom he is trying to console with soft words (*kateprēunen anias* 265; *meilikhiois epeessi parēgoreōn* 294)[26] as they bewail his imminent departure. This scene sets the tone for the characterization of Jason in the rest of the epic. Jason is repeatedly surrounded by women who bewail or fear his imminent departure (on Lemnos, in Colchis); his heroism characterized by the fact that it is only through female help (Medea, the goddesses Hera, Athena and Cypris, but also Circe and Arete) that he succeeds, although he will eventually also come to grief because of a woman. His words practically always attempt to soothe, appease or console his interlocutors. His first speech, addressed to his mother is also revealing of his attitude to fate. He tells her to bear her grief, since his departure is the will of the gods. He furthermore piously expresses his confidence in divine help, inspired by the favourable oracles.[27] Immediately afterwards, Jason is compared to the god Apollo going off to one of his sanctuaries; his beauty and youth are the points of comparison.[28]

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26 It may be noted that epithet *meilikhios* is repeated numerous times to characterize his words: of the 19 occasions on which roots of the word *meilikh-* occur, 7 are associated with Jason speaking.

27 The piety of the Argonauts, foremost among them Jason, which often takes the form of instituting rituals and cult-sites has often been remarked upon.

28 For his beauty, preternaturally enhanced by Hera, cf. 3.919–925 and the star-similes discussed below.

The main characterizing elements in this scene, then, are Jason's connection with women (who need him as he needs them); his youth and beauty; his consolatory gentleness in speech;[29] and his pious submission to fate and the gods, resulting in a heroism *malgré lui*. He goes on his way unwillingly, not to gain fame (unlike so many of the Argonauts, as the catalogue reveals). This explains his notorious, recurrent attacks of *amēkhaniē*:[30] he has landed in this adventure despite himself, in obedience to Necessity in the form of Pelias' request,[31] and he often seems to have no answer to the (admittedly enormous) problems that cross his path. It is no surprise that he leaves his country in tears (1.534–535).

Shortly after, another scene shows Jason among the Argonauts and broaches the theme of his functioning as a leader. As noted, Jason democratically offers the crew the opportunity to choose among themselves the 'best man, who will see to each thing, to take on quarrels and agreements with foreigners' (1.338–340), since 'common to us all is our return again to Hellas' land and common is our voyage to Aeetes' land' (1.336–337; the order here may reveal Jason's priorities). The crew 'with one voice' chooses Heracles, who however thinks the honour should go to Jason, as gatherer of the crew. 'Warlike' Jason (the somewhat surprising epithet *areios*, 1.349) then gets up joyfully and rouses the men to action, beginning, of course, with a sacrifice to Apollo. This sequence shows some other qualities: Jason is not obsessed with *timē* like the Iliadic warlords but favours a democratic procedure. And yet, he is not, after all, entirely averse to personal martial honour.

In other scenes we see that Jason feels a paralyzing sense of responsibility for his crew (his *amēkhaniē* at Idmon's prophecy of his own death, 1.460; at the loss of Heracles, 1.1286; at the death of helmsman Tiphys, 2.866). In one rather surprising scene, this theme returns with a twist. The Argo has just successfully passed the Clashing Rocks, which means, if Phineus' prophecy is to be believed, that there are no imminent dangers in store for the Argonauts, as Tiphys, the helmsman, remarks. Jason replies thus (2.622–637):

> 'Tiphys, why are you saying these consoling words to me in my distress? I made a mistake and committed a terrible and irreversible error. For when Pelias gave his order, I should have immediately refused his expedition

29 Unlike Medea, Aeetes, Heracles, Idas and others, Jason never speaks 'in anger' throughout the epic.

30 1.460; 1.1286; 2.410; 2.623; 2.885; 3.423; 3.432.

31 Cf. his words to Aeetes at 3.430; cf. the appraisal by Jason of Jackson 1992: 155–162.

> outright, even if I was bound to die, cruelly torn limb from limb. But now I am given over to excessive fear and unbearable worries, dreading to sail over the chilling paths of the sea in a ship and dreading the time when we set foot on land, for everywhere are hostile men. And always, day after day, ever since you first gathered together for my sake, I spend the dreary night thinking about every detail. You speak easily, since you are concerned with your own life alone, whereas I am not in the slightest distraught about mine, but fear for this man and that man and equally for you and the other comrades, if I do not bring you back safe and sound to the land of Hellas.'

Although perhaps somewhat strangely timed, this speech seems entirely in character after the numerous previous attacks of *amēkhaniē*, but as the narrator subsequently reveals, its purpose was 'to test the heroes' (2.638). There is an intertextual allusion here to the disastrous *peira*-scene in *Iliad* 2,[32] and the remarkable thing is in fact that Jason's ploy is successful, because the men 'shouted back words full of courage.' Nevertheless, the narratee must feel tested too: what to make of this speech; if it is a 'test', then why is it so in line with what we know to be Jason's true feelings? But perhaps one ought to consider that the *peira* of Agamemnon actually contains some elements of his true desperation about the situation as well. The fact remains that even this strategy of perhaps truly revealing his desperation confirms Jason's idiosyncratic success as an unlikely leader of men.

The only time Jason is fully confident and enjoys the exhilaration of martial prowess which is traditionally associated with Iliadic heroism is at the moment when his physical strength has been unnaturally enhanced by the magical drugs of a lovesick sorceress, as he prepares for the contest with the bronze bulls and the earth-born giants, and is likened to an eager war horse (3.1256–1267). The implication seems to be that Jason could not have risen to the task without these aids. Indeed, the only other occasions where Jason sheds enemy blood are characterized by confusion (at Cyzice, where the Argonauts accidentally slay their former hosts) and treachery (the horrifying murder-plot against Apsyrtus) rather than the heroism of combat.

This brings us to the topic of Jason's interaction with women. The first significant encounter is that with Hypsipyle at Lemnos. To meet her, Jason dons his blazing red cloak made by Athena. As the scholiast already noted, this

32 Cf. Hunter 1989: 445–447.

cloak metonymically characterizes Jason as *apolemos*.[33] Its defining qualities, brilliance and red colour, are strongly associated throughout the epic with seduction and erotic passion. And indeed, as Jason enters the city he is likened to 'a shining star, which young brides gaze upon as it rises above the houses and enchants their eyes with its beautiful red lustre' (1.774–781). The emphasis on the female gaze implies that this is the focalization of the Lemnian women. This star simile is moreover a precursor to another star simile in book 3, when Jason goes to meet Medea for their first conversation. The simile is a clear expression of focalization by Medea:

> But soon he appeared to her longing eyes, striding on high like Sirius from the Ocean, which rises beautiful and bright to behold but casts unspeakable grief on the flocks. So did Jason come to her, beautiful to behold but by appearing he aroused lovesick distress.
>
> 3.956–961

Here the ominous and disastrous effect of Jason's attraction are broached, both explicitly and implicitly through the allusion to the Iliadic star-simile which describes Achilles' arrival as focalized by Priam and Hecuba as they stand on the wall fearing for Hector's life. The simile thus elegantly shows how Jason's erotic appeal replaces Iliadic martial prowess, and has the same devastating effects.[34]

But how does Jason himself feel about women? Does he love Hypsipyle and Medea, or is he just opportunistically using their services? It seems that in the case of Hypsipyle this question is really irrelevant; the Lemnian adventure is just a diversion from the quest. In the case of Medea something more complex takes place. To begin with, the narrator creates a marked contrast between Medea's lightning-like falling in love, pierced as she is by Eros' dart (3.276–284), and the gradual, insecure development of love, fed by pity, on Jason's part (3.1077–1078). Moreover, whereas the narratees are made fully aware of every step in the process of Medea's falling in love with Jason, hardly any information is given about Jason's feelings. The narratees are invited to identify fully with Medea's feelings and point of view, and to feel vicariously frustrated at the lack of insight in Jason's feelings.

33 Cf. *schol. ad* 1.771, p. 60 Wendel 1967.

34 Cf. the way the Iliadic phrase *phuzan aeikelian* (4.3) describes Medea's flight out of love, and how her affliction (mist covering the eyes, loss of control over limbs) resembles that of dying or wounded warriors.

The opacity of Jason's intentions and motives becomes an important theme in book 4 when Medea fears that he will hand her over to the Colchians.[35] It remains unclear whether Jason does at first intend to do so but is then swayed by her violent threats, or whether he has plotted beforehand to remove Apsyrtus and thus save the Argonauts from their pursuers. The narratees, like Medea, are ultimately left in doubt, and will presumably be tempted to use their knowledge of Euripides' tragedy to form their answer, which privileges the interpretation of a 'culpable' Jason.

Looking again at the question of Jason's 'problematic' heroism, I think we need to take stock of the fact that if he appears flawed, this does not mean that he is in that sense different from Homeric heroes. If Jason's proneness to compromise, his attempts to appease his opponents rather than fight them, in the end (beyond the *Argonautica*) prove to be his undoing, this is not basically different from the way in which Achilles' proneness to wrath, Agamemnon's arrogance or Odysseus' curiosity (threaten to) do so.

Medea

Medea's portrayal is rich and complex. Especially in book 3, the devices used to characterize her are manifold and sketch a remarkably complete image, which clearly invites the identification of the narratees.[36] The narrator shows her living arrangements in the palace, her relation with her sister/confidante Chalciope, her daily routine as priestess of Hecate, her foraging in the graveyard for lugubrious drugs and also her play with her companions. Other characters describe her with a sustained focus on her duality of maiden (*kourē*) and powerful witch.[37] The narratees are invited to imagine her divine (*ambrosios*) beauty and preternaturally gleaming eyes (sign of her kinship with Helius), and receive a detailed bulletin from the narrator on all the outward symptoms of the pathology of love[38] and, to a lesser extent, fear (4.10–19). They are also told about her dreams (3.616–632) and about her inner feelings (by narratorial remarks and extended similes),[39] and finally the three interior monologues

35 Cf. Byre 1996: 3–16; Hunter 1987: 129–139; 1988: 436–453; 1993: 12–15; 18–20; 59–68 and Dyck 1989: 455–470.

36 Cf. Fusillo 1985: 347–355; 2008: 147–166; Byre 1996: 3–16.

37 Hera 3.27; Argus: 3.477–478; 3.528–533.

38 Changing colour, rising temperature, copious tears, frantic pacing to and fro, speechlessness, sleeplessness, fluttering heart, pain 'along the delicate nerves and deep down beneath the nape of the neck' (3.762–765), lack of concentration, sightless, staring eyes, loss of control over limbs. For a list of the exact references, see Toohey 1992: 265–286.

39 The similes predominantly use imagery that suggests the helplessness of abandoned

in book 3 provide a uniquely direct insight into her inner world. This intense description of Medea's innermost feelings, which strongly emphasizes her isolation, is more or less confined to the third book. In book 4, near the beginning, there are some glimpses of her desperate fear, both before leaving Colchis and when she fears abandonment by Jason, but after the horrific slaughter of Apsyrtus she is more and more confined to the background.

Partly as a result of this compositional choice, the traditional debate about Medea's characterization in the *Argonautica* focuses on two related issues: has Apollonius succeeded in drawing a consistent character, and is the narrative development of Medea's feelings psychologically consistent? In the past, scholars have often claimed that there is a discontinuity between book 3 where Medea is still the 'innocent' maiden in love with Jason, and book 4, in which she perpetrates all sorts of gruesome magical acts (the taming of the snake, the killing of Apsyrtus and Talus), and her love for Jason is replaced by a blind panic expressing itself in violent threats.

Recent readings have recognized that the presentation of Medea's character is in fact much more subtle and sophisticated. It may for instance be noted that the goddess Hera's characterization of her as 'Aeetes' daughter, expert in drugs' (*kourēn Aiēteo polupharmakon* 3.27), might be said to contain the germs of both sides of Medea's character: she is on the one hand a *kourē*, a young girl, who is entirely under paternal authority.[40] On the other hand her prominent familial linkage (it recurs seven times in the epic) with the fearsome king implies that she shares strains of his menacing character.[41] This seems confirmed by the fact that she is called *expert in drugs*, with a Homeric epithet that immediately calls to mind another member of the family, Circe (her aunt, Aeetes' sister).

But there are numerous other indications of Medea's disturbing side: the first scene in which Medea is presented (3.250–252) refers to her activity as a priestess of the sinister chthonic goddess Hecate, near whose temple she will eventually contrive to meet Jason. An image in the same scene emblematically captures her piquant double-sidedness, as she puts the *Promētheion*, a drug

women: a destitute widow trying to provide for her offspring (3.291–297); a bride whose young husband has died (3.656–664); a captive slave girl abused by a cruel mistress (4.35–39).

40 Cf. the recurrent stress on Medea's youthfulness, her behaviour that is 'natural for a young girl (*hoiē te kourē*) and her loveliness.'

41 Apollonius seems to hold that characteristics can be genealogically inherited. It seems the case with the implied similarity between Achilles and Peleus and Ajax and Telamon, but also with Jason, whose desperate and weak mother Alcimede and debilitated father Aeson figure quite prominently in the opening scenes of the epic.

made of the blood from the liver of the tortured titan Prometheus, 'in the fragrant band that was fastened around her divinely beautiful breasts' (3.868) in order to hand it over to Jason. When she drives out to meet Jason, she is likened to Artemis (an avatar of Hecate) surrounded by nymphs and cowering wild animals as she makes her way. The simile thus encapsulates both her youthful, majestic beauty and her fearsomeness, and moreover reminds us of the fact that Jason was likened to Apollo, Artemis' twin.[42] This clearly means that there is a predestined link between the two. Perhaps, like the gods referenced, they are both each other's doubles and negative images.

The context in which Medea is first named, the Muse invocation that opens book 3 (1–5), reveals that Medea's love will now be essential to the Argonautic quest. As Hera's first mention (3.27) of her makes clear, moreover, Medea will be a means to an end, a pawn. She is to be made to fall in love with Jason, so that she will help him gain the Fleece, return with him to Greece and kill Pelias, in order to avenge Hera's anger. Much like Jason, then, Medea is a helpless (if much more strong-willed) victim of Necessity, or of the frivolous will of the gods, which explains why her feelings are often characterized, by herself and by the narrator, as *amēkhaniē* or *atē*; sometimes she or others even dimly seem to recognize the hand of the gods in her plight.[43] The scene in which the sniggering boy Eros finally shoots his arrow (qualified as 'bringer of much sorrow' 3.279 and 'like to a flame' 3.287) into Medea's heart in order to gain the pretty ball that his mother Aphrodite has promised him emblematizes the cruel irony of her fate.[44]

It is sometimes forgotten by scholars and critics describing Medea's character and actions how prominently this divine motivation of her acts is represented by the narrator, and to what extent it may explain that in the end Medea's motivation is so unclear: is it love or fear, or rather a mix of both that drives her actions? Can anyone, including the narrator or Medea herself, even know and understand what she is feeling, if these feelings are caused and repeatedly manipulated by exterior entities? For we may remember that it is not just Eros' dart which influences Medea; Hera twice averts her from suicide (3.809–818, 4.22) and casts 'excruciating fear' in her heart, in order to make her flee her father's palace (4.11).[45] This issue is pointedly thematized in the invi-

42 1.260–309, cf. Hardie 2006: 25–41 on these similes and the ones they inspired in Vergil's *Aeneid*.

43 Cf. 3.776 (Medea); 3.973–974 (Jason).

44 Cf. the apostrophe to 'cruel Eros, great affliction' (4.445–449). The stock epithet of *erōs* (both with capital and without) is *oulos*.

45 Although Medea is not the only one who is thus manipulated by the gods (cf. Arete's

tation to the divine Muse (at the opening of book 4) that she must personally 'tell of the distress and thoughts of the girl'. The human narrator, for his part, mimicking his character's *amēkhaniē*, confesses:[46]

> … for truly the mind within me whirls in speechless stupor (*amphasiē*), as I ponder whether to call it the ill-desired pain resulting from violent delusion (*atēs pēma dusimeron*)[47] or shameful panic (*phuzan aeikelian*), which made her leave the Colchian people.
>
> 4.2–4

At the same time, this lack of motivational clarity nevertheless leads to a psychologically accurate description of impossible love and its frustrations. Indeed, it seems that those critics who claim there is no consistency in Medea's behaviour from book 3 to book 4, have not carefully read the monologues, which from the very first express the violent confusion of her feelings, irrationally darting between desire, desperation and fear (3.464–470; 636–644; 771–801).[48] Medea's basic dilemma is between *himeros* (her longing for Jason) and *aidōs* (her sense of propriety; her loyalty to/fear of her parents and her people). This opposition causes such turbulent emotions that she almost immediately wishes for Jason's and her own death (3.465–466; 774–809), revealing the violent strain in her character. Her despair culminates in the realization that even these events would not cure her plight, for in one case she would be dreadfully unhappy, and in the other she would invite the posthumous, but equally unbearable, scorn of her fellow-Colchians.[49]

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plans attributed to intervention from Hera in 4.1199–1200), she is certainly the character in whose portrayal this manipulation figures most prominently. The repeated description of Medea's *nous/psukhē* as departing from her own body, as e.g. at 3.289; 3.446–447; 3.1151 also symbolizes Medea's loss of self-control.

46 For the growing uncertainty of the Apollonian narrator with regards to his subject matter during the epic, cf. *SAGN* 1: 46–53 (Cuypers) and Morrison 2007: 271–311. A similar practice can be noted in Pindar (→). Note the verbal echo *amphasiē* 4.3 = 3.284, the very first word describing Medea's love.

47 Race 2008 translates the difficult phrase as 'the lovesick affliction of obsession.'

48 See especially Papadopoulou 1997: 641–664 and Fusillo 2008: 147–166. The latter remarks upon interior monologue's 'suitability for representing the mental fluctuations of a divided self' (159).

49 For Medea's concern for her *kleos* as based on her portrayal by Euripides, cf. Papadopoulou 1997: 641–664. She discusses the way in which the great third interior monologue (3.772–801) is based upon and relates to Euripides' *Medea* 1021–1055 (→).

On consideration then, it seems that what was sometimes understood as inconsistency is really the essence of Medea's nature and her dilemma:

> … there is no major difference with respect to the heroines who will come after her … from her direct descendant, Virgil's Dido, to a very distant one, Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, who is torn between social codes and love, and between her maternal role and her relationship with Vronsky. Their conflictuality is equally insoluble and produces a deep sense of frustration.
>
> FUSILLO 2008: 159

Conclusion

I started with the observation that there is a great difference in complexity and hence ambiguity between the drawing of Jason and Medea on the one hand and the minor characters on the other. I have argued that this contrast forms part of Apollonius' technique, which involves characterizing his two protagonists indirectly (metonymically) through intratextual parallels and oppositions. Of course this is but one of the many devices for characterization that can be identified in the epic. Others, as we have seen, range from the direct (epithets, explicit moral evaluation by the narrator or by characters), to indirect metonymical (description of physical qualities or reactions, speeches, interior monologues and dreams, typical settings and objects, similes) and indirect metaphorical (a very important part is played by pointed intertextual allusions to former texts; mainly Homeric epic and Euripides' tragedy *Medea*), or downright obscuring (the sometimes uncertain level of divine involvement in the psychological processes described, and the withholding of information, or expressed doubt about the characters' motives by the narrator).

The misunderstanding of these latter two techniques has in previous scholarship sometimes led to a negative appraisal both of Apollonius' poetic technique and of the moral value of his characters. More recent readings have recognized the true subtlety of Apollonius' characterizing techniques, and the literariness and, simultaneously, lifelikeness of his characters.

CHAPTER 5

Callimachus

Annette Harder

Introduction

For this study of characterization in the works of Callimachus I will discuss the story of Erysichthon's attack on Demeter's grove and his punishment by the goddess in *Hymn* 6 as a case study in which I will show how Callimachus deals with the various techniques of characterization listed in the Introduction to this volume. The reason for choosing this hymn is that it is the most elaborate example of characterization among the preserved texts of Callimachus and thus offers an opportunity for giving a good survey of his techniques in this respect.

I will embed this case study in the results of a more general investigation of the small corpus of (more or less) preserved narrative passages in Callimachus' work, to which I will refer at relevant points: the story of Leto's pregnancy and search for a place where her children can be born in *Hymn* 4, the story of the blinding of Tiresias by an angry Athena in *Hymn* 5, and the love story of Acontius and Cydippe from the *Aetia*. Sometimes I have adduced details from other passages if they could help to illustrate or elaborate a specific point. It should be noticed that in all cases in Callimachus, apart from the very fragmentary *Hecale*, we have to do with short stories, so that all aspects of characterization are dealt with and conveyed within a very small compass.

An important element in this study, discussed under metaphorical characterization, will be Callimachus' use of intertextuality, which seems to be used to add extra dimensions and to extend the limits posed by the format of the short stories.

A specific point which I will leave out of consideration is the question whether the descriptions of character in Callimachus have metapoetic or political aspects. It has been argued, for instance, that the way in which Erysichthon cuts the trees of Demeter characterizes him as a representative of the wrong kind of poetry.[1] In a comparable way the character of Zeus in *Hymn* 1 was

1 See Murray 2004.

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thought to be shaped in a way that may be related to Ptolemaic kingship.[2] These interpretations are interesting and attractive and should certainly be taken into account when one attempts an overall evaluation of characterization in Callimachus, but they are outside the purely narratological scope of this volume.

The story of *Hymn* 6, which seems to be told by a female participant or mistress of ceremonies at the women's festival of the Thesmophoria, is briefly as follows: Erysichthon, the son of Triopas, together with his servants attacks a sacred and much cherished grove of Demeter in order to use the wood for a dining hall. The goddess first tries to calm him down, but after his insolent answer punishes him with an insatiable hunger so that he cannot stop eating and drinking. His parents are ashamed and desperate: his mother keeps him in the house and refuses invitations with a variety of excuses and his father prays in vain to Poseidon for help when the food runs out. When all the food is gone from the palace the young man ends as a beggar at the crossroads.

Names

Erysichthon's name (*Erusikhthōn*, lit. 'tearing up the earth') is part of the mythical tradition.[3] Even so, it should be noticed that there was another name, Aethon, given to the same character, because of his violent, 'burning' (i.e. *aithōn*) hunger, as we are told in Hesiod fr. 43(a).5–6 and elsewhere.[4] Callimachus seems to be alluding to this name in *Hymn* 6.67, where he applies the adjective *aithōn* to Erysichthon's hunger. Thus the reader is reminded of another, more 'speaking' name of Erysichthon[5] and is thus given additional information about his character.

Interestingly, the same name, Aethon, is also used by Odysseus of himself in *Odyssey* 19.183, when he tells Penelope a false story about his identity. This

2 This way of adapting characters to specific purposes does not seem to be unique in Callimachus; we find similar treatments of Heracles as an ancestor of the Ptolemies as well as charged with metapoetic significance in e.g. Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* and Theocritus 24; see in general the references in Harder 2012: 2.214; and on the metapoetic aspects Heerink 2015.

3 For the evidence see Hopkinson 1984: 18–26.

4 For further discussion and a survey of all the evidence see Hopkinson 1984: 18–22 and on *Hymn* 6.67.

5 The phrasing also recalls Apollonius Rhodius 1.1245 where Polyphemus is compared to a hungry lion. Speaking names are found a few times in the *Aetia* too, e.g. of Acontius, who 'hit' unhappy lovers (fr. 70), or Leimonis, who was probably seduced within the customary erotic setting of a 'meadow' (fr. 94–95c), but are on the whole not very frequent in Callimachus.

story, like the story of Erysichthon has to do with food and entertainment, as 'Aethon' tells Penelope that he has entertained Odysseus and his men for twelve days on Crete with barley, wine and the meat of oxen (*Od.* 19.197–198). Later in the hymn the sequel of this passage, when the tears streaming down Penelope's cheeks are compared to snow melting on the mountain-tops (*Od.* 19.204–209), is alluded to (*h.* 6.91),[6] and *Hymn* 6.88 recalls *Odyssey* 17.358 about the beggar Odysseus eating.[7] At the end of the story *Hymn* 6.115, 'begging for crusts and scraps thrown away from the feast', about Erysichthon as a beggar, is strongly reminiscent of *Odyssey* 17.220 and 222, spoken by Melantheus about the apparent beggar Odysseus. The reasons for these references to Odysseus are not entirely clear, but Callimachus' technique regarding the name is obviously quite complex: Erysichthon has his own name, but another more relevant name is alluded to and a connection to large-scale epic hospitality is added.[8]

Direct Characterization

A complicating factor in evaluating particularly the direct characterization by the narrator in Callimachus' sixth hymn may be that he (or rather she) is a member of the audience in the mimetic setting of the hymn, who is obviously a devotee of the goddess Demeter and in fact in *Hymn* 6.116–117 takes sides against those who are hated by the goddess: 'Demeter, let not him you hate be a friend or neighbour of mine. I hate evil neighbours'.[9] A certain partiality in favour of the goddess therefore seems to be implied by the *persona* of this narrator and may evoke questions when confronted with the attitude of Erysichthon's parents: between the biased devotee of the angry goddess (who, even so, is not quite devoid of pity, as one can see in 6.68 and 93) and the worrying parents an 'objective' view of Erysichthon's character seems hard to achieve.[10]

6 See Hopkinson 1984: ad loc.

7 See the fuller treatment of this allusion below.

8 See on these allusions Bulloch 1977. On possible metapoetic overtones see Murray 2004. On the issue of hospitality in the characterization of Erysichthon see below.

9 All translations from *Hymn* 6 are by Hopkinson 1984.

10 The other hymns are comparable in this respect: in *Hymns* 2 and 5 we also have participants in a ritual (in honour of Apollo and Athena respectively) as narrators, in *Hymn* 1 the narrator seems to take part in a symposium in which Zeus is honoured, in *Hymns* 3 and 4 the narrators present themselves as singers closely connected with Artemis and Delos as nurse of Apollo respectively.

After an elaborate description of Demeter's beautiful and much-loved grove the narrator tells us, without further introduction of the boy, in 6.32 that 'a bad idea took hold of Erysichthon's mind' and adds another comment in 6.36, where he and his men are said to run 'shamelessly' into the sanctuary of Demeter to cut it down in order to build a dining-hall. Then again in 6.45, when Demeter tries to calm him down, the narrator describes Erysichthon as 'the wicked, shameless man', as it were recapitulating her earlier comments and particularly repeating the notion of shamelessness, which thereby seems to be turned into a prominent feature of Erysichthon's character and his specific brand of 'badness'. In 6.50–52 the narrator uses a simile of an angry lioness to describe Erysichthon's fierce and insolent reaction to Demeter's soothing words (see below on indirect characterization) and in 6.56 his aggressive answer to Demeter's words is described by the narrator as 'his evil speech'. What we see here fits in with the observations in the Introduction to this volume about the Greek tendency to evaluate character largely in ethical terms, i.e. in terms of right and wrong, which in its turn could lead to a typical rather than an individual picture.

The effect of these comments on the reader's mental picture of Erysichthon, given early in the story and focusing on 'badness', must have been strong, so that, as argued in the Introduction, the effect known as 'primacy' plays an important part: 'information about a character which is given early on will strongly determine the mental model of a character formed, and a considerable amount of material which is inconsistent with that model needs to accumulate before a reader is willing to abandon or fundamentally modify it'. This accumulation of material modifying the picture of Erysichthon's evil character in fact does not happen, but even so after 6.56 the narrator offers no further comments on the badness of Erysichthon. Instead, she perhaps calls him a 'poor wretch' in 6.68 (*skhetlios*)[11] and in the remainder of the story focuses on the pathetic effects of his punishment on himself, until 'only skin and bone were left the wretch' (6.93), and on his family, which is clearly devastated. Thus, in the end one seems to be invited to think that in spite of the narrator's direct comments

11 Although in Homer the word is always used of wrong and stubborn behaviour, its use in the sense of 'miserable' is attested from the fifth century BCE onwards. Hopkinson 1984: ad loc. adduces parallels which show that in Callimachus the notion 'wretched' also occurs, as in *Hymn* 5.77 of Tiresias innocently trespassing on the bathing Athena and possibly in *Hymn* 3.124, though there, as in the case of Erysichthon, the wretchedness is that of people who had first behaved wrongly. This connotation of earlier mischief may be present in *Hymn* 6.68 as well, so that the notion of 'being wretched through his own fault' may spring to mind.

in the early part of the story there is also another side to Erysichthon and that he was after all an object of pity and the son of loving and protective parents. In this respect it is also significant that his father Triopas calls the young man a 'baby' in his prayer to Poseidon, again emphasizing his wretchedness (6.100). So one could argue here that Callimachus at least gives hints of another perspective on Erysichthon.

Elsewhere we see a similar tendency to offer direct characterization at the beginning of the story, as in e.g. *Aetia* fr. 67, where we are told explicitly that the lovers Acontius and Cydippe are young, beautiful and of good families, but also that the young Acontius was not a very clever talker and needed the help of Eros himself to get his bride. However, we also sometimes find short remarks in the course of the story as in *Aetia* fr. 23.6 about Heracles' lack of gentleness or towards the end as in *Aetia* fr. 80.20–23 about the diplomatic skills of Pieria, who had achieved peace between her town and Miletus after a long time of war.

On the whole, though, direct characterization seems to be only one of the means Callimachus is using to draw his characters and, in fact, indirect characterization seems to play a much larger part and to add further dimensions to the pictures.

Metaphorical Characterization

Comparisons and Similes

Although Callimachus uses comparisons and particularly long epic-style similes rather sparingly,[12] there are two passages in the story of Erysichthon were these techniques can be found and have implications for our view of Erysichthon's character. In *Hymn* 6.50–52 the narrator uses a simile in the epic style to describe Erysichthon's insolent reaction to Demeter's soothing words:

> he looked at her more fiercely than a lioness
> in the mountains of Tmarus looks at a huntsman
> when she has just given birth (then, it is said, her look is most fearful).

In 6.91–93 Erysichthon's emaciation is described by two brief comparisons:

> like snow on Mimas or a wax doll in the sun

12 See Hopkinson 1984: on *Hymn* 6.50–52.

—even more quickly than these he wasted away to the very sinews:

only skin and bone were left the wretch.

The striking use of these devices at these points may help to connect cause and consequences, i.e. Erysichthon's guilt and his punishment, as the narrator highlights both the boy's misguided anger and the disease which destroys him by using the—for Callimachus—rare technique of similes/comparisons. At the same time their message seems a little ambivalent as they may add an element of doubt about the moral issues in the poem: after all, one could sympathize with the anger of a lioness who has just given birth against the threat of an armed huntsman, and the notion of utter powerlessness evoked by the idea of snow or wax melting under the fierce rays of the sun may evoke some pity for Erysichthon's fate.

Elsewhere similes and short comparisons are also used for characterization of other characters. Thus the character of Iris as a faithful and always vigilant servant of the goddess Hera is illustrated by a long simile in *Hymn* 4.228–232, in which she is compared to a faithful dog of Artemis. In *Aetia* fr. 23.2–7 the indifference of Heracles, who is eating a farmer's plough ox, towards the angry threats of the farmer is illustrated by a series of three brief comparisons, and in fr. 67.8 another brief comparison likens Acontius and Cydippe to beautiful stars. Thus one can see that this means, though used sparingly, is definitely part of Callimachus' technique of characterization.

Intertextuality: Similarities and Contrasts

There is much emphasis on Erysichthon's shameless behaviour particularly at the beginning of the story. Although at first sight the main crime seems to be the cutting down of Demeter's sacred grove, it soon becomes clear that there is an ill-conceived idea of hospitality behind this as Erysichthon wants to use the wood for the building of a dining hall (6.54–55). By means of a range of allusions to misbehaving hosts and guests in earlier literature Callimachus seems to draw attention to various counterparts of Erysichthon in this respect and to add a further dimension to this side of his character, embedding it in a larger literary and mythological framework.

However, for his learned readers Callimachus seems to have added yet another dimension of characterization in his use of allusions, 'fleshing out' characters by referring the readers to other characters who may present an instructive kind of contrast.[13] Thus we are invited to consider Erysichthon not

13 See also the Introduction to this volume on similarity and contrast as techniques of

only in relation to similar bad guests and hosts, but also as a contrast to the hot-headed, but noble and repenting Antilochus from the *Iliad*. The references to Antilochus in *Hymn* 6 suggest a notion of repentance and growth, i.e. of a certain change, in that epic character, which is lacking in Erysichthon and finally made impossible by the wrath of Demeter, as a result of which he can do nothing more than eat and drink.

Bad guests and hosts: As argued above the central issue of the story of Erysichthon and the reason for his punishment is his misguided behaviour as a prospective host, which then, through Demeter's punishment, turns him into an impossible guest. He begins to cut down the sacred grove of Demeter and in 6.54–55 declares that he is doing this in order to build a dining hall where he can provide his friends with endless meals; subsequently, when his punishment is beginning to take effect and he eats everything in sight, his mother keeps him away from meals at the homes of others (6.71–86). The notion of misguided behaviour in relation to eating and hospitality is mentioned here only briefly and judged critically by the narrator (see above on direct characterization), but if one takes the references to Homer into account it is illustrated by a range of epic examples of similar bad behaviour.

Following the order of the hymn one is first reminded of Tantalus, as the rare word used for 'then' (*toutakis*) in 6.14 may point to *Odyssey* 11.585–586, where a similar word (*tossaki*)[14] is found in a description of Tantalus unable to drink and eat because of his punishment, thus suffering the opposite of what Erysichthon had to endure. The reason for his punishment is not mentioned, but later authors relate it to *hubris* connected with eating (so e.g. Pi. *O.* 1.36–66, where Pindar rejects the version that he offered his son Pelops to the gods and states that he stole nectar and ambrosia from them and offered these to mortals). The mere use of *toutakis* may not be a very strong pointer to the fate of Tantalus, but the idea is strengthened by the fact that some allusions to the same Odyssean passage occur in the immediate context: the description of

characterization and important aspects of the metaphorical presentation of character and the role of intertextuality in this process. Callimachus usually alerts his readers to an allusion by using a rare word or special phrase that occurs only once, or a few times at the most, in Homer, often in the same metrical position in a line. The assumption is that his learned readers would easily recognize these rarities and remember their context. These contexts may then provide a background or foil against which a given text can be read. See on these criteria, and for some further discussion of characterization by means of allusions in Callimachus, Harder 2002: 190–195.

14 This word occurs three times in Homer: *Il.* 21.268; 22.197 and *Od.* 11.586.

Demeter's grove in 6.25–29 recalls the description of the place where Tantalus is standing near a spring surrounded by trees (*Od.* 11.588–592); the use of the Homeric hapax *kallikhoros* in 6.15 recalls *Odyssey* 11.580–581 in a passage about Tityus,[15] who is described just before Tantalus.

After Tantalus the beginning of the story of Erysichthon is marked by a group of allusions to various kinds of evil or misguided behaviour related to dining. In 6.31–34,

> But when their good genius became angry with the Triopidae
> a bad idea (*kheirōn ... bōla*) took hold of Erysichthon's mind.
> He rushed forth with twenty servants, all of them in the prime
> of strength, all men-giants fit to lift a whole city

we are reminded of several passages from the *Odyssey*: (1) the episode where the men of Odysseus kill and eat the cattle of Helius: Bulloch (1977: 105–106) points to *Odyssey* 12.294–295 and 339, both from the beginning of this episode, where the 'bad idea' of the men of Odysseus, led by Eurylochus, is described in very similar terms (*kakēs ... boulēs*, 12.339);[16] (2) the description of the way in which Aegisthus makes preparations for killing Agamemnon at dinner and selects 'twenty men' from the town to help him (*Od.* 4.530), with the same number (*eeikosi*) in the same metrical position as here; (3) a passage about the behaviour of Penelope's suitors, notorious offenders of the laws of hospitality because of eating Odysseus' possessions, in which Antinous is preparing an ambush for Telemachus and also chooses 'twenty men' to help him (*Od.* 4.778); (4) the episode of the Laestrygonians, who in *Od.* 10.120 are said to look 'not like men, but like Giants' (*ouk andressin eoikotes, alla Gigasin*), and thus show some similarity to Erysichthon's giant servants (*androgigantas*), and subsequently kill Odysseus' men and pick them up 'like fish' for their meal in 124.[17]

Thus after referring the reader to Tantalus, who offended the gods by his behaviour as a host, the text evokes fools who cannot suppress their hunger, men who violate the laws of hospitality in various ways by threatening the life and possessions of the rightful owners of the houses they have invaded,

15 There may be another reference to Tityus in *Hymn* 6.82; see further Bulloch 1977: 106–108 on the references to Tityus in *Hymn* 6.

16 On the relevance of the episode of the cattle of Helius for *Hymn* 6 in general see Bulloch 1977: 104–106.

17 It may be worth noticing that the fact that the ship came to the Laestrygonians was caused by Odysseus' men opening the bag of the winds, is described in *Odyssey* 10.46 as a 'bad idea', which recalls *Hymn* 6.32.

and cannibalistic giants. All these characters may add an extra dimension to Erysichthon's character and crime. They suggest that his behaviour resembles that of epic fools and villains, but also help to draw attention to the differences as Erysichthon's crime and punishment take place in a domestic setting and have repercussions mainly within the small compass of the family and its social environment.

Later in the hymn these themes are picked up again by further allusions, sometimes again appearing in clusters.

The episode of the cattle of Helius is evoked again in 6.67. Here the verb in the phrase 'he was tortured by the great disease' (*estreugeto*) recalls *Odyssey* 12.350–351, where Eurylochus thus concludes his proposal to kill the cattle of Helius and refuses to be 'tortured' (*streugesthai*) by hunger on the deserted island where they have found the cattle.[18] Another reference may be found in 6.88 about Erysichthon 'consuming' a large amount of food. The latter passage may recall the three Homeric instances where forms of the same verb (*esthiō*) are found in the same metrical position, each time of situations which may be considered to have some relevance for *Hymn* 6: *Odyssey* 1.8–9 about the eating of the cattle of Helius; 9.292 about the Cyclops, another misbehaving eater, eating two of the men of Odysseus like a lion and leaving nothing; 17.358 about Odysseus as a beggar in his own palace.

Aegisthus and the suitors are referred to again in 6.72, where the noun *eranos*, used of the 'feasts' from which Erysichthon's parents keep him away, is a word that occurs only two times in Homer, in *Odyssey* 1.225–229, where Athena in the guise of Mentes speaks at some length to Telemachus about the suitors' misbehaviour, and 11.412–415, where Agamemnon tells Odysseus how Aegisthus killed him at dinner.

Summarizing one may say that the bad and shameless character and behaviour of Erysichthon as a host and guest seems to be emphasized by the way in which Callimachus by means of various allusions places him in the company of a number of mythical and literary characters of a notoriously bad reputation in these respects.

Antilochus: A range of allusions to the young epic hero Antilochus seems to be one of the means Callimachus employs to stimulate further thinking about the character and behaviour of Erysichthon in *Hymn* 6 and to add a strong moral dimension.

18 The only other Homeric instance of the verb is *Iliad* 15.512.

In *Iliad* 23.262–650, the description of the chariot race at the funeral games for Patroclus, the youthful Antilochus, a son of Nestor and a brave fighter, performs an act of *hubris* when he passes the chariot of Menelaus on a narrow and dangerous part of the road without paying attention to Menelaus' warnings and thus finishes in second place, after Diomedes, who wins the race. Achilles then offers the second prize, a six-year-old horse pregnant with a mule, to Eumelus, who comes last because of an accident. Antilochus protests and Achilles offers Eumelus the armour of Asteropaeus instead, but Antilochus is scolded by an angry Menelaus, who asks him to swear that he did not win in a devious manner. Antilochus then repents and offers to give back the prize to which he is not really entitled. Impressed by his candid admission of having been in the wrong Menelaus then offers him the horse anyway. The reader is first reminded of the chariot race in *Hymn* 6.4. Here the verb used for looking at the procession of Demeter (*augassēsthe*) recalls a Homeric hapax in *Iliad* 23.458 spoken by Idomeneus (*augazomai*), who—rightly as it soon turns out—thinks that he is seeing the horses of Diomedes running first in the chariot race. Then, if one investigates the allusions in Callimachus' hymn in a systematic way, it turns out that the scenes about Antilochus' behaviour in this chariot race are often evoked.

In the course of Callimachus' sixth hymn a number of words may be considered as allusions to passages about Antilochus. They do not appear in Callimachus in the order in which they appear in the *Iliad*, but taken together may be regarded as evoking this scene: after the reference to the end of the chariot race in 6.4, discussed above, there are references to the first mention of the prizes in the chariot race in 6.100, to Antilochus' irresponsible behaviour in the race in 6.44 and 97, to the scene with Menelaus after the race in 6.22 and 77, and to the young man's death in 6.94–96. In all instances Callimachus' phrasing recalls Homeric *hapax legomena* or phrases used only once in Homer in this particular manner, so that the connections seem fairly cogent.

In 6.22 the noun used to indicate Erysichthon's 'transgression' (*huperbasias*) is a Homeric hapax and recalls *Iliad* 23.589 about the 'transgressions' (*huperbasiai*) typical of young men, where Antilochus offers his apologies and prize to the angry Menelaus. Menelaus accepts his apologies and gives the horse again to Antilochus. The effect of this allusion is that immediately at the beginning of the story of the 'transgression' of Erysichthon a connection and contrast between him and Antilochus is established.[19]

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19 Moreover, in connection with the interpretation of Erysichthon in terms of Callimachean poetics, where he stands for the wrong and un-subtle kind of poetry on account of his

In 6.44 the adjective used of the key hanging 'on the shoulder' (*katōmadian*) of Demeter disguised as her priestess is a Homeric hapax and recalls *Iliad* 23.431–433 about the horses of Menelaus and Antilochus, who run parallel to each other for the distance covered by a discus thrown 'from the shoulder' (*katōmadioio*) of a boy. Then Antilochus does not make room for Menelaus on a narrow part of the road and thus achieves his victory in the chariot race by means of dangerous driving.

In 6.77 the word used for the 'demanding' of a debt (*apaitēsōn*) recalls another Homeric hapax in *Iliad* 23.591–595, where Antilochus is addressing Menelaus after the chariot race and offers to give him back the horse he has taken as an undeserved prize by means of his irresponsible behaviour and to give him even more if he would 'demand' it (*epaitēseias*).

In 6.94–96 the phrasing (beginning with *klaie men*) as well as the pattern of several people 'crying' and then special attention for one of them in particular (Erysichthon's father) recalls *Odyssey* 4.184–186, the only Homeric instance of a passage beginning with *klaie men*. Here Menelaus has recognized Telemachus and everyone is moved. Then the narrative focuses on Pisistratus, the son of Nestor, who remembers the death of his brother Antilochus and refers to him at the end of his speech to Menelaus in 199–202. Menelaus answers him politely, but tactfully avoids further mention of Antilochus—and readers like Callimachus may have remembered the somewhat painful scene of the *Iliad*.

Then again in 6.97 the use of the participle with the negation used of 'the unheeding Poseidon' (*ouk aïonta*), who does not listen to the prayer of Erysichthon's father Triopas, is a phrase used only once in Homer, in *Iliad* 23.429–430 about Antilochus ignoring Menelaus' urgent request not to endanger them both 'looking like someone who was unheeding (*ouk aïonti*)'.

Soon afterwards in 6.100 we find Triopas calling his son a 'baby' (*brephos*), using a word which is a hapax in *Iliad* 23.265–266 about the 'baby' of the

tree violation (see Murray 2004), it is striking that Antilochus explains the tendency to transgressions of young men in *Iliad* 23.590 with a reference to the 'thin' or 'meagre' mind of young men, using the adjective *leptos*. While the young Antilochus admits to this cause of his reproachable behaviour, he shows himself at the same time in possession of a positive qualification in terms of Callimachean poetics. Thus Antilochus is the opposite of Erysichthon on two levels, moral as well as aesthetic: he repents and corrects his transgressions and his mind is unwittingly tuned to the subtle demands of Callimachean poetics. For a similar kind of re-evaluation of terminology cf. *Aetia* fr. 1.9–10, where the 'lightness' which was a negative characteristic of Euripides in Aristophanes' *Ranae* appears as a positive characteristic in terms of the new Callimachean poetics.

pregnant mule, the second prize in the chariot race, which Antilochus acquires by his irresponsibly overtaking Menelaus.[20]

Summarizing one may say that the way in which Antilochus is able to respond in a proper way to Menelaus' criticism may be regarded as a contrast with Erysichthon's reaction to the words of Demeter in the guise of her priestess Nicippe: here we have a young man who like Erysichthon also behaves badly, but unlike Erysichthon is able and willing to admit that he was at fault and to be reconciled with his opponent. On the whole the scene suggests a standard of civilized and sensitive behaviour, which is lacking in the arrogant and headstrong Erysichthon and in the angry Demeter.

This technique of characterizing the people in his stories by means of allusions to their opposites in other literary texts is used by Callimachus elsewhere too, for instance in the *Aetia*. There we are invited to consider the rather helpless Acontius in relation to the clever and talkative Odysseus (fr. 67), the farmer Molorcus fighting the mice invading his home to epic heroes (fr. 54c), and the modest and unselfish Pieria, who refuses precious gifts from her lover and only wants peace for her country, to the oriental princess Medea presented with precious gifts (fr. 80).[21]

Metonymical Characterization

In the story of Erysichthon Callimachus also relies heavily on metonymical characterization. The first we hear about Erysichthon's behaviour and actions is the description of his attack on Demeter's grove (in 6.33–36):

> he rushed forth with twenty servants, all of them in the prime
> of strength, all men-giants fit to lift a whole city,
> whom he had armed with both axes and cleavers,
> and they all ran shamelessly into Demeter's grove.

These lines create a picture of shameless aggression, not only by means of the narrator's comment, but also by the details about the companions Erysichthon has chosen and the weapons he has given them. He appears as shameless,

20 A particular point of interest here is that the noun (*brephos*) is usually used of people, as in *Hymn* 6.100, but occasionally of animals, as in *Iliad* 23.266 of the mule. Elsewhere, in *Hymn* 2.51 and fr. 62a (formerly fr. 60 Pfeiffer) Callimachus too used the noun of an animal.

21 For details see Harder 2012 on those fragments.

strong and aggressive. In the course of the poem the reader hears more about the young man's emotions (more about his aggression in 6.37–56, about his 'despotic' attitude to his twenty servants in 6.61–62, and then about his hunger in 6.66–115), the groups he is part of (apart from the young hooligans also his loving family and its social environment of friends), and his further actions (after his attack on the trees Callimachus describes his insolence towards Demeter in 6.50–56, his endless eating and drinking in 6.66–70 and 6.87–93, and finally his begging at the crossroads in 6.113–115), and his insolent words to Demeter are quoted in direct speech (6.53–55). The reader is also made aware of the way in which Erysichthon's appearance changes in the course of the story: from a young man who forms part of a group of 'giants' (6.33–36) and glares at Demeter like an angry lioness (6.50–52) he is reduced to 'skin and bone' (6.93).

As to focalization, the reader is presented with different views of the world of the story and of Erysichthon himself as part of that environment. As discussed above, the narrator is a devotee of the goddess Demeter and this may be reflected in her focalization of Erysichthon. A certain bias against him seems plausible. Within the story several views of the situation and of Erysichthon appear: Erysichthon's aggressive and arrogant attitude, which suggests that he regards himself as master of his world, Demeter's love for her sanctuary and her angry view of Erysichthon (in which she is backed by Dionysus), the shame, sadness and despair of Erysichthon's family and friends on his behalf as well as on behalf of their social position and property, and in the background the unsuspecting people in the neighbourhood who keep inviting the young man to their parties and the indifference of Poseidon, who does not listen to the prayer of Erysichthon's father.

The views of the main protagonists are highlighted by passages of direct speech, which also fit in with the other indications of their character. The description of Erysichthon's aggression is followed by a description of Demeter's anger in 6.40–41, which she is still able to control in her first speech to him. In 6.45–49 Demeter, in the guise of her priestess Nicippe, addresses the shameless Erysichthon 'in soothing tones' (6.45):

> 'My child, you who are felling the trees dedicated to the gods,
> stop, my child, much prayed-for child of your parents,
> stop and send away your followers, lest the lady Demeter
> become angry—it is her sacred grove you are laying waste.'

Even so, the words 'much prayed-for child of your parents' may suggest a threat that the parents may lose this child. Erysichthon's answer (6.53–55), which is

also quoted, conveys the same idea of aggression that was suggested by the earlier descriptions of his behaviour and the narrator's comments:

> 'Be off with you, lest I stick my great axe in your hide!
> These trees will roof over my hall, where I shall
> sate my comrades constantly with delicious banquets'

The narrator's comment in 6.56 once again marks his words as 'evil' (*kakan*). When Demeter again addresses Erysichthon she is 'unspeakably enraged' (6.57) and shows herself as a goddess again, which frightens the other young men so that they run away immediately (6.57–62). When she calls Erysichthon 'dog' in her second address of him in 6.63–64 the reader is again reminded of the earlier narrator's comments about his shamelessness. The end of it is that Demeter punishes the boy with an insatiable hunger, thus transforming and frustrating his plan to 'sate my comrades constantly with delicious banquets' (6.55).

In the latter part of the story direct speech in the list of excuses of Erysichthon's mother (6.75–86) and in his father's prayer to Poseidon (6.96–110) illustrates the despair of his parents. Their behaviour shows them as ordinary, loving parents, who worry deeply about their son's situation and try to make the best of it. They are ashamed to send him to parties (6.71–72) and his mother tactfully rejects various invitations from neighbours by inventing a long list of excuses (quoted in brief bits of direct speech in 6.75–86) and cries with his sisters, his nurse and the servants (6.94–95). Erysichthon's father Triopas prays in vain to his father Poseidon and tells him how all the food has disappeared from his house (6.96–110). Apparently they keep the boy with them as long as there is something to eat, but then they have to let him go as a beggar at the crossroads (6.111–115).

The description of the settings keeps pace with the process of Erysichthon's physical decline and helps to illustrate aspects of his character and moral attitude. The story in *Hymn* 6 begins with an elaborate description of its setting in Demeter's beautiful and much-loved grove, which Erysichthon is going to destroy (6.25–30), so that the enormity of this feat and Erysichthon's ruthless and selfish aggression become clear at once. It then focuses on the palace of his parents, where in the end he can no longer find food and protection, and the larger setting of the houses of friends, from which the boy is excluded by his disease. The palace becomes a claustrophobic place in which Erysichthon is reduced to a victim of a hunger which is beginning to destroy him. Finally the setting becomes the desolate crossroads where Erysichthon's story ends in hunger and isolation and the 'son of the king' (6.114) is just a desperate beggar.

Similar techniques are also found in Callimachus' other works. A good example of the use of actions to indicate character is the courageous behaviour of Asteria/Delos in *Hymn* 4, which is the only part of the world that waits for Leto and allows her to give birth on the island, whereas the other landscapes, islands and rivers (with the exception of the river Peneius, who is willing to wait, but allowed to go by Leto) all run away for fear of Hera's anger. In the *Hecale* we get a glimpse of the description of actions as a means of characterization in a longer text as a number of fragments (fr. 29–36 Hollis) are about the ways in which Hecale is making her young guest Theseus comfortable. Her behaviour clearly indicates a caring and loving character. In the *Aetia* one line about the unpleasant laugh of Thiodamas in fr. 24.13, when Heracles has politely asked him for food for his starving son, shows his grim character. Other elements of metonymical characterization also appear, as in the description of Athena's feelings towards Chariclo, from whom she never parts (*h.* 5.57–67) or of the way in which the small farmer Molorcus is upset when mice invade his cottage (*Aetia* fr. 54c). As in *Hymn* 6 we see various kinds of focalization that help us to look at the characters in their context from different angles. A good example is the way in which the beauty of Acontius and Cydippe is described as seen through the eyes of others in *Aetia* fr. 67–70: we read how mothers wanted Cydippe as their daughter-in-law when she was still small, we read about her beauty as she appears at religious occasions, we hear about young men admiring Acontius and—apparently—falling in love with him to no avail.

Direct speech, as well, is often used to highlight aspects of character and emotions which have been indicated before. Thus a brave speech accompanies the courageous action of the river Peneius in *Hymn* 4.121–149, when he wants to welcome Leto; Hecale describes the way she looked after her sons in a way that recalls her care for Theseus (*Hec.* fr. 48 Hollis); and Acontius describes his feelings for Cydippe in a—somewhat complex—monologue in the countryside in *Aetia* fr. 73–74. Settings are used as a meaningful background in e.g. *Hymn* 5.70–74, where the midday heat and silence on Mt. Helicon are mentioned twice and suggest a threatening atmosphere for the innocent and unsuspecting Tiresias, when he trespasses on the bathing goddess, or in *Aetia* fr. 54c, where an epic time indication reminds the readers of the efforts of heroes on the battlefield and the description of the homely attributes of Molorcus, which are destroyed by mice, shows him as a poor farmer—who will nevertheless make an epic effort in putting down two mousetraps.

Conclusion

In the story of Erysichthon we see that the main character is characterized in various ways, by name, by direct and by indirect characterization. Among the latter we may observe techniques of metaphorical and metonymical characterization.

Erysichthon is given a few characteristics, which help the development of the plot of the short story and do at first sight not seem very complex: the boy is just arrogant, aggressive and shameless. The other characters present a similar picture: Demeter is a mighty goddess who is duly, but fiercely angry, his parents are loving and protective and possess a sense of shame.

Even so, there may be hints of other ways of looking at the characters, as Erysichthon in spite of his 'bad and shameless character' is still loved and protected by his parents. Thus there seems to be a certain amount of 'lifelikeness' as described in the Introduction, which may be recognized by readers using their knowledge of the world, and in the end seems to evoke some pity, so that the picture is to a certain extent dynamic rather than static. A further hint of a more complex picture is offered by the fact that the story is told by a narrator who may have been somewhat biased as a devotee of Demeter and, even so, gives some hints of pity for the young man and his family.

Metaphorical techniques, in particular, play an important part in the characterization of Erysichthon. On the one hand we see that Callimachus makes use of similes/comparisons. On the other hand intertextuality adds an important further dimension. Allusions to bad hosts and guests help to place Erysichthon's behaviour in a larger framework and underline his bad character as a host and guest. Allusions to the Homeric Antilochus help the reader to gain further insight into the character of young men in general: Antilochus provides a morally instructive contrast, but also could evoke some pity for Erysichthon because Antilochus was able to repent and thus rehabilitate himself thanks to the generosity of Menelaus, whereas Erysichthon was not, due to his own personality and the implacable anger of Demeter. Thus these allusions add depth to the characterization and evoke questions about the morality of men and gods.

The techniques here analysed for the sixth hymn as a case study can be observed in Callimachus' other works as well, as has been illustrated by a number of examples. There too, a closer analysis of all the techniques used in a given story might lead to a similarly complex picture as that in the story of Erysichthon—which is a good example of how Callimachus with his fondness for 'brevity' could indeed achieve much in a few lines.

CHAPTER 6

Theocritus

Jacqueline Klooster

Introduction

The bucolic poems that gained Theocritus his fame are mostly mime-like and brief, with a large dramatic component in which characters (often herdsmen or other simple folk) sing, speak monologues, or engage in dialogue. The corpus is varied: the predominantly mimetic poems are 1–6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18. The 7th *Idyll*, with its internal first person narrator forms a category of its own, on which more below. The diegetic *Idylls* tell brief mythical narratives and/or hymns to (demi-) gods (13, 22, 24, 26), but mostly also contain direct speech. In others, a speaker praises a ruler (16, 17), presents a gift (28), or addresses a beloved boy (*paidika*, 12, 29, 30). Of course these different narrative situations (drama with an implied narrator,[1] third person narrative, first person narrative, all categories featuring embedded narratives) have their consequences for characterization, especially the question who characterizes, and how.[2]

Rather than unfolding a plot, the *Idylls* aim at *representation of characters*, often through their own direct speech or song, much as in drama (→), but on a smaller and less complex scale. These poems are brief vignettes presented as dialogues (often featuring *amoebaic* song) or monologues (also with embedded song), sometimes set within a brief diegetic frame. Their protagonists are characterized as presumably recognizable 'types' mainly by their way of speaking and their choice of subject matter. Besides pastoral song as such, or goats and their qualities, this subject matter is predominantly erotic desire, usually not reciprocated, or otherwise unhappy, and the effects this has on the psyche of the lover (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14).[3] Typically, desire is seen as an external force (the god Eros), whose whims mankind must endure as it may. The reaction to it

1 Cf. *SAGN* 1: 83–85 (Hunter).

2 In this chapter, I will focus on the mimetic and diegetic poems, and leave aside the panegyrics, *paidika* (12, 29, 30), dedication of the distaff (28) and the *spuria*, which are not properly speaking narrative.

3 Cf. Hunter 1999: 14–16. This also goes for the *Paidika* (12, 29, 30). The fact that the spurious *Idylls* practically all focus on this theme too shows the imitators' perception that this was the *Idylls*' central theme.

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forms an important way of characterizing the lovers who are the *Idylls*' protagonists: song, serenades, suicidal thoughts or acts, and attempts at witchcraft—with the aim of attaining either fulfilment or at least some kind of peace of mind. This thematic unity creates a web of significant parallels and oppositions between the mythical and fictitious characters of the various *Idylls*, which were in all likelihood in antiquity gathered in a collection and meant to be read together. How do the Cyclops, Heracles or Daphnis' reactions to unhappy love differ from each other and from those of Simaetha, Lycidas or Bucaeus? In answering these questions, the main corpus of the *Idylls* can be read as a primer on unhappy love and its effects on the heroic and human heart. Attention to the exemplarity of the narratives is drawn by the addresses to narratees in 6, 11 and 13: 'Not for us alone, Nicias, as we once thought, was Love begotten by whoever of the gods begat him … Even Amphitryon's son …' (13.1–5).[4]

The characters of Theocritus' *Idylls* are either mythical personages (the Dioscuri, Polyphemus, Heracles, Helen and the archetypical Sicilian herdsman Daphnis) or fictitious examples of simple folk: named and unnamed herdsmen, housewives, single city girls or soldiers.[5] The treatment of the first group, portrayed either as young and in love, or as children, shows clear affinities with Callimachus' *Hymns* (→). The latter group has a lot in common with the fictitious characters of mimes (Sophron, Herondas) and (Old and New) Comedy (→).[6] For these characters Theocritus does not invent 'speaking names' to the extent that Aristophanes does, but in all likelihood Damoetas, Corydon, Simaetha, Praxinoa and Thyonichus would have suggested to contemporaries a specific social class or type.[7] The narrator also invites us to ponder the significance of the recurrence of a name in multiple poems, such as Amaryllis in 3 and 4, Comatas in 5 and 7, Milon in 4 and 10, and especially the central character Daphnis in 1, 5, 6, 7: are we dealing with the same character, the mythical cowherd?[8] As we shall see below, in the last case this seems likely, and the other

4 Translations are my own, based on Gow 1950.

5 This excludes *Idylls* 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 28 which feature Hieron of Syracuse, the Ptolemies, 'beloved boys', and Nicias and his wife, who are not so much 'characters' in a narrative.

6 Cf. Hunter 1999: 10 on the borrowings from Sophron. Payne 2007 has claimed that Theocritus' fictional world is extraordinary and unprecedented, and speaks of 'the invention of fiction' in this connection.

7 Of the names in Theocritus, especially Lycidas and Simichidas (7) have received a lot of attention, cf. Payne 2007: 17–20; 120–128; Klooster 2011: 196–208 with references.

8 See on this Wilamowitz 1906: 136; Ott 1969: 121; Lawall 1967: 69; Dover 1971: 140; Bernsdorff 1994: 38–51; and Stanzel 1995: 39–40. This in turn entails the question of whether Daphnis in 6 is supposed to be singing about the Cyclops Polyphemus as a contemporary or as a figure

cases likewise suggest, even if the names perhaps do not refer to identical individuals, that the world of the *Idylls* is full of *similar* characters.

Diegetic Third Person Narrative Introductions to the Mimes

A noteworthy feature in connection with characterization in Theocritus' *Idylls* is formed by the diegetic introductions, which as we saw invite named narratees, and by implication others, to identify with the characters in the poems.[9] The diegetic passages opening and sometimes closing the *Idylls* are brief. They only occur in the cases of mythical personages of the far past (11: Polyphemus, 13: Heracles, 18: Helen, although here at the end of the poem, and not inviting identification). This suggests that the Daphnis of *Idyll* 6 should also be understood as such (and thus identified with the Daphnis of 1, 5 and 7), since non-mythical characters are never provided with similar narratorial introductions. The introductions name the specific characteristics of the *Idyll's* mythical protagonist in a *metonymical* way, by enumerating their attributes and sketching their setting and—in the *Idylls* generally uncanonical—situation. So in 11, we read:

> No other remedy is there for love … but the Muses … So at least my countryman the Cyclops fared most easily—Old Polyphemus—when, with the down new on his lips and temples *he was in love with Galatea*. And he loved not with apples or roses, or ringlets, but with downright frenzy, counting all else trifles.

The narrator proceeds to tell how Polyphemus now habitually neglected his sheep and, gazing seaward, sang. This characterizes Polyphemus as a creature of myth, Sicilian, young, a shepherd, an (occasional) singer and, unusually, desperately in love. The incongruity of having the man-eating monster of the *Odyssey* harbour tender feelings is here left implicit in the frame, but brought out to much effect in the Cyclops' own words.

Incongruity is much more emphatically expressed in the opening lines of 13, where Theocritus introduces Heracles as follows: 'Even Amphitryon's *bronze-hearted* son, *who withstood the savage lion,* loved a boy, *charming* Hylas, *with his long tresses.*' (13.5–7) The traditional epithet and description that conjure

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from the mythical past, see Hunter 1999: 245. The same approximately goes for Comatas in *Idyll* 5 and Comatas in *Idyll* 7. See on this Schmidt 1987: 88.

9 See on this Gutzwiller 1991, Bowie 1996: 91–100.

up a world of martial endurance and monster-slaying prowess of course clash with the love Heracles feels for the delicate boy with his significantly girlish and youthful coiffure. This contrast is elaborated to great effect in the rest of the poem.

Direct Speech: Dialogue, Monologue, Song Contests

In the wholly mimetic or dramatic *Idylls*, the speech of the protagonists is the only thing to characterize them, certainly if we assume that these poems were meant for reading rather than dramatic performance. The fact that we are dealing with relatively brief poems (ca. 200 lines at a maximum) moreover makes complex characterization virtually impossible: there can be no significant complexity, development or change of character within this scope. Accordingly, what the *Idylls* aim at conveying is often a character that is amusingly 'true to type', recognizably stereotypical, if psychologically quite subtly drawn. Stereotyping appears to be the point of the exchanges of typical small-town gossip in *Id.* 4 between the herdsmen Battus and Corydon (about Milon's departure to the athletic games and their philandering old neighbour), and of their trivial sagacity.

> Corydon: 'Maybe tomorrow will be better. Where there's life there's hope, and only the dead have no hope. Zeus gives a blue sky one day and rain the next.'
>
> 4.41–42

The same applies to Gorgo and Praxinoa, the Alexandrian housewives of *Idyll* 15 with their expert appraisals of dress fabric (15.34–37) and complaints about their idiot husbands (15.8–20). Similarly, Thyonichus, the self-deluding boor of 14, pathetically acts the spurned lover (14.1–10) after losing his girlfriend Cynisca to another man, although it transpires that he was in the habit of punching her on the head (14.34–36), which puts his self-pity in a questionable light.

The surroundings and attributes that metonymically characterize the protagonists of these mimetic *Idylls* are present, and indeed rendered, only in their own words. The herdsmen of *Idyll* 1 speak of the poetic and ideal 'song-scape' of *Idyll* 1.1–8 ('sweet is the whispered music of yonder pine tree …'),[10] with a

10 Cf. for the term, see Segal 1981a: 228; 229, and see *SAGN* 3: 61 (Klooster).

hint of the numinous ('No, shepherd, no: at noon we may not pipe for fear of Pan', 1.15), and so characterize themselves as similarly poetic and idealized; it remains the question whether Pan is truly present in this landscape. Similarly, the perception of the (frisky, emaciated, beautiful …) goats and calves of *Idylls* 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, reveals, through contrast or parallel, the state of mind and quality of their observers, and especially their uncomplicated sexuality is contrasted with the constraints of human desires (cf. Priapus' remarks to Daphnis in 1.86–91).[11] In the urban mimes, we find the same procedure with regard to the hustle and bustle of Alexandria, and the overwhelming artistic riches of the Ptolemaic palace as seen through the eyes of Gorgo and Praxinoa (15), although in this last case the subtlety of the poem moreover lies in the fact that the women's naive awe and amazement are simultaneously a tribute to the Ptolemies' glamour.[12]

The fact that these poems mostly lack a diegetic frame moreover demands of the narratees an ability to interpret the characters and their situation in ways that these characters are often seemingly unable to achieve themselves. The result is a subtle irony and complicity between narrator and narratee at the expense of the characters, which nevertheless invites the empathy of the narratees. Who has not experienced love's delusions—or so the narrator of the *Idylls* seems continually to ask implicitly. This procedure is directly related to the artificial language, style and dialect of the *Idylls*, which is ostensibly at odds with the simplicity of the characters.[13] Finally, it should also be noted that some of the characters inadvertently create intertextual references to famous episodes from Greek poetry that ironically predicate on their situations, as when Polyphemus says that Galatea may burn his single eye, if she dislikes it (11.50–53), or wishes that a stranger might come to his island, to teach him to swim (11.61–62). A prime example is Simaetha, the single city girl of *Idyll* 2. In telling her story in a monologue to the Moon, she seems on the brink of insight in her own situation. Her opportunistic erstwhile lover Delphis will not be returning to her of his own free will, because he was not all that interested in her in the first place—and her dabbling in black magic will not draw him back to her either. 'He has made wretched me not a wife, but a bad woman—no maiden now.' (2.40–41) In the face of these insights, the poem seems to stage a last, therapeutic, phase of the state of denial, as Simaetha tries a binding spell and tells the Moon of her affair in high-flown language that tragi-comically clashes with some of the more homely details of her experience.

11 Cf. Hunter 1999: 15.

12 Cf. Manakidou 1992: 83–90; Goldhill 1994: 197–223; Zanker 2004: 83; *SAGN* 3: 65–66 (Klooster).

13 Cf. Ott 1969.

Precisely this incongruity, the mismatch between her understanding and expectations of herself (the tragic heroine of an epic betrayal) and what we perceive to be her actual situation (she has thrown herself at an opportunistic, gymnasium-obsessed cad), is what characterizes her, both socially and psychologically. With an epic *aporia*-question, she starts the tale of her heartbreak, in the course of which she relates what she wore, and whom she borrowed it from.

> Now that I am alone, from what point shall I lament my love? Whence shall I begin? Who brought this curse upon me? Eubulus' daughter, our Anaxo, went as basket-bearer to the grove of Artemis … and Theumaridas' Thracian nurse, now dead, who lived next door, begged and prayed me to come and see the show, and I, most unfortunate creature, came along, wearing my beautiful linen chiton and the wrap I had borrowed from Clearista.
>
> 2.64–74

Especially Simaetha's description of the encounter with Delphis, and what ensues, reveals her lack of judgment. When she first sees him at the Artemis festival, he is together with his friend Eudamippus, and in her rendering of the event, there seems surprisingly little difference in Simaetha's experience of their individual looks: 'more golden than gold-flower were their beards and their breasts shone brighter far than you, Moon, for they had just left the noble exertions of the gymnasium.' (2.78–80). Still, it is for some unexpressed reason Delphis who strikes Simaetha with a *coup de foudre*, causing her to waste away canonically (losing colour, hair and weight), and to start looking for magical charms (2.81–92)—she represents herself as some tragic heroine, a Phaedra or Medea (cf. 2.15–16).

The apparent solution, however, turns out to be un-tragically simple: Simaetha sends her maid to go and get Delphis; he arrives accordingly. Despite his previous indifference (did he even know who Simaetha was?) Delphis now feels the need to act out the *exclusus amator*-scenario, in order to gloss over the fact that he was invited. This presumably reflects his take on the conventional Greek male erotic code, in which the object of desire is to be conquered by the adult male, and not vice versa.[14]

14 Cf. e.g. Callimachus *ep.* 31 Pf. At 2.153, Delphis is playing out this scenario with someone else.

> And with a glance at me, that heartless man (*hōstorgos*) fixed his eyes on the ground and sat down on the couch and so spoke: 'Truly, Simaetha, by your invitation to your home you preceded me by just as much as I outran good-looking Philinus the other day. For I would have come, yes, by sweet Eros, I would have, in a company of three or four, at nightfall …'
>
> 2.112–116

The adjective *astorgos* here of course reflects Simaetha's judgment with hindsight, and the remarkable posture Delphis takes on seems reminiscent of Odysseus in *Il.* 3.217 and so perhaps should be interpreted as indicating that Delphis is a smooth and deceptive talker—as noted, we must assume that this intertextual reference is to be attributed to the implied narrator rather than to Simaetha. Delphis' reported speech characterizes him as conceited (2.124–125: 'I am called nimble and handsome among the young men') and superficial (his inappropriate clichés about the power of love at 2.133–138). Unsurprisingly, Delphis' ardour does not last, and though he formerly visited daily, or even several times a day, he has now disappeared for more than twelve days, as Simaetha anxiously reckons (2.155–157). Rumours of another love affair on his part have reached her, and she redundantly asks: 'Must he not have some other pleasure, and have forgotten about me?' (2.158, cf. 2.7)

Hints of Simaetha's inexperience in matters of magic are likewise scattered throughout the poem, together with her assertions of expertise, and her desperate expectations of the ritual she is performing, even if finally she seems to accept that she will have to endure her desire:

> Where are my bay leaves? Bring them, Thestylis. And where are my potions?
>
> 2.1

> First barley groats smoulder on the fire. Come on, put them on, Thestylis! Idiot, where have your wits gone? Have I become a mock to you too, then, you wretch?
>
> 2.18–20

> Now with my love magic I will bind him—but if he keeps on vexing me, so help me the Fates, he shall knock on Hades' gates. Such evil drugs do I declare to possess, Lady Moon, stuff I learned from an Assyrian stranger. But Farewell to you, Lady, and turn your steeds to the Ocean. And I will bear my desire as I have undertaken it.
>
> 2.159–164

It may be noted that her alternative plan, to go to Timagetus' wrestling school and scold Delphis, which she had announced at 2.8–9, seems by far the more likely scenario.

Similarly deluded, and undergoing a similar painful trajectory towards insight, is the unnamed goatherd of *Idyll* 3. The anonymity of the protagonist might here point to his typicality (the quintessential goatherd, i.e. gauche in love, rustic and naive), though some have suggested it indicates his fictionality.[15] The poem opens with the announcement of his plan of serenading the nymph Amaryllis in front of the cave where she dwells, while a friend watches his goats (3.1–5). This serenade, and the monologue the goatherd keeps up with himself, raises some questions: is Amaryllis a 'real' nymph (cf. 3.9 *numpha*, and the fact that she inhabits a cave), i.e. a semi-divine creature?[16] Is she aware of the goatherd's presence, or even existence? However this may be, most of the *Idyll* is made up of increasingly desperate ploys of the goatherd to attract Amaryllis' attention, ending in hyperbolically desperate resignation, although as in *Idyll* 2 (and 11) there is a certain amount of open-endedness: will the hopeless lover truly wise up?

> 3.6–7: Why don't you call out to me anymore, peeping out of your cave? 3.10: Look, I've got ten apples for you. 3.12: Please, look! 3.24: Alas, … You won't listen! 3.33: You don't care about me. 3.37–38: Will I see her? I will sing, and maybe then she will look my way, for she's not made of adamant. (3.40–51: the song) 3.52: I'm not singing anymore, but lie where I have fallen for the wolves to eat me. May that be sweet as honey to your throat.

Several passages indicate the goatherd's inexperience in matters of love, and seem to point to his extreme youth, such as his would-be expert opinion on Eros: 'Now I am acquainted with Eros, a grievous god; surely, he drank at a lioness' dugs, and his mother reared him in the wild bushes' (3.15–16). In this case, the sheer clichés seem to spell out naivety. The goatherd's reliance on the prophetic gifts of the plant *telephilon*[17] points the same way. His song, finally, apparently meant to impress on the nymph that better women than her have loved goatherds, has been variously judged, but seems to reveal an

15 The qualification 'goatherd' has the clear implication of 'unhappy in love', cf. *Id.* 1.86; 6.7: 'calling you 'wretched lover' (*duserota*) and 'goatherd' '; *contra* Payne 2007: 60–61.

16 Some have even questioned her actual existence outside the goatherd's imagination, cf. Hunter 1999: 109.

17 The idea behind *telephilon* could be paraphrased: 'if it sticks, she loves me, if not, she doesn't', 3.28–30. On the explanation of *telephilon*, see Dover 1971: ad loc.

ignorance or wilful misrepresentation of the love affairs of goddesses with mortal herdsmen.[18] All in all, the unnamed goatherd here greatly resembles, both in character (wavering between naive bravura and equally naive desperation) and in situation, that other unfortunate young shepherd in love with an elusive nymph, the Cyclops Polyphemus of *Idyll* 11.

In the dialogue poems (1, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 15) it is not always easy to see what qualities truly distinguish the partners in the dialogue. This goes especially for 1, 4, 5, 6 and 15. The two courteous herdsmen in *Idyll* 1 differ only in so far that Thyrsis is a singer, while the anonymous goatherd is not, but he makes up for this, we might say, with his elaborate and artful *ekphrasis* of the cup he offers as remuneration for the song. Since they tell us next to nothing of their personal circumstances, these speakers exist only as gracious bucolic artists.

In 4, Battus expresses a maliciousness and envy regarding others (4.3; 7, 9, 13), which Corydon does not evince. In 5, on the other hand, Lacon and Comatas engage in a (playful?) exchange of insults, where it is not clear who is more aggressive. All we can say is that Comatas begins, and is apparently the elder of the two (5.35–42), as well as the one with higher social status, not being a slave (5.5–8). The repartee turns into a regulated *amoebaic* contest about halfway through the poem (5.80), where one singer must cap the statement of the other, and Comatas is judged to be the winner by Morson, but it is unclear why. In 6, on the other hand, the friendly harmony and equality characterizing the relationship between Damoetas and Daphnis is expressed in the introduction, implying as it does that they are of almost the same age, and like to herd together: 'Damoetas and Daphnis once drove the flock to a single place, Aratus. One had a ruddy beard; the other's was half-grown.' (6.1–2) In the end the two exchange kisses and instruments, and play while the calves dance in the soft hay: 'neither won the victory, but invincible they proved.' (6.46) In 15, finally, Gorgo and Praxinoa are practically interchangeable, even if Praxinoa comes across as a little more harsh (15.8–13), bossy (15.27–33), and nervous (15.51–57).

In 10 and 14 on the other hand there is a marked difference between the dialogue partners: one is in love, while the other gives common sense advice and gently mocks the distraught lover. In both, the lover comes across as the more naïve, if more engaging, personage. We may ask whether it is love that makes them naïve, or rather naivety, which makes them easy victims to love.

18 See Hunter 1999: 122–123 and Payne 2007: 64–65.

It is worthy of note that this configuration returns in the role-play between Daphnis and Damoetas in 6, where Daphnis poses as a *praeceptor amoris* to the Cyclops in love with Galatea and now playing hard to get. We might say that the theme returns with a twist in *Idyll* 7, where naïve Simichidas is bent on finding commonplace solutions for and ridiculing the unhappy love of his friend Aratus, whereas the mysterious and wise goatherd Lycidas both acknowledges and copes with the power of desire over the human heart in his subtle lyrics.

Direct Self-Characterization and Altero-Characterization by Characters

In the mimetic poems, the protagonists typically engage in direct self-characterization, by singling out looks and psychological traits that they praise, are uncertain about, or blame for their lack of success in love. Similarly they select qualities of their beloveds they praise or blame. Thus Simaetha refers to her own 'beauty' (2.83, melting away at the onset of love; 2.110, growing rigid, at the sight of Delphis) and to her gullibility (2.138 *ha takhupeithēs*, too easily convinced). Delphis' looks are praised in general terms together with those of Eudamippus at 2.77–80, and he is called 'sleek-skinned' (*liparokhrōn*, i.e. by the use of ointments) at 2.102, which comically confirms that his chief concern is working out at the gymnasium (cf. 2.8–9; 51, 77–80; 96–97; 114–115, 155–156).[19] His character is with hindsight judged to be cruel (2.6, 112). In 3, the goatherd is worried that his snub nose and his pointed chin may make him unattractive (3.8–9), while Amaryllis is to him both beautiful (*khariessa* 3.6, of the beautiful glances 3.18, of the dark brows, 3.19) and cruel (3.18: made of stone).

This technique finds a much fuller elaboration in the Cyclops' self-appraisal and his rhapsodizing about Galatea. Polyphemus comically tries to praise her by his own rustic aesthetic standards 'white Galatea … whiter than curd to look at, softer than a lamb, friskier than a calf, sleeker than an unripe grape.' (11.18–21) Her unattainability is metonymically expressed by the fact that she does not leave her habitat, the sea, which the Cyclops cannot enter (11.43; 54–64).[20] Polyphemus also fears that Galatea may find his grotesque features ugly, but feels that nevertheless he has significant attractions to offer:

19 Cf. *SAGN* 3: 61 (Klooster).

20 Cf. *SAGN* 3: 64–65 (Klooster).

> I know, beautiful girl, why you flee, it is because a shaggy brow stretches over all my forehead—one long and single brow from ear to ear; and there is only a single eye beneath it, and my nose lies broad upon my lip. But even so, I feed a thousand sheep, and draw and drink from them the finest milk; and I never lack cheese, neither in summer nor in autumn, nor in midwinter, my cheese-racks are always brimming. And I know how to play the syrinx like none of the Cyclopes, singing about you, my sweet apple, and about me too, often from night to dawn. And I rear eleven fawns for you, with collars and all, and four bear cubs.
>
> 11.30–41

This theme of the Cyclops' deluded self-appraisal is taken up in *Idyll* 6, where Damoetas (in the guise of Polyphemus) says:

> Really, I am not as ugly to look at as they say. Indeed, yesterday I looked into the sea—it was smooth—and my beard and my single eye looked beautiful—by my standards at least—and my teeth shone whiter than Parian marble.
>
> 6.35–38

Here we should bear in mind the theme of 'seeming', which is also addressed in the words of Daphnis in the guise of Polyphemus' *praeceptor amoris*: 'What is not beautiful often seems so to love' (6.18–19). In *Idyll* 10, this theme is also developed to comic effect, when the lovesick reaper Bucaeus praises his beloved Bombyca, whom Milon the overseer likens to a grasshopper (10.19), presumably because of her thinness (considered unattractive). The song amusingly offers a glimpse of Bombyca as others see her (emaciated, sun-scorched, perhaps with a very deep voice, cf. the meaning of the adjective *bombukias*) through the words of the besotted Bucaeus (slender, honey skinned, with a hypnotic voice).

> Pierian Muses, sing with me the slender girl: for all you touch, goddesses, you make beautiful. Lovely Bombyca, everyone calls you 'the Syrian', emaciated, sun-scorched, and I alone: honey-hued. Violets too are dark, as are patterned hyacinths, still, they are chosen first in wreaths … Lovely Bombyca, your feet are like knuckle bones; your voice is like poppy, and your ways—I am at a loss to express.
>
> 10.26–37

These poems thus demonstrate the typical 'blind' delusions of love: either an incorrect self-appraisal of the protagonist and his attractions, or of those of the object of desire, or even of both: the incongruity and false expectations that arise as a result are at the centre of these poems.

Though not a love poem, many of the qualities discussed above more or less apply with a twist to *Idyll* 7, with its unique first person internal narrative by Simichidas, a heteronym, which appears to represent certain aspects of the poet Theocritus' experience.[21] The fact that Theocritus has the other characters of this poem call the speaker 'Simichidas' (rather than Theocritus) seems to indicate that he distances himself from him, whereas the first person narrative, which reads like a personal reminiscence, seemingly identifies him with the speaker: he both is and is not Simichidas. This complex meta-poetical poem has, from antiquity onwards, elicited much discussion about the status of its two protagonists, Simichidas, the first person internal primary narrator, and Lycidas, the mysterious goatherd he meets on his walk, once upon a time, on Cos. Lacking a frame by an omniscient narrator, we can only see events through Simichidas' eyes. And just as in many of the mimetic *Idylls*, there seems reason to question the correctness of his estimation of events. Several of his utterings at the time of the meeting characterize him as conceited and foolish, as does his characterization of Lycidas, presumably meant to reflect his estimation at the time. Again, the tension that arises between his characterization of himself and Lycidas and that which the narratee is invited to construct is the point of the poem.

Simichidas is clearly thrilled by the fact that he is on his way to visit friends of noble extraction, as his dwelling on their illustrious Coan ancestry reveals (7.3–7). His direct characterization of Lycidas, on the other hand, is snobbish and condescending, and focuses strongly on the rustic features of Lycidas' attire:

> … and we found a noble wayfarer, by the grace of the Muses,[22] a man from Cydonia, whose name was Lycidas, and he was a goatherd, and one could not have mistaken his looks, for he looked extremely like a goatherd. On his shoulders he wore the tawny skin of a thick haired shaggy goat, smelling of fresh rennet, and round his breast a tunic was girt, an old

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21 For the literature on this aspect of Simichidas, see Hunter 1999: 146–147; Payne 2007: 138–145; and Klooster 2011: 196–203.

22 In this phrase, *sun moisaisi* is difficult, and could also be understood to qualify *esthlon* (cf. Hunter 1999: 156). In my rendering, *esthlon* should be taken ironically, or perhaps as intervening hindsight.

> *peplos* with a broad belt, and he held in his right hand a crooked club of wild olive. And with a quiet smile and twinkling eye he spoke to me and laughter hung about his lip …
>
> 7.12–20

This description raises questions: can a goatherd who 'looks extremely like' a goatherd actually be one? Do Lycidas and Simichidas know each other? Their eventual exchange seems to suggest they do. We hear of no introductions, yet Lycidas calls Simichidas by his name (in fact, this is when we first learn the narrator's name, 7.21), and Simichidas seems to know Lycidas' reputation (7.27–30). And what exactly do the particular items of the description suggest? As scholars have observed, the meeting between Simichidas and Lycidas has clear overtones of a poetic initiation (cf. Hesiod, *Theogony*). This has prompted identifications of Lycidas with Hesiod (club = laurel staff), Pan (rustic looks and syrinx), Philitas or a character from his poetry (Cos, poetry), and Apollo (name), to enumerate the most common interpretations.[23]

At any rate, what finally emerges is that Simichidas is eager and vain (cf. his self-congratulatory utterings in 7.30; 37–41; 91–95) and that Lycidas has the measure of him (7.43–48) and is moreover a sophisticated bucolic singer in his own right (7.52–89). Of course an objective appraisal of the qualities in their reported songs is impossible, but the delicate style, wisdom, and sophisticated structure of Lycidas' song seem to suggest that he is by far the better bucolic poet—and that the narrator, with hindsight, pays a subtle tribute to his poetic excellence.

Embedded Songs and Role-Playing

Intriguing examples of characterization by secondary narrators can be found in 1 and 6. In 1, Thyrsis sings the song of Daphnis, the archetypical *boukolos*, who dies for unfulfilled love. The way the goatherd asks for the performance of the song makes it clear that *The Woes of Daphnis* (1. 19) is supposedly a 'classic of the bucolic world', in other words, the pretence is that narratees knew who Daphnis was. Whether and to what extent this actually was the case for the primary narratees is a matter for scholarly debate;[24] the fact that the story of

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23 See Klooster 2011: 197 n. 76.

24 See Gow 1950: II, 1; Ogilvie 1962: 106–110; Goldhill 1991: 242–243; Hunter 1999: 62–67; Payne 2007: 40–46; and Klooster 2011: 99–105.

Daphnis is told in a notoriously lacunose way, which leaves out essential details, suggests that it was.[25]

What does emerge, at any rate, is that Daphnis is a figure of myth, and that he stands on the same footing with the gods Hermes, Priapus, and Aphrodite who come to visit him. In much of the song he is characterized by his heroic silence, and by the reactions of others and even of nature to his suffering. As Thyrsis narrates, animals, gods and humans came to mourn Daphnis as he was wasting away. The sense that Daphnis is somehow at one with nature on a deeper level than ordinary mortals also appears to be the implication of his own wish 'now violets bear, ye brambles … let all be changed … since Daphnis is dying' (1.132–135). Daphnis finally deigns to answer only to the goddess Aphrodite, which identifies her as guilty of his plight. His words to her characterize him as proud and stubborn: he swears he will be a bitter grief to Eros even in Hades, and taunts her with her own love affairs. (1.100–113)

Idyll 6 (metapoetically, perhaps) addresses roleplaying, its creative force and psychological effects: assuming a role may help one deal with a situation, test a partner, or frame an emotion (desire). Daphnis challenges Damoetas by addressing him as Polyphemus and alerting him to the behaviour of Galatea, who is trying to attract his attention. Attempting to cast Damoetas-Polyphemus as an awkward lover, he says that he has not noticed her. Damoetas, however, responding to the challenge, gives his own twist to his character, and claims that he has in fact seen Galatea but chooses to feign that he has not. This creates an interesting layering: Damoetas is cast as Polyphemus, but in this role claims to play the careless lover.

The Diegetic Poems: Characterization by the Narrator

Finally, in the diegetic poems (13, 22, 24, 26), the protagonists are characterized either directly by what the narrator says about them (epithets), or indirectly, either by their reactions or by setting or habits. In what follows I briefly look at characterization in the two Heracles' poems (13 and 24).

It is remarkable that in *Idyll* 13 there is practically no direct speech. The poem, as noted, focuses on Heracles' love for young Hylas, and his inability

25 Crucial turns of events transpire only partially through the reactions of the gods to Daphnis' situation: (1.82: Who is 'the girl' looking for Daphnis? 1.95–96: Why does Aphrodite 'laugh sweetly, and secretively, while hiding a bitter anger in her heart'? 1.97: Why did Daphnis say he would 'wrestle Eros down'?).

to find him and cope with his loss and his desire for him when nymphs kidnap the boy. At the opening of the poem, as we saw, Heracles is characterized directly by his epithet 'bronze hearted' (13.6). In the rest of the poem he is characterized metonymically, e.g. by naming his weaponry (13.56–57), or the way he blunders through prickly hedges searching for Hylas (13.64–65). He is likened to a ravenous lion hunting down a fawn, and is thus characterized metaphorically too (13.62–65): the general impression is one of brute (if in this case strikingly ineffectual) force. Hylas, on the other hand, is twice characterized by epithets that refer to his feminine, youthful hairstyle (13.8; 36). We also get an idea of his youthful and attractive nature from the description of his menial, feminine tasks (fetching water) and from the fact that he inspires tender feelings in the hearts of the water nymphs, who drag him into their fountain ('falling like a ruddy star', 13.50, presumably metaphorically describing his erotic appeal) and seat him on their laps to comfort him (13.40–51). The nymphs in turn are characterized as eerie, ungraspable, yet enchanting feminine powers both by the epithets ('the *sleepless* Nymphs, *dread goddesses of the countryfolk*, Eunica, and Malis, and Nychea *with the spring in her glances*', 13.44–45), and by their surroundings, the low lying, overgrown black waters where they reside (13.39–42).

In 24 much of the humour resides in the representation of Heracles as a ten-month-old baby, with epithets like *hupotithion*, the breast-child (24.54), rather than 'bronze hearted', even though his force is superhuman even at this stage of his life, as witness his strangling of the dire monsters sent by Hera. Thus the poem works with indirect characterization by drawing the narratees' attention to what features already forebode Heracles' later prowess (e.g. his sleeping in a shield rather than a crib 24.4; the strength of his hands 24.27–28). An interesting word that deliberately creates an ambiguity in this sense is 'always tearless' (*aien adakrun*, 24.31), which, coming as it does in the description of Heracles as a ten-month-old baby seems to point to a remarkable feature at *this* stage of life, but it may equally be read as forecasting his famous endurance later on.

Within the poem itself, some comical effects are reached by contrasting Heracles' joyful and remorseless throttling of the monsters (24.27–33; 56–59) and Iphicles' more normal fear (24.25–26; 60–61), and recounting the reactions of his royal parents Alcmena and Amphitryon to the frightening scene and the unusual behaviour of their baby. Amphitryon seems clumsy, trying in vain to perform an uncalled-for arming scene when his wife wakes him (24.41–49). Alcmena is motherly and loving (24.5–10, feeding and cradling her babies), alert (24.34 'Alcmena heard the cry and was the first to wake'), and sensible, realizing that something extraordinary must be going on with her son, and calling for Tiresias (24.64–66). The end of the poem consists of Tiresias' prophecy

and a summary of Heracles' education, which enumerates Heracles' habits, lessons and educators.

Conclusion

The great variety of narrative schemes in Theocritus makes for an interesting array of techniques of characterization. By far the most frequent is the characterization by an implied narrator in the mimetic poems. As we saw, this frequently ironic type of characterization works on the assumption that the narratees look beyond the actual words of the speakers themselves. The tension between what these characters and the narratees perceive is the point of these poems. The direct and indirect self-characterizations and characterizations of others all come under this larger procedure. As I argue, this is also the key under which the notoriously difficult seventh *Idyll* should be read.

The frames that sometimes embed these poems invite the narratees' identification in an ironic key with the issues the protagonists of the poems are struggling with (the pangs of unfulfilled desire).

In the diegetic poems discussed here, a different type of tension is aimed at: narratorial characterization makes unambiguously clear what the character and situation of the protagonists of these narratives is, either through epithets or by metonymical description (attributes, settings, habits). However, in these poems too a certain ironic tension arises, as the situations are incongruous for the character described (Heracles in love, Heracles as a baby) and show the protagonists either at a loss how to behave (Heracles searching in vain for Hylas), or unable to fully recognize the implications of their situation (Amphitryon's reaction to the nightly invasion of his home, and to the killer hands of his toddler).

In all cases, characterization in the *Idylls* of Theocritus thus works with the tension between awareness and delusion, naivety and insight, empathy and irony.

PART 2

Historiography

CHAPTER 7

Herodotus

*Mathieu de Bakker**

> And when the sun appeared at the horizon, Xerxes made a libation from a golden bowl into the sea and prayed to the sun that no misfortune would happen to him of such a kind that it would force him to abort the conquest of Europe before he had reached its borders. When he finished his prayer he threw the bowl into the Hellespont together with a golden vessel and a Persian sword, which they call an *akinakes*. Of these gifts I cannot exactly determine whether he threw them into the sea as a sacrifice to the sun or because he repented his lashing of the Hellespont and sought to placate the sea with gifts.[1]
>
> 7.54.2

Just before the Persians start their crossing of the Hellespont, Herodotus describes how Xerxes prays to the sun and throws gifts into the water. He admits his uncertainty as to whether these gifts should be seen as belonging to the ritual itself or as an attempt to appease the Hellespont, which Xerxes lashed after a violent storm had ripped apart his bridge of ships (7.34–35). In this brief passage, Herodotus brings together various aspects that are relevant to an analysis of his characterizing techniques. First, there is his stance as a narrator who observes the scene as an empirical historian, abstaining from an exact diagnosis of motives, since these are within Xerxes' mind and cannot be determined. In order to write a persuasive narrative about the past, he presents himself as a researcher capable of assessments based on observable evidence. It is from this position that he endows his historical characters with credible and recognizable traits, and regularly speculates when ascribing motivation to them. Second, there is the subtle way in which Herodotus adds nuance to Xerxes'

* I thank the editors of this volume for their useful guidance, numerous valuable suggestions and meticulous editing, Emily Baragwanath for her sharp observations, and Hannah Kousbroek for correcting my English.

1 Translations and transliterations in this chapter are based upon the OCT of Herodotus edited by Hude (third edition, 1927). The translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. For stylistic reasons I prefer to write Herodotus when I refer to the narrator of the *Histories* and will therefore indicate when I refer to Herodotus in another capacity.

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character by presenting his prayer and the possible motives for throwing the bowl into the sea. His first interpretation portrays Xerxes from an ethnographical point of view, as king fulfilling the role of priest in the typically Persian worship of the sun (1.131.2). The second interpretation ties in with a darker reading of Xerxes as an impulsive, overconfident king all too keen to prove himself worthy of his royal title. Both aspects of his portrait come together in the king's prayer that he may conquer Europe in its entirety. Conquest of foreign territory is itself considered an ambition demanded of all Persian kings, but the objective of subjecting the continent in its entirety demonstrates Xerxes' overconfidence.

As the Xerxes example shows, a short passage already reveals various methods that, taken together, create certain effects and invite the narratee to engage with the material presented. Given the vast number of interesting characters within the *Histories*, this chapter will only scratch the surface of Herodotus' characterizing methods, and the number of examples will necessarily be restricted. I hope, however, to cover the main narratological techniques that Herodotus uses to encourage the narratee to reflect upon his characters and upon similarities and differences between them, both within and beyond the limits of his work.

Herodotus' Principles in Characterizing Historical Agents

Herodotus aims at describing 'the events that occurred because of men' (*ta genomena ex anthrōpōn*, proem) and makes individual humans primarily responsible for great and marvellous historical events.[2] In doing so, he pays particular attention to monarchs and tyrants whom he features throughout the *Histories*. Given the anthropocentric nature of his enterprise, he presumably thought carefully about the characters of the individuals whom he awarded a role in his narrative.[3] His awareness of the concept of human character and the extent of its influence is revealed in the narrative of Cambyses, who in a volatile

2 I therefore do not discuss Herodotus' characterization of the gods and their influence upon human life. For this vexed question see Lateiner 1989: 189–210, Harrison 2000a, Gould 2001, Mikalson 2002 and Scullion 2006.

3 Baragwanath 2015: 18 formulates this more forcefully: 'Crucial to Herodotus' recounting and memorializing *ta genomena ex anthrōpōn*, "what has come out of men", and explaining cause and responsibility, are insight into the character of individuals and nations and the relationship of character to action.' In this chapter I will mainly focus upon the characters of individuals.

mood orders his servants to kill his adviser Croesus. They, however, 'know his manner of behaving' (*epistamenoi ton tropon autou*, 3.36.5) and decide to hide him, hoping to be rewarded when the king repents for his deed. Elsewhere, Herodotus uses the word *tropos* in a similar way, for instance in qualifying Aristides as the 'best' and 'most righteous' Athenian based on information 'about his character' (*autou ton tropon*, 8.79.1).[4]

For the historian Herodotus, the task of assessing characters may not have been easy. In most cases, he must have based his account on traditions.[5] These could differ in many respects, as can be derived from a comparison between the portraits of Croesus by Herodotus and Bacchylides.[6] Both describe the scene of Croesus on the pyre, but whereas Herodotus makes Cyrus responsible for this punishment (1.86.2), Bacchylides presents a Croesus who ascends the pyre voluntarily, and is rescued by the gods. The poet qualifies the Lydian as an 'old man' (*geronta*, Bacch. *Ode* 3.59) who is rescued for his 'piety' (*di' eusebeian*, Bacch. *Ode* 3.61) in reward for his sumptuous gifts to Apollo in Delphi. In Herodotus' narrative these gifts ultimately prove to be futile, as they only appear to delay Croesus' downfall (1.91.3). Herodotus presents the king as a 'late-learner' who repeatedly ignores sound advice, loses his empire mainly because of his own faults, and, even as adviser to Cyrus, is not able to internalize the lessons he should have learnt from his career (see below), which leads to the defeat by the Massagetae. The comparison demonstrates that Herodotus and Bacchylides based their versions on different traditions and took liberties in characterizing Croesus, so that he fitted well within the themes and purposes of their works.[7]

Croesus lived in a past that had become legendary by the time that Herodotus was active, which may have allowed him some liberty in adapting the records of the past to his needs. This was different, however, for more recent prominent individuals like Xerxes, Themistocles and Pausanias, who were

4 For other instances of *tropos* meaning 'character' see 1.96.2 (Deioces), 1.107.2 (Cambyses the elder), 6.128.1 (the characters of the suitors of Agariste). Herodotus uses *kharaktēr* to indicate traits of distinction in appearance (1.116.1) or in language (1.57.3; 142.4), and *noos* and *phronēma* to refer to a particular plan or mindset (3.122.1–2; 3.125.2). Observe also Herodotus' use of 'nature' (*phusis*) and 'constitution' (*katastasis*) in his paraphrase of Themistocles' harangue at Salamis (8.83.1) to refer to man's general physical and mental capacities, rather than specifically to his character (cf. Baragwanath 2015: 19–20).

5 The dynamics of this process have been lucidly explained by Finley [1965] 1975: 24–29 and Thomas 1989.

6 See Segal 1971 and Crane 1996 for in-depth studies and comparison of the two versions.

7 Compare the ways in which the tragedians characterize their heroes in accordance with the needs of their plots (→).

remembered by many in Herodotus' time, and whose records must have been manifold and at variance depending on local prerogatives, constitutions and politics.[8] Despite apparent controversies in the source material, Herodotus' characterization of these individuals is remarkably consistent. While he often inserts variant versions of the course of events in the past,[9] he does not mention controversies in his sources about an individual's traits.[10] In the alternative version of Xerxes' escape from Greece, for instance, (8.118), the king demands that his subjects sacrifice their lives when the ship turns out to be overloaded. Later he praises the captain with a crown for saving him, but also decapitates him as punishment for the loss of his servants. The tradition, which Herodotus did not believe in (8.119.1), shows traits of Xerxes' character that match with depictions of him elsewhere, such as his fearful nature, his generosity in praise and his cruelty in punishing his subjects.[11] Herodotus portrays his protagonists with a steady hand, and, whereas he includes variant versions on actions and motivations, in his characterization of individuals does not hint at conflicts in his sources.[12]

Herodotus' steady hand in characterizing does not mean that he avoids complexity. He is aware that characters are not stable and coherent entities, but may change under the influence of circumstances.[13] He addresses such character change in his Constitution Debate, where he makes Otanes observe the following:

> Once a man becomes a monarch, even if he is the best person in the world (*ton ariston andrōn pantōn*), he will leave his customary way of thinking (*ektos tōn eōthotōn noēmatōn*)
>
> 3.80.3, transl. WATERFIELD, with slight adaptations

8 The controversy is evident in the differences in the portrait of Themistocles between Herodotus and Thucydides (see below).

9 For Herodotus' strategy of presenting variant versions see Groten 1963; for an overview of variant versions in the *Histories* see Lateiner 1989: 76–90.

10 In contrast to later historians, e.g. Plutarch (→), *Them.* 5.1.

11 For Xerxes' fear, compare his reaction to the dream that threatens him after reconsidering the invasion of Greece (7.15.1); for his generosity in praise, compare his reaction to Pythius' hospitality (7.29) and for his cruelty in punishment, his cutting in half of Pythius' son (7.39.3).

12 Cambyses' anger in each of the variant versions of the origins of the Persian war against Amasis (3.1–3) is another salient example of consistency in characterization.

13 For change of character in historiography see Pitcher 2007: 115–117 with references to further literature (mainly on Hellenistic and Roman historiography and biography).

The *Histories* contain various examples of characters that change over the course of time. Cyrus, for instance, attacks the Massagetae in the belief that he is 'more than human' (*pleon ti einai anthrōpou* 1.204.2). At this stage of his career, he has forgotten the Solonian warning that he seemed to understand when it was taught to him by Croesus, namely that he was a human being like any other and therefore subject to the same vicissitudes of fortune (1.86.6). His insight turns out to be fleeting, with lasting consequences for the course of history.[14] As Baragwanath points out, character change adheres to the general principle that nothing remains stable, which Herodotus voices at the end of his introduction (1.5.4).[15]

Herodotus' approach to characterizing individuals corresponds to the unrestricted way in which he handles other literary techniques like speeches and detailed description. This liberty is masked behind his pose as a researcher who studies the world around him from a strictly empiricist point of view.[16] It is in his self-advertisement as a *histor* who selects and passes his judgments upon traditions that he creates the manoeuvring space to endow individuals with particular traits. Posing as an empiricist, he takes the stance of an external observer and presents his characters primarily on the basis of their words and deeds.[17] When he moves to the area of the unseen, of private reflection and motivation, he resorts to the technique of giving multiple options, as exemplified by the various interpretations he suggests for Cyrus' reasons to punish Croesus (with fourteen Lydian children) on the pyre,

> … as he had in mind either to burn them as first fruits to a certain god, or because he wanted to fulfil a promise, or because he had gathered that Croesus was a pious man he made him mount the pyre, as he wished to know whether one of the gods would protect him against being burnt alive.
>
> 1.86.2

14 See Pelling 2006b: 164–165, and n. 86 for Cyrus' forgetfulness of the Solonian wisdom offered to him by Croesus (1.86.5–6). Another prominent individual whose traits change over the course of time is Cleomenes; see Ubsdell 1983: 47–77.

15 Baragwanath 2008: 107–108 and 2015: 20–21. Compare also her useful observations on the various ways in which Herodotus draws attention to unusual aspects of character, in harmony with the *thōmata* that he mentions in his opening words (2015: 19–20).

16 Cf. 2.99. For the way in which Herodotus presents himself in his work as a researcher see Schepens 1980 and *SAGN* 1: 101–114 (de Jong).

17 On the way in which Herodotus poses as an impartial judge in the *Histories*, see Darbo-

Cyrus' motivation for punishing Croesus is explained either in terms of foreign religion or as resulting from his inquisitive nature, a trait of character that Cyrus shares with other kings in the *Histories*.[18] Like in the earlier Xerxes example, Herodotus juxtaposes motivation based on foreign religion with motivation that ties in with the plot structure of his narrative.[19]

Overt Characterization in the *Histories*

Explicit comments by the narrator on the characters of individuals in the *Histories* are rare and confined to relatively minor players when they enter his narrative.[20] Some of them are qualified as *agathos* ('good', 'brave') or *aristos* ('best', 'excellent'), which sometimes reflects their noble background[21] but more often points to great achievements on the battlefield.[22] Others are praised for their *sophiē* ('wisdom', 'cleverness') because they give useful advice to monarchs[23] or, less often, for their *dikaiosunē* ('righteousness') because their actions attest to honesty and integrity. An example of the latter is Cadmus of Cos, whom the Syracusan tyrant Gelon sends as a messenger to offer gifts and allegiance to Xerxes in the case of a Persian conquest of Greece (7.163–164).[24] Herodotus tells how Cadmus voluntarily laid down the tyranny of Cos 'out of righteousness' (7.164.1) and praises 'among his other acts of righteousness' the honest return of the gifts that Gelon had entrusted to him (7.164.2). These acts are exceptional in comparison with regular human behaviour in the *Histories*. No other tyrants

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Peschanski 1987: 107–112, Thomas 2000: 235–248, Bakker 2002: 20–28, Cartledge and Greenwood 2002 and *SAGN* 1: 101–114 (de Jong). For Herodotus' empirical attitude see Müller 1981.

18 On this aspect of characterization in the *Histories*, see Christ 1994.

19 See Baragwanath on this passage (2008: 66–67).

20 On these assessments see Westlake 1968: 5–19, who acknowledges their methodological originality within Greek literature.

21 For instance 1.107.2 (Cambyses the elder); 3.68.1 (Otanes).

22 Usually in the formula *anēr agathos* (for instance 1.169.1 (Ionians); 5.2.1 (Perinthians); 6.14.3 (Samian admirals); 6.114 (Callimachus); 6.117.2 (Epizelus); 7.238.2 (men in general); 9.75 (Sophanes)) or *anēr aristos* (7.181.1 (Pytheas); 7.224.1 (Leonidas); 7.226.1 (Dieneces)). For a possible link of this formula with funerary rhetoric see Arrington 2011: 187–188.

23 For instance Deioces (1.96.1), Melampus (2.49.2), Phanes (3.4.2), Oebares (3.85.1), and Anacharsis (4.76.2). Sometimes the qualification is focalized by others than the narrator, for instance in the case of Sandanis (1.71.2), Amyris (6.127.1) and Chilon (7.235.2).

24 Other examples are Mycerinus (2.129.1, in reported narrative), Glaucus (6.86α2, in Leutychides' speech, see below).

are mentioned who step down voluntarily; they usually cling to their position, even at the expense of alienating or killing their subjects.[25] Similarly, there are various examples of individuals or groups that abuse the trust of others and steal their goods. A salient example is that of the Athenians who refuse to return Aeginetan hostages that Sparta has entrusted to them (6.73.2) as a punishment for Aegina's tokens of surrender to Darius' heralds (6.49). As a consequence, the already existing tensions between Athens and Aegina escalate. Herodotus uses the opportunity to make the Spartan Leutychides deliver a long, castigating speech to the Athenians, in which he compares their dishonesty to that of the Spartan Glaucus (6.86), who was famed for his *dikaiosunē* (6.86α3). Glaucus merely contemplated not returning a deposit that was entrusted to him by a Milesian and was subsequently punished by the gods, who eradicated his lineage.[26]

Cadmus is also exceptional in that he does not use his reputation for more self-centred ends, as happens with Deioces the Mede. Herodotus introduces him as 'a wise man' (*anēr … sophos*, 1.96.1) who 'fell in love with tyranny' (*erastheis turannidos*, 1.96.2) and used his reputation of being an 'honest and righteous' judge (*ithus te kai dikaios*, 1.96.2) to win the trust of the Medes, who elected him as their king (1.96.3). A similar example is found in the case of Themistocles, who uses his reputation of being 'wise and of good counsel' (*sophos te kai euboulos*, 8.110.1, cf. 8.124.1) to dissuade the Athenians from pursuing Xerxes on his flight from Greece. Thus, he makes the king indebted to him, as he lets him know—through a secret embassy—that the Persians owe their survival to him as 'best and wisest man of the entire alliance' (*anēr … tōn summakhōn pantōn aristos kai sophōtatos*, 8.110.3). The same ambassadors subsequently demand exemplary damages from islands in the Aegean; of these the Carystians and Parians obey, as they know that Themistocles was held 'in much praise' (*en ainēi megistēi*, 8.112.2) among the generals. The Athenian keeps the financial compensation for himself as he, in Herodotus' own words, 'could not stop lusting after money' (*ou … epaueto pleonekteōn*, 8.112.1).[27]

25 Compare Thrasybulus' advice to Periander in Socles' speech to the Peloponnesians (5.92ζ-η).

26 Compare also the arguments between the Samians and Spartans about the alleged theft of a vessel that the Spartans had sent as a gift to Croesus (1.70.2–3; 3.47.1) and of a linen jerkin sent as a gift to Amasis (3.47.1–3).

27 The principle of using one's reputation for material ends is voiced by Darius in his defence of the use of lies, contrary to Persian custom (3.72.3–5, cf. 1.136.2). For different opinions upon Herodotus' judgement of Themistocles' traits see Barth 1965 and Frost 1980: 9–

The narrator also lavishes exceptional words of praise on Aristides,

> a man (*anēr*) from Athens, but ostracized by the people, of whom I am firmly convinced, based on information about his character, that he was the best (*ariston*) man in Athens and the most righteous (*dikaiotaton*).
> 8.79.1

Aristides' activities in the narrative, however, do not seem to be exceptional enough to merit such praise, and his righteousness in particular remains unmotivated. As for military exploits, Herodotus mentions Aristides' attack upon the Persians at Psyttaleia (8.95) and his role as commander of the Athenians in Plataea (9.28.6), but these feats are relatively modest in comparison with the achievements of compatriots like Miltiades and Themistocles. The personal way in which Herodotus frames his judgement (observe *tōn egō nenomika*, 'of whom I am of the opinion', 8.79.1) points to a contemporary debate about the characters and merits of the Athenian leaders during the Persian war. Traces of this debate are also found in Thucydides' judgement of Themistocles (Thuc. 1.138.3, →), which differs from Herodotus' more negative portrait as it highlights the Athenian's extemporizing talents and foresight.[28] Within Herodotus' narrative, the praise for Aristides creates a contrast with his more critical attitude *vis-à-vis* Themistocles, who often succeeds in obtaining his objectives in less pleasant ways, but reaps the harvest of glory after the war, when the Greek commanders award him a crown (8.123–124). There is a faint hint of cynicism in this, as if Herodotus intends to demonstrate—through the evocation of a comparison between Aristides and Themistocles—that righteousness is not always properly acknowledged or rewarded, and that a good dose of amoral ruthlessness may serve as a better means to reach one's end.[29]

Metaphorical Techniques of Characterization

Herodotus hardly ever evaluates major historical individuals explicitly, but makes their characters apparent from words, deeds and responses in the nar-

10. See Blösel 2004 for a comprehensive treatment of Herodotus' characterization of Themistocles.

28 See Blösel 2012: 232–236.

29 Compare in this respect his characterization of Darius, who is ruthless in his objective to seize the Persian throne. Cf. Bringmann 1976 and below.

rative that can be matched with those of others, within but also beyond the text of the *Histories*.[30] Concentrating upon parallels within the text first, I propose a distinction—in Lohmann's terms—between *äußere* and *übergreifende Komposition*, i.e. characterization by comparison *within* the same scene, and by comparison with other scenes *elsewhere in the narrative*.[31]

In the case of comparison within the same scene, Herodotus makes his characters respond to the same situation in different ways in order to bring out their individual traits.[32] He employs this method in his narrative of the Persian conspiracy against the Magi to characterize the young Darius. When introduced within the circle of conspirators, he favours a course of action without delay (3.71.2), is ready to betray his fellow-conspirators (3.71.5), and promotes the forsaking of the typically Persian custom of truth-telling (cf. 1.136.1; 138.2) if his goals can also be reached by manipulation (3.72.4–5). Herodotus stages Otanes as an opponent who insists on more time and on widening the circle of conspirators (3.71.3). By inviting the narratee to compare the conspirators, Herodotus brings out Darius' ruthlessness more sharply, a character trait that explains how he wins the kingship and succeeds in reorganizing the empire that Cyrus and Cambyses have left him. He also contrasts Darius' attitude with that of his fellow-conspirator Gobryas, who appeals to Persian feelings of heroism, urging the others to reclaim the throne or die an honourable death (3.73.1–3). During the battle with the Magi, it is indeed Gobryas who is staged as a hero in ordering Darius to strike either himself or the Magus with whom he is fighting in a dark chamber of the palace (3.77.4–5). Finally, Herodotus presents Prexaspes in this scene as a third foil to Darius. Being no part of the conspiracy, he is invited by the Magi, who confide their identity to him and ask him to assuage the Persian people outside the palace (3.74). Prexaspes, however, reveals the truth about the illegal reign of the Magi and throws himself from the wall (3.75). In contrast to Darius, he refuses to forsake the Persian custom of truth-telling, and, like Gobryas, he is willing to pay the ultimate price. Contrasting characters in this passage evokes reflection upon the recipe for a successful *coup d'état*. It appears as though, for Herodotus, heroism and a

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30 Cf. Baragwanath 2015: 24. An exception is the Persian qualification of their kings: Darius as 'merchant' (*kapēlos*), Cambyses as 'despot' (*despotēs*), and Cyrus as 'father' (*patēr*) as recorded by Herodotus after Darius' accession (3.89.3).

31 See Lohmann's study of the speeches in the *Iliad* (1970), in which he analyses their internal structure (*innere Komposition*), their structure in relation to other speeches within the same scene (*äußere Komposition*) and elsewhere in the narrative (*übergreifende Komposition*).

32 The tragedians use the same technique (Aeschylus, →; Sophocles, →).

readiness to die are in themselves not enough. Ruthlessness and willingness to manipulate are equally, if not more important in making such an operation a success.[33]

A variant of this contrasting technique is Herodotus' method of describing characters' differing reactions to the same situation at *different* moments in history. This is exemplified in Herodotus' account of Darius' and Xerxes' reactions upon seeing a massive golden statue in a Babylonian sanctuary. Both kings want to take it away for themselves, but Darius manages to restrain himself whereas Xerxes kills the priest and takes the statue (1.183.2–3). Early on in the *Histories*, this anecdote has the effect of 'primacy', as it anticipates the predatory nature of Darius' and Xerxes' kingships, but also the more restrained way in which Darius handled the subjected states. Their different attitudes hint at a possible reason why Darius' reign is more successful and long-lasting than Xerxes's.

Moving from *äußere* to *übergreifende Komposition*, traits can also become apparent by staging different individuals in similar scenes. The most common way this is done in the *Histories* is through the adviser scene, which exposes an addressee's character—often a king or tyrant—by his response to the advice.[34] Herodotus' frequent use of this scene enables him to evoke comparison. He highlights Cambyses' volatile character, for instance, through the nature of his reactions to his adviser Croesus. When he asks the grandees in his retinue how he compares to his father Cyrus, they reply that he is better, as he is king of a larger empire. Croesus disagrees, believing Cambyses not to be equal yet, as he has 'not yet left a son such as he left you' (3.34.5). This should be seen as an implicit warning, since Cambyses has just murdered his—allegedly pregnant—sister and wife (3.32.4). Cambyses, however, 'enjoys' (*hēsthē*) Croesus' words (3.34.5). When he thereupon murders the son of Prexaspes and buries twelve Persians alive (3.35), Croesus attempts to assuage him, imploring him not to 'commit everything to his age and temperament', as this will cause a revolt (3.36.1–2). Despite Croesus' careful phrasing and 'benevolence' (*eunoiē*, 3.36.2), Cambyses this time responds angrily, pointing out to Croesus how he failed as king and as adviser to Cyrus, and tries to kill him with his bow (3.36.3–4). His attempt is foiled, however, and when the king has calmed down he is glad

33 For other examples of this technique, compare the observations on Themistocles and Aristides above and on the debates at Xerxes' court (7.8–11) below. On a larger scale observe Herodotus' overview of the different ways in which the Greek states respond to Xerxes' invasion (7.131–174).

34 For overviews of the different types of wise advisers in the *Histories*, see Bischoff 1932 and Lattimore 1939.

to hear that Croesus has survived (3.36.6). This sequence of advice is primarily meant to give insight into Cambyses' reign of terror, as, in Herodotus' version at least, he was led by his whims and behaved increasingly as a madman.[35] The contrast is striking with the sensibility of his predecessor Cyrus, who is willing to listen to others. The latter puts in place Croesus' recommendations to end the plundering of Sardes by manipulating the Persians into handing over their booty (1.89–90.1). He evaluates Croesus' words as typical of a fellow-king, who is willing to perform 'useful deeds and words' (*khrēsta erga kai epea poieein*, 1.90.1) and makes him into his counsellor. In this position, Croesus offers another practical recommendation on the rebellious Lydians (1.155.3–4), advising Cyrus to have them change their customs. His words again betray the perspective of a monarch able to manipulate his subjects so that they can be ruled more easily, and they are warmly welcomed by Cyrus. The usefulness of these first two recommendations motivates Cyrus' decision to follow Croesus' third, fateful piece of advice about the question of how to fight the Massagetae (1.207). Although Croesus frames his words in Solonian terms, pointing to the cycle of human life and instability of human fortune (cf. 1.32), he does not advise Cyrus to abandon the campaign (1.207.1–2), but to fight the Massagetae in their own land (1.207.3–5). Croesus' advice illustrates, as Pelling argues, the elusiveness of wisdom, as it reveals the Lydian's ability to recollect Solon's words, but by their contrast with the actual advice also highlights his failure to internalize them and to adjust his perspective to their deeper meaning.[36] Together with the Persian's over-confidence (1.204.2, see above), it is the limited capacity of Croesus' understanding that contributes to the end of Cyrus' reign.

A final method of metaphorical characterizing concerns the various ways in which the portraits of individuals within the *Histories* are informed by elements from outside and thus evoke comparison. These elements could range from portraits of the same individual in other genres and traditions to a more general relation with characters and ideas known from Greek myth that could serve as a backdrop. Bacchylides' image of Croesus (see above) or Aeschylus' staging of Darius and Xerxes[37] are examples of the former, whereas an example of the latter is Herodotus' use of the great heroes of the Trojan War, Achilles

35 I am indebted here to the more in-depth analysis of Cambyses' 'self-absorbed and arbitrary nature of … reasoning' by Baragwanath (2008: 107–121, quote from p. 118).

36 Pelling points out that Croesus' perspective is limited by his own past experiences (2006b: 164–172). See also Stahl 1975: 21–36.

37 Observe that other authors often write more positively about kings and tyrants. For the Pisistratids compare Thucydides' words of praise (6.54.5), for Cyrus Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (*passim*) and for Darius Plato's *Laws* (694c–695).

and Hector, to inform his narrative of Leonidas at Thermopylae. By moving from the intratextual to the intertextual, from *übergreifende* to *ausgreifende Komposition*, we are dealing with a subject that is, given the wealth of material within the *Histories*, too extensive to be treated within the scope of this chapter. I therefore confine myself to one example, the way in which Herodotus' portrait of the legendary Athenian lawgiver Solon may have been informed by various external models.

Solon is introduced within the *Histories* as belonging to the 'sophists' (*sophistai*, 1.29.1) that visited Croesus' palace in Sardes at the height of Lydian power. As Moles (1996) has argued, this specific qualification—Herodotus elsewhere only uses it for Pythagoras (4.95.2)—has an anachronistic ring and evokes the image of contemporary Athens as the backdrop against which Solon offers his advice to Croesus. Apart from his canonical status as sage and lawgiver, Herodotus mentions his travelling for the purpose of research (*theōriē*, 1.29.1), which Solon uses as a pretext to force the Athenians to live under their new constitution (1.29.1–2). Croesus repeats this information when he receives Solon in his palace, praising the Athenian by stating

> 'that you have in your longing for wisdom (*philosopheōn*) come across much land (*gēn pollēn … epelēluthas*) for the sake of research (*theōriēs*).'
>
> 1.30.2

Croesus' flattering words contain an allusion to epic poetry in the expression *gēn pollēn epelēluthēnai*, which Homer uses to describe Menelaus and Odysseus who have travelled across the earth and learnt much about mankind (*Od.* 4.266–270).[38] Apart from the contemporary Athenian background, Solon's character is informed by these mythical arch-travellers, which adds to his authority when he addresses Croesus.[39] The image, moreover, evokes the way in which Herodotus presents his own travels and research, which makes Solon an *alter ego* of the historian.[40] Finally, there may be engagement with poetry ascribed to Solon. Herodotus mentions that Croesus' age is 35 at his accession (1.26.1). Croesus reigns for fourteen years and, after a siege that lasts fourteen days (1.86.1), is placed on a pyre with twice seven Lydian youths (1.86.2). This emphasis on the number seven and its multiples evokes an elegy ascribed to

38 Compare *Il.* 15.79–83.

39 Observe that Solon, like Menelaus and Odysseus, visits Egypt (2.177.2). He is also hosted at Cyprus (5.113.2). Compare the portrait of Anacharsis (4.76.2) as traveller and sage.

40 Cf. Arieti 1995: 41 and Moles 1996.

Solon that divides human life in ten periods of seven years, in which the peak lies in the sixth, seventh, and eighth heptomad (from 35 to 56 years). Herodotus makes his Solon hint at the elegy in his speech to Croesus on happiness, which opens with the words that he sets 'the limit (*ouron*) of life for a human at the age of seventy' (1.32.2). With *ouros* (Attic *horos*, 'boundary-stone'), this phrase also contains a reference to Solon's reforms in Athens, i.e. his moving of the boundary stones in the context of the cancellation of debt-slavery (*seisakhtheia*).[41] It appears as if Herodotus has built his character Solon in part upon images that stem from the past, and in part upon ideas that are closer to him in time. Thus he has created a Solon character that bridges the gap between a legendary past and his own contemporary fifth century BCE audience, for whom he believed Solon's wisdom had many benefits.

Metonymical Techniques of Characterization

Herodotus' ascription of particular deeds, words, and thoughts to individuals is his most powerful characterizing tool. The analysis here will be confined to a few general observations. For more in-depth studies on these aspects of the *Histories*, I refer to recent publications by Scardino (on speeches, 2007), Baragwanath (on motivation, 2008), Barker (on debates, 2009), Froehlich (on motivation, 2013), and to older seminal publications of Lateiner (especially on tyranny, 1989) and Christ (on kings as investigators, 1994).

Action

When we look at characterization by deeds, hardly any of the more substantially portrayed individuals in the *Histories* keep reputations of integrity throughout their appearances in the narrative. In the case of kings and tyrants, this is self-evident, as Herodotus chose one-man rule and its negative consequences as one of the main themes of his work.[42] Even individuals like Croesus and Polycrates, who may evoke sympathy because of their euergetism or their portrayal in intimate settings, do not escape unscathed. The story of Croesus ends with the killing of a rival, whom he tortured by 'dragging him across a carding-comb' (*epi knaphou helkōn*, 1.92.4). Polycrates' reign on Samos begins with the murder of his brother Pantagnotus and the exile of his brother Syloson (3.39.2). Herodotus reminds us that these autocrats committed grave

41 Cf. Solon fr. 36, 37 (West). See also Chiasson 1986.

42 Lateiner 1989.

crimes in order to ensure their position of power. Similarly, Herodotus singles out high-born Persian officials for their atrocities, for instance Otanes, who—despite his thoughtful character (see above) and plea to abolish Persian monarchy (3.80)—wipes out the population of Samos (3.147; 149). In the same vein, Oroetes, satrap of Sardes, kills Polycrates out of envy and subsequently rids himself of various Persian officials (3.120–126).[43] On the side of the Greeks, Hermotimus' revenge upon Panionius, who castrated him as a boy, is a cruel atrocity. Hermotimus forces him to castrate his own sons and in turn has them castrate him (8.104–106).[44] It appears as if Herodotus believed that men endowed with power were by their very nature capable of the most atrocious crimes.

Thought and Speech

Herodotus uses the representation of thoughts and speeches to demonstrate his characters' political capacities. This is illustrated by Themistocles' speech to Eurybiades at Salamis (8.60α-γ) after the fall of Athens, when the Greek alliance plans to move to the Isthmus. Themistocles has been advised that this move will lead to the collapse of the alliance, and has shared this opinion privately with Eurybiades (8.58.2). In the subsequent meeting of admirals, however, Themistocles fears that disclosing this concern may give offence (8.60). He therefore adopts a different line of reasoning in his public address to Eurybiades, emphasizing the advantages of fighting in the narrows and the importance of keeping Megara, Aegina and Salamis in allied hands.

Speeches function in a different way. They characterize an individual (or a group of individuals representative of a clan or a polis) in relation to (the network of) their addressee(s),[45] and thus give an idea of the communication that accompanies (a) particular event(s). Particularly successful in this respect are the speeches held in the meeting at the Persian court at the beginning of the seventh book (7.8–11). In the prelude to this passage, Herodotus describes how Xerxes initially does not wish to prioritize war against Greece (7.5.1), but is persuaded by his cousin Mardonius and Greek lobbyists who seek support in order to regain power at home (7.5–6). In the subsequent debate, Xerxes

43 Compare Artayctes, satrap of the Hellespont, whom Herodotus qualifies as *deinos* and *atasthalos* (9.116.1).

44 For other atrocities committed by Greeks that Herodotus mentions, see Menelaus' sacrifice of two Egyptian children to obtain favourable winds (2.119.2) and the Athenian crucifixion of Artayctes (9.120.4).

45 Observe in this respect Herodotus' artful use of forms of address to qualify the relationships between characters, as analysed by Dickey 1996.

delivers the first speech and argues that he has to follow his predecessors' tradition of enlarging the empire (7.8α). He announces Greece as his objective, as it enables him to take revenge upon Athens for its support of the Ionian revolt and its victory at Marathon (7.8β). After arguing that a conquest of Greece will make the entire world into one Persian empire (7.8γ), he gives specific orders to his subjects (7.8δ) and rounds off with a request for opinions, as if the decision has not yet been taken:

> 'And in order that I do not appear to you to decide on my own, I place the topic in your midst, and order that whoever wishes to do so (*ton boulomenon*) should come forward with his opinion.'
>
> 7.8δ2

Mardonius thereupon speaks in support of the decision, flattering the king and making light of Greek fighting power (7.9). Next, Artabanus tries to dissuade Xerxes, pointing out the poor track record of Persian fighting in Europe (7.10β-γ) and warning—in veiled terms—against a hubristic undertaking (7.10δ-ζ). He then rebukes Mardonius for telling lies about the Greeks (7.10η-θ). Xerxes flies into a rage, telling Artabanus to stay home with the women (7.11.1) and summing up his Achaemenid lineage (7.11.2). Revenge upon the Athenians should be seen as a pre-emptive strike, he claims, to avoid the conquest of the Persians themselves (7.11.2–4).

The debate at the Persian court characterizes its participants via their attitudes and their words. Xerxes lacks the confident authority that is needed to motivate his decision and seeks refuge in overstating the importance of revenge, in repeated appeals to the traditions of his ancestors and eventually in anger. He also tries to raise support by giving the impression of a democratic debate, asking his subjects to speak freely with a formula that resembles that of the opening of the Athenian assembly—who wishes to speak (*tis agoreuein bouletai*)? This odd way of ending an autocrat's speech indicates that he is portrayed as unsure of how to establish his authority most effectively. Mardonius is characterized as a shrewd and manipulative lobbyist, keen on personal glory after his earlier failed campaign to Greece. Artabanus' words to Xerxes parallel those of other advisers, but his bitter invective against Mardonius also reveals that he, as an older statesman, lacks the charisma to bring the sensitive debate to a satisfying conclusion. Altogether, the way in which the individuals interact, their choice of arguments and phrasing, the excessive flattery of Mardonius, the lengthy apology made by Artabanus at the beginning of his speech, and his warning clouded in general, almost proverbial statements, characterize the Persian court as a place of intrigue, and intimidation, in every way the opposite

to the atmosphere of freedom of speech that Xerxes tries to create through his quasi-democratic invitation at the end of his opening speech.[46]

In contrast to Homer (→) and Thucydides (→), Herodotus has not endowed any of his characters with an idiolect.[47] Rather, it is *types* of characters that are characterized in this way. Thus he sometimes makes kings and tyrants use 'posh' Homeric language. Darius twice uses the dactylic closure 'for it's not better' (*ou gar ameinon*, 3.71.2; 3.82.5),[48] and Croesus' opening words in the *Histories* also share their diction with poetry:

> 'Would that the gods place that in the mind of the islanders, to war against the sons of the Lydians on horses.' (*ai gar touto theoi poiēseian epi noon nēsiōtēisi, elthein epi Ludōn paidas sun hippoisi*)
>
> 1.27.3

The use of *ai gar* to introduce a wish and the expressions *poiein epi noon* ('place in the mind') and 'sons of the Lydians' are poetical and possibly derived from Homeric poetry.[49] Similarly, Herodotus often makes his advisers speak in veiled terms, in particular when they address a superior whose reaction may be volatile. They make use of general maxims, such as Solon's *pan esti anthrōpos sumphorē* ('man is entirely subject to accident', 1.32.4)[50] or of colourful similes that mask their criticism. An example is Artabanus' veiled warning to Xerxes against the influence of warmongers in his palace:

> 'the company of evil men endangers you, in a similar way as they say that storms that hit the sea—of all things the most useful for mankind—do not allow it to use its own nature.'[51]
>
> 7.16α

46 For a lengthier analysis see de Bakker 2007: 136–159, with references to scholarship on this passage.

47 For Homer see Friedrich and Redfield 1978, for Thucydides see Tompkins 1972.

48 See Hes. *Op.* 750 and cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.217 (*hōs gar ameinon*). The phrase is also found in the inscription in Nitocris' tomb which exposes Darius as 'shameless pursuer of profit' (*aiskhrokerdēs*, 1.187.5).

49 For *ai gar* compare Hom. *Od.* 20.236; for the gods placing a plan in the mind of a man compare Hom. *Il.* 13.732; for the form of address 'sons of …' compare Hom. *Il.* 1.162.

50 On this aspect of the language of advisers see Pelling 2006b.

51 Observe that the simile alludes to Solon's fragment 12 (West): 'the sea is brought into turmoil by winds. If no one causes it to move, it is the most righteous element of all'.

Without mentioning Mardonius and the Greek lobbyists explicitly, and by comparing the king to an element that is by nature useful, Artabanus issues a warning without making Xerxes suffer a loss of face.

In a similar way, Herodotus typifies the ethnic background of his characters by way of their speech. This holds especially for the Ionians and the Athenians, whose rhetorical capacities he underlines through their speeches, and for the Spartans, whose words are laconic and devoid of rhetorical embellishment. This creates a humorous effect when representatives of both parties meet in debate, as happens when Aristagoras' lengthy oration to raise Spartan support for the Ionian revolt (5.49.2–8) is answered by Cleomenes with the briefest of replies:

> 'Stranger from Miletus, I adjourn my reply to you until the day after tomorrow.'[52]
>
> 5.49.9

In the case of the Ionians and Athenians, the integrity of their rhetoric is often undermined by the narrative context. A dramatic example is found in the interlude between the battles of Salamis and Plataea, when the Persians seek to win over the Athenians by sending Alexander of Macedon who delivers a lengthy plea with words from Xerxes, Mardonius and himself (8.140). The Athenians refuse with a reference to

> 'the Greek world, being related by blood (*homaimon*) and related by language (*homoglōsson*), and the communal places of worship and sacrifice for the gods, and our characters that are of the same manner (*homotropa*), of which it could in no way be the case that the Athenians betrayed them.'
>
> 8.144.2

Not much later, however, this idealism is undermined when the Spartans procrastinate in organizing their support for the alliance. Eventually they send out their army under Pausanias without telling the Athenian ambassadors, who are still waiting for an official reply in Sparta (9.10). They accuse the Spartans of treachery and announce that the Athenians will ally themselves with the Persians, fighting together with them 'against whomever they march out' (9.11.2). Only at this late stage do the ephors reveal the dispatch of their army. The way

52 For other examples of Ionians having trouble in communicating with the Spartans when they meet one another see 1.152, 3.46, 3.148.

in which Herodotus has structured the narrative and speeches of this episode characterizes the cooperation of the Greek states against the Persians as lacking trust and being devoid of Panhellenic idealism, and anticipates the deterioration of Greek interstate relationships in the period after the Persian War.

Conclusion: Herodotus' Multiple Methods of Characterization

The overview of the most important techniques of characterization within the *Histories* demonstrates Herodotus' versatility as a historiographer. Posing as an empirical observer of past events, he gives the impression of assessing his characters with a steady hand according to their deeds and words, but in fact takes literary liberties in characterizing individuals so that they contribute to his important themes, such as his stance against one-man rule and opposition to internecine fighting among the Greeks. For the same purpose, he invites the narratee to reflect upon similarities and differences between characters by staging them together within the same or a similar scene, or by deriving aspects of their characterization from sources outside the *Histories*. Aided by these techniques, Herodotus creates a wide cast of divergent characters, in whom he highlights the full complexity of human behaviour. He shows that the free Greek world is in many ways not much different from the courts of kings and tyrants, and that both settings abound in intrigue, manipulation and hostility. Finally, he draws attention to his own Protean struggle in gathering and evaluating the wealth of traditions that informed his unique work.

CHAPTER 8

Thucydides

Tim Rood

Thucydides' treatment of character met with a mixed reception in antiquity.[1] He was praised for his skilled characterization in Marcellinus' *Vita* (*deinos … ēthopoiēsai*, 20), but Dionysius of Halicarnassus suggested that while Thucydides was good at *pathos*, Herodotus was more skilled at showing *ēthos* (*Pomp.* 3). The reason for such mixed judgements is easy enough to grasp. It is not that Thucydides' work is short of individuals: it includes 'about 530 persons, of whom 496 are men, 22 are heroes, seven are gods, and six are women'[2]—though admittedly this number is less than half that found in Herodotus' rather longer work (with an especially significant disparity in the number of women). The point, rather, is that many of these characters are mere names, figures who play a brief part in Thucydides' political and military narrative and then disappear. Few are given much circumstantial information, let alone endowed with distinctive character traits. Nonetheless, Thucydides' handling of character is of interest for a number of reasons. For one thing, there are striking divergences across the course of his work: different techniques are used in different sections and for different categories of individuals. Besides this, an important thematic role is played by the characterization of groups—particularly city groups such as the Athenians and Spartans. Analysing Thucydides' various techniques of characterization does, then, reveal much about his understanding of the Peloponnesian War. In this chapter, I will discuss first his manner of naming and introducing characters; then his direct evaluations; and finally a number of techniques of metaphorical and metonymical characterization.

Naming and Introductions

The 530 persons counted by Griffith are merely those who receive names. In addition to these characters, there are many who are nameless—for instance the woman who helps some of the Theban invaders of Plataea to escape by

1 For good modern treatments, see Westlake 1968; Gribble 2006; de Bakker 2013.
2 Griffith 1961: 21.

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giving them an axe (2.4.4); the Spartan commander at Plataea, though his perceptions and wishes are described (3.52.2: *gnous*, *ebouleto*); the five Spartan judges who decide that the Plataeans should be put to death (3.52.3, 68.1); and the Myrcanian peltast who kills Cleon in battle (5.10.9). The narrator's limited knowledge may well be an explanation in these cases; the status of the characters is doubtless also important for the woman at Plataea and the peltast. Hornblower in addition suggests that the anonymity of the Spartan judges makes them 'more chilling, like a hooded figure at an *auto-de-fe* or a Ku Klux Klan executioner'.[3] But equally a solemn list of their names could have given the effect of the power of the Spartan state machinery. At any rate, lack of knowledge will not explain all cases of anonymity. It is scarcely likely that Thucydides did not know the name of the prisoner who informs about the Herms scandal (6.60.2: the orator Andocides, as we know from his speech *On the Mysteries*). Here it has been suggested that the non-naming is contemptuous.[4] But while this explanation seems plausible enough, it would not do for the unnamed Athenian (*tis tōn Athēnaiōn*, 6.25.1) in the debate on the Sicilian expedition who (in indirect discourse) calls on Nicias to state openly and at once what force he requires in Sicily. Here the character's anonymity seems rather to point up his swift democratic (i.e. typically Athenian) challenge to Nicias' desire to deliberate at leisure with his fellow generals.

The question of naming is particularly interesting in relation to speeches. Thucydides often prefixes speeches with an attribution to a *polis* group,[5] suggesting that the speakers in such cases stand as representatives of their *polis*. This hypothesis is strengthened by cases where Thucydides ends a speech with a *polis* attribution even though a more precise attribution to envoys or counsellors has been used at its inception.[6] In the later stages of the work, by contrast, there is a greater tendency for speeches to be given to individuals: thus at the Gela conference the only speech included is made by Hermocrates (4.59–64), even though he starts by stressing his Syracusan identity; and the speeches in the Camarina debate (6.76–87) are again attributed to individuals (Hermocrates, Euphemus) even though they deal with the issue of Athenian and Syracusan imperialism at a fairly general level. While the Melian Dialogue

3 Hornblower 1991–2008: ii.137.

4 Pelling 2000: 255 n. 4.

5 Corcyraeans (1.31.4), Corinthians (1.36.4, 53.1, 67.5, 119), Athenians (1.72.2), Thebans (3.60).

6 Contrast 3.8.2 with 3.15; 4.16.3 with 4.21.1; 5.85, 86 with 112.1, 113 (this case, the Melian Dialogue, is particularly interesting because the intervening indications of changes of speaker (*Ath.*, *Mēl.*) in the manuscripts were not included by Thucydides himself, as a papyrus and a scholion on 5.85 show).

is an obvious exception to this pattern, the focus on individual speakers is in line with the greater role given to individuals in the later sections of the *History* (see below).

Opposing speakers are most often given the same level of detail. In the case of the haunting conversation between an Athenian and an Ambraciote herald who has been sent to recover the corpses from one disaster but now discovers that the Ambraciotes have suffered a second, still greater disaster (3.113.4), neither speaker is named: the shared anonymity highlights the incidental way in which the herald discovers the news and the pathos of his failure even to fulfil the task he has been given as herald. A number of exceptions to this principle may nonetheless be noted, notably the contrasting attributions in the Plataean debate. While the speech pleading for the lives of the Plataeans is made by two men, 'Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aemnestus' (3.52.5), the opposing speakers are merely 'the Thebans' (3.60).[7] Thucydides here seems to draw on the associations of names that are symbolic of Plataean identity and of their long-standing connections with Sparta.[8]

Whether named or not, characters are often given a number of identifying features. The most common is an ethnic label; such labels are frequently found even when the ethnic could reasonably be inferred from the context (e.g. the Corinthians put in charge 'Alexarchus a Corinthian' and the Sicyonians 'Sargeus a Sicyonian', 7.19.4). The inclusion of the ethnic adds formality, perhaps echoing the style of Athenian inscriptions which often add a demotic (without article) to the name of the *grammateus* (e.g. Meiggs and Lewis [1969] 1988: no. 84 line 1, no. 86 line 1). Slightly more prominence is given by the inclusion of the definite article with the ethnic tag, which suggests that the character is familiar. Thus mention of 'Cleomenes the Spartan' (1.126.12)—without mention of his status as king or of his patronymic—draws on his position within the Athenian historical tradition. Cleomenes is mentioned in the account of the run-up to the Peloponnesian War when Thucydides describes how the Spartans invoke the Cylonian curse as an anti-Alcmeonid move. Thucydides explains first the origins of the curse, then notes that the curse had previously been invoked by Cleomenes after the expulsion of the Pisistratids. The phrasing 'Cleomenes the

7 The speakers become 'the Plataeans' in the closing formula (3.60). Cf. the speech attributed to 'Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian generals' at 2.86.6 but to 'the leaders' (*hoi arkhontes*) at 2.88.1—whereas 'the [Syracusan] generals and Gylippus' (7.65.3) is repeated at 7.69.1. In these two cases the opposing speakers are individual Athenian generals, Phormion and Nicias.

8 Hornblower 1991–2008: i.444 (identifying Aemnestus with the individual named at Hdt. 9.72.2).

Spartan' is focalized through the Athenians, inasmuch as the story is told in the context of a new (failed) attempt by the Spartans to intervene in internal Athenian affairs.

A common feature used by Thucydides in introductions of named characters is the patronymic.[9] He includes patronymics (a feature resonant of Homeric epic) generally for characters of high status (generals, satraps, kings), for speakers, and for some individuals of lesser status who nonetheless play a part in significant events. Patronymics are, however, sometimes revealed not on a character's first appearance, but on a later, more decisive, intervention.[10] Overall, it is still hard to press for consistency in the inclusion of patronymics. Indeed, inconsistency can be seen even in two decree-texts that Thucydides includes. The three Athenian officials (*prutanis*, *grammateus*, *epistatēs*) presiding over the assembly when the Athenians agree to an armistice are given names but not patronymics (4.118.11), while the men involved in the actual making of the armistice and in the pouring of libations are given patronymics (4.119.2). This difference may seem to reflect the relative importance of the roles of the two groups—though Athenian inscriptions (unlike Thucydides) do not include patronymics for speakers whose proposals are recorded, even though their contributions strike us as more important. Surprisingly, moreover, in Thucydides' texts of the subsequent peace treaty and alliance between Athens and Sparta the men involved do not receive patronymics (5.19.2, 24), even though these two treaties are more important than the armistice and involved oaths as well as libations. Such inconsistency is, however, also a feature of actual texts of treaties: the *grammateus* sometimes receives a patronymic (e.g. Meiggs and Lewis [1969] 1988: 61.6, 14; 81.8–9), sometimes not (as in the two inscriptions cited above).

Other information included at characters' introductions tends to explain why they are mentioned at all. That the Plataean Lacon was a *proxenos* of the Spartans offers a further reason for his choice as speaker (3.52.5). The Athenians send for Nymphodorus, 'whose sister Sitalces had married', and make him their *proxenos* (2.29.1) because they want to form an alliance with Sitalces, a powerful Thracian king. A Corinthian Ariston, 'the best helmsman among the Syracusans' (7.39.2), devises a striking plan for hitting at the Athenian fleet. Such information relates above all to characters' public roles.

9 Griffith 1961. Unlike Herodotus and Xenophon, Thucydides never includes the local Athenian demotic (Hornblower 1987: 97 n. 98).

10 Cf. 1.139.3 vs. 2.12.1; 1.79.2 vs. 2.19.1; also *SAGN* 1: 115–117 (Rood) on Thucydides as 'an Athenian' (1.1.1) vs. 'son of Olorus' (4.104.4).

As with patronymics, other sorts of expositional material are frequently revealed in a piecemeal way. Hermocrates, for instance, is given a patronymic before the first two long speeches he makes (4.58, 6.32.3), but it is only when he bolsters the flagging Syracusan cause and is elected a general that an evaluation of his character is offered (6.72.2). The same principle holds for another leading figure, Pericles. He appears as general briefly in the *Pentecontaetia* (1.111.2, with patronymic, in a genitive absolute at the end of a clause). He is next mentioned when the Spartans invoke the Cylonian curse against him. Thucydides explains that Pericles was linked to the curse as an Alcmeonid, but that the Spartans were really seeking to remove him from Athens: 'for being the most capable man of his time, and the leading Athenian statesman, he was opposing the Spartans in everything' (1.127.3). He is characterized here in terms of political influence, the aspect that affects the Spartans most. The basis of his political influence is then clarified as he addresses the Athenian assembly: 'Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, most capable alike in counsel and in action …' (1.139.4). A broader description of his political character is then offered on his death, in an extended contrast with later leaders (see below).

As well as using this piecemeal technique, Thucydides also at times repeats expositional information about a character.[11] Thus he often indicates patronymics and information about status (e.g. Archidamus' kingship, cited above) not just when a character is introduced but on the first occasion when a character is reintroduced in a new section of the narrative. This technique illustrates how Thucydides' overt characterizing techniques lend formality to his narrative while also marking off discrete discourse units. Rather more surprising than the reiteration of these quasi-formulae is the repetition of evaluative information. In the case of Pericles, we have seen a gradual intensification and nuancing in his direct characterization. The Athenian demagogue Cleon, by contrast, receives the same label—'most persuasive (*pithanōtatos*) at that time'—both when he is first introduced, in the Mytilene debate (3.36.6), and (with no hint that he has been mentioned earlier) when he appears for the second time, pressing against peace with Sparta (4.21.3). The apparent repetition has often been attributed to the unfinished state of Thucydides' work, but the repeated detail 'at that time' underscores Cleon's continuing hold on the Athenians over a period of two years. The language of persuasion also points up a contrast between the two occasions: in the first instance Cleon—who had won the debate the previous day to kill the adult male Mytilenaeans—is unexpectedly defeated; in the second his power of persuasion wins the day (*epeise*,

11 Cf. *SAGN* 3: 152–153 (Rood) on repetition and piecemeal distribution of topographic information.

4.21.3). The stress on his political influence and his persuasiveness continue when the Athenians put to death the whole adult male population of Scione, 'persuaded (*peisthentes*) by the judgement of Cleon' (4.122.6).

So far we have been considering the way Thucydides introduces characters in the narrative of the Peloponnesian War and its immediate antecedents. If we turn back to sections where he deals with the more distant past, a number of contrasts may be noted. Firstly, in the *Archaeology*, Thucydides introduces by name alone a number of figures, some famous from the poetic tradition (e.g. Achilles (1.3.3), Minos (1.4), Tyndareus, Helen (1.9.1), Pelops, Atreus, Chrysippus, Eurystheus (1.9.2)),[12] others known from oral tradition or from earlier writers such as Herodotus (Polycrates, Cyrus (1.13.6), Themistocles (1.14.2), Croesus (1.16)). The single patronymic is attached to the first named individual, 'Hellen son of Deucalion' (1.3.2): the patronymic contradicts Hecataeus, who made Hellen grandson of Deucalion (*FGrH* 1 F 13), as well as perhaps stories that he was the son of Zeus (*schol. Od.* 10.2), while more broadly locating him in time (in keeping with Thucydides' argument on the period at which the idea of 'Hellenes' first appeared).

The more substantial narrative of the *Pentecontaetia* does include a number of famous names from Athenian history. Most of these figures, however, appear (like Pericles) simply as commanders in genitive absolutes at the end of clauses, often with patronymics attached.[13] The individual who is most prominent appears in the first section, Themistocles: already mentioned in the *Archaeology*, he later receives a substantial account of his later career (1.135.2–138) that is loosely attached to an account of Pausanias, the curses incurred by whose sacrilegious death feature in the diplomatic tit-for-tat prior to the start of the war (1.128.3–135.1). While the narrative style used in this section is distinctive, neither figure receives a substantial introduction. In the more leisurely account of the tyrannicides, by contrast, Harmodius is introduced as 'in the flower of youthful beauty' and Aristogiton as 'a citizen in the middle rank of life' (*hōrai hēlikias lamprou … anēr tōn astōn, mesos politēs*, 6.54.2); the introductions here support Thucydides' revisionist account, which undermines the patriotic image of the tyrannicides.

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12 So too with Cecrops, Theseus, Eumolpus, Erechtheus at 2.15; contrast the use of patronymics in 'mythical' material at 2.29.3 (Procne daughter of Pandion—a detail that becomes germane to the argument over Teres/Tereus), 2.68.3, 102.6 (Amphilochus and Alcmeon, both sons of Amphiaraus: in the case of Amphilochus differentiation from his homonymous nephew is one reason for the patronymic).

13 Cimon (1.98.1, 100.1, 102.1, 112.2, in the first two cases with patronymic), Tolmides (1.108.5, 113.1, both with patronymics), Myronides (1.105.4, 108.2, in neither case with patronymic). Cimon's death is then mentioned (1.112.4), again in a genitive absolute.

The character who receives the fullest characterization at his first appearance is Cylon, the curse on whose killers was invoked, as we have seen, by the Spartans in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides makes this diplomatic row the occasion for an unusually detailed account of the occasion of the curse, the opening sentence of which became a famous example in antiquity of the sweet storytelling style.[14] The sweetness of the style lies partly in the way in which each detail about Cylon proves to be significant: 'In former generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position (*eugenēs te kai dunatos*), who had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara' (1.126.3). As the story progresses, it becomes apparent that Cylon's noble birth and power explain his tyrannical ambitions, and he receives direct help from Theagenes. His Olympic victory in turn explains why, when advised by an oracle to try to seize power at Athens during the 'greatest festival of Zeus', he assumes that this festival is the Olympics rather than a festival within Attica; given the association between successful athletes and tyrannical ambition, it also helps to explain why he wants to become tyrant in the first place.

The full effect of the introduction of Cylon becomes apparent only when it is read against Thucydides' treatment of individuals in the rest of the work. The details offered in Cylon's introduction (marriage, noble birth) are mentioned elsewhere when Thucydides is dealing either with the past or with remote areas of the Hellenic world.[15] Similarly the only other individuals in Thucydides' work who receive oracles belong to the distant past (2.102.5–6 [Alcmeon]; 3.96.1 [Hesiod]). Thucydides thereby distances the figure of Cylon from the period of the Peloponnesian War itself, exposing the cynicism of the Spartans' diplomatic manoeuvre.

Evaluations

Thucydides' most extensive evaluation of an individual, like his most extensive introduction, is found in one of his accounts of the past—the story of the final years of Themistocles. In context the evaluation explains the unparalleled position that Themistocles managed to achieve in Persia following his escape from Greece—a position achieved thanks to his manifest demonstration of intelligence (1.138.2, *xunetos*). It is particularly striking because its style clashes

14 Rood 2013 offers references and a detailed analysis of the narrative.

15 Rood 2013: 136.

with the 'Herodotean' storytelling mode of the rest of the section, showing instead a strong tendency towards antithesis and abstraction:

> For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius (*phuseōs iskhun*); indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity (*oikeiai … xunesei*), alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application (*phuseōs men dunamei, meletēs de brakhutēti*), this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency.
>
> 1.138.3

The 'Herodotean' style is then resumed in the formal closure to the whole Pausanias/Themistocles sequence: 'So ends the story of Pausanias the Spartan and Themistocles the Athenian, the most brilliant men of their time in Greece' (1.138.6). The Spartan/Athenian contrast makes it tempting to see Themistocles' qualities as distinctively Athenian. The judgement is also placed just before Pericles—heir to his vision of Athens' naval destiny—comes to the fore. But Themistocles can also be read as a character who transcends his context: Moles suggests that he 'instantiates the full programme of [Thucydides' comments on method at] 1.22'—'understanding, judgement, forethought, excellence in both speech and action, the ability to bring different time-scales and contexts into the right perspective and thus at any given moment to speak and implement the necessary things'—with the 'piquant irony' that he can do so 'without reading Thucydides'.[16]

Thucydides' other judgements on characters[17] share a number of regular features. Sometimes a verdict is given on the first appearance of a character, as a form of introduction (e.g. 3.36.6); sometimes when a character first appears

16 Moles 2001: 215, 217.

17 De Bakker 2013: 25 n. 10 offers the most complete list: Archidamus (1.79.2); Pericles (1.127.3, 139.4; 2.65.8); Themistocles (1.138.2–3), with Pausanias (1.138.6); Cleon (3.36.3; 4.21.3); Brasidas (4.81.1–3, 84.2); Nicias (5.16.1; 7.50.4; 7.86.5); Alcibiades (5.43.2, 6.15.2–4); Athenagoras

in a later narrative sequence (e.g. 6.72); sometimes in the form of an obituary (Pericles at 2.65, where following a proleptic mention of Pericles' death a further prolepsis argues that the extent of his foresight only became clear later; Nicias at 7.86.5); and sometimes—in the case of traits that help understand a character's behaviour at a particular time rather than throughout his career—incidentally in the midst of a narrative, in an explanatory *gar*-clause (e.g. Hippias' accessibility at 6.57.3, which also implicitly contrasts with the model of the out-of-sight Asiatic despot; Nicias' superstition at 7.50.4). Throughout Thucydides' selectivity is plain. Some characters simply disappear from view without their deaths being mentioned, and while Nicias is given an obituary, the simultaneous death of his colleague Demosthenes passes without comment. Another sign of Thucydidean selectivity is the unusual grouping of character judgements in Book 8, particularly in the account of the civil war at Athens. This grouping mirrors the greater concentration on interaction between individuals in Book 8 as well as highlighting the role of individuals in underhand plotting.

The qualities on which Thucydides comments can be listed as follows: intelligence (*xunesis*: 1.79.2 [Archidamus], 2.15.2 [Theseus], 4.81.2 [Brasidas], 6.54.5 [Pisistratids], 6.72.2 [Hermocrates], 8.26.5 [Phrynichus], 8.68.4 [the oligarchic conspirators]), excellence (*aretē*: 4.81.2 [Brasidas], 6.54.5 [Pisistratids], 7.86.5 [Nicias], 8.68.1 [Antiphon]), prudence (*sōphrosunē*: 1.79.2 [Archidamus]), general ability and power (*dunatos*: 2.15.2 [Theseus], 1.127.3, 139.4, 2.65.8 [Pericles]), incorruptibility (*khrēmatōn ... adōrotatos*: 2.65.8 [Pericles]), activity (*drastērios*: 4.81.1 [Brasidas]), superstition (7.50.4 [Nicias]), military experience (6.72.2 [Hermocrates]), skill at speaking (1.139.4 [Pericles], 3.36.6, 4.21.3 [Cleon], 4.84.2 [Brasidas], 6.35.2 [Athenagoras], 8.68.4), at formulating (8.68.1 [Antiphon], 8.68.4 [Theramenes]), villainy (*mokhthēros*: 8.73.3 [Hyperbolus]). These qualities typically relate to performance in the realms of politics and war: Thucydides is concerned in particular with praising those individuals who display political prudence (though he does show some concern for personal morality). Even in the political realm, however, Thucydides is selective: personal appearance must have played a role in the political careers of statesmen in Greek *poleis*, whatever their constitution, but Thucydides never comments on characters' physical stature.[18]

(6.35.2); the Pisistratids (6.54.5); Hermocrates (6.72.2); Phrynichus (8.27.5, 68.3); Antiphon (8.68.1); Theramenes (8.68.4); Hyperbolus (8.73.3). Cf. also 33 on their timing.

18 Cf. Hornblower 2016. An exception is the comment on Harmodius' beauty (6.54.2, cited above), from a section devoted to the past.

The overt character assessments in the *History* are marked by two further features: a concern with historicization and with perceptions. Superlatives applied to characters are often (as already noted with Cleon) qualified in respect to period (*tōn keth' heauton*/*heatous* 1.127.3, 138.6; *kat' ekeinon ton khronon* 1.139.4, 4.21.3; *en tōi tote* 3.36.6; *en tōi paronti* 6.35.2). Characters are thus not discussed in respect of timeless qualities (as in epideictic modes of rhetoric), but assessed against their contemporaries. It is their quality relative to those of their rivals that explains their successes and failures.

It is equally a concern for historical explanation rather than an isolated moral interest in personal traits that explains Thucydides' stress on perceptions in his comments on characters. When Archidamus gives his speech warning against war, Thucydides comments that he 'was thought (*dokōn*) at once a prudent and a moderate man' (1.79.2)—thereby underscoring his (relative) failure. While that passage is a rounded assessment of his character as a whole, Thucydides suggests a partial reassessment later when Archidamus is faulted by his troops for his slowness in the first invasion of Attica: 'even during the levying of the war being thought (*dokōn*) weak and pro-Athenian by the half measures he had advocated' (2.18.3). Here what is at stake is not the overall judgement of his character but the perception of the Peloponnesians about his actions in a particular campaign. Anticipating his later account of how perceptions are swayed by the pressures of war, Thucydides claims that a reputation for being 'intelligent' and 'prudent' (*xunetos*, *sōphrōn*) has been replaced with one for weakness (*malakos*).[19]

Perceptions play an especially important role in evaluations of Brasidas and Alcibiades. When the Spartans decide to support the revolts of Athens' disaffected allies in the north, Thucydides describes how they 'sent out Brasidas, as he very much wanted himself, and the Chalcidians were also eager for him, a man thought (*dokounta*) at Sparta to be active in every way, and whose later service abroad proved of the utmost use to his country' (4.81.1). He then goes on to explain that Brasidas 'by showing himself just and moderate (*heauton paraskhōn dikaion kai metrion*) towards the cities generally succeeded in procuring their revolt' (4.81.2), and that the reputation he left proved valuable later, since 'he was the first who went out and was thought (*doxas*) so good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that the rest were like him' (4.81.3). The effect of his self-presentation is further shown when Thucydides describes the Athenians' fears after Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis: one

19 Being *xunetos* and *sōphrōn* renders one liable to suspicion during *stasis* conditions (3.82.4).

reason for their alarm is the fact that Brasidas 'was showing himself moderate in all his conduct' (*metrion heauton pareikhe*, 4.108.2). Throughout this section, then, Thucydides lays emphasis not just on the way Brasidas was perceived but also on his deliberate manipulation of his own image.[20]

The thematic importance of perceptions of character is more complex in the case of Alcibiades. Alcibiades' introduction, at the time of Athens' alliance with Argos, stresses his personal motivation, based upon his own sense of superiority:

> Foremost among [those pushing for the Argive alliance] was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal pique (*phronēmati philonikōn*) had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he being offended with the Spartans for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as their *proxeni* …
>
> 5.43.2

This introduction leads to the expectation that Alcibiades will fall into the general pattern of self-interested politicians analysed by Thucydides in his obituary notice for Pericles. This expectation is in turn both confirmed and slightly overturned at the outset of the Sicilian expedition. Alcibiades does have personal reasons for promoting the campaign (6.15.2), but the long-term harm is caused by the Athenians' perceptions of his unconventional behaviour:

> Alarmed at the greatness of his licence (*paranomias*) in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly (*dēmosiai*) his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired individually, his habits gave offence to everyone privately (*idiai*), and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city.
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> 6.15.4

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20 Rood 1998: 72–74.

The greatest problem in evaluating Alcibiades proves to be the *dēmos*' inability to separate private resentment from recognition of public good.

Narratorial evaluations of character also interact with evaluations offered in speeches—including self-evaluations. Pericles offers a self-appraisal to defend himself when the Athenians are angered by the effects of the Peloponnesian invasions and the plague: 'And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an honest one' (2.60.5). The terms of his evaluation are then substantially justified in the narratorial assessment offered in his premature obituary notice (2.65.8). In the case of Nicias, interaction between speech and narrative is more complex. After the Athenians' final naval defeat at Syracuse, he points to his own character as offering still some grounds for hope: 'my life has been one of much devotion towards the gods, and of much justice and without offence towards men' (7.77.2). The narrator, however, has earlier offered a mild criticism of Nicias as being 'somewhat over-addicted to divination and practices of that kind' (7.50.4). In the event Nicias' hopes of divine support prove to be unfounded. Nonetheless, his self-assessment moulds the narratee's response to the overt pathos of his final obituary notice, where he is described as 'a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had been regulated with strict attention to excellence' (7.86.5). Here excellence, *aretē*, seems to have a moral colouring rather than to be solely defined by competitive pursuit of success (though Nicias had been called the most successful Athenian general during the Archidamian War, 5.16.1).

The relation between narratorial evaluations and speeches is also thematically interesting in the presentation of group characters. In the account of the aftermath of the Sicilian disaster, the narrator brings out the Spartans' failure to capitalize on the Athenian defeat by an overt comparison of their character with that of the Athenians:

> here, as on so many other occasions the Spartans proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters (*diaphoroi … ton tropon*), the slowness and want of energy of the Spartans as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents (*hoi men oxeis, hoi de bradeis, kai hoi men epikheirētai, hoi de atolmoi*), proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens.
>
> 8.96.5

These terms unmistakably pick up a speech in the first book in which the Corinthians goad the Spartans to declare war by arguing that they 'have never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves' (1.71.1). The start of their description brings out the main points in their comparison:

> The Athenians are addicted to innovation (*neōteropoioi*), and their designs are characterized by swiftness (*oxeis*) alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power (*para dunamin tolmētai*), and daring beyond their judgment (*para gnōmēn kinduneutai*), and in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release …
>
> 1.70.2–3

Thucydides, then, sets up the opposition between Athenian and Spartan characters through a speech, but only confirms the basic terms much later in the narrative of the war, when he is concerned to explain why the war was unexpectedly prolonged after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. The terms used in this speech, however, have had great resonance at other parts of the *Histories*, notably in the aftermath of the Spartan defeat at Pylos, when the Spartans

> generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a war whose rapidity defied precaution (*polemou takheos kai aprophulaktou*), they lived in constant fear of internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more hesitant (*oknēroteroi*) than ever in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime struggle, which their organization had never contemplated, and that against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked upon as a success sacrificed.
>
> 4.55.1–2

The Spartans' timidity contrasts with the Corinthian depiction of the Athenians as *aoknoi* ('unhesitant' 1.70.4). The Corinthians, too, had suggested that the Athenians were never satisfied with a success (1.70.7) and that—unlike the Spartans here—they could quickly bounce back from defeats (1.70.5).

The terms used by the Corinthians are also central to the Athenians' own self-evaluation. Responding to the Corinthians, the Athenian envoys at Sparta offer a narrative of Athens' performance in the Persian Wars: 'for daring patriotism (*prothumian … kai polu tolmērotatēn*) we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city … to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger' (1.74.2). The ensuing account of Athens' rise to power in the period following the Persian Wars shows how the Athenian character was perceived—and feared—by their rivals: at the time of the Messenian revolt, the Spartans are 'apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary character (*to tolmēron kai tēn neōteropoiian*) of the Athenians' (1.102.3), and their apprehension leads to the first open breach between the two cities.

Nonetheless the initial Corinthian evaluation of the two sides does not go unquestioned. Archidamus offers a robust defence of the Spartan character: 'We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them' (1.84.3). And the subsequent narrative suggests that the Spartans do take action when pressed, and that their caution is offset by an internal stability that ultimately wins success. The Corinthian speech, then, exaggerates Spartan slowness while ignoring the self-destructiveness of Athenian impetuosity.

The thematic importance of the narratorial evaluation at 8.96.5 is increased by the fact that it also embraces Syracuse. The narrator goes on to argue that the importance of the Athenians' and Spartans' difference in character 'was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character (*homoiotropoi*), and also most successful in combating them'. As with the contrast of Athens and Sparta, the similarity of Athens and Syracuse has great resonance in the narrative. In his speech warning the Athenians against invading Sicily, Nicias suggests that 'besides Naxos and Catana … there are seven other [cities in Sicily] armed at all points just like our own power (*pareskeuasmenai … homoiotropōs*)' (6.20.3). As the Athenians sink towards defeat, their soldiers come to regret their decision to invade, reflecting that 'these were the only cities that they had yet encountered, similar to their own in character (*homoiotropois*), under democracies like themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude' (7.55.2). While Nicias had conceived the similarity above all in military terms, the soldiers think more broadly in terms of character. And that broader similarity has above all been shown in the Syracusan readiness to take to the sea to confront invasion. Indeed, Hermocrates in a speech pressing for greater naval resistance appeals precisely

to the Athenians' performance against Persia, suggesting that 'to daring spirits like the Athenians, a daring adversary would seem the most formidable (*pros andras tolmērous ... tous antitolmōntas*)' (7.21.3).

Metaphorical and Metonymical Characterization

Characterization through intertextuality is fundamental to Thucydides' presentation of character. Pericles' skill at speaking and action evokes the ideal attributes of the Homeric hero (1.139.4 ~ *Il.* 9.443); the opposition between Pericles and Cleon has been thought to draw on the Iliadic opposition between Achilles and Thersites.[21] Thucydides' characterization also interacts with Herodotus' presentation: in the case of Pausanias, he fills in Herodotus' implicit hints of his later medizing, while with Themistocles Thucydides, as we have seen, adopts a notably un-Herodotean stylistic register to offer a characterization that seems intended to shed light on the Herodotean Themistocles too. The Herodotean Themistocles is in turn suggested by the craftiness of Hermocrates, who uses a duplicitous message to stop the Athenians from immediately setting out on their retreat after their final defeat in the great harbour (7.73.3, in different ways mirroring Hdt. 8.75–76, 110.3). At a group level, moreover, various intertextual links suggest that the Athenians take on the expansionist character of Persian monarchy.[22]

Intratextual comparison and contrasts are even more important in Thucydides. We have already seen that Pericles is compared with Themistocles and contrasted with Cleon. In the latter case, the intertextual link via the Achilles/Thersites paradigm is reinforced by their formal introductions: when Cleon is described as 'most violent and most persuasive' (*biaiotatos* and *pithanōtatos*, 3.36.6), the paradoxical combination of force and persuasion (*bia* and *peithō* are normally opposites) contrasts with Pericles' paradigmatic skill in the realms of speech and action (*legein te kai prassein dunatōtatos*, 1.139.4). Cleon himself is later implicitly compared with the Syracusan speaker Athenagoras (*tōi te dēmōi para polu en tōi tote pithanōtatos* 3.36.6 ~ *en tōi paronti pithanōtatos tois pollois* 6.35.2)—part of Thucydides' ongoing comparison between the sources of internal and external strength and weakness in Athens and Syracuse.

The most fundamental use of contrast occurs in the sketch Thucydides offers of the decline in leadership at Athens in the course of the war:

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21 Cairns 1982.

22 Rood 1999.

> Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.
>
> 2.65.8–10

In keeping with the claim that Pericles transcends his contemporaries, Thucydides presents a relatively isolated image of Pericles, focusing on his conflicts with the Athenian *demos* rather than with any political rivals. When he comes to the rivalry of Alcibiades and Nicias, by contrast, he uses a richer palate: his presentation of both speech and action suggests that Alcibiades has Pericles' ability to control people but not his honesty or patriotism, while Nicias has Pericles' prudence but not his ability to carry his way with crowds. While Westlake suggested that Thucydides 'seems to have come to believe that the personality of leading individuals was a much more influential factor than he had been prepared to acknowledge',[23] it is better to see the change in Thucydides' technique as a stylistic enactment of his plot: individuals and individualism become more important in his narrative because they become more important in explaining the course of events as the war proceeds.[24]

Another common mode of metonymical characterization in Thucydides is through setting. As we have seen, setting shapes characterization insofar as the actions he describes take place mostly in public spaces such as the assembly and the battlefield, and it is mostly on qualities that are important for success in these political and military spaces that he focuses. An exception occurs in a passage in the *Archaeology* where Thucydides opposes Athenian and Spartan modes of dress (1.6.3–5)—a passage that sets up from an unexpected angle the key opposition between the two leading cities in the Peloponnesian War. In

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23 Westlake 1968: 319.

24 Pelling 1990c: 259–261; Gribble 1999: 205–213.

Thucydides' treatment of 'marginal' figures (women, slaves), setting is again important, but it is not so much setting that characterizes individuals as the very mention of marginal groups that characterizes the settings in which they appear: the presence of women and slaves in the fighting in the civil war at Corcyra (3.73–74.1) contributes to the sense of turbulence and disorder.[25]

Instances of metonymical characterization through both action and speech can also be found in Thucydides. A good example is the first appearance of Brasidas:

> he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of the besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country and had its attention turned to the wall, threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during the war.
>
> 2.25.2

This episode points to the Brasidean dash that will later cause the Athenians problems in the north. With Brasidas, metonymical and metaphorical characterization work together: a number of Homeric features—such as his fainting in the fighting at Pylos (*elipopsukhēse*, 4.12.1)—suggest comparison with a Homeric *aristeia*.[26]

As for speech, while many speakers in Thucydides seem to employ a similarly dense and complex style, fine-grained analysis points to stylistic differentiation in the speeches of Alcibiades and Nicias: the more forceful Alcibiades employing a paratactic style that carries his argument forward, while Nicias' hypotactic style reflects his more cautious character.[27] Stylistic characterization is also found in the speech of the ephor Sthenelaedas, whose forceful bluntness seems archetypically Spartan (1.86).

Characterization through emotion is found above all in the treatment of the Athenians.[28] In the early stages of the war, Thucydides opposes the ideal figure of the unyielding and rational leader (Pericles) to the shifting fears and hopes of the Athenians. In the later stages their desires and hopes are self-destructively

25 Wiedemann 1983; Harvey 1985.

26 Hornblower 1991–2008: ii.38–61.

27 Tompkins 1972.

28 This is not to say that other characters are not portrayed as feeling emotions, only that those emotions are more (understandable) responses to immediate stimuli than strongly characterizing.

let loose. A similar heightening of characterization in the case of Athenians can be seen with focalization.[29] Particularly striking is the role played by Nicias from the time of the uneasy peace onwards. Thucydides' account of how Nicias wants peace in order to preserve his good reputation and spare himself and other Athenians toils (5.16.1) is the start of a concerted focus on his character: his perspective both shapes the narratee's understanding of the Athenian disaster in Sicily while also revealing his own combination of patriotic feeling and strategic shortcomings.[30] With despotic characters such as the Macedonian king Perdiccas and the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, on the other hand, it can be plausibly claimed that a relative absence of focalization contributes to their characterization as duplicitous: Perdiccas frequently switches sides without a full elaboration of his motivation at any one time (e.g. 2.80.7), while Tissaphernes' reasoning is unusually a subject for narratorial speculation (e.g. 8.56.3, 87.1–4).

Group membership is another important element of metonymical characterization in Thucydides. Athenian and Spartan individuals are measured against the dominant Athenian and Spartan stereotypes: thus Brasidas is an unusual Spartan both in terms of his dynamism (4.81, cited above) and his ability as a speaker ('not a bad speaker for a Spartan', 4.84.2). Nicias, by contrast, betrays a caution that sets him off from the other Athenians: he acknowledges that he would be unlikely to be successful if he merely advised the Athenians to keep what they have (*ta … huparkhonta sōzein*, 6.9.3, echoing the Corinthian depiction of the cautious Spartans at 1.70.2). Alcibiades, on the other hand, adopts for himself some of the characteristic tropes of Athenian rhetoric, thereby revealing a self-assertiveness that renders him suspect to the Athenians while also aligning him with their self-presentation.[31]

This sketch of characterization in Thucydides has explored a range of characterizing devices (notably introductions, overt assessments, the use of comparison and contrast, the interaction of the individual and the group) which are integrated with some subtlety into the narrative's ongoing analysis of the Peloponnesian War. It is fitting, then, to end it with the broadest of all group categories within the *Histories*. Thucydides' whole work is grounded in the assumption of a shared human nature. Bolstered by the pervasive analogy between

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29 Again, Thucydides often uses internal focalization to bring out the mistaken perceptions and cognitive difficulties of non-Athenian characters, but rather to highlight the difficulties of the situations confronted by characters than any distinctive character traits.

30 Rood 1998: 183–201.

31 Macleod 1983: 68–87.

individuals and cities, his work seeks to offer a characterization of what it is to be human amidst the pressures imposed by the daily suffering of wartime. And, in one of its boldest flourishes, it even offers a characterization of war itself: 'In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a violent teacher' (3.82.2).

CHAPTER 9

Xenophon

Tim Rood

Scholarly treatments of Xenophon's handling of characterization point to an apparent paradox. On the one hand, Xenophon is seen as 'a pioneer experimenter in biographical forms',[1] because he wrote a memoir on Socrates, the first war memoir (*Anabasis*), and the encomiastic biography *Agesilaus*, which reworks (with minor differences) many of the same events treated in the historiographical *Hellenica*. Passages like the obituaries of Cyrus and the Greek generals (*Anabasis* 1.9, 2.6) are also seen as evidence of an increased interest in the individual in the fourth century.[2] On the other hand, Xenophon's historical writings are notorious for downplaying some prominent individuals, for instance Pelopidas, who appears only at *Hellenica* 7.1.33–40. Discussions of Xenophon's model of ideal leadership[3] also seem to militate against a strong interest in character: individuals are often seen as good or bad depending on how they match the qualities attributed to the character Xenophon in *Anabasis*. In this chapter—which is devoted mainly to *Anabasis*, though I will draw comparisons with *Hellenica*[4]—my focus will be restricted to narratological aspects of character: the narrator's modes of introducing characters; the use of obituaries and their interaction with the narrative; and the characterization of Xenophon as a character in his own story (I will henceforth use 'Xenophon' to refer to the character rather than to the author).

Character Introductions

Naming

There are about 150 named individuals in *Anabasis*, together with a number of collectives (e.g. Cyrus' Greek mercenaries, often referred to as 'the Greeks' (though they included some non-Greeks), and various ethnic groups, called

1 Momigliano 1971: 43.
2 E.g. Pomeroy 1991: 33.
3 E.g. Gray 2011.
4 For *Hellenica* see now Flower 2015; older discussions with much on characterization include Gray 1989, Tuplin 1993, and Dillery 1995.

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either 'the barbarians' or by their ethnic names). Besides these named individuals and groups, there are a number of unnamed individuals who are at most defined by age, sex, and ethnic group.

While it is not always easy to offer plausible narratological reasons for the naming or non-naming of characters (e.g. the anonymous 'young man' (*neaniskos*) at 2.4.19, discussed below),[5] a pattern can be detected for anonymous Persians. Minor Persian characters are often defined by family ties rather than by name (e.g. 'the daughter of the king', 2.4.8, 3.4.13; 'the bastard brother of Cyrus and Artaxerxes', 2.4.25; cf. e.g. *Hell.* 5.1.28). While their anonymity may reflect the limits of the narrator's knowledge, the use of familial terms does point to the importance of familial ties within the Persian monarchical system. Such familial ties are also of some thematic importance: intra-familial rivalry initially drives the plot of *Anabasis*, and dynastic issues return in the Thracian episodes (e.g. Xenophon is offered the daughter of the dynast Seuthes in marriage, 7.2.38).

Low social status may explain the non-naming of certain characters. An anonymous Rhodian (*tis anēr Rhodios*, 3.5.8) who makes a detailed proposal that the army cross the Tigris on inflated animal-skins may have belonged to the group of 200 Rhodian slingers established at 3.3.16. Another anonymous character of low status is the Macronian peltast who appears just before the army arrives at the sea. The army is confronted by a local tribe that is blocking its way to the sea when a peltast 'who said that he had been a slave in Athens' (4.8.4) approaches Xenophon to indicate that he recognizes the local language; with his help the army is able to negotiate its way through the Macronians' territory. This peltast also fits a pattern whereby characters who enable Xenophon to help the army are not themselves named (e.g. 4.3.10, 5.8).

Gender and ethnicity are further factors in the naming or non-naming of characters. No names (but some personal details) are given for two Greek women in Cyrus' camp who are captured by the Persians (1.10.2). By contrast, the narrator does name two powerful non-Greek women (Parysatis, Cyrus' mother, and Epyaxa, wife of the Cilician ruler) and one Greek woman who belongs to a powerful family within the Persian empire (7.8.8). It is nonetheless revealing that between her first and last appearances (1.2.12, 25) Epyaxa is identified seven times as 'the Cilician woman'—a reflection of the way she was talked about by the Greeks, who gossiped about her relationship with Cyrus?

5 Cf. Tsagalis 2009.

Ethnicity

Members of the army are normally identified by an ethnic at their first appearance, and often again on later appearances (thus Agasias who appears in nine scenes in the last five books is identified as Stymphalian in all but one of these). More distinguished characters such as generals have a definite article before their ethnic identification ('Proxenus the Boeotian', 'Sophaenetus the Stymphalian', 'Socrates the Achaean', 1.1.11); definite articles are used for later appearances of some less distinguished characters (e.g. Agasias), though others have their ethnic tag repeated like a formula in the same terms.[6] For some ethnic groups, both local and broader identifications are found: in the case of Arcadians, characters who are prominent in the narrative or in some way close to Xenophon receive a local tag, while others are simply 'Arcadian' (Roy 1972). Greeks who are not part of Cyrus' army also receive ethnic tags (e.g. Seuthes' sidekick Heraclides of Maronea), with the exception of two Greeks who were with the camp of the Persian king (Ctesias and Phalinus) and some of Seuthes' other courtiers (Polynicus, Bi(t)on, Nausiclides). In *Hellenica*, by contrast, ethnics are much less common because they can readily be inferred from the context.[7]

The widespread use of ethnic tags in *Anabasis* contrasts with the rareness of patronymics, which are used only for three of the Athenian participants (and hence are an indirect ethnic marker): Lycius when he is appointed cavalry commander at 3.3.20; Amphicrates and Cephisodorus at 4.2.13, immediately before their deaths at 4.2.17 and their pathetic burials (their comrades 'did everything they could under the circumstances that is usually done when burying brave men' (*andrasin agathois*), 4.2.23). Lycius' patronymic may be explained by the fame of the family (his father is probably the defendant in [Lysias] 20, who was involved in the first oligarchic coup at Athens), while the patronymics and the personal naming of the two Athenian war-dead stand in pointed contrast with Athenian civic ceremonial. The rare use of patronymics in *Anabasis* contrasts with *Hellenica*: thus Socrates receives a patronymic for his single

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6 Manuscript variations make certainty impossible, e.g. some manuscripts have the article for Aristeas of Chios at 4.6.19 (accepted by Marchant, rejected by Hude-Peters). See also 'Soteridas the Sicyonian' at 3.4.47, with Huitink and Rood (fc).

7 For examples in polyethnic armies see e.g. *Hell.* 1.6.32, 2.1.18. Some further examples: repetition of 'Procles, a Phliasian' (*Hell.* 6.5.38, 7.1.1) is in line with Xenophon's strong focus on the vicissitudes of this small Peloponnesian town, while mention of 'Aeneas, a Stymphalian' (*Hell.* 7.3.1) links with his homonym (presumably a member of the same family) in *Anabasis* (4.7.13) and perhaps with the extant work on siegecraft.

appearance in *Hellenica* (1.7.15), where he is a *prutanis* during the Arginusae trial, but not in *Anabasis*, where 'Socrates the Athenian' offers Xenophon advice before the expedition (3.1.5); and the same pattern is found with Clearchus, a major character in *Anabasis*, but given a patronymic only at *Hell.* 1.1.35.[8]

There are three exceptions to the principle of giving ethnic identifications for members of the army. Two *lokhagoi* are mentioned by name alone on their single appearances, when their deaths are mentioned (Cleaenetus 5.1.17; Clearetus 5.7.14); the absence of an ethnic for Clearetus may be explained by the fact that his death is narrated by Xenophon in a speech to the army, who may be presumed to know his ethnic origin. The third case is more interesting. After the arrest of the five generals, Xenophon calls a meeting of officers at which Apollonides—who 'spoke like a Boeotian' (*boiōtiazōn tēi phōnēi*, 3.1.26)—proposes that the army should continue to negotiate with the Persians. Xenophon then abuses Apollonides for his defeatism, proposing that he should be removed from office and used as a baggage-carrier (3.1.30)—like an animal, that is. Agasias then claims that Apollonides 'doesn't belong in Boeotia or anywhere in Greece; he has both ears pierced, Lydian-style' (3.1.31), and Apollonides is expelled from the meeting, never to be heard of again. The lack of distinct ethnic identification of Apollonides reflects the uncertainty that remained over his status.[9]

The quasi-formulaic use of ethnic identifications has other functions both locally and in relation to broader themes of the work. In the case of the anonymous Rhodian mentioned above, it may be that the ethnic identification characterizes Rhodians as rapacious, given that he requests the high sum of a talent as payment (Rhodians have earlier been offered financial incentives to serve as slingers, 3.3.18).[10] An ethnic stereotype is certainly involved in the case of the Spartiate exile Dracontius, who is chosen to supervise the athletic competition at Trapezus. While Dracontius is given a back-story (he had been 'banished from his home while still a boy for having accidentally stabbed another boy with his dagger and killed him', 4.8.25) which in both technique and content recalls Homeric epic, his Spartan character is suggested by his choice of a hillside for a wrestling contest on the grounds that 'it'll be a bit more painful for the one who is thrown' (4.8.26).[11] Like the blunt talk of

8 *Hellenica* is still notably irregular: thus it is hard to see why only one of the two generals introduced at 1.4.21 is given a patronymic.

9 The *indices nominum* in Marchant and Hude-Peters both claim unambiguously that he is a Lydian, though this is not warranted by the narrative.

10 Huitink and Rood fc.: ad loc.

11 For ethnic characterization cf. e.g. *ton Thettalikon tropon* at *Hell.* 6.1.3.

Agasias cited above, Dracontius' pithy utterance is a good example of characterization by speech.[12]

More broadly, ethnic tags bring out the extent of the Greek participation in Cyrus' expedition, ensuring that the Greek participants can in some sense be seen as representative of Greece. At the same time, ethnic identifications can help to focus on divisions within Greece. The prominence of Spartans in the leadership is a reflection of Spartan power in Greece: it is notable that when Chirisophus speaks first in the assembly of the whole army after the arrest of the generals, he is 'Chirisophus the Spartan' (3.2.1), whereas he is just 'Chirisophus' when he speaks at the preceding meeting of surviving officers (3.1.45). His Spartan identity explains his precedence; Xenophon goes on to suggest that Chirisophus should lead 'since he's a Spartan' (3.2.37). The importance of the army's having a Spartan commander is further stressed as the army approaches Greece (notably through Xenophon's own thoughts as to whether to seek the leadership, 6.1.26).

Ethnic divisions are especially important in the march along the Black Sea coast, when the Arcadians and Achaeans break away from the rest of the army (6.3). This breakaway is foreshadowed through the characterization of individual Arcadians earlier in the march. Three volunteers at 4.1.27, Callimachus, Aristonymus, and Agasias, are unusually given both local and Arcadian ethnics.[13] Together with another Arcadian, Eurylochus, these three men are also prominent in the attack on the Taochian stronghold, where the narrator comments on their competitiveness ('All four of these men were constantly involved in a keenly contested rivalry to see which of them was the bravest, and on this occasion their rivalry enabled them to take the stronghold', 4.7.12), picking up an earlier remark on Callimachus' attempted one-upmanship (*antistasiazōn*, 4.1.27). Continuity between this local rivalry and Arcadian ethnic feeling is suggested by Callimachus' later role in the separatist movement (6.2.9).

Rank and Personal Qualities

Besides ethnicity, the rank and position of characters is regularly mentioned where this is important for the narratee's understanding of their actions or of actions taken against them. A particular concern is shown for positions within the Persian hierarchy, and in some cases this concern is combined with direct characterization of personal qualities:

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12 For Agasias cf. also 6.1.30 and the dispute at 6.6.7–28.

13 The Arcadian ethnic (found also at 4.2.21, 7.6.40) is deleted by Marchant, following Bisschop, but defended by Roy 1972: 131 on the basis of inscriptional parallels and retained by Hude-Peters.

- 1.2.20: ‘a Persian called Megaphernes, a royal secretary (*phoinikistēn basileion*)’, mentioned as he is executed on a charge of plotting against Cyrus. The specification of his position presumably adds to the seriousness of the plot.
- 1.6.1: ‘Orontas, a Persian who was related to the king and was said to be as good as any Persian at warfare.’ The introduction hints at how Orontas puts loyalty to the king above loyalty to Cyrus (to whom he was, after all, related to just the same degree) and also at the significance of his attempted desertion of Cyrus.
- 1.6.11: ‘Artapatas, the most loyal of Cyrus’ staff-bearers.’ Here the introduction does not just explain his role in the execution of Orontas, but also prepares for his brave death at Cyrus’ side in battle (1.8.28–29), where the repetition of ‘the most loyal of his staff-bearers’ together with details of the golden jewellery ‘which had been given to him by Cyrus as rewards for his loyalty and reliability’ underscores the effectiveness of Cyrus’ honorific system.
- 1.8.1: ‘Pategyas, a Persian who was one of Cyrus’ trusted advisers (*khrēstos*)’ comes riding with a sweating horse with news of king’s approach. Given that Pategyas appears only here, the detail of his status is hardly necessary for the narrative, but perhaps adds further to the urgency suggested by the vivid detail about the horse.[14]

The officers in the Greek mercenary units gathered by Cyrus receive introductions of this sort only rarely. *Lokhagoi* and other minor officers are sometimes directly introduced as such (e.g. ‘Hieronymus of Elis, the oldest of Proxenus’ *lokhagoi*’, 3.1.34; ‘Aeneas of Stymphalos, a *lokhagos*’, 4.7.13). Such overt introductions do not always occur at a character’s first appearance (e.g. Nicarchus, wounded at 2.5.33, is identified as a *lokhagos* when he deserts with twenty men at 3.3.5;[15] Aristonymus’ rank is formally explained on his second appearance at 4.7.9), though the status of some characters can be inferred earlier (Aristonymus’ first appearance at 4.6.20 already suggests that he is a commander, and Agasias, who is first overtly called a *lokhagos* at 4.7.9, was present at the conference of Proxenus’ *lokhagoi* called by Xenophon at 3.1.15). Occasionally *lokhagoi* or *taxiarkhoi* receive a separate introduction that focuses on their personal qualities. Thus the taxiarch[16] Aristeas of Chios volunteers for a dangerous task, and ‘this was not the only time he proved his value to the army in this kind

14 Cf. also 1.7.5 (Gaulites), 2.1.7 (Phalinus).

15 The identity of the two men has been doubted owing to the nature of Nicarchus’ earlier injuries, but should probably be assumed.

16 His position can be inferred from the terms of Xenophon’s request for volunteers.

of situation' (4.1.28); later he volunteers again (4.6.20). This sort of focus on the qualities displayed by individuals throughout the retreat is a particularly common feature in Book 4: a similar mode of direct characterization at first appearance is offered at 4.4.15 for a non-officer who is sent on a night-time mission, while later the competiveness of some of the Arcadian officers is stressed (4.7.12, cited above).

Direct introductory characterization is used rather differently in the later stages of the narrative. During the narrative of a dinner for *stratēgoi* and *lokhagoi* at Seuthes' court, when the Thracian custom of throwing bits of meat and bread around from one diner to another is described: 'an Arcadian called Arystas, who had a prodigious appetite (*deinos phagein*), could not be bothered with throwing pieces of food around' (7.3.23), and instead picks up the large loaf in front of him and eats it all himself—and then, to laughter all around, refuses his turn for the drinking horn because he is still busy eating (7.3.25). The characterization here is comic. Another *lokhagos*, Episthenes of Olynthus, is introduced as a *paiderastēs* when he intervenes to save a pretty Thracian boy whom Seuthes is about to kill (7.4.7); Xenophon intervenes on his behalf, explaining his character (*tropon*) to Seuthes and telling an anecdote about his past (he had once formed a company 'the sole criterion for entry into which was the attractiveness of the men', 7.4.8). The tone here again seems lighter.

With *stratēgoi*, the focus at their introduction is the personal relationships with Cyrus which led to their being recruited rather than their personal qualities. Proxenus, Sophaenetus, and Socrates were all 'guest-friends' of Cyrus (1.1.11), as was Aristippus (1.1.10), who raised an army for Cyrus in Thessaly. How Clearchus became acquainted with Cyrus is described with increasing detail at 1.1.9 and in his obituary (see below). This stress on personal contacts with Cyrus prepares for the account of how Xenophon was persuaded by Proxenus to come on the expedition by the prospect of becoming a *philos* of Cyrus (3.1.4). The *stratēgos* Meno, by contrast, is introduced simply as 'the Thessalian'; readers are at first left to infer that his contingent was formed from the army that Aristippus was maintaining for Cyrus in Thessaly (1.2.6). An explanation for the different treatment of Meno may be the narrator's unremittingly critical assessment of his character. This character is sketched much more fully in the obituary for Meno, which itself (as we shall see) fills in the earlier narrative gap.

Introductions of non-officers tend to be concerned with personal qualities rather than with hierarchy. Tolmides of Elis is called 'the best herald of the time' (2.2.20) when called on by Clearchus to exercise his skills in a crisis (he appears twice later). A Spartan called Cleonymus is called 'a brave man' (*anēr agathos*, 4.1.18)—an introduction that is also an obituary, resonant of patriotic celebrations of the war-dead (see above on 4.2.23). Hecatonymus of Sinope

(spokesman for one of the cities that the army disturbs in its march along the Black Sea coast) had 'a reputation as a formidable speaker' (5.5.7)—but he is rhetorically outmanoeuvred by Xenophon. Other introductions provide back-stories, if not often as dramatic as Dracontius' involuntary manslaughter (4.8.25, quoted above). When the Greek army in Thrace is briefly wooed by a Theban Coeratadas, the narrator explains that he 'was travelling from place to place, not because he was in exile from Greece, but because he wanted to be a general and was offering himself to any city or people that needed one' (7.1.33). Rather comically, he is promptly dropped by the army when he humiliatingly fails to make good his promise of supplies.[17]

Reference to rank or personal qualities when characters are introduced explains the type of actions they are called to perform and in some cases the way they perform those actions; it is not necessarily an indication that a particular character is going to be prominent. There are, moreover, many individuals who appear fleetingly with little attempt at direct characterization, and some who appear several times without any overt judgement of their character. Some of these characters are relatively unproblematic, in that their actions are largely a function of their social or military positions. But there are (minor and major) characters who do pose considerable hermeneutic challenges. One such minor character is Aeneas of Stymphalus, a *lokhagos* who is mentioned only when the Greeks take a Taochian stronghold, when he falls to his death after trying in vain to stop a Taochian wearing a fine cloak from jumping off a sheer cliff (4.7.13). The narrative leaves it unclear whether Aeneas was acting from humane concern to save the Taochian's life (the narrator has just commented that the sight of the Taochian men and women hurling themselves and their children off the cliff was 'terrible', 4.7.13) or because he wanted the fine cloak for himself.[18] This type of interpretative challenge is much greater in the case of major characters such as Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes seems to be a stereotypically deceitful barbarian, but the game he is playing is left unclear (why, for instance, his delaying tactics at 2.3.25?) until he has the generals seized after inviting them to a meeting. And even after the generals' arrests, the ques-

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17 He is presumably the same as the Boeotian of the same name defending Byzantium together with Clearchus during the Ionian War (*Hell.* 3.1.15)—in which case he had local knowledge and probably also personal contacts with some of the Greek mercenaries, both of which are suppressed in *Anabasis*.

18 The uncertainty could simply be attributed to the non-omniscient narrator—but since the narrator does at times display knowledge that goes beyond what the historical Xenophon could have known with certainty, such an explanation would raise the question why inference of motivation was not employed here.

tion asked by Clearchus in dismissing warnings not to visit Tissaphernes is left unanswered: why should Tissaphernes perjure himself when he could have gained his ends by force (2.4.7)? The sort of lengthy overt characterizations allotted to Cyrus and the doomed generals might seem to be a way of forestalling such open questions—but as we shall see, they raise new questions of their own.[19]

Obituaries

Obituaries in ancient historiography are important settings for the interaction of different techniques of characterization: they are tools for conveying the importance as well as shedding retrospective light on the character of their subjects.[20] There are some notable examples in *Hellenica*,[21] but their handling in *Anabasis* (where there is a smaller set of leading characters) is particularly distinctive.

The first character in *Anabasis* to receive a major obituary is Cyrus. This obituary runs for five OCT pages (1.9), cutting into the narrative of the battle fought against the Persian king at the dramatic moment of the deaths of Cyrus and his loyal follower Artapatas. The obituary itself is marked off from the main narrative stylistically (it has an unusually large frequency of totalizing vocabulary, including many superlatives and many forms of *pas*) and in narratorial mode: it frequently foregrounds the perspective of contemporaries (e.g. 1.9.1: 'Of all the successors of Cyrus the Elder, no Persian was a more natural ruler and none more deserved to rule, *in the view of all who were held to have been close to Cyrus*')[22] and has an unusual number of first-person forms (note especially 1.9.28: 'it is my personal view that no Greek or barbarian—or none that I have heard of—was loved by more people'; cf. *oimai*, 1.9.22; *emoige … dokei*, 1.9.24). Such overt narratorial interventions are more common in the first two

19 Compare, for the complexity of characterization in *Hell.*, Moles 1994 on Callicratidas and Flower 2015 on Pharnabazus.

20 See in general Pomeroy 1991.

21 E.g. 3.1.14, 4.8.31, also 5.3.20, an obituary of Agesipolis partly focalized through his fellow king Agesilaus. *Hellenica* stands out by contrast for a number of narratorial comments justifying the inclusion of incidents that highlight the character of particular leaders (e.g. 5.1.4, 6.2.31, 39, 6.5.51).

22 Also 1.9.2: 'he was regarded …'; 1.9.5: 'there was reckoned …'; 1.9.14: 'it was universally acknowledged …' (*hōmologēto*); and (with a seemingly gratuitous change of tense) 1.9.20: 'it is universally acknowledged …' (*homologeitai*).

books of the *Anabasis*, before the emergence of the character Xenophon, but they are particularly pronounced in this section.

The obituary starts by identifying ruling as Cyrus' key skill (1.9.1, quoted above). It then adopts a linear approach, dealing with Cyrus' boyhood and education; his beginning to hunt at the proper age; and his holding of political office.[23] The principles he adopted as ruler are then explored through a generalizing account, focusing on his trustworthiness, his system of rewards and punishments, his concern for friends, and the respect in which he was held. This account is supported by some specific examples, some of which supplement or repeat details from the earlier narrative (1.9.29: many deserted from the king to Cyrus (cf. 1.4.3, 1.7.2, 1.7.12) while no one deserted Cyrus for the king except for an attempt by Orontas—and even he was betrayed (cf. 1.6);[24] 1.9.30: the loyalty shown by Cyrus' *philoi* at his death is illustrated by the death of Artapatas, which had been narrated immediately before the main narrative, 1.8.28–29), while the closing mention of the flight of Ariaeus after Cyrus' death (1.9.31) anticipates an event described immediately on the resumption of the main narrative (1.10.1). This variety of characterizing modes employed, and above all the subordination of narrative exempla to broader characterizing categories, are similar to the techniques used in *Agesilaus*.[25]

The obituary interacts with the earlier narrative in other ways apart from simple repetition. The negative/positive formulation used for an account of Cyrus' youthful (Odysseus-like) encounter with a bear ('he did not flinch at a she-bear that charged him, but engaged …', 1.9.6) echoes the use of the same form in the narrative of Cyrus' fatal charge at his brother ('he did not hesitate, but cried out "I see the man"', 1.8.26), suggesting a causal link between Cyrus' courage and the rashness that leads to his death, and a contrast, too, with his earlier caution in battle ('he was not tempted to join in the pursuit, but kept his squadron in close formation', 1.8.21).

The obituary also addresses broader ideas of leadership by means of metaphorical characterization. It starts, as we have seen, by linking Cyrus with the elder Cyrus, subject of the *Cyropaedia*; the account of the early promise shown by Cyrus (1.9.2–3) also recalls Herodotus' account of the boyhood of the elder

23 Note that there are no detailed references to his interactions with Lysander and Callicratidas, which are described at some length in *Hellenica*.

24 The alleged plot at 1.2.20 is ignored, though this was not specifically an attempt to defect to the king.

25 Cf. *tekmērion* at 1.9.29 and 1.9.30, used elsewhere in *Anabasis* only in a speech by Xenophon (3.2.13), but also used in a similar way of actions as evidence for virtues at *Agesilaus* 4.1, 4.3, 6.1.

Cyrus, when he displayed his kingly properties during a game (1.114–115). An intertextual link is also activated with Herodotus' account of Persian education. The young Cyrus is taught to ride and to shoot—two of the three aspects of Persian education noted by Herodotus (1.136.2). He is not said to have been taught to speak the truth. The absence may hint at Cyrus' use of duplicity earlier in the campaign, when he lies about the aim of his expedition.

A key theme in the obituary is the use of reciprocal bonds to ensure the loyalty and willing obedience of subordinates. This theme is highlighted in the narrative too, in particular by the use of altero-characterization (a technique used otherwise, as we shall see, primarily with regard to Xenophon). When two Greek generals abandon Cyrus, Cyrus makes a point of proclaiming that he will not pursue them and that he will return their wives and children 'in recognition of the good they did me before' (*tēs prosthen heneka peri eme aretēs*, 1.4.8)—an announcement that is seen by the Greeks as a mark of Cyrus' *aretē* (1.4.9). Meno later encourages his troops with the idea that 'Cyrus will be grateful for your commitment and will recompense you for it—and there is no one better at recompensing than he is' (1.4.15). In a notable instance of altero-characterization, this perception is shared by those who sailed to join Cyrus because they had heard of his *aretē* (6.4.8) and also by Clearchus, who tells the army in trying to quash the mutiny at Tarsus that Cyrus is 'worth a great deal as a friend to anyone who is loyal to him' (1.3.12) and later tells Tissaphernes (who soon betrays him) that he wanted to be a *philos* of Cyrus because 'there was no one alive who was better placed to help those he wanted to help' (2.5.11). While Clearchus' claims in particular are shaped by his immediate rhetorical needs, his characterization of Cyrus is to some extent supported too by the narrator, who comments on Cyrus' distress at not having enough money to pay the troops—'because it was not in Cyrus' nature to refuse to pay a debt when he had the money' (*ou gar ēn pros tou Kurou tropou*, 1.2.11). This foregrounding of perceptions of Cyrus' character highlights a theme that becomes important again in the final books, when Xenophon lectures the Thracian dynast Seuthes on the art of ruling (7.7.20–47), and again in the denouement to Xenophon's own story, when a late windfall leaves him 'at last in a position even to do someone else a favour' (7.8.23).

The long and glowing description of Cyrus does not seem primarily designed to illuminate the preceding narrative. It underlines his importance to the plot while inviting the construction of counterfactuals (what if Cyrus had won?) that perhaps offer an implicit defence of the decision of Xenophon and others to leave Greece to serve with Cyrus. Its striking placement also allows for a stronger focus on the isolated position in which Cyrus' Greek troops do find themselves. At the same time—as with the portrayal of the elder Cyrus

in *Cyropaedia*—it is open to ironic readings. Some critics have been worried about the possible threat to Greek interests if the Cyrus as portrayed in the obituary had been victorious. We have also seen the hints of Cyrus' duplicity and the repeated stress on his reputation. These hints may suggest that his principles of leadership are manipulative and self-interested, designed to play off the perceptions of his subjects and make them content with their own subjection.

Obituaries are also provided for the five generals arrested and killed by the Persians.[26] These obituaries split into two groups: the two generals who have been least prominent in the earlier narrative, Agias and Socrates, are treated last and briefly ('no one ever scorned these men as cowards in war or found fault with them in matters of friendship', 2.6.30), while the other three generals are treated at greater length. The obituaries also differ stylistically. Clearchus' obituary resembles Cyrus' in that it is focused largely around his qualities—in Clearchus' case, his love of war (*philopolemos* 2.6.1, 6, 7) and (as with Cyrus) his capacity as a ruler (*arkhikos* 2.6.8)—and around other people's perceptions.[27] In the case of Proxenus and Meno, by contrast, the narrator focuses much more on the characters' own perceptions—their desires and their thoughts about how to fulfil them[28]—though in Proxenus' case there are also (as with Clearchus) narratorial comments on his abilities and shortcomings as a leader.[29] Finally, Meno's obituary is marked out from the other four in two ways: the narrator does not reveal how old he was when he died, and the obituary is proleptic, in that the narrator first notes that 'the Greek generals who were captured as described were taken to the king and beheaded' (2.6.1) before revealing that Meno was in fact 'kept alive in constant torment for a year, it is said, before being killed' (2.6.29).[30]

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26 None of the *lokhagoi* or common soldiers killed at the same time is given an obituary. Contrast, too, the lack of an obituary for Chirisophus, who leads the vanguard in the retreat, whose death is mentioned analeptically at 6.4.11.

27 2.6.1: 'Clearchus was universally held by those who knew him …'; cf. *elegeto* 2.6.8; *ephasan* 2.6.10, 11; *edokei*, *ephaineto* 2.6.11. For a similar stress on perceptions in overt characterizing comments, see e.g. *Hell.* 3.1.3 (*doxas*), 3.1.8, 4.8.31 (*dokōn*).

28 Proxenus: *epethumei*, *epithumian* 2.6.16, *epithumōn* 2.6.18, *ōieto* 2.6.17, 18, 20. Meno: *epithumōn* 2.6.21 (three times), *epithumoiē* 2.6.22, *ebouleto* 2.6.21, *ōieto* 2.6.22, 24 (twice), 26, *enomizen* 2.6.26, *ēxiou* 2.6.27.

29 Note especially the use of *hikanos* at 2.6.8 (twice) of Clearchus and at 2.6.16, 17, 19 of Proxenus.

30 The chronological relation of the obituaries of the other generals to their actual deaths is not clear. As with Cyrus' obituary, they are placed at a point in the narrative before the Greek soldiers could have heard of their deaths; Ariaeus has told them that Clearchus has been killed for conspiring against the Persians, but the trustworthiness of that information

The placement of the obituaries has two main advantages. It provides a premature closure to the question of the part played by Proxenus and Meno in the events leading up to the arrest of the generals. In response to the Persian claim that Proxenus and Meno had denounced Clearchus, Xenophon asks that they be allowed to return (2.6.41). During the Greek debate the following night, the position of the arrested generals is uncertain (Xenophon suggests they are 'being beaten, tortured, brutalized, and denied the death their suffering surely makes them long for', 3.1.29), but the possibility of their return is forgotten. They are formally replaced as generals, and their position is no longer a subject of debate with the Persians when discussions resume. A further reason for the placement of the obituaries is that the differing characters of the three main generals prepare by contrast for the portrayal of Xenophon, who rises to prominence immediately after the obituaries.[31]

How do the obituaries relate to the earlier narrative?[32] That Clearchus was a good leader in times of danger is reflected in the way he effectively takes command after Cyrus' death, 'not because they had elected him to this position, but because he was plainly the only one with the mentality of a leader, while the rest were untried' (2.2.5). The strictness of his leadership had earlier been seen when he had one of Meno's men flogged (1.5.11)—leading to a dangerous escalation of a dispute between Meno's contingent and his own. Now, after Cyrus' death, his strict personal leadership proves more effective: he stops a panic (2.2.20–21) and, when the army has to cross water-filled trenches on logs from fallen palm trees, he beats shirkers and lends a hand himself, 'which shamed everyone into working just as hard as him' (2.3.11–12). In this way the narrator's earlier use of implicit characterization through action receives explicit endorsement from the obituary.

In some ways, however, the obituary does not do justice to the character Clearchus has displayed earlier. During the mutiny at Tarsus, Clearchus initially tries to use force to make his men continue with the journey (1.3.1–2)—in much the manner suggested by his characterization in the obituary. When not successful through force, however, he proves a master of guile, affecting loyalty

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is compromised by Ariaeus' further claim that Proxenus and Meno are in favour with the Persians for denouncing Clearchus (2.5.38).

31 Cf. Høeg 1950: 177; Roisman 1985–1988: 51–52. Howland 2000: 885–886 ambitiously suggests that Xenophon's portraits of the three arrested generals (2.6) reflect the three parts of the Platonic soul.

32 I do not consider here Proxenus, who plays a much smaller role in the narrative than Clearchus and Meno and receives a shorter obituary—though its placement between Clearchus and Meno perhaps reprises his role as a mediator between their forces at 1.5.14.

to the troops while at the time serving Cyrus' interests (as with other duplicitous characters such as Tissaphernes, Clearchus is characterized in this scene implicitly, with no explicit report of his motivation). His guile is also shown through a couple of close echoes between obituary and narrative. Speaking of some money he had been given by Cyrus, Clearchus tells the troops that 'I did not bank it for my own personal use or waste it on luxurious living; I spent it on you' (1.3.3). In the obituary, the narrator agrees that Clearchus 'did not spend the money on a life of ease'—but sees this as a mark of his devotion to war rather than to the men under his command: 'Just as other men are happy to spend money on their boyfriend or on some other pleasure, so he spent his on warfare' (2.6.5–6). Again, while Clearchus claims that he would be prepared to follow another leader because 'I know as well as anybody in the world how to take orders as well as give them' (1.3.15), the obituary closes with the claim that 'it was widely held that he was not very good at being led by others' (2.6.15). The gap between the obituary and the narrative points to the exceptional nature of Clearchus' behaviour during the mutiny, while not diluting the contrasts between the Clearchus of the obituary and the Xenophon of the ensuing narrative: Xenophon can be as strict as Clearchus (e.g. in his recourse to violence), but he is also shown using speech for positive ends.

The relation of Meno's obituary to the earlier narrative is also interesting. The picture of his devotion to self-aggrandizement seems to be a straightforward confirmation of the impression created by the scene at the Euphrates where Meno urges his men to cross the river first—a move that will win them favour with Cyrus if the other troops agree to cross too, but cost them nothing if the other troops refuse (1.4.14–17); Meno's speech to his troops overturns the usual ethical connection between toils and rewards (1.4.14), and he is himself rumoured to be the recipient of Cyrus' largesse (1.4.17). More complex is the way that the extreme picture of Meno's duplicity (which echoes Thucydides' account of *stasis* at 3.82–83—a form of metaphorical characterization by intertextuality) moulds the narratee's perception of the complicated diplomacy between Greeks and Persians in the aftermath of Cyrus' death. The earlier narrative has included strong hints of Meno's close links with the Persian Ariaeus: Clearchus gave Chirisophus and Meno the task of escorting two envoys back to Ariaeus, and 'Meno specifically wanted the job, since he was on good terms with Ariaeus, who was his guest-friend' (2.1.5); Chirisophus then returns 'without Meno, who had stayed with Ariaeus' (2.2.1); later a deceitful Persian messenger seeks out Proxenus or Clearchus, but 'he did not ask for Meno, despite the fact that he had come from Ariaeus, Meno's guest-friend' (2.4.15: Meno must have returned in the meantime). Meno's close relations with Ariaeus are relevant because the narrative brings out how Ariaeus gradually abandons the Cyreians'

cause for that of the Persian king. Any suspicions raised by Meno's closeness to Ariaeus are then refracted through Clearchus, who thinks that the ambitious Meno has been telling Tissaphernes that Clearchus is plotting against him (2.5.27–28: it is this suspicion that lures Clearchus to the fatal meeting with Tissaphernes, who has promised to reveal the names of his accusers). The bleak account of Meno's character seems to lend credence to those suspicions while still leaving unresolved the questions raised by the narrative of mutual suspicions and murky diplomacy after Cyrus' death.[33]

The critical presentation of Meno continues with a more detailed account of how he had come to join the army:

> It is possible to be mistaken about things that are unseen, but there are aspects of his life which are public knowledge. While he was still in the bloom of youth, he managed to secure an appointment as one of the generals of the mercenary corps from Aristippus, and although Ariaeus was a barbarian, Meno became very close to him, because Ariaeus had a fondness for beautiful young men. Also, Meno himself, though still a beardless youth, had Tharypas as his boyfriend, although Tharypas was mature enough to have a beard.
>
> 2.6.28

The perversions of Meno's moral code are matched by his sexual conduct, details of which are here introduced for the first time: the suggestion is that Meno exploited his personal attractiveness for self-advancement. Meno's corruption of conventional age distinctions may also explain why his age is not revealed at the end of his obituary.

Xenophon

Xenophon receives privileged treatment in *Anabasis*. He is the only character whose dreams are narrated. He is allowed numerous speeches, some of which rehearse and defend his own earlier actions. The narrator has more frequent access to his thoughts (sometimes revealing his manipulative use of speech); at one point Xenophon's thoughts are even narrated in direct speech, a passage unique in extant classical Greek historiography (3.1.13–14).[34] Xenophon also

33 Another sign of the non-omniscient narration of *Anabasis*: cf. n. 18 above.

34 With the possible exception of Ctesias F8d.12 Lenfant.

receives a more detailed explanation than any other soldier of how he came to serve with Cyrus (3.1.4–9) and a more detailed account of his life after the end of the expeditions (5.3.7–13).

Xenophon's formal introduction comes after the arrest of the generals: 'There was in the army a man called Xenophon, an Athenian' (*ēn de tis en tēi stratiai Xenophōn Athēnaios*, 3.1.4). This mode of introduction is paralleled in many genres, e.g. epic (*Il.* 5.9, 10.314, 13.663–664). A particularly neat parallel is the introduction of Themistocles in Herodotus ('there was an Athenian ... whose name was Themistocles' (*ēn de tōn tis Athēnaiōn ...*), 7.143.1)—like Xenophon, an Athenian saviour-figure. In both cases the archly underplayed introduction prepares for the character's extraordinary later achievements. Herodotus' Themistocles can be seen, then, as a form of metaphorical characterization. In Xenophon's case, the emphasis given by this mode of characterization is later bolstered by echoes of characters in Thucydides (the control exercised by Pericles, Nicias' reluctance to endanger success, Alcibiades' desire for fame)[35] and also by the use of the *Odyssey*, notably when Xenophon steers the army away from any thought of remaining within the Persian empire by invoking the lotus-eaters (3.2.25).[36]

Scholars have suspected that the narrator disguises earlier contributions by Xenophon. Both the philosophical Athenian Theopompus ('divinely sent') who rebuts defeatist advice at 2.1.12[37] and the anonymous 'young man' (*neaniskos*) who points out flaws in a deceptive Persian message at 2.4.19 have been seen as ciphers for Xenophon.[38] Xenophon does, however, make a few appearances before his main introduction at 3.1.4 (1.8.15–17, 2.4.15, 2.5.37–41). So even if the 'young man' and 'Theopompus' are both Xenophon, it is hard to explain the narrator's recourse to anonymity and a pseudonym in these two passages. The most one can say is that the *neaniskos* and Theopompus have (in Greimas' terms) the same actantial function as Xenophon.

35 Rood 2004a: 328.

36 This type of metaphorical characterization is most strongly attached to Xenophon. In addition, the elder Cyrus of *Cyropaedia* serves as a model against whom the younger Cyrus is evaluated; while in the *Hellenica* the invocation of Agamemnon in the context of Agesilaus' sacrifice at Aulis offers interesting perspectives on Agesilaus himself (Stanke 2006).

37 Some manuscripts have the reading 'Xenophon', which is accepted by Hude-Peters, but it seems easier to suppose that this displaced 'Theopompus'.

38 Covert self-reference is thought typical of our author: thus 'the leader of the Cyreans' at *Hellenica* 3.2.7 is generally thought to be Xenophon; cf. Körte 1922: 19 on 'one of [Agesilaus'] companions' at *Agesilaus* 5.4–6.

Other details that the narrator reveals about Xenophon in his introduction contribute both to the plot and to ethical themes. His identity as an Athenian is important initially because (as Socrates warns him) he joins the man who had funded the Spartan victory over Athens (3.1.5). It also explains his distinctively Athenian memories of both the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian Wars (3.2.12–13; 6.1.27–28, 7.1.27); his kinship links with Seuthes (7.2.31, 7.3.39, cf. 7.2.19, when Seuthes' sentries ask 'whether he was the Athenian from the army'); and perhaps also his rhetorical versatility (see below). Again, it is foregrounded in some Spartan-Athenian joshing about thieving (4.6.14–16, alluding to the Spartan *krupteia* and to Athenian public corruption) and perhaps in the Spartan suspicion that Xenophon may be a 'demagogue' (7.6.4). And it is also part of the way he is perceived by other characters: after Xenophon's speech to the surviving officers the night after the generals' arrest, Chirisophus comments that 'up until now, Xenophon, I knew nothing about you, except that people had told me you were an Athenian' (3.1.45)—a metatextual comment on Xenophon's delayed introduction.

The narrator goes on to explain that Xenophon did not have a formal rank: 'He had come along not as a general, nor as a company commander, nor as a soldier, but because Proxenus, a long-standing guest-friend, had invited him to leave home and join him, and had held out the promise of friendship with Cyrus' (3.1.4). Xenophon is here removed from the cash nexus and embedded in a code of aristocratic reciprocity.[39] Disappointed in his hopes for Cyrus, Xenophon nonetheless ends the *Anabasis* in a position to do good to others (see above).

The narrator then mentions Socrates' warnings to Xenophon before the expedition. Proleptic references to Xenophon's exile (5.3.7, 7.7.57) confirm that the expedition did prove dangerous for Xenophon, but it is not clear that it was Xenophon's service with Cyrus (as opposed to his later service with Sparta) that was responsible for his exile. At any rate, the introduction foregrounds the role of advice-giving, preparing for Xenophon's change from being the recipient of advice that he ignores to the giver of advice that saves the Greek army.

Xenophon's introduction also stresses the importance of piety.[40] He does follow Socrates' advice to the extent of consulting the Delphic oracle, but is berated by Socrates for asking the wrong sort of question. Later Xenophon consults the gods twice through sacrifices about whether to stay or go, using

39 Azoulay 2004a.

40 See further Rood 2015, with discussion of ironic readings. For the importance of piety in the Xenophontic model of leadership see Flower 2016.

precisely the either/or formulation that Socrates had told him he should have used in the first place (6.2.15, 7.6.44). There is also later a detailed account of the fine festival Xenophon establishes for Artemis of Ephesus with part of a tithe of the army's profits (5.7.7–13).

While Xenophon's introduction sets up some important themes, the ensuing assembly scene where he begins to play a dominant role in the action displays further characterizing techniques. Characterization through emotion is illustrated by the contrast between the despondency of the rest of the army and the spirit shown by Xenophon himself: while the army's varying emotions articulate different stages in the retreat, Xenophon is characterized by his (Periclean) ability both to stir them when they are despondent (as at 3.1–2) and to calm them when they are unruly (e.g. 7.1.18–32). Characterization through appearance is used when Xenophon puts on especially fine armour before addressing the whole army, thinking that this was suitable whether the gods gave victory or death (3.2.7)—perhaps a heroizing touch.[41] Elsewhere manipulation of appearance is important at the level of plot, but physical appearance itself is not much emphasized except in the case of a number of minor characters in erotic contexts (1.10.2, 7.4.7).[42] The assembly scene itself illustrates characterization through speech in the contrast between the short and blunt speeches by Chirisophus and Cleanor (3.2.2–4) and Xenophon's longer speech, which displays elements of Gorgias' apagogic style (3.2.8–32). During the narrative of the retreat itself, speech continues to be used as a characterizing device, but now in particular to bring out the distinctive strategic insight of Xenophon, who points out in speeches the importance of geographical features that have not been mentioned earlier by the narrator.[43]

Following Xenophon's rise to prominence at the start of Book 3, the character he displays as a leader in the retreat is initially left to be inferred from a number of narrative set-pieces (characterization through action). His personal participation is shown, for instance, when he dismounts from his horse and grabs the shield of a soldier (3.4.47–49) or takes the lead in cutting wood during the winter march through Armenia, inspiring others to follow his lead in snow (4.4.11–12). This mode of characterization (the dominant mode in *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*) is refined in the course of the narrative by an increasing use of altero-characterization. Thus when two soldiers approach Xenophon with a new discovery, his accessibility is reinforced by a generalizing comment on people's

41 Cf. Tuplin 2003 on heroic aspects of characterization in *Anabasis*.

42 It is notable that the appearance and voice of Clearchus are stressed in the obituary (2.6.9, 11) rather than in the earlier narrative of his actions.

43 Rood 2014.

perceptions of Xenophon: 'Everyone knew that, if they had a military matter to discuss, they could approach him during mealtimes and could wake him up if he was asleep' (4.3.10). As the narrative advances, Xenophon's character as leader is more and more presented as perceived both by others (e.g. 7.6.4: Seuthes on Xenophon as *philostratiotēs*; cf. 7.6.39) and by Xenophon himself.[44] Like Clearchus' observations on Cyrus (1.3.12, quoted above), such comments have a local function while also contributing to broader characterization and to important themes. This technique is particularly effective in dealing with characters whose actions provoke controversy, like Xenophon himself: the best example of its use comes from the description of Alcibiades' return to Athens in *Hellenica* (1.4.13–17), where the perceptions of those who support and oppose Alcibiades are described at markedly different lengths, in terms which evoke Thucydides' analysis of the problematic relationship between Alcibiades and the Athenians.[45]

Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed a number of different narratological modes used for characterization in *Anabasis*, and some comparisons have been drawn with *Hellenica*. The evidence does at least suggest that it is reasonable to see a pronounced interest in characterization in these works despite the importance of the leadership model (though we should be wary of integrating this interest into overly simplistic developmental narratives of the discovery of the individual). In the case of Xenophon, the distinctive range of characterizing techniques speaks to the narrator's concern for general ethical standards and leadership principles while not neglecting the difficult personal interactions through which those standards have to be maintained. And other characters, too, are not simply drawn in black or white depending on whether or not they match the paradigm of the good leader. They all in their various ways illuminate the complexities involved in the world of political action—by contrast with the Socratic possibility of connecting virtue and leadership in the world of the ideal.[46]

44 Rood 2004a.

45 Rood 2004b: 366–369.

46 Cf. Tamiolaki 2012.

CHAPTER 10

Polybius

Luke Pitcher

Polybius is an important figure if one wishes to study methods of characterization in ancient Greek narrative. His importance is two-fold. On the one hand, he is significant simply because he furnishes so much material. It is true that Polybius' corpus is imperfectly preserved. There is good reason to regret what has disappeared. The loss of the separate work on Philopoemen, which the historian describes (Plb. 10.21.8) as *enkōmiastikos*, is galling: the impact of genre upon narratology might well have been illuminated by setting Polybius' works against each other. Still, enough remains of his universal history to furnish many examples of characterizing techniques in practice.

So much might be said of other ancient historians. Where Polybius is unique among the historiographers of ancient Greece is in the level of the meta-historical reflexion which he brings to his endeavours. Polybius has a great deal to say about almost every aspect of the historian's craft. How a historian should go about understanding and depicting the characters of historical agents is no exception.[1]

This chapter, then, pursues a double strategy. Polybius uses characterizing techniques aplenty. The first topic of concern will be to catalogue them. Equally interesting, however, and the subject of the second part of the chapter, will be consideration of how characterization functions within Polybius' vision of his enterprise. It will become clear that, in several respects, he anticipates the thinking of this volume's Introduction, and that his meditations on this theme remain of relevance.

Character in Polybius

Characterization of one sort or another happens a great deal in the text of Polybius. This is no more than one would expect from the genre in which he is working. Narrative history without characterization is not easily written, in the ancient world or in the modern. Even a very summary historian such as Florus

1 Walbank 1972: 92–93; Eckstein 1995: 239.

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does not abstain from characterizing flourishes, as for example, in his opening description of Romulus as 'a lover of thunder and the mountains' (Florus 1.1). Polybius, whose treatment of events is much more ample, cannot but engage in significant levels of characterization.

Character, for Polybius, can be the product of many factors. The key ones are familiar from earlier Greek authors. The Introduction to this volume has identified macro-social groups, micro-social groups, and peer-groups as potentially anchoring characters in their social contexts. All of these can be seen as playing a part for different characters in the text of Polybius, though he does not necessarily address them in the vocabulary that has been presented in the Introduction.

On the macro-social level, Polybius's text repeatedly imputes certain characteristics to particular nations or ethnic groups. Phoenicians are innately (*emphuton*) disposed towards greed and the love of domination (9.11.2). Aetolians are innately (*emphuton*) given to covetousness (4.3.1). Peloponnesians are the most disposed of all mankind towards a peaceful and sociable life (5.106.4). Numidians are by nature (*phusikēn*) inclined to grow disgusted with what has pleased them, and are given to unreliability in their dealings with gods and men alike (14.1.4). The savagery of Egyptians is terrible when their anger is aroused (15.33.10). The people of Gaza are notable for keeping their faith (16.22a.3).

The fact that Polybius's text presents some characteristics as associated with particular ethnic groupings is unsurprising. It is more instructive to look at how these characteristics are presented, and their interactions with the characters of particular individuals. One may note, for example, that Polybius seems to be less inclined than some of his historiographical predecessors to put the lion's share of analysis of national character into speeches delivered by individuals in his text. Thucydides' (→) most ample passages on the purported national characteristics of the Athenians and the Spartans, for example, tend to come in long, set-piece speeches: that of the Corinthians at the debate in Sparta before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, for example (Th. 1.70.1–9);[2] in Pericles' Funeral Oration (2.37.1–41.5); or in Cleon's speech at the debate on Mytilene (3.37.2). Polybius, by contrast, makes more of these generalizations outside of lengthy *oratio recta* speeches by the individuals in his text. There are exceptions. The Rhodians are eloquent on the subject of their own freedom of speech, and their guard over the liberty both of themselves and of the other Greeks (Plb. 27.4.7); Scipio Aemilianus speaks of the Roman propensity to show dynamism through the medium of forensic oratory (31.23.11–12). In

2 Hornblower 1991: 108.

general, however, the Polybian narrator's voice has a lot more to do in explicitly fashioning these stereotypes for the benefit of the reader than the equivalent narrator does in Thucydides. In particular, one notes how Polybius often uses an adjective denoting a nation to fix a quality as particularly characteristic of that nation. Hannibal employs a 'Phoenician stratagem' (3.78.1) when he adopts disguises to ward off attempts against his life. Elsewhere, one finds allusions to 'Aetolian vigour and greed' (4.3.5) and 'Ionian debauchery' (32.11.9).

Despite this difference of narrative practice, Polybius does share an important trait with Thucydides. He does not always present the relationship of purported national characteristics to the character of a given individual as necessarily straightforward. Sometimes a Polybian individual does indeed straightforwardly evince the expected characteristics of his nationality. The characterization of Dorimachus is a case in point. Dorimachus appears in the text immediately after the narrator has described the Aetolians as innately covetous and desirous of domination, and he is the one who is immediately described as full of the 'Aetolian vigour and greed' that was cited in the previous paragraph; this greed, *pleonexia*, notably echoes the 'greedy life-style' (*pleonektikon bion*) which the Aetolians have just been said to lead (4.3.5, 4.3.1). In this instance, the relationship of individual character to national tendencies is unproblematic.

The narrative pattern is not always quite so simple. Just as Thucydides has Archidamus and Brasidas, two important Spartans who are in different ways notably 'un-Spartan', so characters in Polybius can defy the narrative expectations that might be raised by their several nationalities. Sometimes, the narrator spells this out. The Cretan Antiphatas, addressing the Achaean assembly (33.16.5), does so in words 'more serious and weighty than is the way with Cretans (*ē kata Krēta*)'. The narrator goes on to comment that 'the young man' (*neaniskos*—a carefully chosen word, since Polybius, as we shall see, can be inclined to assess people in terms of whether or not they live up to, or beyond, their physical maturity) was 'not at all Cretan' (*oudamōs Krētikos*). Instead, he had escaped Cretan 'ill-breeding' (*anagōgian*). Cotys, king of the Odrysae, is 'in spirit not at all like a Thracian' (*kata tēn psukhēn panta mallon ē Thrax*) (27.12.2). Ptolemy, the Egyptian commander in Cyprus (27.13.1), is sensible and capable, and so 'not at all Egyptian' (*oudamōs Aiguptiakos*). It is not simply where national characteristics are concerned that individuals can surprise, either. One might compare the case of Aristonicus, whom the narrator characterizes as 'more of a man in courage than eunuchs generally are' (22.22).

On other occasions, the narrator does not spell such contrasts out, and they are left for the reader to notice. An example of this would be the Carthaginian general Bostar. Hannibal's tricks may be characteristically 'Phoenician'. Abilyx, by contrast, perceives (*theōrōn*) Bostar to be 'without evil (*akakon*) and mild

(*praion*) by disposition (*tēi phusei*)' (3.98.5–6) and given to trust Abilyx. Sure enough, the deception which Abilyx then executes upon Bostar is successful.

The case of Bostar illustrates a point that will recur in the study of Polybian characterizing techniques. The overarching narrator is not the sole source of these manoeuvres within the text. Polybius' characters spend a fair amount of time in the assessment and characterization of each other. Moreover, despite the more straightforward examples that we have already seen, the Polybian narrator is not always on-hand to confirm or deny whether these assessments are the whole story—and ironies often accrete when the assessments lead to action. Abilyx does indeed perceive Bostar to be blameless and mild, but we may note that the arguments which he uses to persuade his mark do not exploit those characteristics alone. There is an appeal to self-interest as well, since he tempts Bostar with the prospect of many presents (3.98.10).

This is by no means logically inconsistent with the impression of Bostar that Abilyx's opening assessment has given to Polybius' narratees. A blameless and mild man may yet welcome the possibility of remuneration, especially in the value-systems current in the ancient Mediterranean. But the fact that Abilyx chooses to argue in this fashion adds nuance to the picture (and may also say something about Abilyx himself). Bostar's capitulation then leads to a substantial narrative irony. Once the guileless Carthaginian hands over hostages to Abilyx, as suggested, the latter not only betrays him, but also uses the handing back of the hostages to their families as a visible lesson in the 'mildness (*praiotēta*) and magnanimity of the Romans' in contrast to the 'faithlessness and harshness of the Carthaginians', which convinces many of the Iberians to follow Rome (3.99.7).

Bostar's perceived mildness and Abilyx's demonstrable faithlessness towards him produce a situation, through Abilyx's cunning, where it is the Romans who come out looking mild and the Carthaginians who come out looking untrustworthy; note how the initial description of the dupe as *praion* is picked up by the use of *praiotēta* at 99.7. As for the unfortunate Bostar, Polybius' narrator takes leave of him with the final judgment on his performance made by his fellow Carthaginians (the focalizers are left implicit here, but the reference to punishment barely evaded at the end suggests that it is Bostar's domestic audience). 'Since it seemed (*doxas*) that he had handed over the hostages in a manner more childish than was befitting for one of his years, he had found himself in very serious danger' (3.99.8).[3]

3 See also McGing 2013: 184.

There are few other points in the text of Polybius where the possible interactions between (supposed or asserted) national characteristics and individual behaviour are worked out with this degree of thoroughness. Yet some there are. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that they also tend to revolve around deceptions.

The story of Bolis is pertinent in this regard. Cretans are one of the macro-social groupings whose purported characteristics the narrator rarely misses an opportunity to mention. We have already seen Antiphatas marking himself out as un-Cretan through the seriousness and gravity of his oratory (33.16.5). The people of the Cretan polity of Cydonia manage the unenviable distinction of perpetrating an act of treachery so profound that it stands out even though 'many things of that sort had happened in Crete' (28.14.2). The untrustworthiness of Cretans is not a theme unique to Polybius, of course: the famous (and logically tortuous) claim of Epimenides, from the sixth century BCE, that 'Cretans are always liars' is quoted by Callimachus (*Hymn to Zeus* 8). But the theme is one that Polybius is particularly keen to revisit.

Polybius's presentation of Bolis makes considerable use of this macro-social expectation. The fact that Bolis is a Cretan is mentioned in the first sentence in which he appears ('There was a man called Bolis, a Cretan by race …', 8.15.1). This is not, in itself, unusual for the introduction of an individual in Polybius, especially if that individual is in an area where his ethnicity might be surprising (this stretch of the narrative begins at the Egyptian court of Ptolemy IV). This opening sentence then continues '… who had a reputation (*dokōn*) for acumen, exceptional daring, and experience that was second to none in military matters'. The use of *dokein* in this passage does not, of course, necessarily bear the implication that this reputation is false. Again, one might make a comparison with Thucydides, who introduces Archidamus of Sparta with the comment that he 'had the reputation (*dokōn*) of being both an intelligent and a prudent man' (Th. 1.79.2); the participle in this phrase 'refers not merely to appearance but to repute'.[4] However, the fact that the narrator is already focusing on how Bolis appears to other people may well prod the cautious narratee into wakefulness. It is, perhaps, pertinent to compare the case of Abilyx, the deceptive Iberian whose gulling of Bostar has already been examined. The narrative introduced Abilyx as 'having the reputation for far exceeding everyone else in good-will and trustworthiness towards the Carthaginians' (Plb. 3.98.2), and this reputation is key to his success in deceiving Bostar in the story that follows. When a Cretan, then, is introduced in terms of his glowing local reputation, the cau-

4 Hutchinson 1985: 137.

tious narratee may well be disposed to wonder whether those who buy into this reputation are in for a rude awakening.

In fact, the sequel is more complicated in its impact than one might expect. To judge from what happens, Bolis' reputation for sagacity, unlike Abilyx's reputation for trustworthiness, is well-founded. But sagacity (*sunesis*), while a good thing to have, is not the same as reliability, and can carry attendant dangers.[5]

In light of his reputation, Bolis is put in charge of a delicate mission. It is notable that throughout the first stage of this mission, Bolis' thought-processes remain opaque to the narratee. The Polybian narrator notes at an early point that the Cretan 'had taken counsel with himself (*dous de logon heautōi*)' (8.15.4), but does not say what the inward result of these cogitations was. As the opening part of the mission unfolds, assessments of Bolis' character continue to be offered by his admiring employer, Ptolemy's chancellor Sosibius, who is firmly convinced that there is no better man for the task in hand than him (8.15.6). The Polybian narrator, by contrast, remains studiously uncommitted at this point as to Bolis' capacities or allegiances.

Once the plan is actually underway, there is a marked change in the tenor of the narrative. The Polybian narrator has previously mentioned Bolis' ethnic affiliation, and has noted that Bolis himself has made claims for its pragmatic usefulness in his mission, since it will enable him to establish diplomatic relations with the opposing garrison (8.15.4). The narrator has not, so far, dwelt explicitly on the likely implications for Bolis' character of his Cretan lineage. Now, however, the narrator begins to explore its possible ramifications: 'Bolis, inasmuch as he was a Cretan and subtle by nature (*phusei*), began to weigh every matter' (8.16.4). From this point onwards—now that the power of action is in Bolis' hands, and that he is taking the pragmatic decision to double-cross his Egyptian paymaster—allusions to the kind of behaviour that one might expect from a Cretan appear more often. Bolis and Cambylus, the individual with whom Bolis is supposed to be negotiating for the relief of Achaeus, are said to have 'considered the matter in a Cretan fashion (*skepsin Krētikēn*)' (8.16.5); they come to the same conclusion about the profitability and desirability of Bolis' betrayal, 'because they were both Cretans (*amphoteroi Krētes ontes*)' (8.16.7).

Sosibius' naïve assessment of Bolis at the beginning of this story is mirrored, near the end of it, by an assessment of him made by Achaeus, the individual whom Bolis is supposed to be rescuing but is, in fact, delivering to Antiochus.

5 Cf. Zahn 1934: 76–78.

Like Sosibius, Achaeus is portrayed as being impressed by Bolis' apparent capabilities, judging him (*theōrōn*) to be equal to the gravity of the situation (8.19.2). Unlike Sosibius, Achaeus, whom the Polybian narrator explicitly characterizes as a man 'second to none in his intelligence' (8.19.3), decides not to repose his whole trust in Bolis.

Bolis outwits him, nonetheless. The narrator comments that, although Achaeus did what he could, 'he did not know, as the saying goes, that he was playing the Cretan with a Cretan' (8.19.5). Bolis has already worked out in minute detail every possible move and counter-move in his plan (*apsēlaphēton*, the word which conveys this, recalls the use of its cognate verb *psēlaphan* at 8.16.4 above ('he was testing every plan'), the last occasion when the narrator alluded to complex planning as a characteristically Cretan activity). Achaeus' precautions almost scupper the plan, because Bolis, 'although a Cretan' and so naturally wary, could not penetrate his disguise in the dark (8.20.2), but Bolis manages to capture him all the same.

The story of Bolis, then, makes for a thought-provoking *comparandum* with that of Abilyx. Both are tales in which linkage of character to purported macro-social characteristics is a significant consideration. In the story of Abilyx, however, the expected macro-social determination is subverted. Abilyx is successful in 'demonstrating' what he presents as the characteristic mildness of the Romans and the perfidy of the Carthaginians to his fellow Iberians, but the plan only works because an individual Carthaginian has been mild and he himself has been perfidious. In the case of Bolis, by contrast, the macro-social determination of his character which the narratee might expect is entirely reliable: he is a subtle and untrustworthy Cretan. In this story, the interest is generated by the fact that his foils fail either entirely (in the case of Sosibius) or adequately (in the case of Achaeus) to account for this factor in dealing with him. A notable irony of Bolis' tale is that no one's assessment of the Cretan mastermind is actually wrong. Sosibius is right to think that he was a man of sagacity and experience in warfare and very capable, and Achaeus is right to think him entirely equal to the situation. This story is full of character assessments that are true but not (for the purposes of the individuals making them) sufficient.

The complexity with which Polybius treats the impact of macro-social groupings upon individual character finds a corresponding complexity in his treatment of micro-social groupings and of peer-groups. Sometimes lowly birth turns out to be a reliable index of individual character. Heracleides, an agent of Philip V of Macedon in his machinations to destroy the Rhodian navy, is a man described at his introduction to the narrative as 'well-fitted by nature to mischief (*eu pephukōs pros to kakon*)' (13.4.3) and the narrator is keen to link

his unpleasant character to his stock and upbringing: 'he was from the stock of (*pephukenai*) labourers and people who worked with their hands' (13.4.4).[6] In similar vein, Chaeron, a former Spartan ambassador to Rome who embarks upon a career of fiscal rapacity and corruption, is described by the narrator on his introduction as 'young, and of lowly station, and brought up in a vulgar way (*dēmotikēs agōgēs teteukhōs*)' (24.7.1).

Even in these instances, however, the final narrative effect is rather more complex. Heracleides and Chaeron are notable because, loathsome as they are, they both show considerable gifts. Each is described as 'keen-witted (*ankhinous*)' (13.4.5, 24.7.1), and the narrator also notes Heracleides' exceptional memory. With regard to his intellectual gifts, in fact, the description of Heracleides is, in part very similar to that of his employer Philip V, of whose keen intelligence (*ankhinoia*) and memory the narrator comments that they are 'resources for the acquisition of power' (4.77.2). Philip, of course, has other gifts as well that fall in that category, and which Heracleides is not described as sharing—notably, 'kingly presence and authority' (4.77.3). The temptation, then, is to read Polybius as depicting Heracleides and Chaeron as cases in point of how lowly upbringing can undermine even resplendent natural gifts.

This is probably true, but the careful narratee will note that the Polybian narrator's recital of the young Philip's shining promise is framed from the outset in terms of the monstrous failure that he will later become (4.77.4). Philip, after all, is a case on which the Polybian narrator dwells of how the good qualities which are a man's by nature (*phusei*) may eventually feel encroachment from the bad qualities which come upon him when he ages (10.26.8). As the Introduction to this volume has noted (→), 'metaphorical characterization can also function intratextually: characters are associated with (or dissociated from) other characters within the same work'. One wonders whether this may not be the case here, since one of these individuals with a sharp mind and a retentive memory is working for the other. For all the differences in their upbringing, and the very different scale of the arenas in which they work, Philip and his creature are, in some signal respects, not so very different, after all.

What emerges from these cases is that Polybius makes use of the many characterizing techniques that have been set out in the Introduction. He does not necessarily do so in a straightforward way. Moreover, the key issue of '*Who* characterizes?' is one that this historian transforms into tense and gripping narratives. The story of Bolis hinges upon two mirrored assessments of the temporary protagonist's character delivered by agents within the text. This

6 McGing 2010: 28–29.

level of orchestration is unusual, to be sure. But Polybius' text is thronged with smaller-scale assessments of characters by other characters.

Like a reader, Polybius' principals base their assessments on the data at their disposal. Time and again, the Polybian narrator reminds the narratee how such assessments are formed. One notes, for example, the recurring Polybian preoccupation with the figures that historical characters present to each other. Achaeus' reading of Bolis—accurate so far as it goes, though incomplete—is explicitly based on considerations that will be familiar from the Introduction: how Bolis looks, and how Bolis talks. Achaeus' opening impression founds itself upon Bolis' 'appearance' (*epiphaneian*) and his 'discourse' (*homilian*) (8.19.2). These ways of judging a man on first acquaintance are as old as Homer: compare Antenor's recollection of meeting Menelaus and Odysseus on an embassy, and acknowledgment of how he found himself revising his impressions on the fly (*Iliad* 3.208–223). Polybius' narrator endorses their possible validity. 'Kingly presence (*epiphasis basilikē*)', as we have already seen, is on the list of the resources possessed by Philip V of Macedon that would tend to promote the acquisition of power (4.77.3). One of the characteristics that makes Cotys an atypical Thracian, besides his mild temper and his sobriety, is his distinguished appearance, *kata tēn epiphaneian axiologos* (27.12.1). Perseus in his earlier years, another (albeit temporary) pattern of sobriety, shows royal dignity because, besides other things, he looks able to do the job (25.3.6). An accurate token of Philopoemen's austerity is the simplicity of his dress (10.22.4).

In the text of Polybius, how someone looks is central to how he interacts with others, since it will form the foundation of how those others assess him. Once again, however, not all hypotheses derived from appearance are accurate or helpful, and not all attempts to impress through cultivation of a particular appearance are efficacious. During the period of his decline, Philip's *epiphasis basilikē* takes on a more sinister cast as he deliberately tries to foster the impression of mildness and approachability by laying aside his diadem. His excesses contradict his spin (10.26.1–2). Ptolemy the son of Sosibius makes a fool of himself by thinking, amongst other things, that the virtue of the Macedonians resides 'in the distinction of their footwear and their dress' (16.22.5).

This may not surprise in a historical text. In fact, however, assessment of character, and how the character thus assessed should then be described, is a matter of more explicit concern to Polybius than it is to most other historiographers. How he articulates these concerns is the topic of the next section.

Polybius on Character

For Polybius, the assessment of character is in certain respects key to his historiographical enterprise. Why this is the case emerges from the beginning of his treatment of Philopoemen (10.21.3). In this passage, the narrator remarks that it is odd how writers describe the foundation and physical disposition of cities in considerable detail, yet stay silent about the 'training (*agōgas*)' and goals of the men responsible for founding them, even though such information is much more profitable. 'For by how much the more readily one may emulate and imitate living men than soulless buildings, by that much more is it reasonable that treatment of the former is better with regard to the improvement (*epanorthōsin*) of one's audience' (10.21.4).

Several of Polybius' preoccupations are coming together in this passage. This commonly happens when he launches into meta-historical reflexion. Pointless descriptions of places and buildings are a Polybian bugbear elsewhere in his work, though the emphasis is more often on how other authors succumb to the allure of rhetorical expansion than, as here, on the limited utility of the subject itself. Compare the narrator's explicit scorn for *topographiai* as elaborations perpetrated to cover the paucity of data (29.12.4)[7] and his professed reluctance to talk at length about the palace of Ecbatana, 'for to those that choose to offer up astonishing tales and are accustomed to give exaggerated and rhetorical accounts of some matters, the aforementioned city affords an excellent theme' (10.27.8).[8]

In the present passage, the Polybian narrator exalts the delineation of men, rather than of buildings, with explicit reference to the superior effect that this will have on the improvement of his narratees. This argument goes to the heart of Polybius' historical endeavour. From the very beginning of the history, Polybius' opus has been framed in terms of the utility which his narratees may derive from it. Indeed, the opening sentence of Book One affects to consider this theme so threadbare that it scarcely seems worthwhile to mention it at all: 'If it were the case that previous historians had omitted to write in praise of history, then perhaps it would be necessary to encourage all to choose for study and welcome such treatises, since there is no readier corrective (*diorthōsin*) for people than understanding of deeds that have happened before' (1.1.1). Polybius does not deny elsewhere that history may have other incidental incitements as well. His narrator notes, for example, that his account of Scipio Aemilianus

7 *SAGN* 3: 182 (Rood).

8 Cf. *BNJ* 83 F 6 with commentary.

will give pleasure to the elders among his narratees at the same time as it gives instruction to the younger (31.30.1).[9] But Polybius' primary justification for reading (and writing) history remains the useful instruction to be derived therefrom.

How, then, does Polybius' abiding concern that historiography should be useful to the reader interact with his presentation of character? This pragmatic turn, once one is aware of it, is quite obvious in Polybius' depiction of individuals. 'Our hankering for the idiosyncratic has rightly been called "a strange and recent prejudice" (Pelling 1990c: 253)'.[10] For Polybius, idiosyncrasy has an additional disincentive, because the problem with something which is truly unique is that one cannot, because of this uniqueness, draw useful generalizing conclusions from it. Polybius, not unlike a modern scientist, is principally interested in results that can be replicated.[11] In the passage comparing the study of men favourably to the study of buildings, his narrator notably focuses upon the training (*agōgas*) of the men. Training, of course, is that particular determinant factor in a person's character that can most easily be ported across to someone else. Charles Atlas is generalizable. Superman is not.

This also helps to explain Polybius' recurrent interest in the impact that advisors (good or bad) have upon the careers and personalities of powerful men.[12] A case in point is the cautionary tale of Hieronymus of Syracuse, where the narrator spells out that what goes wrong is the way in which the young king's 'naturally unstable (*phusei … akatastaton*)' traits are augmented by the pernicious influence of Hippocrates and Epicydes (7.4.6). One may note that the narrator prepares the ground for this account of a monarch led astray when he pointedly describes Hieronymus as a 'lad' (*meirakion*) at the moment when Hippocrates and Epicydes first go to work on him (7.4.4), since youth is the vulnerable time at which such influences are particularly likely to be potent.[13] The effect of others upon character is by no means a theme unique to Polybius in ancient Greek literature, as the Introduction to this volume has already acknowledged.[14] But Polybius' overmastering desire to provide material that is potentially 'corrective' and so profitable to the reader explains why he

9 Walbank 1972: 40.

10 Introduction (→).

11 Walbank 1972: 58.

12 Walbank 1972: 93–94.

13 McGing 2013: 185.

14 Introduction (→). This would presumably be a specialized instance of what is there dubbed membership of an 'educative-intellectual' social group, although a king and his advisors are not 'peers'.

explores this particular constituent element of character so thoroughly and so often. One cannot choose one's native predispositions, but one can choose one's friends.

Polybius' utilitarian drive has other consequences for his depiction of individual characters, besides his narrator's tendency to bring to the fore the constituent elements in character-formation that can be copied. He makes it clear in his meta-historical excursuses that the reflective historian has a responsibility to select the correct individuals on whom to dwell, and how best to delineate these individuals when they are selected. The production of examples for the narratee's emulation is not the whole story behind this insistence. Polybius's oft-expressed reverence for truth, which, in his view, is indissolubly linked to a sense of due narrative proportion, also has its part to play. But the utilitarian drive is still important.

The importance of selecting the right individuals for narrative emphasis appears at several points of meta-historical discussion. Such also tend to be the points where what the Introduction (→) to this volume has described as 'metaphorical characterization' becomes a prominent weapon in Polybius' armoury—above all, in the delineation of characters by reference to other characters. Two passages stand out. These are the one in which the Polybian narrator criticizes other (unnamed) historians for the way in which they have treated the fall of Hieronymus (7.7–8 = *BNJ* 180 F 3), and the one where other nameless authors are deprecated for how they handled the end of the regent Agathocles and his kindred (15.34.1 = *BNJ* 83 F 1).

These passages show a very similar rhythm of argumentation. In both, techniques of metaphorical characterization are well to the fore. Polybius' objection to prior treatments of Hieronymus and Agathocles is that neither individual deserved treatment on the scale which earlier authors have afforded them. It is notable, given what we have been saying about the importance to Polybius of furnishing examples a reader might copy, that his narrator characterizes Agathocles' handling of affairs as 'neither fortunate nor worthy of emulation (*zēlōton*)' (15.34.4). In similar vein, the narrator dismisses the career of Hieronymus in favour of other individuals, an account of whom would be 'more pleasing to those who wish to hear, and more useful (*khrēsimōteros*) to those who wish to learn' (7.7.8). The 'metaphorical' turn emerges when, in both cases, the Polybian narrator proffers specific instances of people whose careers would make for a more fitting subject. In the case of Hieronymus, these are Hiero and Gelo; for Agathocles, they are his namesake Agathocles of Sicily and Dionysius. The narrator fixes the impression of how inconsequential Hieronymus and the regent Agathocles are through studied contrast to these other, more admirable rulers, on the laudable qualities of whom he expatiates. In

the case of Dionysius, for example, the trope of dwelling upon an individual's humble origins appears to unusual effect. Unlike a Heracleides, or a Chaeron, Dionysius becomes a person of true substance, for all that he began from a 'vulgar and humble position' (15.35.2). The lowly origins, in this case, magnify the ultimate achievement.

The correct selection of individuals for emphasis emerges from these passages as an important concern for Polybius. But so—and this is a consideration of special interest to a volume concerning the *techniques* of characterization—does narrativity. Polybius is not objecting to the treatment of Hieronymus and the regent Agathocles *per se*. He describes with some detail what happens to both individuals, and the career of the former neatly exemplifies the evil effects of bad counsel. His objection is to depictions of these men that allot them undue significance and, in particular, that treat them as fit material for a substantial *epimetrōn logos* (7.7.7, 15.34.1). By *epimetrōn logos*, Polybius means the amplification of a narrative, involving digressions and the dilated expression of the historian's personal judgment, of a sort which Ephorus was, in his view, particularly skilled at producing (12.28.10). For Polybius, assessment of individuals and the narrative texture of his own work are indissoluble: decisions about the one feed into decisions about the other.

The *epimetrōn logos* is not an especially common feature of the Polybian narrative, but explicit concern for the impact that narrative choices may have upon the delineation of character recurs in different forms throughout the work. Polybius strikingly anticipates the notion of cognitive 'primacy' in the delineation of character which emerged as such a key feature in the Introduction. When discussing Philip V of Macedon, the narrator explicitly comments upon his own decision not to deliver judgments about the king 'at the outset (*en tois prooimiois*), like other writers', but rather to match appropriate comments (*ton kathēkonta logon*) to affairs as they unfold (*ep' autōn tōn pragmatōn*), judging this to be more proper (10.26.9). Polybius' side-swipes at the putative practices of other writers sometimes have to be taken with a pinch of salt, since, where the modern reader can control them against instances of those authors' actual practice, they are not always especially accurate. In this instance, the implication that narratorial assessment of an individual early on in a text is standard operating procedure for ancient historical writers other than Polybius is wide of the mark, even if one interprets *en tois prooimiois* in this passage as meaning 'when the character first appears' rather than 'at the very beginning of the historical work itself'. In fact, ancient historiographical practice in this regard is very various. Sometimes characters are subjected to an assessment by the narrator at the moment of their first introduction. So much might be said of Archidamus in Thucydides (1.79.2), or the eponyms of Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*

(5.1) and *Bellum Iugurthinum* (6.1). On the other hand, there is likewise a strong disposition to place these assessments at or near the points in the texts at which the individuals in question have just died: this is true of Xenophon's treatment of Cyrus (*Anabasis* 1.9.1–31) and the fallen generals Clearchus (2.6.1–15), Proxenus (2.6.16–20), and Meno (2.6.21–27), of Thucydides' Nicias (7.86.5), and of Tacitus' Galba (*Histories* 1.49) and Tiberius (*Annals* 6.51). There are other narratorial character assessments which do not congregate at the moments of entry and departure for their several individuals at all. Thucydides' final assessment of Pericles comes when the great man still has a couple of years to live (2.65.1–6) and his lengthiest disquisition upon the characteristics of Alcibiades attaches itself not to the account of his manoeuvrings in Book Five (as for example at 5.45.1–4), but to his contribution at the debate on the Sicilian Expedition in Book Six (6.15.2–4). Tacitus's narrator discourses upon the character of L. Aelius Sejanus at the beginning of the year 23 (*Annals* 4.1), rather than at the moment of his first introduction in Book One (*Annals* 1.24).

Polybius' practice is not, then, as distinctive as his narrator avers. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that he shows a shrewd sense for the effects that such narrative decisions have, and, above all, for the fact that the order in which the narrator discloses assessments and pertinent data to the narratee can have a considerable impact in forming the response of the latter to a character. Polybius has a lively awareness that material about a character placed relatively early on in a narrative will have a particularly strong effect on how the narratee looks upon that individual. In the case of Scipio Aemilianus, the narrator is candid about this strand of his strategy. 'I have spoken at such length concerning the development of Scipio's character from his first youth … chiefly desiring to secure credibility for what will be said in the following books, so that my audience may not hesitate on account of some of the things which befell subsequently in his career (*tōn sumbainontōn*) appearing astonishing' (31.30.1–2). The Polybian narrator lays the ground for a believable account of the mature Aemilianus by being careful to establish that the amazing deeds of his later career were entirely congruent with the figure that he cut in youth.

The correct and effective *presentation* of character is not the only such issue that vexes the Polybian narrator. It has already emerged in this account of Polybian characterization that individuals who attempt to characterize others within the text do so with very variable results.[15] Bostar's assessment of Abilyx is wrong. Sosibius and Achaeus are right about some elements of Bolis' character, but, to their cost, do not succeed in addressing some of the other ones.

15 Cf. McGing 2013: 187.

Examples of haphazard or incomplete characterization may be multiplied. The Rhodians, for example, initially favour Pausistratus over Pamphilidas for their naval operations because they rate the energy and the daring of the one more highly than the dependability and reliability of the other. Their ultimate change of mind extorts a generalizing comment from the narrator: 'most men are good at judging a situation rather from what happens (*ek tōn sumbainontōn*) than from reasoning' (21.7.6). Note, once more, the emphasis on the role that the assessment of 'events' (*ta sumbainonta*) plays in the decision-making.

The narrator's editorializing comment here has a wider applicability. The sudden *volte-face* of the Rhodians in this instance paints them as unsteady of judgment. But Polybius elsewhere dramatizes the fact that coming to an accurate assessment of character is hard work for anyone.[16] This can potentially apply to the historian, as well as to the individuals whom he describes.

In most extant ancient historiography, the issue of how the narrator arrives at his assessment of an individual character is rarely placed in the foreground. In fact, the inverse is, if anything, more often the case. The historiographical narrator, on occasion, discriminates between competing versions of events on the basis of the characters of those concerned, which, for this purpose, are usually presented as straightforwardly knowable or known. So, for example, the Tacitean narrator can aver, with regard to a version of the events of 69 CE found in 'certain authors' that 'I do not believe that Paulinus, *with his practical good sense*, ever hoped for such moderation on the part of the people in that most corrupt age …' (*Histories* 2.37). The fact that the historian's assessment of an individual's character is itself built up from his understanding of the events in which that individual participates is very seldom addressed.

Polybius, as so often, is an exception. While discussing Hannibal, his narrator shows himself aware that what people say can stand in contrast to their moral choices (*para tēn hautōn proairesin*, 9.22.10) or be opposed to their real character (*tēn enantian tēi phusei diathesin*, 9.23.4), because of the press of circumstance. This is a recurring theme. For example, in justifying his ample coverage of the Saguntines, Polybius explains that coverage of a wide sweep of events is a means of counteracting this difficulty (3.31.11). In the case of Philip V of Macedon, the issue of the interlocking impact of different characters on one another leads the narrator to sign-post the point at which he is furnishing the proof for his assertion that the rival influences of Aratus and Demetrius on Philip were respectively benign and malignant (7.13.5), as well as the careful gloss that the model of Aratus' character which it entails is justified by the facts of Aratus's

16 McGing 2010: 36.

life-story (7.13.4). The Polybian narrator also highlights the complication that a character may be laudable in some respects, but not in others: Aratus, generally commendable, was not a military man (4.8.5),[17] whereas Tlepolemus was the other way around (16.21.3–4). In character assessment, as in most other aspects of the historian's craft, the Polybian narrator is keen to highlight epistemological issues—and the ways in which a thoughtful historiographer may overcome them.

Conclusion

This is not a study of the character of the Polybian narrator, about which much has already been said elsewhere. The thing to note in conclusion is that this overt methodological insistence on the part of the narrator helps to establish the characterizing operations of the agents within Polybius' history as parallel to those of the historian—and of his narratees. Characterization, for Polybius, is a game that everybody needs to play. Careful reading of his history will enable his readership to play it well.

17 McGing 2010: 99.

CHAPTER 11

Appian

Luke Pitcher

Appian's *Rhōmaika* is notable for its comprehensive sweep. In its original form, it covered events across multiple theatres of operations from the foundation of Rome to the second century CE, though with variations in the depth of this coverage along the way. A history that seeks to cram in so much does not necessarily have to sacrifice a wealth of explicit characterizing commentary from the narrator in order to do so. Livy, who works on a similar chronological scale, is an interesting *comparandum* in this regard. But Livy chooses to arrange his material across more than one hundred and forty books. Appian confines himself to twenty-four. This may help to explain, then, why the Appianic narrator is not, on the whole, expansive in his explicit characterizing remarks, though he is still more lavish in that regard than some (such as Cassius Dio).

On the other hand, there are certainly exceptions. In addition, Appian deploys several of the diverse characterizing techniques which the Introduction to this volume has catalogued. If one analyses how Appian goes about presenting character in the *Rhōmaika*, one soon discovers that in this respect, as in so many others, the work is more fluid and narratologically adventurous than its reputation may suggest.

A Line on Catiline

For an opening insight into the characterizing techniques which appeal (or do not appeal) to the Appianic narrator, the *Rhōmaika*'s introduction of L. Sergius Catilina, at the beginning of the second book of the *Civil Wars*, is instructive. Appian's sources (at least once the *Civil Wars* are underway) are usually a vexed question.[1] In the case of the Catilinarian conspiracy, however, it seems likely that Sallust is his primary source for the beginning of the affair, though probably supplanted by other ones as the narrative of 63 BCE unfolds.[2] It is there-

1 Rich 2015: 112–114; Westall 2015: 125–126.

2 Pelling 2006a: 263.

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fore a thought-provoking enterprise to look at the similarities and differences between the first appearances of Catiline in Sallust and Appian:

> L. Catilina, born of a noble family, was a man distinguished by great powers, both of body and of mind, but evil and wicked in his character (*ingenio*). Civil wars, slaughter, rapine, and civic discord were pleasing to him from his youth, and he spent his young manhood amongst them. His body could endure pain and deprivation of food or sleep to an incredible extent. His mind was bold, cunning, and subtle; he was a master of deception; he desired what others had even as he was profligate with his own resources; he was fiery in his desires. He had his fair share of eloquence, but not of wisdom. His great spirit yearned (*cupiebat*) incessantly after the immoderate, the incredible, the unattainable.
>
> SALL. *Cat.* 5.1–5

> Gaius Catilina, distinguished by the amplitude of his fame and the splendour of his ancestry, an unstable man, who (it was said) had murdered his own son for the love of Aurelia Orestilla, because she would not consent to marry him while he had a son, who was a friend, a follower, and, above all, an emulator of Sulla, driven by ambition, his descent into poverty, and the support of powerful men and women, ran for the consulship as a stepping-stone to tyranny.
>
> APP. *BC* 2.2.4

There is much to compare and contrast between these passages.[3] In particular, one notes that Appian both draws upon material that Sallust reserves for later treatment in the *Bellum Catilinae* and leaves some other data out altogether. The Sallustian narrator expatiates upon Catiline's prodigious physical powers—an emphasis which is itself inherited from the thumb-nail sketch of his one-time nemesis that Cicero supplies in his speech *Pro Caelio* (13). Appian ignores this emphasis entirely.

This is of a piece with the practices of the Appianic narrator elsewhere in the *Rhōmaika*. Appian does not usually care to comment upon the physicality of the characters in his history, though there are some notable exceptions. The physical strength of Mithradates VI finds a place in the necrology for the king near the end of the *Mithradatika* (112.550), as does that of Masinissa in Appian's account of Carthage (*Libukē* 106.500). Appian also notes that both men were

3 Cf. also Carsana 2007: 11–14.

large of stature, and the physiques of Seleucus Nicator, Lysimachus, and the Galatians in the service of Antiochus III draw comment in the *Suriakē* (57.294 and 64.342). Where Romans are concerned, by contrast, the Appianic narrator typically remains silent as to their physical appearance or potentialities—even in the cases of individuals whom we know from other sources to have been rather distinctive in this respect (an exception here is the wife of Scipio Aemilianus, whose alleged ugliness is plot-relevant—it is given as the reason why the younger Africanus did not love her at *Civil Wars* 1.20.83). Plutarch, for example, lingers upon the physical appearance of the 'mulberry-coloured dictator', Sulla, in his *Life* of the general (*Sull.* 2.1). He receives no such attention in the text of Appian. Plutarch, again, talks about the seemingly frail physique of Julius Caesar—'a thin man, and his skin looked white and soft'—and how he strengthened his physique through hard work (*Caes.* 17.2–3). Appian, who says a lot about Caesar, comments only that he was 'well-grown and good-looking' (*BC* 2.151.633), although he does note that the dictator was unstinting in the expenditure of his bodily resources, in the course of comparing him to Alexander the Great (*BC* 2.149.621). It is tempting to suppose that the Appianic narrator's decisions about whether to include such material or not are themselves a sort of characterizing trope. It is typically only non-Romans (and, in particular, exotic and potentially troublesome kings) whose imposing physiques are accorded this narratorial attention in the *Rhōmaika*. Romans (even turbulent ones like Catiline) by and large are not.

In some other respects, Sallust and Appian initially seem to fashion Catiline more similarly. He appears on the scene in both texts with a resonant (if, in Appian's case, inaccurate) declaration of two of his names. This is, in fact, more marked as a divergence from standard operating procedure in the latter than in the former. The Sallustian narrator regularly introduces even quite minor characters with an allusion to their *praenomen* and either their *nomen* or their *cognomen*. Appian states as a point of method in his general *Proem* that, in relation to Roman names, 'for purposes of distinction I shall sometimes mention all the names, especially of illustrious men, but for the most part I shall call these and others by the names that are deemed most characteristic' (*Praef.* 13.51). The use of multiple names is often, in Appian, symptomatic of an important figure or an important moment (or both): an instance of this would be the interchange, demonstrating Marius' greatness even in flight, which the general has with his would-be assassin (*BC* 1.61.274), where both the intended victim and the diffident hit-man talk about '*Gaius* Marius'.

Allusion to the distinction of Catiline's family follows in both accounts. The Introduction (→) to this volume has noted how 'membership of specific groups' can have characterizing force in ancient narrative. It gave 'noble birth' as an

example. Sallust's 'nobili genere natus' and Appian's *genous lamprotēti* both convey such a notion. A case can be made, however, that they do not do so to exactly the same effect. In Sallust, Catiline's lineage is presented as one of a number of important facts about him. They are disposed across several sentences. They are mostly (in typical Sallustian style) quite short. There is an intermittent sense of narrative to them. One notes the chronological progression from Catiline's lineage to his formative years of rapine and slaughter: 'he spent his young manhood (*iuventutem suam*) amongst them'. On the whole, though, the opening characterization of Catiline's traits has a rather timeless quality: this is just the sort of person he was. Note, for example, the use of the imperfect *cupiebat*. The Sallustian narrator does then zero in on the period after Sulla's pre-eminency as the point at which his personality took a turn for the worse (Sall. *Cat.* 5.6). But this comes only after several sentences of setting the scene.

Appian proceeds otherwise. His opening emphasis is not on Catiline's lineage *per se*. Rather, the narrator dwells upon the observation that Catiline is famous for it: *genous lamprotēti* ***periōnumos***. Moreover, this fame is placed near the beginning of a string of characterizing observations about him which are all—in contrast to Sallustian practice—piled into the very first sentence in which he appears. In fact, Appian goes to some trouble to include material at this point which the Sallustian narrator saves for later. This applies to the comments about the alleged murder of Catiline's own son to ease his path towards marrying Aurelia Orestilla (Sall. *Cat.* 15.2), about his poverty (5.7), and about the support which he enjoyed amongst some women (24.3). In Appian, all of these factors are welded into the single sentence that culminates in Catiline's would-be tyrannical candidacy for the consulate.

What effect does this syntactical redistribution have? Most obviously, it exemplifies the narrative condensation which often arises from Appian's need to get through so much material, a consideration to which the beginning of this article has already alluded. There is, perhaps, a more subtle effect, as well. Appian's Catiline, from the first words in which he is introduced, is portrayed as being forcefully impelled to his fateful decision by a welter of societal factors. He is subject to the pressure of his own and his familial reputation, and to his cultivation by influential people. Sallust's Catiline, whose road to perdition proceeds by (slightly) more subtle gradients, and whose encounters with each of these factors are more spaced out, is not.

Perhaps surprisingly, the only other prominent individual in the *Rhōmaika* whose introductory sentence is as analepsis-heavy and elaborate as Catiline's is Antiochus the Great, at the beginning of the *Suriakē*. There, too, it is, in part, a consciousness of his own reputation on the part of an individual which impels

him to a decisive and misguided step, 'having performed many great deeds, and on this account having been named Antiochus the Great, *elated by what had happened, and by the title he had gained* on account of them' (*Syr.* 1.1). The elaboration of the syntax, as in the case of the *Civil Wars*, helps to suggest a certain over-determination in the course that the individual follows.

The parallel is instructive. But it is also a little misleading—perhaps designedly so, on the part of Appian's narrator. The part that Antiochus will play in the *Suriakē* is a complex one. Appian goes to some lengths to establish Antiochus as a rather strange protagonist who is not a protagonist, an individual whose assessment leads into a meditation on the nature(s) of 'greatness'. Whatever one makes of this proposition, it is undeniable that he has a considerable impact upon the action of the book in which he plays a part. Antiochus loses to the Romans. He loses big. But he does not forfeit his life or kingdom in the process.

In such company, Appian's Catiline turns out to be rather more of a flash in the pan. The narrator does, to be sure, editorialize that his insurgency brought Rome to the brink of destruction, once it is done and dusted (*BC* 2.7.24). But the account of the conspiracy occupies only nineteen sections in a book that consists of six hundred and forty-nine. It will ultimately encompass the Battle of Pharsalus and Caesar's assassination on the Ides of March. Catiline, by contrast, flares and dies with some rapidity. The consul Antonius is said to have conquered him at Pistoria 'without difficulty'. In the end, the Appianic narrator characterizes Catiline in exactly the same way as when he was first introduced. At the last, as at the first, the narrator stresses his psychological instability: *emplēktōs* at 2.7.23, describing the way in which he hatched his scheme, recalls the opening description of him as *emplēktos anēr* at 2.2.4. At the last, as at the first, he is also characterized in terms of the support that he receives from prominent men: the *dunatōn andrōn* of 2.2.4 are echoed by the *tōn sunontōn epiphanōn*, who, to a man, do not desert him at 2.7.23. This last detail undeniably redounds to Catiline's credit, but the fact remains that Appian fashions his account of the insurgent in a way that makes it very much a mini-narrative lodged at the beginning of something more impressive. As far as book two of the *Civil Wars* goes, Catiline is a narratorial bait-and-switch. He looks as though he is going to be an Antiochus. In fact, he just sets the scene for the more impressive individuals—above all, Julius Caesar—who will hog the limelight later in the book.

Catiline is not an altogether typical case in Appian's *Rhōmaika*. The comparison of Appian's treatment of him with that offered by his likely model, Sallust, is, nevertheless, instructive. Some of the characterizing moves which Sallust uses in his introduction of Catiline do appeal to Appian as well. Others do not.

Moreover, the Appianic narrator is perfectly capable of, as it were, a narratological false sell. The intensity of Catiline's characterization at the beginning of the book does not correspond to the long-term narrative importance of that insurgent. As we shall see, this selectivity in the deployment of characterizing tropes, and occasional narratological deviousness in what is done with them, are notable features of the Appianic narrator.

A Cast of Thousands

Many individuals in the *Rhōmaika* do not linger long enough to receive much in the way of characterization. The imperfect preservation of the text has also deprived us of some potentially interesting case-studies. It would have been interesting to see in more detail what Appian made of the kings of Rome.

Even so, the *Rhōmaika* offers much material in which the student may discover characterizing tropes at work. Some (though not, as we have seen, all) of the particular techniques examined in the Introduction to this volume are present. The introduction of Prusias, at the beginning of *Mithridateios*, is a case in point:

> Prusias, surnamed the Hunter, was the one to whom Perseus, king of Macedonia, gave his sister in marriage. When Perseus and the Romans, not long afterward, went to war with each other, Prusias did not take sides with either of them. When Perseus was taken prisoner Prusias went to meet the Roman generals, clad in a toga which they call the tebennus, shod in the Italian fashion, with his head shaved and wearing on it a pilleus in the manner of slaves who have been made free in their masters' wills, and making himself appear base and insignificant in other ways. When he met them he said in the Latin tongue, 'I am the freedman of the Romans, which is to say "emancipated".' They laughed at him and sent him to Rome.
>
> *Mith.* 2.3–5

Many familiar moves are on display in this passage. The most obvious of these is characterization by dress. Prusias humiliates himself by dressing as a Roman freedman. The ludicrousness of this is accentuated by other aspects of his physical appearance: he looks wretched (*aiskhros*) and small (*brakhus*). Some translators seem to have assumed that *brakhus* here refers to lack of importance rather than physical stature. The emphasis on visuality in this passage, of which we shall say more in a moment, seems to tell against this interpretation.

The narrative focus is upon what Prusias' audience can see—a small man, comically dressed. Nonetheless, the association between mean physical stature and unimportance is itself a characterizing trope of sorts. It is in full force here.

We may note, too, that the Appianic narrator includes Prusias' additional name 'the Hunter' (*kunēgos*) at the first opportunity. This vigorous appellation contrasts with the spectacle which the king immediately makes of himself. Appian's narrator has a shrewd sense for the characterizing possibilities of names. One might adduce, for example, the trouble-making demagogue Philocharis of Tarentum. The nature of Philocharis is made apparent almost from the moment of his introduction by the narratorial note that in his youth he had earned the nickname 'Thais' through his behaviour (after the famous prostitute, although the Appianic narrator does not trouble to spell this out).[4] This is not the only place in which the Appianic narrator plays upon the additional nomenclature of the Hellenistic monarchs. Antiochus III's designation 'the Great', besides being presented as one of the factors behind his decision to engage in a trial of strength with the Romans at the beginning of the *Suriakē*, reappears in the assessment of his career offered by the Romans after his defeat at the battle of Magnesia: 'There *was* a king, Antiochus "the Great"' (*Syr.* 37.192). In the case of Antiochus, the final effect is, in fact, more complicated than a simple undermining of his political stature. Where Prusias is concerned, one is inclined to read the contrast between name and deportment as rather more blatant.

Nonetheless, the passage about Prusias is more complex in its impact than it would be if it were merely the depiction of a ridiculous little man in dress-up. This is not Prusias in his natural state. He is setting out quite deliberately to make the *impression* that he is a figure of fun, *gelōta de paraskhōn* (*Mith.* 2.5). His success at wriggling out from under the obloquy that he has incurred through his failure to take sides in the conflict between Perseus and the Romans is then explicitly linked to the fact that he has *appeared* (*phaneis*) to be ridiculous (*geloios*, picking up the *gelōta* from the previous sentence). As often where clothing seems, in ancient Greek narrative, to have a measure of characterizing force, it is worth pausing to reflect upon the element of *self*-presentation that can lurk behind it. In the sentence immediately after he wins pardon from the Romans for appearing to be so ridiculous, Prusias takes offence at Attalus and begins to lay waste to territory in Asia (*Mith.* 3.6). The reader therefore has to modify his or her developing picture of Prusias once more. He may be vile, but he is not to be dismissed as simply ridiculous. Prusias is more than he seems.

4 App. *Sam.* 7.1–2. Cf. Pitcher 2015: 207–208.

As in the case of *Civil Wars II*, the structure of the book is also a factor to be considered. Prusias is not set up syntactically as a true, if problematic protagonist (like Antiochus III in the preceding book). Nor is he a bait-and-switch protagonist, like Catiline. On the other hand, the opening presentation of his character does gain nuance from what happens later in the book. In due course, Prusias' son Nicomedes wins the favour of the Romans and conspires against his father. The Appianic narrator is careful to note that, when Nicomedes disembarks at Berenice, he is decked out in kingly splendour: 'In the morning Nicomedes came out of the ship clad in the royal purple and wearing a diadem on his head' (*Mith.* 5.13). The contrast between the voluntary debasement of the father's clothing and the proud display of kingly authority on the part of the son in Appian's narrative looks studied. Appian's narrator likes the contrastive power of dress. Compare the rich raiment which the wife of Hasdrubal pointedly wears to meet Scipio Aemilianus during the fall of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War (*Libukē* 131.626): her dress not only indicates the way in which her character rises above defeat, but supplies an uncowed contrast to the more emollient olive branch that her conniving husband is wielding on the same occasion.[5]

The contrasts do not end there. Thus far, this study of Appian has focused largely on what the Introduction (→) to this volume has dubbed 'metonymical characterization'. It has examined, for example, how a portrait of Catiline is built up through reference to his membership of a social group (his proud ancestry). What the Introduction calls 'metaphorical characterization' is equally important in Appian's oeuvre. The construction of individuals in comparison, or contrast, to other individuals is a key feature of the *Rhōmaika*.

Nor is it a feature limited to the main Appianic narrator. Characters within the text can get in on the action as well. The Appianic narrator engineers the contrast between the clothing of Prusias and the regal outfit sported by his son, which did not chronologically occur in any proximity. Once Nicomedes disembarks, however, the crafty Menas takes over the *sunkrisis*, which he claims, in an *oratio recta* speech, to be unavoidable. Successive, Gorgianic antitheses, structured via *men … de* clauses, set father against son. This is invariably to the advantage of the latter. 'One is an old man; the other a young one. The Bithynians turn away from the one; they choose the other …' (*Mith.* 5.14–15). Menas flits between metonymical and metaphorical modes of characterization in this speech. After the opening antitheses, the appeal of Nicomedes is further defined by reference to the social grouping that has already approved

5 Cf. also Schnegg 2010: 83–86.

him, which is 'those who are important among the Romans'. Where Prusias is concerned, Menas (as the speech shifts from *oratio recta* to a summary), instantiates the savagery, the *ōmotēs*, of the old king. He does so by reference to Prusias' past deeds, his *praxeis*. The Appianic narrator, as often, is on hand to hint at the slippery relationship between rhetoric and reality, and how the former can end up shaping the latter. Menas has *claimed* that the Bithynians are turning away (*apostrephontai*) from Prusias. The narrator uses the very same verb to describe the effect that Menas sees his speech having upon his audience, *tēn Prousiou mokhthērian apostrephomenous*. The prior narrative leaves no doubt that the villainy, the *mokhthēria*, of Prusias is genuine. But the narrator, through this deft repetition of a key verb, points out that Menas, like so many orators before and after him, is doing his own bit to create a situation by describing it. In Appian, as in other authors, the question of 'Who characterizes?', on which the Introduction (→) to this volume places emphasis, is often key. Menas is not exactly disingenuous in characterizing the iniquity of Prusias. He has something to sell, all the same.

Beyond the case of Prusias and Nicomedes, the metaphorical mode in Appianic characterization takes several forms. Sometimes, as with Menas, comparison and contrast between individuals is a component in the rhetoric of characters within the text. This does not always work out as smoothly for them as it does for Menas. Appian is alive to the expressive possibilities, for the historian, of rhetoric on the part of his characters that does not quite work. He thereby suggests the inconsistencies of their position.

The Second Triumvirate offer an object-lesson in this sort of compromised rhetoric. This is best seen in the version of the bill of proscription which the Appianic narrator presents at the beginning of the fourth book of the *Civil Wars*. Appian uses this purported piece of propaganda to reveal the tricky position, in terms of precedent for their behaviour, in which Octavian, Antonius, and Lepidus find themselves. The triumviral drive towards self-justification results in a particularly tortured example of the metaphorical mode. This manifests in the document's convoluted insistence that these proscriptions are not geared towards the wealth of the proscribed, unlike those of 'another person with supreme power before us, who likewise administered the city during civil wars, whom you named "fortunate" on account of his success' (*BC* 4.10.39).

In this passage, the Triumvirs deploy the metaphorical mode of characterization to set themselves in flattering contrast to Sulla. Their argument is implicitly *a fortiori*. Octavian, Antonius, and Lepidus are behaving (so they aver) in a more moral fashion than Sulla. Sulla was in a similar position to theirs, and the Roman people gave him a flattering appellation (note once more Appian's interest in the characterizing force of names). The second-person '*you* named',

proseipate, is important to the rhetoric of the bill. The onus of assessing the old Dictator is placed squarely upon the shoulders of the Roman people. In one sense, this rhetoric is quite effective. But the disinclination actually to name Sulla, rather than simply throwing in his famous additional name as an argument, is suggestive. The Roman people may have called him *felix*, but his position in the collective memory still makes referring to him a delicate business. One recalls that Catiline, in the list of characteristics which helped impel him to his behaviour at the beginning of book two, was described as amongst other things an 'emulator of Sulla'—a characteristic which the Appianic narrator notably spells out in a way that the Sallustian one, at the equivalent point, does not. The Triumvirs, therefore, end up looking rather more compromised by the comparison/contrast than their own rhetoric would suggest.

This, of course, is a familiar hazard for individuals within a text who try their hand at characterizing tropes, whether aimed at themselves or at others. The nature of their rhetoric often ends up inadvertently revealing more about their true natures than they probably intended. Fittingly enough, Sulla himself becomes an example of this. 'Lucretius cut off the head of Marius and sent it to Sulla. Sulla is said to have put it in the forum, in front of the rostra, and to have laughed at the youth of the consul and said: "One needs to take one's turn at the oars, before one tries to steer the ship"' (*BC* 1.94.435).

The combination of the characterizing tropes in this passage is complex and effective. Sulla's intent is to highlight the youth of his deceased adversary and, by comparison, his own seasoned experience. The *sunkrisis* of the mature and alive Sulla and the young and dead Marius is simple enough.

Other modes of characterization are also in play at this point of narrative. Sulla does not mock Marius in his own words. He quotes from the *parabasis* of the *Knights* of Aristophanes (542). Speech, of course, can itself reveal a great deal about character. The first thing which one notes about this speech is its grisly aptness. The central naval metaphor of the aphorism is being quoted, as Appian's narrator has just made clear, in front of the rostra, which, of course, was partly constructed from the remains of captured warships. Sulla shows himself to be an individual with a shrewd sense of the (literally) dramatic.

Further, more subtle resonances may be discerned. The *parabasis* is the point of an Aristophanic play where the chorus-leader speaks on the part of the playwright, the demiurge of the dramatic universe. Sulla has not just set the stage for this stretch of the Republic's history. With this quotation, he is making an implicit claim to be writing the script, as well. The final consideration, of course, is that the *Knights* is a comedy. The thoughtful narratee may still be disconcerted by the behaviour of an autocrat who thinks that the presentation of a severed head is an occasion for a comic quotation. As so often, the texture

of the Appianic narrative, especially in the *Civil Wars*, invites the narratee to compare and contrast. Julius Caesar, when offered the opportunity in the following book to look upon the head of his defeated foe, Pompeius Magnus, rejects the chance to do so with disgust. Sulla's attempt to stage-manage a flattering contrast between himself and the younger Marius is, in some senses, a successful one. But the reception of his image is not, in fact, altogether his to control.

One might, perhaps, expect that metaphorical characterization which is executed by the Appianic narrator himself would evade the tensions and ambiguities which sometimes manifest when that mode is deployed by characters within the text. There are certainly occasions where the contribution of the narrator seems easy to interpret, especially when he is spelling out or reinforcing a contrast that his characters are already making. Thus, the wife of Hasdrubal, besides taking care to send a very different visual message to the Romans from that which her husband is currently favouring, calls him 'the most effeminate of men' and then kills her children and herself by immolation. The Appianic narrator immediately comments: 'Such, they say, was the death of the wife of Hasdrubal, *which would have been more becoming to himself*' (*Libukē* 131.628).

On the other hand, the narrator's interventions in the vein of metaphorical characterization are not always quite so cut-and-dried. Consider, for example, the case of Scipio and Syphax, which Appian presents in the course of his account of the Punic Wars. 'Scipio called Syphax to the council, as he had shown himself sagacious and was acquainted with the country, and advised with him as Cyrus did with Croesus, king of Lydia' (*Libukē* 28.116).

On the surface, this comparison seems straightforward. Scipio has just defeated Syphax, and is making him his confidant. The texture of the narrative at this point makes it clear that a historiographical allusion is in play at this point, as well as a historical one. The narrator is alluding not so much to the historical personages of Cyrus and Croesus, as to the versions of those rulers that appear in the opening book of Herodotus. This becomes clear if one looks at the words with which Scipio first addresses Syphax, just before the passage quoted above: 'What evil genius misled you, after inviting me as your friend to come to Africa, and caused you to forfeit your oath to the gods and your faith to the Roman people, and to join the Carthaginians in making war against us, when not long before we were helping you against the Carthaginians?' (*Libukē* 28.113). The Cyrus of Herodotus, too, begins the interview of his defeated foe with a question as to who seduced the miscreant to his self-destructive act of folly, although Cyrus sees the likely agency as mortal rather than divine: 'Who among men advised you to march against my land and so become my enemy rather than my friend?' (Hdt. 1.87.3).

The narrator, then, has shaped this whole passage to evoke Herodotus. The reflective narratee, however, may begin to query whether this narrator-endorsed analogy is really so simple. In Herodotus, Croesus gets started on his role as a helpful advisor to Cyrus very quickly, with his comments on the congenital rapacity of the Persians (Hdt. 1.88.2–3). In Appian, by contrast, the narrator dwells from the beginning on the possibility that Syphax's motivations are not disinterested. Croesus, in answer to his interlocutor's question, makes a famously moving statement on the foolishness of war: 'In peace, sons bury fathers; in war, fathers bury sons' (Hdt. 1.87.4). The speech which Syphax delivers at the equivalent point, by contrast, fixes the blame for his behaviour on Sophoniba, and the narrator then explicitly raises the possibility that he may have been dissembling: 'So he spoke, whether he was telling the truth or was moved by jealousy and a desire to hurt Massinissa as much as possible' (*Libukē* 28.116). It should, in fairness, be added that Laelius almost immediately corroborates Syphax's account of Sophoniba—but one may tell the truth and still do so because of spite. Syphax, it might be argued, makes a less than convincing Croesus.

Or does he? After all, neither the Croesus nor the Cyrus of Herodotus is, in fact, a straightforwardly admirable figure. Cambyses II will later claim, not without justification, that Croesus managed to get his father Cyrus killed with his 'advice': 'Do you dare to advise me, who governed your own kingdom so well, and gave my father such good advice, bidding him to cross the Araxes and attack the Massagetae when they were willing to cross over?' (Hdt. 3.36.3). Cyrus rounds off the whole of Herodotus' *Histories* with a grave warning about the effect of luxury on ethnic character (Hdt. 9.122.3–4), but he himself will end up decapitated with his head in a leather sack full of blood, as an insult to his alleged blood-lust from Tomyris, queen of the Massagetae, who had defeated him (1.214.4), though the narrator does state that this is only one version of his end (1.214.5). Even Croesus' first piece of advice to Cyrus, concerning the way that the Persians are ransacking Lydia, could be viewed as almost as self-interested as that offered by Syphax. The difference is that the Appianic narrator explicitly highlights this possibility, where the Herodotean one does not. The elder Africanus, unlike Cyrus, will enjoy a career of pretty much unalloyed success and personal virtue (at least in the extant text of Appian). But his association with an individual who, in Herodotus, is ultimately so preoccupied with the possibility of a great empire's decay has a certain resonance with the overarching themes of Appian's *Libukē*. This stretch of the *Rhōmaika*, after all, circles around the actual downfall of the Carthaginian hegemony, as stressed in a speech by a friend of the elder Africanus at *Libukē* 57.246. It also glances at the possible future downfall of Rome herself, as hinted in the same speech, and

more famously, in the quotation of *Iliad* 6.448–449 by Scipio Aemilianus during the final fall of Carthage at *Libukē* 132.629.[6] An argument can be made, then, that the Appianic narrator's nod towards Herodotus in the *sunkrisis* of Croesus/Cyrus with Syphax/Scipio Africanus constitutes a more subtle engagement with the Herodotean text than it initially appears to be.

Conclusion

Appian's narrator asserts at several points, in the general introduction to the *Rhōmaika*, an interest in the characteristics by which the Romans have attained to their current position of universal hegemony, and how those characteristics stack up in comparison to those of the peoples that they have conquered. 'I have made this research also in respect to each of the other provinces, desiring to learn the Romans' relations to each, in order to understand the weaknesses of these nations or their power of endurance, as well as the bravery or good fortune of their conquerors or any other circumstance contributing to the result' (*Praef*. 12.48). In some respects, the text that follows lives up to this billing. A contribution to another volume in this series has examined how a preoccupation with the prowess of particular regions helps to explain Appian's decisions about the distribution of his narrative.[7]

Where individuals are concerned, the relationship between programme and performance is rather more complicated. In some ways, the *Proem*'s insistence on the characteristics which have brought the Romans their empire sounds Polybian. Polybius is also, whether at a remove or (more likely) in his original form, one of the important sources for the *Rhōmaika*. Despite this, the Appianic narrator shows little approaching the Polybian one's overt interest in untangling the factors which can (under ideal conditions) generate the sort of character that makes for a successful politician or military commander (or, conversely, create an incompetent or a demagogue). It is certainly possible to derive exemplary lessons from the deeds and misdeeds of Appian's characters. Erotic over-indulgence, for example, is a sure-fire route to disaster.[8] But if the narratee assumes that a consistent interest in the qualities of 'bravery, patience, and hard labour', of which the *Proem* (11.43) makes so much, will be carried over into the remainder of the *Rhōmaika*, that expectation is, if not exactly

6 Cf. Tweedle 2015: 178.

7 *SAGN* 3: 231–232 (Pitcher).

8 Pitcher 2015: 209–213.

thwarted, then not fulfilled altogether as one might expect. There are certainly brave and patient people in the *Rhōmaika*. But their time in the lime-light is strictly rationed.

In place of the somewhat stolid insistence upon Roman virtues which one might have expected from the *Proem*, Appian delivers a work where characterizing manoeuvres are, as we have seen, various and fluid. They are coupled, on occasion, by narratological adventurousness on a larger scale. When Sallust devotes a chapter of his monograph on Catiline to a narratorial *sunkrisis* of the younger Cato and Julius Caesar, who have just contributed influentially to the debate on the Catilinarian conspirators, but otherwise play little part in the action of the narrative (*Bellum Catilinae* 54.1–6), the effect is a little disconcerting. When Appian devotes twenty-nine chapters of a six hundred and forty-nine chapter book to a narratorial *sunkrisis* of Caesar and Alexander, the latter of whom had been dead for more than two hundred and fifty years by the Ides of March, the impact is considerably more so (App. *BC* 2.149.620–153.649).[9] The reasons behind Appian's decisions to engage in this and other similar large scale *tours de force* go some way beyond the purview of this collection, though the *sunkrisis* obviously serves, amongst other things, to add weight and nuance to Appian's presentation of Julius Caesar, the individual to whom he ascribed the lion's share of responsibility for securing the Roman hegemony.[10] The mere fact of the existence of such *tours de force*, however, is an illustration that, with regard to characterization as well as other aspects of narratology, the *Rhōmaika* is a much less staid text than it originally seems.

9 On this comparison, see Pelling 2006a: 265, Pitcher 2009: 274–275, and Pitcher 2016: 287–288.

10 Pitcher 2009: 271.

CHAPTER 12

Cassius Dio

Luke Pitcher

Cassius Dio's handling of characterization in his third century CE history of the Roman Empire shows elements of both continuity and contrast with the practices of the other Greek historiographers who have appeared elsewhere in this volume. For Dio, as for the other historians, engagement of some sort with the delineation of character is unavoidable. Historiography without characters is a tall order. It is true that, like some of his predecessors, he has a lot of ground to cover. Dio's history embraces everything from the foundation of Rome to 229 CE. Dio's eighty books, however, offer more apparent scope for expansive treatment than do the more compact works produced by some of those engaged in a similar enterprise. One might contrast the twenty-four books of Appian (→), or the forty books of Diodorus Siculus. If Dio were to show no interest in the delineation of character, it would not be for want of space.

In fact, Dio's engagement with character in his history has something of the paradoxical about it. The narratee notes, after lengthy engagement with his text, that there is a slight but palpable distinction between Dio's readiness to talk about human nature on a general level and his reticence (at least in comparison to some of his historiographical brethren) about using some elements in the full array of characterizing tropes when he is discussing particular people. The nature of this distinction invites examination.

Dio and Human Nature

Greek historians are not equally keen to expatiate explicitly upon the alleged constants of human nature. 'Explicitly' is an important qualification in this regard. The example of Thucydides (→) (to whom Dio owes a considerable debt in terms of style, if nothing else)[1] is instructive.[2] Thucydides' incidental remarks make it clear that some elements of the utility of his historiographical enterprise rest on the assumption that human nature will remain constant.

1 Litsch 1893; Millar 1964: 42; Lintott 1997: 2500.

2 Reinhold 1985: 21–40; Rich 1990: 11.

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The assurance of being able to apprehend future events with the clarity of past ones relies on the expectation that the former will play out 'in accordance with the human condition (*kata to anthrōpinon*)' (Th. 1.22.4), though *kata to anthrōpinon* in this passage seems to mean something rather broader than simply 'human nature'[3] The idea that what happens during the civil unrest at Corcyra in 427 BCE will be more or less accurately replicated in future instances of intra-civic discord comes with the proviso '*as long as* human nature (*phusis anthrōpōn*) remains the same' (3.82.2).

What, if anything, Thucydides feels that such predictions may be able to achieve in terms of practical utility to the narratee is a vexed question.[4] Nonetheless, the reasoning of Thucydides' narrator in these passages is clearly informed by the idea that the constancy of human nature is at least a rational expectation. This idea, however, does *not* lead Thucydides' narrator to be especially free with generalizations about human behaviour. Such generalizations do crop up from time to time. They manifest especially in caustic comments upon the instability of large groups. Thus, for example, the behaviour of the Athenian people with regard to Pericles in his last years, first fining him, and then choosing him as general once again, draws the parenthetical response 'which the mob is accustomed to do' (2.65.4, cf. also 4.28.3). For the most part, however, Thucydides' narrator leaves to his narratees, or to characters within his text, the labour of generalizing axioms about human nature from the particular instances which he covers in the course of the work.[5]

Later Greek historiographers vary in their willingness to offer such narratorial generalizations. On the whole, these observations tend to cluster around situations in which humans are stupid or dysfunctional. Polybius (→), for example, is fairly free with them, as when his narrator comments upon why the Rhodians initially favour Pausistratus over Pamphilidas with regard to their naval operations (21.7.7). The narrators of Appian and Herodian, by contrast, are much less inclined to do so, though this disinclination does not necessarily extend to characters within their texts. Appian's Mark Antony may lecture the young Octavian upon how the people is as unreliable as a shifting sea, quoting Demosthenes in order to do so (App. *BC* 3.20.76, alluding to Demosthenes 19.136).[6] But this is not the sort of generalization, rising beyond its immediate context, in which Appian's narrator often indulges.

3 Stahl 1966: 33.

4 Raaflaub 2013: 6–7; Stahl 2013: 314.

5 Most of the examples of Thucydidean generalization given at Reinhold 1988: 215 are in speeches, not Thucydides' narrative voice.

6 Gowing 1992: 68.

Where does Dio's practice appear upon this spectrum? Dio's narrator is, in fact, quite fond of the generalizations upon the way in which humanity behaves which most of his predecessors sprinkle much more sparingly across their narratives.[7] A case in point is the narrator's treatment of the occasion in 59 BCE when the younger Cato, Metellus Celer, and Marcus Favonius swore the oath to uphold Julius Caesar's legislation for the redistribution of public land to the poor, despite their initial loudly-stated opposition to doing so. This *volte-face* draws from the narrator the speculation that it may have happened 'in accordance with the human condition (*kata to anthrōpinon*), whereby many make promises and threats more readily (*rhaion*) than they carry them out in practice' (38.7.2).

'*Kata to anthrōpinon*' in this passage clearly evokes Thucydidean usage. As often in later appropriations of Thucydidean idiom, the phrase is being deployed in a context which, in the Thucydidean original, would have been rather surprising. Thucydides' narrator reserves the expression for a somewhat rarefied moment of meta-historical reflection. Dio's deposits it in the midst of an account of fairly standard late Republican political sharp practice.

It is true that, on inspection, this generalizing interjection from the narrator turns out to be not altogether random. Dio's construction of this passage ties neatly into his complex portrayal of the younger Cato, and the effect which that individual has on other people.[8] Favonius is portrayed in this passage as a slavish fan of Cato, 'one who imitated him in everything' (38.7.1). Dio's narrator has already, while discoursing upon Cato's virtues in the wake of the formation of the so-called 'First Triumvirate', noted that some people 'strove to imitate him … and displayed some deeds similar to his, but they did not persevere, since their efforts sprang from cultivation of an attitude and not from innate virtue (*aretēs emphutou*)' (37.57.3). This observation makes the point, which appears in other Greek historiographers, that imitation of virtue, while it can be helpful, has its limits, particularly if the imitator mistakes the nature of what he should actually be imitating. One thinks of Polybius' Ptolemaeus, who believes that the virtue of the Macedonians resides in their clothing (Plb. 16.22.5), and Herodian's Macrinus, who apes the appearance of Marcus Aurelius and is roundly criticized by his contemporaries for doing so (Hdn. 5.2.4). Metellus, while not carrying Catolatry so far, vocally analogizes the putative resistance of the band to the case of Metellus Numidicus, who refused to swear to the *Lex Apulia* in 100 BCE (Cassius Dio 38.7.1). It is perhaps not entirely coincidental

7 Reinhold 1988: 215–217; Rees 2011: 11–15, 38–39.

8 Cf. Rees 2011: 104 n. 9.

that Dio's narrator tentatively attributes the collapse of a policy that constructs itself so much in terms of idiosyncratic *individuals* (Cato himself, Metellus Numidicus) to less starry imperatives, which are the common lot of mankind. Cato and Favorinus may look like exceptional people; to a certain extent, they are. Metellus Celer invokes the example of the exceptional Metellus Numidicus. When the three men are actually put to the test, however, they capitulate and take the oath just as 'many people' might.

This is not the first or the last time in Dio's text that a narratorial allusion to the general dispositions of mankind deflates the pretensions of a rhetoric which the sequel finds wanting. Thus, for example, Carbo's conviction on charges of corruption, after he himself has convicted another of similar offences, yields the narratorial comment that 'some people censure others much more readily (*rhaion*) than they give good advice to themselves' (36.40.5). The structure of the narrator's gloss here as in the case of 38.7.2 that we have just mentioned, is built upon the sardonic comparative 'more readily' (*rhaion*), and shows how deeds can fail to live up to words. Dio's narrator may, in general, be freer with commentary upon general behavioural traits of humanity than Thucydides', but he shares the tendency to focus his attention on general human vices rather than on general human virtues.[9]

Thus far, the cases where we have seen Dio's narrator implying, or stating outright, that human behaviour is under certain circumstances usually predictable have operated at a high level of generalization. The narrator's comments about how people tend to make threats more readily than to carry them out, or find it easier to provide moral precepts to others than to live by such precepts themselves, might in principle apply as readily to the kings of Persia as to late Republican Roman politicians. In light of the emphases of this volume's Introduction, it is reasonable to ask whether he ever descends from this high level of abstraction. Does Dio ever see more limited factors than the overarching one of *to anthrōpinon* as potentially moulding how people behave?

A survey of Dio's text soon reveals that several familiar factors may, in theory, be important in shaping an individual's character. Ethnicity, unsurprisingly, is a recurring one. Dio, like many other Greek historians, is not shy of making sweeping claims about the characteristics of entire peoples.[10] His construction of ethnic personality profiles is in some cases quite similar to those of his predecessors and contemporaries. For example, Dio's narrator, recounting Gabinius' operations in Egypt, depicts Alexandrians as mouthy and unreliable but poten-

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9 Reinhold 1988: 216.

10 Rees 2011: 12–13.

tially capable of atrocious violence (39.58.1–2). When Cleopatra turns tail and flees at the battle of Actium, this action draws the comment that her behaviour is 'true to her nature as a woman and as an Egyptian' (50.33.2). The narrator's analysis in these cases shares traits with what other historians say about Egyptians in general and Alexandrians in particular. Polybius' narrator attests their capacity for violence ('Terrible is the cruelty of the Egyptians when their anger is roused', 15.33.11). Herodian's has much to say about their flighty loquacity (4.8.7).

It is not accurate to assert that all of the imperial Greek historians are singing from exactly the same ethnographic song-sheet. Dio's narrator, for example, talks about the martial prowess of the Pannonians (49.36.3) and, in doing so, is much in accord with Herodian (Hdn. 2.9.11). Unlike Herodian, Dio's narrator does not describe the Pannonians as dull-witted (and the historical Dio, who had been proconsul in that region, had a personal stake in it which the historical Herodian almost certainly did not share).[11] Nonetheless, the willingness of Dio's narrator to think in this fashion aligns him with the general practice of the imperial Greek historians, even where the details of their depictions differ. Besides the Alexandrians and the Pannonians, Dio's narrator also, at various points, discusses the characteristic drunkenness of the Scythians (51.24.2) and the bitterness of the Jews (49.22.4). Dio does see nationality as potentially determinative of character.

The Sovereignty of Praxis

Dio's narrator, then, is, by historiographical standards, freer than most in his disquisitions upon general human nature. Other imperial Greek historians come close to his narrator's discursiveness in other respects (as, for example, when they attribute characters to entire ethnic groupings). They are, for the most part, less keen than Dio to offer up generalizations about how humanity behaves while in full narrative flow.

One might therefore expect Dio's narrator to be equally keen to offer up individual assessments of the characters in his history. Herein, however, we find the mild paradox. If anything, Dio's narrator is less eager to offer up snap judgments on individuals than, for example, Herodian's. This applies even though his willingness to talk about human nature in *general* is much greater.

11 Millar 1964: 25–26.

There are certainly exceptions to this general rule. Publius Clodius is a man with an 'inherent love of revolution' (36.14.4). Gabinius is a 'wretched fellow' (36.23.4). Catiline is 'a man of the utmost audacity' (36.44.4). Cato the Younger, despite his political failures and the difficulty that others experience in imitating him, still receives the narratorial tribute that 'no man of that day took part in public life purely (*katharōs*) and without desire for personal gain except Cato' (37.57.3). A handful of other very big players in Dio's text (such as Julius Caesar, Mark Antony, and Octavian) also receive rather more attention, though the exact quality of that attention varies from case to case. For the most part, however, the narrator holds back from making overt remarks about individual character in the *History*. The extent of this reticence is, perhaps, surprising.

This is not to say that Dio's text lacks the wealth of characterizing options which the Introduction to this volume has endeavoured to catalogue. The case is rather that Dio's narrator uses some of the more subtle ones at the expense of others. At the same time, the characters in Dio's history more than pick up the narrator's slack in using the tropes which the narrator, for the most part, avoids.

Dio's portrayal of Cicero shows some of these techniques in action. Dio's narrator is, on the whole, content to allow Cicero's own actions to do the talking. There is no grand synoptic disquisition upon his character, either upon his first appearance in Dio's narrative or upon his departure from it. Cicero's entry into the history (unless he received a grander one in a lost portion of the work—perhaps in relation to the trial of Verres) is accomplished without fanfare.[12] He first appears in person at the end of a sentence about the debate on the *lex Manilia* of 66 BCE as a supporter of the bill. In this passage, Dio's narrator says nothing about Cicero's antecedents, his upbringing, his general personality, or even his talents as an orator. All he supplies initially is a description of Cicero's actions ('he was accustomed to play a double role and would espouse now the cause of one faction and again that of the other …', 36.43.5), the immediate motivation behind his actions ('… in order that he might be courted by both', ibid.), and the results of his misfiring machinations ('As a result of this he gained, in general a bad reputation, and was dubbed "turncoat"', 36.44.2).

Of course, all of these statements do, in fact, serve to characterize Cicero very effectively. The use of an imperfect verb when referring to his turncoat tendencies (*epēmphoterize*) conveys the fact that this sort of behaviour was habitual

12 Rees 2011: 109 n. 9.

to him. The revelation of his motivations establishes the desire to be courted that remains a constant in Dio's depiction of his character. The dismissive nickname lingers in the memory of the narratee, and comes back to haunt Cicero during the debate concerning the character of Mark Antony in a later book. All the same, Dio's narrator has not troubled to supply an introduction along the lines of 'Marcus Tullius Cicero supported this measure—a fine orator, but a man of weak and unstable character, which afterwards drove him to destruction …', which one might readily have expected him to have done.

This treatment exemplifies several important facets of how Dio prefers to construct character through his narrator. In the first place, he is a dedicated exponent of the 'show, not tell' principle. To put it in the terms of the Introduction (→), the *praxis* of individuals is in most cases the most important constituent element in Dio's construction of their characters. This is in line with Dio's own methodological statements about his history, which notes the importance of putting together *erga* with the plans that underlie them (46.34.5–35.1).[13] Moreover, even a quite trivial instance of behaviour may justify its inclusion in the history if it is sufficiently evocative of an individual's ways. Such, for example, is the narrator's justification for including the detail that Domitian was accustomed to impale flies on a stylus.[14]

Dio's treatment of Lucullus shows the sovereignty of *praxis* in his historiographical technique. At 36.16.1, the narrator confronts head-on the issue of Lucullus' inability to control his men. The narrator runs through the practices which made the general unpopular. 'He gave them many orders, and (since he was hard to approach, and stringent in his demands for work and not one who could be won over when it came to punishments), he did not understand how to win a man over with persuasion'. What is striking in this passage is that many of the adjectives that are being used to characterize Lucullus ('unapproachable … stringent … not one who could be won over …') are the sort that, for another narrator, might simply feature in a static list of Lucullus' qualities, suitable for an individual's introduction or envoi. In the case of Dio, by contrast, they are strung together in a subordinate clause, and the focus of the passage is not so much on these qualities *in vacuo*, as in their application to the particular issue of why Lucullus failed to extort obedience from his soldiers. The final argument, which is presented as the clinching one, is the observation that Pompey the Great managed the same men without any suggestion of rebellion. The narrator caps the discussion off with a closing

13 Rees 2011: 82–83, which is preferable to Millar 1964: 45.

14 65.9.4 [Xiph.], with *SAGN* 1: 195 (Hidber).

apophthegm: 'to such an extent does one man differ from another' (36.16.3). The difference between Pompey and Lucullus is readily shown, for Dio's narrator, not so much by narratorial statements about their contrasting qualities, as by the different level of success which the two men enjoyed in tackling the same issue.[15]

Lucullus is, to be sure, an unusually striking case, but the same principle applies throughout Dio's work. Even in the case of Julius Caesar, the turn towards the consideration of *praxeis* in constructing a sense of character can often be observed. During his account of Caesar's dictatorship, for example, the narrator claims that 'by furnishing one instance of the extravagance which was then the case, I shall thereby give a notion of all the rest'. He then goes on to give the example of the silk coverings which Caesar had installed to keep the sun off the citizens during the public games (43.24.2). Most historians do show a disposition to wed action to character—especially, as in this passage, when the issue is one of potentially despotic luxury. But Dio's narrator makes the conjunction more readily and more thoroughly than most.

One Joke Composed an Island in the Night

Dio's opening shot of Cicero does not end with the description of his *praxeis*. The segment is rounded off by the reception of these *praxeis* amongst Cicero's contemporary audience. This is important. Dio's *narrator* does not do as much in the way of evaluative comments upon the characters of his subjects as do the narrators of the other imperial Greek historians. People within his text, by contrast, certainly do.

In particular, Dio's characters like to supply verbal commentary on whatever display of conspicuous virtue or depravity they have just seen. They often do so in an epigrammatic or joking form. Dio is not, of course, an innovator in deploying a strategic gag to direct the response of his narratees. Plutarch, famously, notes that a joke can be as revealing of character as a great battle (*Alex.* 1).[16] The tradition of including such telling quips in Greek historiography can be traced all the way back to Herodotus and Thucydides: one thinks, for example, of Xerxes' witticism after the heroics of Artemisia of Halicarnassus at the battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.88.3), or the grim joke of a Spartan prisoner after Pylos (Th. 4.40.2). Amongst Dio's more recent predecessors, one might

15 Pelling 2006a: 258, noting that 'elaborate implicit *synkrisis*' is a key strategy for Dio.

16 Cf. Pelling 2006a: 266.

compare, for example, the jest of the Romans upon Antiochus the Great after their unexpectedly easy run at the Battle of Magnesia (App. *Suriakē* 37.192).

Even with such precedents, Dio's text is notable for its density of such one-liners. So, for example, Bibulus has his quip about how his fellow-aedile Caesar put him in the shade with regard to the expenses of the *Ludi Romani* (37.8.2). Milo has his famous jibe at Cicero after the publication of the *Pro Milone* (40.54.3). Both Sulla and Cicero have their animadversions upon Julius Caesar's negligent mode of dress (43.43.4–5). Mark Antony and Cassius the Liberator have their tense exchange in the wake of the Ides of March (44.34.7). Sextus Pompey puns upon *carinae* (both a word for the keels of ships and the name of a district in Rome) in conversation with Antony and Octavian (48.38.2–3). An anonymous jester comments upon Livia's domestic arrangements (48.44.3). Maecenas has his summary judgment on the irresistible rise of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (54.6.5).

What explains this blizzard of aphorisms? Part of the explanation, of course, lies in the nature of Dio's source-material. Late Republican political culture placed a premium upon the ability to turn an epigram. Cicero, in particular, was noted for his mastery of the craft, as the younger Cato ruefully attested (Plu. *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.5–6, *Cat. Mi.* 21.9).

Dio's historiographical strategy, however, goes beyond a mere collection of acid drops. A joke can have a two-fold characterizing function. It says something (obviously) about its target. But it says something about its maker, too—often, the fact that the maker is ready to risk the wrath of the butt of the joke. Sometimes the charge is more subtle. Bibulus's quip about the young Julius Caesar's hogging of the lime-light when it came to the production of the *ludi Romani* looks a lot grimmer in retrospect. When the two men are consuls, there is more at stake than entertainments and, tellingly, it is no longer Bibulus who is making the joke about how he has been air-brushed from the action, but unnamed others (38.8.2). Sulla and Cicero on Caesar's unkempt appearance afford an instance of how dress can be a characterizing trope in its own right in the ancient world.[17] But they also neatly and anachronically bookend his achievement. Sulla, long dead by the time of Caesar's ascendancy, was prophesying the danger he would pose (a function which he also performs in other texts, though not always with the same quip).[18] Cicero, by contrast, looks back from the perspective of the world after Pharsalus.[19] And in the case of

17 Cf. Prusias, Nicomedes, and the wife of Hasdrubal in Appian (→).

18 Cf. Plu. *Caes.* 1.4, with Pelling 2011: 136–137.

19 Pelling 2006a: 258.

Milo, Dio's narrator unusually delves explicitly into the psychology behind that remark, as well ('he wrote this not because he was pleased with his situation (for he made many efforts to return) but as a joke at the expense of Cicero' 40.54.4).

Dio's characters are fond of epigram. They are not by any means restricted to it. Epigrams are a part of how the individuals within Dio's work help to fashion images of each other (and of themselves). But full-scale speeches, although less common, are just as significant. Scholarship, until comparatively recently, has tended to be less interested in the characterizing force of the orations in Dio than in other aspects of their composition. In particular, the quality and provenance of their political and philosophical underpinnings have tended to hog philological attention. Thus, for example, the speech of Maecenas advising Augustus against resigning his monarchical power (52.14.1–40.2) has often been analysed more as a political pamphlet and authorial manifesto from Dio himself than as a speech which has a function within a history.[20]

Maecenas' speech does, it is true, deal more with political structures than with individuals. Even this one, however, is not without a characterizing charge, if only because it helps to establish Agrippa and Maecenas (who present the antithetical stances in the 'debate') as the two pillars upon which the opening years of the Augustan principate rest. One notes that the sardonic comment upon Agrippa's indispensability at 54.6.5 is attributed to Maecenas.

In Dio's other speeches, characterizing tropes often play a much more obvious part. Once again, the case of Cicero proves fruitful for analysis. A full complement of characterizing manoeuvres *is* ultimately deployed to expound the character of Cicero. It is not, however, the narrator who expounds it. That office falls to Quintus Fufius Calenus. Fufius, at the beginning of book forty-six, rises in response to the speech of Cicero against Mark Antony which takes up the final part of the previous book. His speech on this occasion is remarkable for the number of boxes which it manages to tick from the list of characterizing tropes that were enumerated in this volume's Introduction. If Cicero's lineage is not an issue upon which Dio's narrator dwells, Fufius more than makes up for that absence. The orator's alleged uncouthness and lack of assurance in polite society, so Fufius avers, is to be attributed to the fact that his father was a fuller: 'the man himself, having been raised in such surroundings, naturally (*ouk apeikotōs*) tramples and besmirches his betters' (46.4.2).[21] Cicero is,

20 So correctly Rich 1990: 14.

21 Millar 1964: 53.

moreover, the kind of man who has 'always worn nothing but the clothes of others' (46.5.2). The nickname 'turncoat', familiar from Cicero's first appearance in the narrative at 36.44.2, makes another appearance (46.3.4). Cicero's physical appearance is also taken as an index of his character: he trails his garb to hide the ugliness of his legs (46.18.2), and wears oil upon his greying hair (46.18.3). Fufius is keen, as well, to establish Cicero's character through his *praxeis*. He presses into service both some incidents which have appeared already in the narrative and others which have not. We do not know what, if anything, Dio's narrator made of the trial of Verres, since it would have appeared, if at all, in a missing portion of the history. But we may legitimately doubt whether Dio's narrator included the detail that Cicero wet himself while it was in progress (46.7.4).[22]

Of course, the narratee should take Fufius' claims about Cicero's character with a pinch of salt. Some of what Fufius has to say can be verified from Dio's prior narrative. Such is true, for example, of the claim that Cicero had won the epithet 'turncoat'. Other assertions are much less reliable. Fufius' attempt to paint Catiline as an innocent man, grievously wronged by Cicero ('Did you not wickedly destroy Catiline, who had only canvassed for office, and had otherwise done nothing bad?', 46.20.2) while it anticipates the tack of some revisionist scholarship on the conspiracy of 63 BCE, does not correspond with the take on the insurgent offered by Dio's narrator (36.44.4, 37.29.1–5).

Fufius' speech is assuredly partisan. So is the oration of Cicero which precedes it, where similar characterizing manoeuvres are deployed against Mark Antony: one notes allusions to the triumvir's 'well-fleshed and detestable body' (45.30.3), and to his voice, 'dripping with unguent' (45.30.4). Dio is doing a good job of evoking the rough-and-tumble of political slinging, where some characterizing tropes have remained surprisingly constant for millennia: the jibes about the *arriviste* Cicero's clothes are not a million miles away from Alan Clark's (borrowed) description of Michael Heseltine as a man who 'bought all his own furniture'.[23] All the same, both speeches neatly illustrate the proposition that there are some sorts of characterizing manoeuvres which, in Dio, are focalized much more often through the individuals that throng the text than through the narrator. The notion that a certain sort of character might be

22 Bodily functions, too, may serve to characterize, in imperial Greek historiography. The insolent turd of Philonides (App. *Sam.* 7) establishes his contempt for Rome, and the crudeness of his own character. The final indignity of Caracalla's fall (Hdn. 4.13.4), in the course of which he has forfeited all the respect which he originally won, is that he is assassinated while relieving himself.

23 Clark 1993: 162.

expected from an individual's lineage, for example, is not one on which Dio's narrator customarily dwells. This notion, however, often appears on the lips, or in the thoughts, of speakers within the text. Julius Caesar discourses upon his own descent from Aeneas (41.34.2). Maecenas sees birth (as well as wealth and virtue) as a good criterion for admitting people to the ranks of the *equites* (52.19.4). Crassus believes, on the formation of the so-called 'First Triumvirate', that it is right that he should be pre-eminent, on account of his wealth and lineage (37.56.4).

In such cases, as in Fufius' speech, not all the chains of reasoning are equally cogent. Crassus may think himself a big man on account of his wealth. His fate after Carrhae, however, will determine that the truth is far otherwise. The Parthians (according to one version of the story) will pour molten gold down his throat, 'mocking him, for, though a man of vast wealth, he had set so great store by money that he pitied those who could not support an enrolled legion from their own means' (40.27.3). In Dio, as in other historiographers, individuals attempt to characterize themselves or others all the time. The characterizations which they supply are not necessarily reliable ones.

The Case of the Caesars

Dio's spectrum of characterizing techniques is most clearly seen in operation (at least so far as our extant text is concerned) in the case of Julius Caesar. Cicero, while not an inconsiderable figure, cannot match the impact upon the text of the Dictator. Caesar's career highlights nicely the ways in which Dio does, and does not, conform to the characterizing practices of the other imperial Greek historiographers.

Caesar seems to accord with the general tendency of Dio's narrator to soft-pedal the introduction of significant characters. His first appearance in person seems to be in the passage that also introduces Cicero—though, like Cicero, he *may* have featured in lost portions of the narrative before that point.[24] Caesar's first appearance in the extant text immediately establishes his dynamism and his wish to establish a power-base ('Caesar courted the good-will of the mob' 36.43.3), and also hints, through positioning, that he will be a more considerable force than Cicero. Although the two are initially brought in in the same sentence, Caesar's name appears first. So does the explication of what he hopes to gain through his current course of action. In addition, the narra-

24 Rees 2011: 187–188.

tor at once makes it clear that Cicero's attempted chicanery results in a bad reputation for the orator. The success or otherwise of Caesar's personal machinations at this point is not an issue which the narrator addresses. Thus, Cicero immediately looks a little incompetent; Caesar, by contrast, becomes more of an unseen menace.[25]

Praxis, then, and narratorial explication of the motives behind that *praxis*, are the narratee's first clues as to the character of Caesar. The narrator does not supply a précis of his lineage, his capacities, or his temperament. Perhaps more surprisingly, Caesar does not receive a summation of his character after he dies either (44.19.5). After the stabbing, the narrator moves straight on the behaviour of the Liberators in the wake of the assassination—neither at this point nor at the end of the book does the narrator step in to make a lapidary assessment. Dio's general treatment of death-notices is, in fact, notable for its odd selectivity. Not everyone of note receives a significant one from the narrator,[26] and those who do are sometimes rather unexpected. It is not especially odd that Pompey the Great (42.5.1), the younger Cato (43.11.6), or Mark Antony (51.15.1–3) receive such attention upon their demise. The same might be said, in light of the key roles which they play in the burgeoning Principate, of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (54.29.1) or Gaius Maecenas (55.7.1–6). On the other hand, the one for Lutatius Catulus at 37.46.3 may well surprise: 'a man who always preferred the common good, more conspicuously than anyone else who ever lived'.[27] It is tempting, in this last case, to suspect that Dio's narrator is less interested in Lutatius Catulus *per se* than in making a point about the texture of political life in this period, since, not much later in the same book (37.57.3), he produces the assessment of the younger Cato as virtuous but inimitable which we have already examined above. Lutatius Catulus dies just at the point where the political ideal which he represents is becoming (thanks to the so-called 'First Triumvirate') almost impossible to sustain.

The explanation for the absence of a Julian death-notice is to be found, perhaps, in the fact that what is missing from the narrative is amply supplied by the oration for the dead Dictator which Mark Antony delivers at 44.36.1–49.4. Once again, focalization through an individual within the text brings into

25 Rees 2011: 104 rightly comments that 'the real difference here between Caesar and Cicero is that the former is far more successful'. His footnote 13 on Dio's *sunkrisis* of the two men is also useful.

26 *Pace* Millar 1964: 47.

27 It is thus not quite accurate to see Cato the Younger as the only politician of this period whose integrity the narrator endorses (so Dorey 1965: 33).

play an array of characterizing techniques which Dio's narrator usually denies himself. Antony expatiates, for example, upon Caesar's lineage (44.37.1–6) and his education (44.38.1), as the narrator typically does not. Dio's reticence in this regard contrasts with another comparable account of the same period. Appian includes both a version of Antony's funeral oration (*BC* 2.144.600–145.606) *and* a final synchronic analysis of Julius Caesar which compares and contrasts him with Alexander the Great (*BC* 2.149.620–153.649). Moreover, Appian also finds space for a posthumous analysis of the characters of Cicero (*BC* 4.20.82),[28] Brutus, and Cassius (*BC* 4.132.553–134.567), none of which Dio reciprocates.[29]

Dio's construction of Caesar's character, then, does not rest upon big set-piece narratorial interventions at the beginning or the end of his career, but rather on the characterizations offered by others and, as usual, on the interpretation of his deeds. As in the case of Lucullus, Dio's narrator makes his most explicit claim about the nature of the dictator's character while puzzling out the nature of some of his actions: 'For, although Caesar possessed in reality a rather mild character, and was not at all easily moved to anger, he nevertheless punished many, since his interests were so numerous' (38.11.3). Once again, the narrator presents claims about personality not as a static proposition, but as a contribution to an argument, or a conundrum. The avoidance of simple narratorial labelling of personality traits remains marked.

Like most historians, Dio is prepared to make an exception to his usual narrative practices to produce a special effect. In Dio's case, the grand exception is Octavian, who receives unusual treatment befitting the founder, in Dio's view, of the Principate.[30] In contrast to his adoptive father, the future Augustus is treated to a lengthy narratorial disquisition upon his antecedents (45.1.1), his training (45.2.8), and the portents that accompanied his early life (45.1.5–2.6).[31] All this is delayed until the point of maximum narrative impact, at the beginning of a book. The first appearances of the young Octavian take place as early as book 43, where the narrator's prolepsis does allude to his future importance, but only briefly (43.41.3).[32] Dio puts the most lavish display of prefatory information about the future Augustus at the opening of book 45, where his contribution to the narrative becomes more significant. One might compare Tacitus' treatment of Sejanus, who shimmers in and out of the narrative for quite some

28 Gowing 1992: 156.

29 Millar 1964: 47, 60; Gowing 1992: 176–177.

30 Dio 53.17.1, with Barnes 2009: 279. For the latest treatment of Augustus in Dio, see Burden-Strevens 2015: 229–236.

31 Gowing 1992: 60–61; Rees 2011: 187.

32 Pelling 2006: 259.

time before his formal introduction at the beginning of *Annals* book four; there are other comparable instances in Dio's predecessors (Polybius, →).

Even in the case of Augustus, however, Dio's more typical narrative strategies do still make an appearance. They are simply supplemented by others that are a little atypical. Octavian's introduction is unusual in its narratorial detail about his training and antecedents. Once the future Augustus starts doing things, the narrator's usual vein of generalizing reflection on human nature starts up again, with mordant comment on the young man's initial decision to march to Rome in the aftermath of the Ides of March: 'For it has often happened that men who were wrong in undertaking some project have gained a reputation for good judgment, because they had the luck to gain their ends' (45.4.2). Even though the founder of the Empire is a special case, and treated as such by the narrator, Dio's preference for talking about human motivation on a very abstracted level soon reasserts itself, all the same.

Conclusion

We end, then, where we began. Dio's characterizing manoeuvres do have many affinities with those of other Greek historiographers. The extent to which many of these are focalized by agents within the text, however, is quite striking. Dio uses his narrator to ponder big questions about human character and motivations. When it comes to the level of individuals, however, he usually (though not always) prefers to let the actions and words of the characters within the text do most of the characterizing, rather than explicit intervention by the narrator. It is tempting to relate this preference to the point of historiographical method which he states at one point, echoing a similar passage from Sempronius Asellio: 'Indeed, it strikes me as most instructive in this kind of thing when one, taking the things done as the basis of the rationale behind them, proves the nature of those deeds from these motives and proves the motives from their agreement with the things done.'[33] Dio, perhaps, likes to dramatize the labour of arriving at the proper estimate of actions. His reader, therefore, is compelled to become an interpreter of *praxis*, like the historian with whom he or she engages.

33 Dio 46.34.5–35.1. The translation used here of this debatable passage is that of Rees 2011: 81 (see note 13 above). The parallel passage of Sempronius Asellio is Gell. 5.18.7–8 (= *FRHist* 20 F1).

CHAPTER 13

Herodian

Luke Pitcher

The importance of character-portrayal in Herodian's history emerges from a significant swerve in the emphases of that work's proem. When Herodian's narrator justifies the appeal of his chosen period, he begins, in a Thucydidean vein, with reference to exciting events: 'successions of reigns, diverse fortunes in both civil and external wars, disturbances of peoples and captures of cities both in Roman territory and in many barbarian countries, earthquakes and plagues …' (1.1.4).[1] At the end, however, this list, unlike the parallel passage in Thucydides, settles its focus on individuals—'the surprising lives of tyrants and emperors'—and continues that focus for several subsequent sentences (1.1.5–6).

The emphases of a history's proem are not always matched by those of the narrative that follows it, but in this respect, at least, Herodian's history lives up to its billing. From Marcus Aurelius to Maximus and Balbinus, Herodian's narrator has much more to say about emperors than he does about seismic disturbances.[2]

He also, by and large, has more to say about emperors (or aspirant emperors) than he does about anyone else.[3] This may not surprise. A focus on the man, or men, at the top is hardly a novel approach to the writing of imperial history. All the same, Tacitus, in the course of doing for the Julio-Claudians what Herodian does for Commodus, the Severans, and the so-called Crisis of the Third Century, finds time for character studies of such men as Gaius Petronius Arbiter (*Annals* 16.18). The likely author of the *Satyrica* was never going to make a play for the imperial purple.

Herodian's narrative, by contrast, seldom delivers detailed depictions of individuals who are not, or do not want to be, emperor (the king of the Persians gets attention as well, at 6.2.5). The others are typically of people who hold extraordinary sway over an emperor instead. This influence, in Herodian, is often deployed to selfish ends, and typically turns out to be pernicious to the

1 Sidebottom 1998: 2776–2780.
2 Cf. Widmer 1967: 11.
3 On Herodian's social biases, see Sidebottom 1998: 2823.

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princeps concerned. Examples would include Perennius (1.8.1–2) and Cleander (1.12.3–5) during the reign of Commodus, and Mamaea (6.1.5–8) during the ascendancy of her son Severus Alexander. There are scattered instances which fall outside these two categories, such as Caracalla's assassin Martialis (4.13.1), but the treatment even of this regicide is sketchy. Martialis interests the narrator insofar as he brings about the death of Caracalla. In general, people receive characterizing detail in Herodian only to explain their actions in relation to the emperor of the day.

How, then, does Herodian go about generating the imperial portraits with which he is so concerned? In some passages, Herodian's narrator seems to be using, in a more or less straightforward fashion, the metonymical techniques which the Introduction to this volume enumerates. *Praxis*, for example, is a key element in the characterization of Septimius Severus. His blackmail, betrayal, and destruction of his opponent Niger's generals and their children extorts from the narrator the comment that 'his false nature (*hupoulon autou ēthos*) was really made clear by the deeds (*ek tōn ergōn*)' (3.5.6). *Praxis* likewise contributes to the narrator's depiction of Maximinus. The dichotomy between his laudable deeds in battle and his despicable behaviour towards his subjects draws overt comment from the narrator: 'his achievement (*praxis*) would have won him a reputation, if he had not been so oppressive and frightening to his people and his subjects' (7.3.1).

Just as *praxis* can on occasion serve as a reliable index of character, so can membership of particular social groups. Before the narrator tackles the issue of Maximinus's *praxis*, he has already, in the character-sketch of the new emperor that opens book seven of the history, stated outright that Maximinus was the sort of person one would expect on the basis of his ethnicity and his birth. 'By nature (*phusei*), he was barbarous in his behaviour (*ēthos*), as in his lineage (*genos*). Having the bloodlust characteristic of his forefathers (*patrion*) and his country (*epikhōrion*), he put his mind to confirming his rule through savagery' (7.1.2). The link between Maximinus's behaviour and his origins (he was reported, as the narrator goes on to note, to have been a villager and a shepherd-boy in the Thracian mountains before joining the army) could not easily have been made more explicit.

To an extent, these straightforward characterizing moves recur elsewhere in Herodian's history. For example, the narrator is keen to stress at several points the idea that different peoples have different ethnic characteristics. Barbarians as a whole are characteristically unstable (1.3.5), avaricious (1.6.9), and not readily to be trusted with extended missions (8.1.3). Egyptians are volatile (1.17.6), while Alexandrians are particularly frivolous (4.8.7). Pannonians have strong physiques, but dull wits (2.9.11). Syrians are erratic by nature (2.7.9),

but sharp-witted (3.11.8). These characteristics turn out to be important at various points in the action of the narrative. The Alexandrians are given reason to repent of their frivolity when Caracalla, who has felt the sharp edge of their tongues, enacts bloody reprisals against them (4.9.1–2). The strength and gullibility of the Pannonians make them ideal shock troops for the devious and deceptive Septimius Severus (2.9.11).

On the other hand, things are not always quite so simple. The *praxis* of Severus is not the whole story about how Herodian's narrator depicts his character. There is more to understanding Maximinus than just the fact that he is by birth a Thracian peasant with a talent for war and domestic oppression. These individual manoeuvres are plucked from longer sequences of characterizing material, which have to be analysed more comprehensively if the full complexity of Herodian's narratology is fairly to be apprehended.

Min-maxing Maximinus

The case of Maximinus is perhaps the easier to unpack, if only because his reign is shorter (in Herodian's text as in reality) than that of Septimius Severus. The narratology of his characterization is less complex than that which attends upon the career of Severus. Nonetheless, it is not quite as straightforward as one might expect.

Take, for example, the narratorial assessment of his character at the beginning of book seven. The linking of his bloodthirstiness to his lineage and ethnicity is clear enough in its effect.[4] But it is worth taking a moment to note the point in the narrative at which Herodian has chosen to place it. The question of *where* the narrator should principally engage in such characterizing activity once an individual appears in a text is always an interesting one. In historiography, it has the potential to be yet more so. At least one of Herodian's predecessors in the genre considered the matter important enough for detailed narratorial reflexion (Polybius, →).

Maximinus receives this narratorial assessment at the beginning of his *reign*, and not at the moment of his first introduction. When he first appears, towards the end of book six (6.8.1–3), the treatment which he receives is rather different. At that point, his Thracian origins and alleged former career as shepherd-boy are mentioned (6.8.1), but the narrator does not, as he will at the beginning of book seven, spell out what will later be seen as the logical consequences of

4 Zimmerman 1999: 255.

his upbringing for his behaviour. In book six, the narrator turns instead to an account of how he was drafted into the army, and, more particularly, the cavalry, 'on account of his size and strength'. The narrator then goes on to talk about his conscientious training of his recruits, and how they sought to emulate the example of his personal courage (6.8.2).

There are, of course, good practical reasons why a narrator might delay the full revelation of Maximinus's hereditary tendencies until the beginning of his actual reign. It might be argued that there is little point in expatiating upon an individual's bloodthirstiness before he has had the opportunity (beyond the circumstances of his accession) to do anything especially bloodthirsty. On the other hand, prolepsis of how destructive an individual's later career will prove to be at the very moment of their first introduction is not an impossible narrative choice, either.[5] What Herodian achieves through these two, somewhat separated assessments of Maximinus is an adroit piece of implied focalization. The facts (or, at least, the reports) of Maximinus's upbringing do not substantially change between 6.8.1 and 7.1.2.[6] However, Herodian's narrator, by the divergent disposition and treatment of those facts in the two different places, achieves on their second telling in book seven an effect very different from that which they had at the end of book six. At 6.8.1, the emphasis moves smoothly from Maximinus' pastoral beginnings through his tremendous size and strength to the good work that he has already done in the army of Severus Alexander. At this point, Herodian seems to be deliberately triggering the ideology, well-established in Roman military discourse, that links the rugged life of the rustic to the production of exceptionally talented soldiers.[7] Once Maximinus has his feet under the imperial table, in book seven, the more negative associations of such an origin, including a congenital predisposition to bloodshed, come to the fore. At the end of book six, the narratee gets the slant on Maximinus' life-history which helps to explain (even though the topic has not yet been overtly broached) why

5 Cf. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, *The Coming of Arthur* 322–324: 'But Modred laid his ear beside the doors,/ And there half-heard; the same that afterward/ Struck for the throne, and striking found his doom.' Modred has at this point appeared previously only as 'young Modred' in a list at 243.

6 Whittaker 1970: 150 n. 1 is not quite accurate when he claims that the 'same details [sc. "reported as a scandalous story at 7.1.22"] are related as facts' at 6.8.1. The parenthetical 'so it was said (*hōs elegeto*)' at 6.8.1 establishes at least the detail about Maximinus having been a shepherd-boy as a rumour, although it is true that this parenthesis is missing from Politian's Latin translation of the text.

7 Cato *De Re Rustica* proem 4; Cic. *Pro Rosc. Amer*. 50; App. *BC* 1.7.28, though it is true that this ideology links itself more readily to farmers than to shepherds. Cf., however, Livy 1.4.8–9.

people find him attractive as a potential replacement for Severus Alexander. After he takes over, the grass no longer looks quite so green.

Herodian's narrator uses several different techniques to bring out this shifting response to Maximinus. One of these is the change in nuance in the description of his past life at 7.1.2, as compared to the one at 6.8.1. In the earlier passage, the rumour goes that Maximinus was drafted (*katatageis*) into the army. No adverse comment is passed upon the army into which he was drafted. In the later passage, it is alleged that Maximinus offered himself up for service (*epidous … hauton*), and the army in which this happened is described as 'mean and provincial'. In book seven, therefore, the behaviour of the young Maximinus looks more calculating (even though his ultimate success in winning the purple is attributed to chance), and the humility of his origins, even after he has stopped being a Thracian shepherd, is brought into even sharper focus. Rumour has ceased to be Maximinus' friend, and he is sharply conscious of the fact: the gossip at 7.1.2 is explicitly adduced by the narrator as the grounds for the emperor's fears that the senate and his subjects will despise him ('for there was a story widely circulated …').[8]

Another of the narrator's techniques for evoking this shifting response is the treatment of Maximinus' physical stature. In contrast to Appian (→), who tends to be exercised primarily by the physical characteristics of non-Romans, Herodian has an interest in the characterizing possibilities of the physique and looks of the characters in his history which manifests even in his treatment of Roman citizens or their emperors. In particular, Herodian's narrator shows an acute awareness of the effect that an individual's physiognomy can have on his reception by other people. Throughout the narrative, guards are repeatedly selected on the basis of their towering physiques, in order to make an impression on their audiences (4.7.3, 5.4.8, 7.6.2—the Persians do this as well at 6.4.4). In a subtler case, Caracalla wins admiration while on campaign for physical strength that is unexpected in one of his small build (4.7.7), but finds only derision later on, as what appeal he has starts to fail, when his short stature and near-baldness get in the way of his attempts to emulate Achilles and Alexander (4.8.5, 4.9.3—Herodian, despite the richness of the ancient attestation to the contrary, seems to have believed that Alexander was a physically large man).[9]

Despite the apparent contrast in their statures, Herodian's strategy for figuring Maximinus's physique has affinities with the way in which he treats Caracalla's. When he first appears in book six, Maximinus's strength and size are

8 I am indebted to Evert van Emde Boas for this last point.

9 Sidebottom 1998: 2809.

characteristics that play to his advantage—they are mentioned in the run-up to the description of his sterling military career. At the beginning of book seven, where the picture has already darkened, they are mentioned again (7.1.2), but, lacking that original context of subsequent achievement, they only recapitulate how he ended up in the army in the first place—they are otherwise value-neutral. By 7.1.6 they very nearly become a liability. Maximinus's attempt to establish these personal qualities of his as a contrast to those of his predecessor Severus Alexander enables would-be (though unsuccessful) assailants accurately to predict his behaviour. Once he has become further embittered by plots against him, what was once a selling point is described as a part of what makes him repugnant: 'he was in any case a man of quite terrifying appearance and gigantic physique, such that he could not easily be likened either to any Greek athletes or to any of the most martial of the barbarians' (7.1.12).

Maximinus and Caracalla are not the only cases where Herodian's narrator plays this shifting light across the physical characteristics of his (temporary) protagonist. Elagabalus receives a similar treatment. In this case, the point at issue is not his stature, but his physical attractiveness. During the period while the young Elagabalus is being viewed by many as a strong candidate for the imperial purple, the narrator's take on his physical attractions has a very positive tone. 'He was in the prime of his youth and the most handsome of all the young men of his generation' (5.3.7). 'His handsome appearance attracted everyone's attention' (5.3.8). Once Elagabalus is actually in charge, and estranging informed opinion through his antics, the narrator mentions his physical beauty only to note how he has defaced it, 'spoiling his natural good looks through repellent make-up' (5.6.10). The nadir is reached when the narrator presents the emperor through the eyes of his disaffected and soon-to-be insurgent subjects at 5.8.1: 'they were disgusted seeing him dolled up more elaborately than would befit a woman of good sense, dressed up in an unmanly fashion with gold necklaces and delicate fabrics'.[10]

The description of metonymical characterizing features in Herodian's history is not, then, necessarily a static feature. It can readily have a dynamic quality, charting (in most cases) the decline of an emperor and the deterioration of his relationship with his people. Moreover, as the Introduction to this volume has demonstrated, what it describes as metonymical characterization is by no means the whole story.[11] The metaphorical mode can be equally important. This, too, is relevant to how Herodian's narrator distributes his assessments

10 On Elagabalus' dress, see Zimmerman 1999: 224.

11 See Introduction (→), §5.

of Maximinus. Maximinus' key propagandistic strategy, both as an aspirant to the title of Princeps and as its holder, lies in stressing the difference between himself and his predecessor Severus Alexander. This, according to the narrator, is the motivation behind the ostentatious (and almost fatal) display of his physical prowess at 7.1.6: he desires 'to prove that Alexander's dithering and cowardice with regard to martial deeds had rightly been condemned'. The narrator, too, is intent upon drawing a contrast between Severus Alexander and Maximinus, but it is not one which, on the whole, redounds to the latter's credit.

The contrast is, in fact, a structural one. Both books six and seven of Herodian's history open with an assessment of a reign. This is a feature which they share with each other, but not with any of the other books of the work, where the openings are typically more immediately concerned with the nitty-gritty of how emperors are establishing, or failing to establish, their political dominance. As a result, there is a strong incentive to read the two of them in relation to each other. Such a reading throws into even sharper relief the contrast between Septimus Alexander's fourteen years of peaceful, constitutional rule (6.1.1–4) and the swift descent into a reign of terror under Maximinus (7.1.1).[12] To make assurance double sure, the narrator employs phrases to describe these two reigns in relation to those that immediately preceded them which are almost exact mirror images of each other: 'the form of the principate, changed from a high-handed tyranny to a form of aristocratic government …' (6.1.2) in contrast to 'he tried to change from a mild and very benign autocracy to the savagery of tyranny' (7.1.1). The narrator's decision to open a book with the analysis of Maximinus and the character of his regime manages the classic metaphorical manoeuvre of setting up a structural *sunkrisis* with the book before it.

Maximinus is not, at first blush, a complicated character. It would be fair to say that savagery, *ōmotēs*, remains his abiding characteristic in Herodian's history.[13] Nonetheless, his depiction is not unchanging, nor does it exist *in vacuo*. Herodian's narrator establishes a web of correspondences which anchors the interpretation of his reign firmly within that of the larger text that surrounds it.

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12 Opelt 1998: 2944.

13 Sidebottom 1998: 2811.

Se-verities

These considerations apply in a more urgent form to the analysis of that much more considerable figure, Septimius Severus. As befits the founder of the Severan dynasty, he is arguably the most important, and certainly the most complex, character in the whole of Herodian's history. The only other individual who might contest that claim would be Marcus Aurelius, with whom Severus enjoys an uneasy textual relationship.

The moment at 3.5.6 when Septimius Severus's *praxis* is said to have revealed his underlying character needs, like the narrator's comments on Maximinus, to be viewed within its original context within the larger work. The case of Septimius Severus illuminates what the Introduction to this volume has described as the role of 'cognitive primacy' in the narratological construction of character. Herodian's narrator makes his portrait of this emperor an especially complex and arresting one by establishing an initial impression of the man, which is then subjected to substantial modification as his narrative progresses.

Septimius first enters Herodian's narrative at 2.9.2. The point at which he appears is significant. Herodian's narrator is not always as overt in the deployment of structural *sunkrisis* as he is in the case of Severus Alexander and Maximinus. In the case of Septimius Severus, the point to note is that the narrative immediately prior to his introduction has been concerning itself with Niger, who, according to the narrator, has been 'idly imagining things and getting carried away by hopes that lacked authentication' (2.9.1). When Septimius takes the stage, the narratee is alerted to his likely importance in the forthcoming action by several means: 'Severus, a man of Libyan stock, was in control of the whole of Pannonia, which was under a unified command—a man fiery and efficient in the disposition of affairs, accustomed to a tough, hard life, readily resistant to physical hardships, swift to make decisions and to act upon them' (2.9.2). Quite apart from the opening insistence upon Septimius' current position of authority, the fact that the narrator bothers to furnish him with an ethnic (*anēr to men genos Libus*) suggests his probable importance in what is to come. Herodian's narrator does not supply ethnics for nobodies. What follows the ethnic is notable for the striking contrast which it presents with the behaviour of Niger. Niger vacillates; Septimius Severus acts.

He also receives some borrowed lustre through intertextuality. Herodian's narrative, from the first, constructs itself in relation to that of Thucydides. So much is clear from the opening sentence of book one (1.1.1), where the narrator's preoccupation with those who prefer speciously attractive utterance to the rigours of accurate historiography recalls the themes of Thucydides 1.22. In the case of Septimius Severus, the vocabulary which Herodian's narrator

deploys to characterize the future emperor's speed in decision-making and implementation evokes what Thucydides' Corinthians say about the Athenians, 'swift to have ideas and to bring about in practice what they decide' (Th. 1.70.2). Such expressions may simply be part of the stock of post-Thucydidean Greek historiography, of course, but one recollects, perhaps, that the Corinthians in the Thucydidean narrative are also setting up a *sunkrisis*, between the dynamic Athenians and the dawdling Spartans. It may be that Herodian's narrator is sharpening the narratee's sense for his own account of hesitation against dynamism by alluding to a paradigmatic case from the historiographical tradition (though one, unlike Herodian's, where the dawdlers will ultimately prove triumphant).

Septimius Severus lives up to this initial billing by immediately executing a plan to seize command of the empire (2.9.3). Once again, some fancy footwork by Herodian's narrator helps with the effect in this passage. Septimius seems to have claimed in his own autobiographical writings that a series of prophetic dreams convinced him that he was destined for greatness (2.9.3).[14] Herodian's narrator dutifully records this claim, and notes that these dreams were responsible for spurring Septimius on, but only does so after his initial assessment of the future emperor's character *and* the description of how he swung into action 'on learning that the Roman empire was up in the air'. Thus, Herodian's narrator, by delaying the revelation that Septimius has been having these dreams in favour of an account which initially presents the execution of his plan as a reaction to breaking news, reinforces by apparent *praxis* his description of Septimius as the sort of man who makes decisions and acts upon them in a flash.

The first stages of Septimius's plan involve a great deal of talking. In Herodian, as in other Greek authors, the characterizing possibilities of speech apply not just to what characters actually say, but also to how often, or how seldom, the narrator grants them the opportunity to say it. Elagabalus, for example, is presented as a feckless adolescent, and never delivers an extended *oratio recta* speech during the whole course of his reign—the closest he gets is writing a letter to the senate (5.6.2), and saying that a marriage of the sun and the moon is very appropriate (5.6.5). Pertinax, by contrast, for whom the narrator has a great deal of respect, is so eloquent that he very nearly talks his assassins out of killing him: 'by trying to say some such things he was on the verge of talking some of them around' (2.5.8). Caracalla, whose identity will prove disturbingly fluid and who is addicted to playing different parts in turn, delivers a speech after his assassination of his brother Geta which the narrator characterizes as

14 *FRHist* 100 F1; Sidebottom 2007: 55.

hinting at things obliquely and aimed at making what has happened deducible rather than simply explaining it (4.4.6).

Septimius Severus is at the far end of this scale. He gives multiple *oratio recta* speeches (e.g. 2.10.2–9, 2.13.5–9), as well as others which the narrator merely summarizes (2.14.3). In particular, he is very good at telling people what they want to hear. This is not, admittedly, much of a challenge in his initial dealings with his (strong but unsubtle) Pannonian troops (2.9.11). His speech to the Roman garrison, however, shows in abundance his talent for rhetoric that plays into the *Zeitgeist*: the adjectives which he uses to describe the deceased Pertinax during that oration ('respected (*semnon*) … honourable (*khrēston*)') recall the ones used of his unfortunate predecessor before and immediately after his assassination.[15] This talent reaches its apogee when, later in the same book, his routine works on (some) senators as well: 'by speaking thus he won over most of the senators to good-will and belief in what he had promised, but there were some of the more senior men and those who knew his ways (*ton tropon*) who commented in private that he was a man of many wiles (*polutropos*) and skilled in the art of contrivances … This was later, in fact, proved to be true.' (2.14.4)

Once again, the vocabulary which Herodian deploys in this passage is studied. Septimius Severus has been presenting himself as an emulator of Marcus Aurelius and Pertinax (2.14.3). His senatorial critics, by contrast, link him to the primal example of the *polutropon andra*, Odysseus (Hom. *Od.* 1.1). The evocation is particularly apt at this point in the narrative, since Septimius has just executed a stratagem to ensure that potential enemies of his are unarmed (Hdn. 2.13.10).[16] Odysseus, too, was not a fan of allowing his foes access to weaponry (Hom. *Od.* 19.4–13, 22.25).

It is against this background that the narrator's insistence on what Septimius Severus' *praxis* reveals about his underlying character at 3.5.6 needs to be viewed. While *praxis* can (and does) serve as a touchstone for character in the case of other important players within the history, it is especially important in the case of Septimius. *Praxis* allows the individual (internal or external to the text) who is trying to understand Septimius to keep an eye on an otherwise uniquely elusive ball. One notes that Herodian's narrator, who is not usually keen to disrupt the orderly onward march of his narrative with prolepsis, steps in to validate the opinion of Septimius' critics within the Senate by reference to what he is going to do later: 'this was later, in fact, proved to be true'. Herodian's

15 2.13.6, recalling 2.5.8 in the case of *semnon* (focalized through the soon-to-be assassins), and 2.6.2 in the case of *khrēston* (focalized through the senators).

16 Opelt 1998: 2931–2932.

narrator, unlike those of some other historiographers given to such foreboding prolepsis, does not specify at this point in the narrative exactly which elements of the emperor's later career will validate this verdict. Contrast, for example, Thucydides on Alcibiades (6.15.3). However, the behaviour that provokes the narrator's comment about the revelation of underlying character at 3.5.6 would be a reasonable candidate. Septimius not only holds the threat of injury to their hostage children over the heads of Niger's generals, but (according to Herodian)[17] kills both the generals and the children when his objectives have been reached.

Once again, there are ironies in this situation which only become apparent when the larger dynamics of the narrative are considered. Septimius Severus's own rhetoric constantly seeks to align him with Pertinax and Marcus Aurelius, but this hostage-taking is, in fact, a practice which he has taken over from the now-despised Commodus (3.2.4). In this earlier passage, the narrator even notes Septimius' foresight in planning this move (3.2.3). Septimius is ruthless and deceptive, but these unpleasant traits are undeniably accompanied by the more unambiguously admirable one of foresight, his possession of which has already been endorsed by the narrator's description of him at 2.15.1 (*anēr promēthēs*). This trait, in turn, plays into the on-going *sunkrisis* between him and Niger. Niger believes himself to be foresighted, but is not (3.1.7, where the parenthetical 'so he thought' (*hōs ōieto*) reveals the narrator's scepticism).

Septimius's career is a triumph of rhetoric, as well as of determined action. Herodian's depiction of him leaves little doubt of this. However, the relationship between what Septimius says and what actually happens is more complex in Herodian's text than a simple case of the latter falsifying the former. A particular irony of Septimius's characterization is that things which he asserts disingenuously sometimes come back to bite him in the sequel.

Septimius' handling of Albinus is a case in point. Septimius sends a letter asking Albinus to attend to the good of the empire. 'He [sc. 'Septimius'], being an old man beset by gout, whose children were still very young, stood in need of a man of good birth who was still in the prime of life' (2.15.4). Albinus's noble birth (*andros eugenous*), on which the narrator has already lingered when introducing him ('a patrician-born member of the Senate', 2.15.1) comes in for special attention. This is no surprise in Herodian's text, where the characters are often portrayed as setting great store by noble blood or the lack thereof: the supporters of Gordian I anticipate that he will meet with a warm reception from the senate and the people of Rome because of his good birth (*andra*

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17 Contrast Whittaker 1969: 286 n. 1.

eu gegonota, 7.5.2), and the narrator gives this as a reason why the people like Maximus and Balbinus (8.8.1). (How useful a striking lineage *actually* is in accurately assessing whether an individual will make a good emperor is a more vexed question: the narrator notes at 1.15.7 that his lineage was one of the reasons why the Roman people felt so let down by the gladiatorial antics of Commodus, and this disparity between blood and performance is also highlighted by Septimius's *apologia* for him at 2.10.3.) As so often with Septimius Severus, the rhetoric is careful to hit the right buttons.

The letter achieves its immediate goal, which is to trick Albinus into giving his support to Severus and so prevent him from making his own play for the Principate (2.15.3). In due course, however, the claims which Septimius, with studied self-deprecation, makes in it turn out to be inconveniently true. Albinus's birth, for example, does indeed stand him in good stead—it makes him so popular that 'the nobles preferred to have him as emperor, because he traced his lineage back to a long line of ancestors' (3.5.2). Septimius ultimately has to solve the problem by destroying him.

The point about age plays out in a rather more interesting way. Near the beginning of Septimius' career, where we see more of him as the master-manipulator, his age and gout appear as his rhetorical tools. He exploits both of them shamelessly—and effectively—but the narratee does not see any evidence of them actually inconveniencing him. Septimius Severus, like Pratchett's Granny Weatherwax, is only old when it suits him. Like Elagabalus' looks, or Maximinus' strength, these characteristics do not retain a stable 'metonymic' meaning in the text. What starts out as an advantage ends up being otherwise. Septimius Severus is not as badly struck by this device of Herodian's narrator as Elagabalus or Maximinus. After all, in terms of retaining power and keeping the empire on a more-or-less even keel, his reign is a conspicuous success, which is not a claim that could be made for either of the others. Septimius' succession, however, is a less happy matter, and it is in relation to that that his age and health cease to be a convenient tool and eventually become an active problem. Once the narrative reaches his expedition to Britannia in 208 CE, they are a legitimate, and not merely a rhetorical obstacle, though one which serves to highlight his strength of spirit: 'by now he was an old man and suffering from gout, but in matters of the spirit he was stronger than any young man' (3.14.2). Once the expedition is actually underway, age and ill health begin to undermine his control of Caracalla, who will turn out to be the weak point in the old man's legacy: 'a more prolonged sickness took hold of Severus, who was now an old man ... he tried to send out Antoninus to settle the military matters, but Antoninus was lukewarm with regard to the campaigns against the barbarians' (3.15.1). The former advantage is at last a hindrance. Illness and age then recur

in the narrator's references to Septimius ('his [sc. Caracalla's] father, subject to a long drawn-out illness … the old man', 3.15.2) until his death, which is not long-delayed.

Septimius dies in a state of sorrow, but the narrator furnishes him with a handsome death-notice, which stresses his military distinction (3.15.2–3). The positive impact of this necrology comes not just from the fact that it accentuates the positive in his reign (much about soldiering and nothing about deception) but also from the fact that he receives a death-notice at all. With regard to exits, as to entrances, Herodian's narrator does not dispense characterizing material in an entirely predictable fashion. His decisions in each case can say a great deal about his attitude to the individual concerned. Whereas Tacitus's narrator (again, a useful *comparandum* when examining different ways to do imperial history) dutifully supplies necrologies for Galba (*Histories* 1.49), Otho (2.50), and Vitellius (3.86) alike, Herodian's is much less consistent in his practice. In many cases his death-notices are paltry. Macrinus does not get one at all, beyond the comment that his judgment and his fortune had failed (5.4.12); Septimius's son Caracalla receives only a summary of how long he reigned (4.13.8) and so does Elagabalus, albeit with a dry allusion to the fact that he led the 'life described above' (5.8.10). In fact, the only necrologies delivered by the narrator in Herodian's *History* that can compete in bulk and loquacity with Septimius Severus' are those of Commodus (1.17.12) and Severus Alexander (6.9.8)—Marcus Aurelius, interestingly, receives one that is focalized through his grieving subjects rather than simply through Herodian's narrator (1.4.8). The death-notices for Commodus and Severus Alexander both appear at the very ends of books, where one may suspect that the incentive to provide a strong moment of closure at an important structural break helps to explain the narrator's decision to expatiate. Septimius' life alone receives this posthumous treatment before the final paragraph of a book, although it is fair to add that book three, too, has very little left to go once he departs from it. In death, as in life, he is exceptional.

Praxis, then, does reveal character in the case of Septimius Severus, but due consideration of how Herodian handles his whole career reveals that this is only a part of a greater whole. For Septimius, *praxis* does not simply serve as a corrective to what the emperor has to say—though there is certainly an element of that. Where Septimius is concerned, speech is itself a form of *praxis*. And, as with Maximinus, one needs to pay attention to the web of allusions that link and contrast him with many other characters, both within and (in the case of Odysseus) without the text of the history to make full sense of what Herodian is doing with him as a character.

Conclusion

Maximinus and Septimius Severus are both characters who receive an ample amount of coverage in Herodian's history. How far, then, can the techniques which we have seen Herodian deploying to characterize them be generalized to what he does in the remainder of his oeuvre?

Synoptic contemplation of Herodian's work suggests that, from the various modes of characterization which are detailed in the Introduction to this volume, the metaphorical turn is especially important. Cassius Dio, Polybius, and Appian certainly deploy the metaphorical turn as well, but, in Herodian, the drive to compare and contrast takes centre-stage. It is tempting to relate this prevalence to Herodian's entirely imperial narrative: Polybius, of course, never had to depict emperors at Rome; Appian presumably would have done so, but in portions of his text that are now lost; Cassius Dio did, but his extant imperial narrative is quite fragmentary.

Herodian, by contrast, is all about the emperors. The urge to compare, contrast, and categorize emperors or would-be emperors of Rome against each other is insistently manifested not just by Herodian's narrator, but also by most of the characters within the text. Septimius Severus is far from the only one who tries to stress his own affinities with a popular predecessor; Maximinus has company in attempting to point up the contrasts between himself and a rival. Pertinax (2.4.2) and Macrinus (5.2.4, with significant reservations from the narrator) both model themselves on Marcus Aurelius. The Roman troops object strongly to the contrast which they detect between the dissolute habits of Macrinus and the disciplined lifestyle of Caracalla (5.2.5).

These comparisons have a way of leading back to Marcus Aurelius, and it is surely right to see him as serving as Herodian's touchstone for the successes and (more often) the inadequacies of his various successors.[18] Comparison and contrast with the Augustus of Tacitus's *Annals* (who likewise expires close to the beginning of the text, and likewise exerts a vast posthumous influence) are suggestive in this instance. Where it is easy to see Tacitus' Augustus as a deeply ambiguous figure, held in much more straightforward esteem by the characters of the text than by the narrator, in Herodian dissenting voices are few and far between (although Caracalla's ingenious attempt to use the precedent of Marcus to justify his own fratricide at 4.5.6 comes close).

Sunkrisis, then, is at the heart of Herodian's narrative strategy—as, arguably, it was in the self-depiction of the emperors he portrays. It would be wrong,

18 Whittaker 1969: lxxii; Sidebottom 1998: 2804–2805.

however, to conclude from this that what he does with characterizing tropes is therefore uniformly unsubtle. The cases of Maximinus and Septimius Severus demonstrate that there is more dynamism and flux to Herodian's characterization than one might assume. Ethnicity, lineage, physique, and clothing can all bear semantic freight in Herodian, but the cargo may not be the same at the end of an individual's career as it was at the beginning.

CHAPTER 14

Josephus

*Jan Willem van Henten and Luuk Huitink**

General Observations

In general terms, the Jewish historian Josephus, working in Rome in the first century CE and supported by the Flavian dynasty, attempts to inculcate what he sees as the correct interpretation of the devastating conflict between Rome and the Jews (66–73/4 CE) as well as a fair view of the Jewish people and its way of life, beneficial to Jews and non-Jews alike: he is particularly concerned with showing how the God of Israel works in history and arguing that living in line with Jewish customs would result in a morally good life and the proper attitude (*eusebeia*) towards God, who in turn would reward these with happiness.[1] In order to prove these points, Josephus assesses the lives of his protagonists, examining to what extent they meet the moral standards to which they should, according to Josephus, be held.[2] It is difficult, therefore, to think of a narratological category more relevant to Josephus' project than characterization, both in his major historical narratives, *Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquities*, and in the shorter tracts *Life* and (the largely non-narrative) *Against Apion*. Indeed, even a superficial reading of Josephus' works betrays the central importance of character. In *Antiquities* in particular, he constructs his narrative around the lives of great individuals, collapsing the distinction between history and biography to such an extent that it is tempting to call the work a 'psycho-history'.[3] But *War*, too, evinces a strongly personal perspective on history, and combines an interest in the behaviour of the military and political leaders on both sides with reflections on the 'national character' of Jews and Romans.[4] The autobiographical *Life*, finally, gives an overview of Josephus' own public

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1 See e.g. *AJ* 1.15–16, 20. Villalba i Varneda 1986: 63, 254–255.

2 Cf. Mason in Feldman 2000: XXXII–XXXIII, also placing Josephus in the context of an overtly didactic and moralizing strand of Roman historiography; cf. Feldman 1998: 4–5 and Landau 2006: 18–20 for historiographical antecedents of Josephus' interest in character.

3 Feldman 1998: 5, 74–75.

4 Cf. Mason 2007: 223–225.

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career, with the express purpose of enabling readers 'to judge my character (*ēthos*) as they see fit' (*Vit.* 430).

In an insightful paper Neyrey demonstrates the extent to which characterization in Josephus is indebted to formal rhetorical models by comparing Josephus' extensive self-characterization in *Life* with the precepts for the rhetorical exercise of the encomium given in the *progumnasmata*.[5] In line with what these rhetorical handbooks prescribe, Josephus emphasizes his descent from an ancient and aristocratic priestly family ('ancestry'), his early and thorough education in the various Jewish traditions ('nurture and training'), and above all his moral qualities ('virtues'), which include courage (*andreia*), wisdom (*phronēsis*, *sophia*), moderation (*sōphrosunē*, *metriotēs*, *enkrateia*), justice (*dikaiosunē*), and a proper religious attitude (*eusebeia*). These virtues are both mentioned explicitly and shown to have informed his actions (*praxeis*), and they are thrown into relief by various comparisons (*sunkriseis*) of Josephus and his opponents, who inevitably come off badly.[6] They are, among other things, characterized by the envy ('emotion') they feel towards Josephus, which is an index of the high regard in which Josephus himself is held. The main point of contrast between the *progumnasmata* and *Life* is that Josephus devotes little to no attention to his health, beauty or strength ('outward appearance').

Neyrey's analysis has a wider applicability. First, reflections on morality, especially as they are couched in terms of virtues and vices, everywhere form the most important 'ingredient' of Josephus' character portrayals;[7] he essentially avails himself of the canonical Greek virtues, but *eusebeia* often specifically means appropriate behaviour towards the God of Israel, and is the crowning virtue.[8] A character's ancestry and education are quite often flagged, while references to outward appearance are on the whole used more sparsely.[9] And whereas Josephus is elsewhere more interested in powerful emotions than in *Life*, he generally gives pride of place to the darker side of the spectrum, frequently referencing not only envy,[10] but also anger, hate and mistrust; he also

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5 Neyrey 1994.

6 Cf. Mason 1998: 62–70.

7 Feldman 1998: 96–129 (on *Antiquities*).

8 According to Josephus, the Jews are special in that their lawgiver Moses 'did not make piety (*eusebeia*) a part of virtue (*aretēs*)', but all other virtues part of piety (*Ap.* 2.170).

9 For a list of passages see Feldman 1982: 62. Josephus would probably endorse the comment of the prophet Samuel (*AJ* 6.160): 'I do not make kingship the prize of bodily good looks (*sōmatōn euphormias*), but rather of virtue of soul (*psukhōn aretēs*)'.

10 On envy see Feldman 1998: 198–203.

tends to stress the negative sides of love.[11] Secondly, characterization is everywhere primarily shaped by a mixture of direct comment, characterizing deeds and implicit and explicit comparisons between characters (arguably in that order of importance). Thirdly, the evaluative slant to Josephus' techniques of characterization, which is so prominent in *Life*, is clearly visible in his other works, too.

However, Neyrey's interpretation of *Life* as a formal encomium is less helpful in coming to grips with other, more nuanced, aspects of Josephus' practice, which breathe life into his 'rhetoric of character'. First, while *Life* does not depart from a conventional framework of what counts as 'good' and 'bad' behaviour, Josephus takes an evident pride in his ability to match character traits to events (and *vice versa*) in flexible and even surprising ways. An extreme example is his treatment of the Judean Queen Alexandra, whom, on the basis of much the same evidence, he paints as a superstitious dupe in *War*, but as a conniving powermonger in the parallel account in *Antiquities*.[12] Nor, secondly, are Josephus' evaluations always black-and-white; in fact, he often aims to achieve balance in his assessments, casting his protagonists as neither wholly good nor wholly bad.[13] Thirdly, characterization in Josephus serves narrative and argumentative purposes that go beyond expressing (dis)approbation; even in *Life* itself, he does not put so much emphasis on, say, his education because it is a conventional category of praise, but because it helps him position himself as one of only a few men capable of forming correct opinions on the Jewish people and their history—in short, to imbue the narrator of *Antiquities*, to which *Life* forms an appendix, with authority.[14] Fourthly, Neyrey claims that the *progumnasmata* contain all 'the basic information thought relevant for knowing a person' in Greco-Roman culture,[15] but in fact they focus on the public, displayed aspects of character. This may suit Josephus in *Life*, but in his longer narratives he often operates, as we will see, with a much wider and more elastic view of character, taking account of, for instance, idiosyncratic traits, people's 'true' nature or the possibility of character change.

The upshot, then, is that Josephus' practices of characterization can be both rigid and malleable, rely on typification and resist it, and serve purposes both

11 Cf. Mason in Feldman 2000: XXXII for Josephus' interest in erotic intrigues.

12 Mason 1991: 258–259; 1998: 71–72, with *BJ* 1.107–119 and *AJ* 13.400–432. See also Atkinson 2012.

13 Mason in Feldman 2000: XXXII.

14 Cf. Mason 1998: 45; 2001: XIV, XXXIV. By contrast, in *War*, where Josephus is also a (third-person) character, we hear nothing about his education in Jewish traditions.

15 Neyrey 1994: 180.

evident and more veiled. Since the material is vast, we will elaborate on this claim by highlighting a few important points. We will first make the general point that the (moral) evaluation of characters is firmly tied to the narratorial voice. We will then show how Josephus employs his multi-layered conceptualization of character to explain and evaluate narrative events by analysing a sample of brief characterizing narratorial comments. We will then argue that Josephus' longer reflections on character (such as obituaries) may guide the narratees' interpretation in fairly straightforward ways, but may also raise complex questions about the relation between morality, actions and character. Finally, we will bring the strands of the discussion together by considering how Josephus shapes one of his most elaborate characters, namely Herod the Great.

The Narrator versus Focalizing Characters

It will be clear from the above that the most important characterizer in Josephus is the narrator himself. Being an overt narrator and in line with his self-appointed role as the arbiter of history, Josephus engages in abundant direct characterization. While speaking and focalizing characters often engage in characterization as well and could be a way of introducing multiple and equally legitimate perspectives, their point of view does not carry the weight of that of the narrator, and is often not allowed to stand without his interference.[16] One example concerns Saul's son Jonathan, who, after unwittingly violating an oath of his father, indicates in a speech that he is prepared to die nobly in order to propitiate God, after which the people, who first wanted to see him punished, are so impressed that they save him from his father's wrath (*AJ* 6.125–128). The characterization of Jonathan as a noble person and, implicitly, of Saul as a cruel father is shaped by his own speech and the perception of the people; but it is the narrator who has the last word: Jonathan 'was not dismayed at the threat of death, but showed himself noble and magnanimous' (*eugenōs kai megalophronōs*; 6.127).[17] Similarly, when Potiphar's wife supposes that she can easily seduce Joseph (*AJ* 2.41), at that point a servant in her household, and Joseph refuses, the narrator feels the need to add that 'she was looking at the outward bearing of his slavery (…) but not to his character, which remained

16 Cf. Landau 2006: 107–111.

17 A specific reason for the narratorial interference here may be that, according to Josephus, 'the people' are by definition fickle and easily persuaded; cf. also the programmatic statement at *AJ* 8.252, that 'the morals (*ēthē*) of subjects are corrupted together with the character (*tropois*) of their leaders'.

firm despite his change of fortune' (*AJ* 2.42). The reader is not allowed to entertain the thought that Joseph could possibly be anything but virtuous: it is the perceiver who is at fault.[18]

In general, when Josephus includes his protagonists' opinions about others, it is often to indicate whether they do or do not understand them; in the paranoid atmosphere of the royal courts which he describes, a person's ability to assess other people's characters correctly can take them far, while a lack of such understanding can mean their downfall. Particularly intriguing in this respect is a group of on the whole wicked protagonists whose insight into character matches that of the narrator. An example is Eurycles the Lacedaemonian, who visits Herod the Great's court only to seek financial gain and stir up trouble. Quickly 'seeing through Herod's character' (*sunidōn ton Hērōdou tropon*), he ingratiates himself with the king 'through flattery, clever talk and false encomiums' (*BJ* 1.515). Another is Salome's son Antipater, who in an indirectly reported speech accuses Herod the Great's successor Archelaus of various crimes, including some which he did not commit but would easily be believed, 'because they were the kind of things that would typically (*phusin*) be done by young men who in their ambition to rule seize power prematurely' (*AJ* 17.233).[19] Eurycles' persuasive rhetoric of praise and Antipater's ability to refer actions to convincing stereotypes almost read like a blueprint of what are, at times, the narrator's own methods. The difference is, of course, that Josephus portrays himself, especially in *Life*, as a morally upstanding person, who at all times sticks to the truth.[20] As such, Josephus implicitly pits these characters against himself, in what we might call metaleptic *sunkriseis*.[21]

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18 Significantly, both these narratorial interferences are extra-biblical additions; cf. 1Sam. 14:24–45 and Gen. 39:6–15, respectively.

19 Josephus reports Antipater's words in indirect speech precisely so as to be able to make such comments on them (cf. Landau 2006: 142); he therefore only tells us that Antipater was a 'very clever speaker' (*deinotatos … eipein*, 17.230), but does not show it by giving the man's own words. In general, Josephus is not much interested in characterization through speech; most of the direct speeches in his work are long, highly rhetorical disquisitions.

20 Cf. e.g. *Vit.* 8–9 for Josephus' concern with *akribeia* (also *SAGN* 2: 213, van Henten and Huitink). By contrast, Josephus' rival historian Justus of Tiberias is (dis)credited with 'craftiness and guile' in words (*Vit.* 40).

21 Cf. Daube 1980 on equally suggestive parallels between Josephus' stories about biblical figures associated with prophecy and his own life-story as shaped in *War* and *Life*.

Motivating Actions

At almost every turn Josephus' narratorial voice explains the narrative action, and very often his explanations involve brief statements about the character of the actants. The sample given below may serve to highlight some key aspects of Josephus' practice. First, he takes into consideration various aspects of the concept of character, most notably someone's innate and behavioural qualities and/or emotions. The difference between the former two is to some extent lexically marked: the nouns *ēthos* and *tropos* (especially in the plural) often accompany characterizing statements which focus on the notions of performance and socially conditioned traits, while *phusis* is more frequently used to refer to someone's 'true' nature and more permanent characteristics.[22] Secondly, he configures the relation between such aspects and their influence on the course of events in several ways. Thirdly, apart from explaining the action, his comments usually also entail moral judgement.

– Josephus often motivates an individual's or group's actions in terms of some innate or learned moral qualities. For instance, Cambyses responds angrily to advice given to him by certain Samaritans, 'because he was wicked by nature' (*phusei ponēros ōn*, *AJ* 11.26), while Herod's son Antipater manages to conceal the hatred he feels towards his brothers, 'since he was of an extremely diverse disposition' (*poikilōtatos ōn to ēthos*, *BJ* 1.468); this damning phrase, which casts Antipater as an arch-dissembler and implies a lack of true moral steadfastness, recurs in Josephus' characterization of his own mortal enemy John of Gischala (*BJ* 4.85).
– More frequently, characters' actions are the result of an inherent trait, which is 'activated' by the immediate circumstances. For instance, the Germani recklessly revolt against Rome, because their character (*phusis*) 'is without

22 This resembles the practice of the Greek novelists; cf. De Temmerman 2014: 22 and van Henten 2014: 60. The distinction is not absolute (cf. e.g. how Cambyses is called 'wicked by nature' (*phusei ponēros*, *AJ* 11.26), Herod 'wicked in disposition' (*ponēros ēthos*, 19.329), without, it seems, a different import), but still illuminating, for example to explain the use of *ēthos* at the end of *Life* (430); when Josephus speaks about the formation of character (through education and training), he almost invariably uses *ēthos* (*ēthē*); cf. e.g. *BJ* 2.120; *Ap.* 2.171–173; on other occasions the word means little more than 'custom' or 'habit'; cf. e.g. *BJ* 2.279; 6.115, 190; *AJ* 20.256. Conversely, Josephus only talks about the *phusis* ('essence') of God, never about God's *ēthos*; cf. *AJ* 1.15, 19; 2.146; 4.269; 8.107, 338; 10.142; *Ap.* 1.224, 232; 2.168, 180, 250; similarly with 'human nature': *AJ* 3.23, 190; 5.215, 317; 6.59, 136, 341; 7.133, 8.117; 10.241; 13.315; 19.296 (see, however, n. 38 below).

good sense and prone to take risks even when there is little hope' (*logismōn erēmos agathōn kai meta mikras elpidos hetoimōs ripsokindunos*), but also because they have come to hate their governors and because Rome is weakened by civil war (*BJ* 7.77–78). The references to the Germani's *phusis* and hatred (which has negative connotations) imply condemnation of their revolt.

– Circumstances may also repress aspects of someone's *phusis*. This line of thinking is made explicit in the speech which Claudius gives on becoming emperor: he concedes that he may not be 'moderate by nature' (*phusei metrios*), but assures his audience that the murder of his predecessor Caligula will be a 'sufficient warning to act with restraint' (*hikanon hupodeigma sōphrosunēs*) (*BJ* 2.208). While fear drives a wedge between Claudius' nature and his behaviour, a different emotion does the same for the Jews besieged in Macherus: they surrender the town to the Romans, giving in out of pity for a Jewish captive 'contrary to their nature' (*para tēn hautōn phusin*) (*BJ* 7.204).[23] An extreme case is Herod's hatred (*misos*) for his sons, which becomes so great that it 'completely overcame his nature' (*aponikēsai tēn phusin*) (*AJ* 16.395; cf. 16.10).[24]
– Occasionally, someone's *phusis* proves stronger than his circumstances. Thus, David mourns the death of his son Absalom, despite the fact that he had rebelled against him, because David was 'by nature an affectionate person' (*phusei … ōn philostorgos*) (*AJ* 7.252). The fact that David's affection overcomes the anger he might reasonably feel counts in his favour.
– It is also noteworthy, finally, if emotions do not influence a character's behaviour. For instance, despite his anger at certain Jews, Titus 'did not change his disposition' (*ouk ēllaxe to ēthos*), but received them (*BJ* 6.356).[25] In *Life* (80), Josephus goes out of his way to report that he never violated a woman, intimating that this was not a matter of course for a relatively young man in a position of authority. In these cases, which point out why people did *not* perform certain actions, explanation gives way to (positive) moral judgement altogether. The implicit praise concerns these characters' behaviour, but indirectly points to their possession of the cardinal virtue *enkrateia*.

23 The phrase recurs at *AJ* 19.88 (on Caligula).

24 Or rather (and more damningly) 'human nature', since what is intended is the natural affection a father feels for his sons.

25 The use of *ēthos* is suggestive of Titus' act of will; by contrast, David could not control the emotion which he felt for his son, as it was part of his inherent nature (*phusis*).

A further point brought out by several of these examples is the extent to which the narrator's assessments rely on established types as a point of reference. Cambyses' behaviour resonates with the stereotype of the tyrannical ruler,[26] while that of the Germani is partly explained in terms of such a global category as ethnicity.[27] Herod and Josephus are assessed in terms of how their behaviour departs from what may be expected from human beings and young men,[28] respectively. This does not mean, however, that all these characters are very transparent. Thus, the violent metaphor used in the example about Herod's fatherly love being 'completely conquered' by hatred suggests that he is a genuinely conflicted figure and, perhaps, a dynamic one (see the section on Herod below; by contrast, it is not implied that Claudius or the Jews in Macherus undergo an actual change of character). Furthermore, there does not always exist a straightforward link between the narrator's moral (dis)approval and a character's success; Antipater's dissembling act, for example, takes him far. We will now consider how Josephus occasionally thematizes such complexities in longer reflections on character.

Longer Reflections on Character

The narrator also offers more elaborate reflections on character in separate blocks of the narrative, when protagonists are introduced, when they die (obituaries),[29] and/or after pivotal moments in their lives. While such reflections serve similar explanatory and appreciative purposes as the brief comments

26 See below. Perhaps this owes something to Herodotus' portrait of the king in book 3 of the *Histories*; it is in any case an extra-biblical addition.

27 Cf. e.g. *BJ* 2.76 on the characteristic unreliability of Arabs. Josephus also recognizes typically Jewish virtues, catalogued at *Ap*. 2.146, 170: justice (*dikaiosunē*), moderation (*sōphrosunē*), endurance (*karteria*), especially in times of hardship, 'harmony in all things among the members of the community' (*tōn politōn pros allēlous en hapasi sumphōnia*), 'universal benevolence' (*katholou philantrōpia*) and 'contempt for death' (*thanatou periphronēsis*). These virtues sometimes come to the fore in the narrative; cf. e.g. *BJ* 5.306, where Jewish soldiers are emboldened by their 'characteristic endurance in the face of calamities' (*to phusei karterikon en sumphorais*); see Swoboda 2014: 136–145, 338–341, 399.

28 For references to 'human nature', see n. 23 above. For 'age', cf. e.g. *AJ* 1.291: Rachel gets emotional, 'as usually happens to young people (*tois neois*)'; 8.209: Jeroboam is a 'characteristically hot-headed youth' (*phusei thermos … neanias*).

29 Cf. *SAGN* 2: 221–222 (van Henten and Huitink). They are particularly common throughout *Antiquities* and in the first book of *War*, which treats the Hasmonean dynasty; see Landau 2006: 92–98, 127–134 for discussion.

discussed in the previous section, their clearly marked-out status within the broader texture of the narrative flags up the importance which Josephus attaches to character. Introductory remarks prime narratees to consider the entire following story in light of the character of the protagonists involved. Obituaries lay bare the traits, dispositions and behaviours which helped shape a person's fortunes throughout (much of) their life in order to impart a moral lesson.

A straightforward example concerns Josephus' treatment of King Asa of Judah. An introductory statement reports that God led him to a long and happy old age on account of his piety and sense of justice (*AJ* 8.290). Asa's exemplary behaviour in the story which follows is not in doubt, and thrown into relief by the contrasting deportment of a whole series of short-lived kings of Israel, with whom he has dealings. When Asa dies, Josephus comments:

> From these things one may learn that the Deity has very close oversight of human affairs and how he loves the good (*tous agathous*), but hates and annihilates root and branch the wicked (*tous ponērous*). For many kings of the Israelites, one after the other, were, within a short time, designated to be calamitously destroyed, along with their families, on account of their lawlessness (*paranomian*) and acts of injustice (*adikias*), while Asa, the king of Jerusalem and the two tribes, because of his piety (*eusebeian*) and righteousness (*dikaiosunēn*) was brought by God to a long and blessed old age and, after a reign of forty-one years, died in a happy state.
>
> *AJ* 8.314

This character assessment focuses only on the virtues *eusebeia* and *dikaiosunē*, the possession or lack of which here and elsewhere is the minimum requirement for distinguishing between good and bad rulers and for determining God's (dis)approval;[30] it takes the form of a polarized *sunkrisis* which deals in the absolute categories of 'good' and 'bad'; and it straightforwardly matches the *praxeis* of the various kings as described in the preceding narrative (indeed, in the interest of maintaining a sharp contrast Josephus has ignored biblical reports of Asa's less-than-happy end).[31] In short, Josephus here relies on stringent selectivity, schematization and black-and-white stereotypes in order to drive home a lesson about God's involvement in history.

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30 Josephus here follows a basic trend of Jewish Scripture (cf. e.g. *AJ* 8.298–302, 361–362, 417–420; 9.1, 99–101), but the principle also determines his reports of non-biblical characters.

31 See Begg and Spilsbury 2005: 87, with 1Kgs 15:23, 2Chr 16:7–10.

Josephus' narrative does not, however, always so obviously proceed at this emblematic level. As he tells the story, many protagonists lead more turbulent and uneven lives than Asa and do not occupy an extreme position on a scale of virtue. Josephus makes sense of these lives in a number of ways: he may still suggest (as he does for Asa) that a character's volatile career can be understood in terms of a few character traits, or he may draw up more rounded, composite portraits which take in various types of character traits. Moreover, while in the case of Asa the introductory and concluding comments correspond with each other and with the other characterization strategies employed throughout the story, at other times there are tensions between these elements in that, for instance, the introduction of a character does not match his or her obituary. In such cases, narratees are prompted to 'fill in the gaps' (to use a term from Iser's reader response theory), that is, actively to reconsider the relation between the several strands of someone's characterization; in the process they may arrive at a more profound understanding of a protagonist's character and motives; accordingly, the 'lesson' they take away from their reading may also be more complex. We will now illustrate these various possibilities.

Hyrcanus II is a good example of a character whose eventful life can, according to Josephus, be reduced to a single pattern of characteristic behaviour. He was High Priest, then King, but quickly deposed; then made ethnarch by Pompey, but deposed again; taken captive by the Parthians, he returned home, but he had lost his power to Herod, who finally executed him in 30 BCE. His obituary first summarizes the 'complex and changing fortunes in his lifetime' (*poikilais kai polutropois … tais en tōi zēn tukhais*) (*AJ* 15.179) and then concludes:

> He seemed to be mild and moderate (*epieikēs kai metrios*) in all matters and to handle most parts of his rule through administrators. He was not interested in general affairs (*polupragmōn*), nor formidable (*deinos*) enough for being in charge of a kingdom. That Antipater and Herod advanced so far was due to his mildness (*dia tēn epieikeian*). So finally he met such an end at their hands, which was neither just nor pious.
>
> *AJ* 15.182

The passage reiterates the key elements of Hyrcanus' characterization so far.[32] Its added value is that it makes clear at a glance how Hyrcanus' fortunes were

32 He has been called decent and kind (*phusei khrēstos … di' epieikeian …*, *AJ* 14.13), but also naive, unambitious and indecisive (14.158, 179), which at least partly results from his kindness (*epieikeia*, 14.13; 15.165, 178), and incompetent to take action 'because of his unmanliness and want of good judgement' (*hup' anandrias kai anoias*, 14.179).

essentially governed by a single character flaw, namely, a total lack of spine. Since Josephus formulates the man's shortcomings in part by commenting on his possession of the important virtues *epieikeia* and *metriotēs*, narratees are made to realize that friendliness and moderation are not in themselves enough to make a successful ruler.

A fairly typical example of a composite portrait is that of the malcontent Kores (biblical name: Korah), who rebels against Moses; his introduction gives the narratees an insight into his background, natural gifts and emotions:

> Kores, a certain one of the Hebrews who was among the most distinguished both in ancestry and in wealth (*kai genei kai ploutōi*), an able speaker (*hikanos d' eipein*) and most persuasive (*pithanōtatos*) in dealing with crowds, seeing that Moses was established in extraordinary honour, was hostile through envy (*phthonou*), for he happened to be his fellow tribesman and kinsman, and was embittered (*akhthomenos*) because he was more deserving to enjoy this glory by virtue of his being wealthier and not inferior in ancestry.
>
> *AJ* 4.14

The picture which emerges from this carefully balanced sketch is that of a man who possesses considerable endowments and talents but puts them to use in the service of the wrong cause, because he regrettably lets himself be guided by his emotions. The sketch helps explain why Kores will initially have considerable success and pose a serious threat to Moses (and to that extent creates suspense), but also why in the end he must fail. For despite the brief insight we are offered into Kores' motives, his is not a case of *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*: Kores should have known (as the narrator has made sure readers do) that Moses, because of the special favour in which God holds him, is rightly more honoured and that God disapproves of the rebellion; in the end, Kores and his followers are consumed by a God-sent fire (4.54–56).

A more complex composite portrait is that of Mariamme I, Herod the Great's wife. Her story abounds in brief characterizing comments, which are less consistent and one-sided than those which pepper the story of Hyrcanus II. She is, to begin with, one of the most beautiful women of her age (*AJ* 15.23, 25–27, 66–67, 73),[33] and partly for this reason Herod cannot stand the thought of her ever being with someone else, and gives the order to execute her if something

33 Josephus calls several other women 'the most beautiful'; this usually spells trouble for the women themselves and/or the men who behold them; cf. e.g. *AJ* 1.288; 7.130; 11.199; 20.142.

happens to him (65). This order marks the beginning of the deterioration of her relationship with Herod. She is characterized as embittered (204, 208) and as taking many of Herod's actions in the worst possible way (70 'as was to be expected' for a woman, 202–203, 210, 222). She also, however, takes advantage of the love which Herod clearly, if problematically, bears her (65–66, 82–85, 204–205, 207, 216, 218–219), does not conceal her feelings (85, 208, 210–211, 214, 222), is arrogant (81, from the perspective of Salome; 212, 219), and has an inflated sense of her own nobility (36, 73, 210, 220); all of this is in part because she had 'something womanly and difficult about her by nature (*ti kai gunaikeion kai khalepon ek phuseōs*, 219).[34] However, in the section leading up to, and including, Mariamme's execution at the hands of Herod a noticeably more positive note creeps in, when she is called prudent (*sōphrōn*) in most things and also faithful (*pistē*) to Herod (219). And while she used to operate *in tandem* with her wicked mother Alexandra (e.g. 202), this now changes, too: in a calculated show of histrionics, Alexandra pretends ignorance of the things Mariamme is accused of in order to save herself, while Mariamme exercises great self-control up to the end (15.232–233). Using strongly evaluative terms, the narrator makes explicit how Mariamme's behaviour reflects on that of her mother:

> For [Mariamme] did not say one word, nor was she disturbed when she looked at Alexandra's annoying behaviour. Through her attitude she indicated, as it were, that her mother had behaved offensively and that she was more than angry about her evidently shameless behaviour. She, at last, truly went to her death calmly and without any change of complexion, clearly displaying her nobility to those who were looking at her, even in her last moments.
>
> *AJ* 15.235–236

At this point, it may be concluded that the change in Mariamme's characterization serves local rhetorical needs: she becomes the positive pole of a *sunkrisis* which pits her against Alexandra, and this is convincing to the extent that her story is temporarily aligned with the conventional pattern of a rogue character redeeming herself in death.[35] However, her obituary takes full account of her positive and negative sides, combining them into an integrated portrait:

34 For other instances of 'typically' female behaviour encapsulated by the word *gunaikeios*, cf. *AJ* 2.54; 15.44, 69, 168; 17.121; 18.255.

35 Cf. Ash 1999: 84, and van Henten 2007 and Swoboda 2014 on noble death in Josephus.

> So Mariamme died this way, a woman who excelled in self-control (*enkrateian*) and greatness of mind (*megalopsukhian*) but fell short (*eleipen*) in reason (*to d' epieikes*); contentiousness had the upper hand in her character (*pleion ēn en tēi phusei to philoneikon*). Yet in physical beauty and dignity of manners she surpassed the women of her time more than one could say. But the greatest cause of her not living acceptably or pleasantly with the king arose from just this: while being paid court because of his love and not expecting anything unpleasant from him she kept up a disproportionate frankness (*parrhēsian*).
>
> *AJ* 15.237–238

Josephus appears to have realized that not all strands of Mariamme's characterization sit comfortably together (e.g. *enkrateia* and *megalopsukhia* on the one hand, and *parrhēsia* and *philoneikia* on the other). He meets the challenge by ranking Mariamme's various virtues and vices, suggesting that her 'contentiousness' was her most important trait and played the most important role in her eventual downfall. In the process, Mariamme's portrait has become quite rounded and individual. While her contentiousness resonates with earlier remarks on her 'typically' female behaviour, the total picture cannot easily be reduced to any simple type.[36]

While Josephus here appears to go out of his way to create a coherent portrait, there are occasions on which he lets apparent inconsistencies stand side by side. This can be illustrated with the help of what is perhaps Josephus' most ambitious reflection on character. It is inserted after a narrative episode which relates how Saul, the first ruler of the united kingdom of Judah and Israel, killed the High Priest Abimelech and his entire family:

> [By committing this deed, Saul] gave everyone to learn and understand the ways of man (*ton anthrōpinon tropon*): as long as they are private, humble citizens, they are gentle and moderate (*epieikeis eisi kai metrioi*), because they are incapable of exhibiting their nature (*khrēsthai tēi phusei*) and do not dare to do as they wish; they only pursue justice (*to dikaion*), and on that they focus all their positive impulses and energy (*spoudēn*). As for the Deity, they are convinced that he is present to everything that happens in life, and does not only witness their actions, but even knows the very thoughts that give rise to those actions. When, however, they attain

36 Cf. van Henten 2014: 162, noting, for instance, that *megalopsukhia* is elsewhere a typically male trait in Josephus (of ambiguous morality).

> to authority and dynastic power, they set all these things aside, and taking off, like stage masks, their habits and manners (*hōsper epi skēnēs prosōpeia ta ēthē kai tous tropous apothemenoi*), they instead put on audacity (*tolman*), recklessness (*aponoian*) and contempt (*kataphronēsin*) for matters human and divine; and at the moment when they are most in need of piety (*eusebeias*) and justice (*dikaiosunēs*), since they are now most exposed to envy, with their thoughts and actions manifest to all, then, as if God no longer saw them or was afraid because of their authority, they act without restraint (*emparoinousi tois pragmasin*). Their fear of rumours, their wilful hates, their irrational loves—they regard all these things as valid, sure and true, and as pleasing to men and God alike, while to the future they give no thought at all.
>
> *AJ* 6.262–266

This comment moves on an abstract plain. The reference to 'human nature'[37] suggests that Saul's story shows that no human being can fully incarnate God's divine will as king, and this chimes with indications to this effect given earlier in the narrative.[38] But the logic of the argument is difficult to follow. On the one hand, Josephus unfolds a theory of gradual character revelation: the implication is that a ruler's firm grip on power gives him the opportunity finally to 'exhibit his [true] nature' (*khrēsthai tēi phusei*) and to do as he pleases; the morally upstanding behaviour he displayed before, encapsulated in the phrase *ta ēthē kai tous tropous*, turns out to be disposable. On this reading, the ruler never was actually gentle, moderate or just (and this may alert us to the fact that when Josephus states that someone '*is* gentle and moderate' or the like, he does not necessarily refer to inherent qualities, but may have projected, cultivated traits in view). On the other hand, Josephus suggests that the ruler's character is adversely affected by his hold on power, specifically because emotions (fear, hate, love and envy) and a susceptibility to slander begin to cloud his judgement; the connotation of madness which the noun *aponoia* and the verb

37 Only here is *tropos* used to refer to 'human nature', no doubt because of its associations with 'change' (of circumstances or character?); cf. *trepō* 'turn'. Begg 2005: 171 claims that the passage articulates a universal tragic pattern.

38 Cf. *AJ* 6.40–42, 60–61 (speeches of Samuel), drawing a sharp distinction between God and kings. The main exception is Moses, whose legislation is believed faithfully to reflect the divine will and so to be 'greater than [Moses'] own [human] nature' (*tēs autou phuseōs kreittona*) (*AJ* 3.320). For the motif of 'superiority to human nature', cf. also *AJ* 15.372; 19.345. Van Henten 2014: 277 notes how the motif plays on the tragic trope that 'human nature must think human thoughts' (S. *TrGF* 590.1).

paroinein carry strongly suggests that the ruler is no longer himself, up to the point that his earlier virtues are so completely suppressed that it makes sense to speak about character change.[39]

The combination of these two explanatory models is uneasy and poses an interpretative challenge. One factor to emphasize is the programmatic nature of the passage. Both models will play a role, either in isolation or in combination, in the narrative about Saul's successors, and so the passage underlines that, in one way or another, monarchy is a form of rule which is bound to lead to problems. Still, careful readers will also find that both strands of the argument resonate with certain elements of Saul's story. For instance, when it is determined that he should become king, Saul's first response is to hide himself, 'I think', Josephus says (marking an extra-biblical addition; cf. 1 Sam. 10.21–22), 'because he did not wish to appear eager to take the rulership' (*AJ* 6.63)—which implies that he *was* eager and deliberately hid that side of himself. When he spares the Amalekite king Agag even though God demands his execution, the narrator states that Saul disobeyed God, 'being overcome by his emotions and giving in to an untimely pity' (137); this exacerbates a process of deterioration which set in even earlier.[40] The narratees, then, are prompted to apply to Saul an even more differentiated view of character than that which the narrator applied to Mariamme, considering both the preceding and following account of Saul with questions in mind about what traits were dominant in what parts of Saul's life, who he really was, and who he really became.[41] There may be no definitive answers, and ultimately readers may well be left with a sense of Saul's inscrutability.[42]

That Josephus at times intends narratees to think about his protagonists in such ways may be illustrated through two final examples. One case in point is the obituary of the matricide and fratricide Aristobulus I, which casts him, among other things, as someone of 'a gentle nature' (*phusei … epiekei*) and given to 'modesty' (*aidous*) (*AJ* 13.319). This striking evaluation of a murderer

39 Feldman 1998: 531 emphasizes this aspect of the passage, claiming that Josephus' 'main point is that Saul's character suffered because of his accession to power'.

40 Cf. *AJ* 6.102, 104, 146–151.

41 For Josephus' multi-faceted portrait of Saul, see Feldman 1982; 1998: 509–536. He remains, for instance, exceptionally brave and is prepared to meet death on the battlefield (*AJ* 6.343–350).

42 A possible parallel is Tacitus' characterization of the enigmatic Tiberius in *Annales* 1–6; Koestermann 1963–1968: vol. 1, 38 suggests that Tacitus deliberately provides readers with alternative scenarios from which they can choose.

has been called 'almost comical',[43] and there is something to this; the whole sequence is rather reminiscent of the fictional court speeches which pupils at the declamation schools were asked to write and which often set out to defend the indefensible in extravagant ways.[44] On the other hand, the obituary is consistent with one strand in Aristobulus' earlier characterization: he really did love his brother Antigonus and was led astray only 'reluctantly'[45] by the rumour-mongering of 'wicked persons' into believing that he was plotting against him (*AJ* 13.302–307). Antigonus' execution is presented as an object-lesson about how 'there is nothing more powerful than envy and calumny, nor anything that more easily disrupts friendship and the ties of nature (*phusikēn oikeiotēta*) than these influences' (310), and Aristobulus immediately regrets it (314). It is still surprising that the obituary should focus on who Aristobulus once was (and, dimly, remained) rather than on what he had become, but the result is poignant rather than comical: it reinforces the moral lesson that outside influences can make people behave contrary to their deepest nature, and imbues the story with a tinge of regret.

Something close to the opposite of this can be observed in Josephus' treatment of Herod the Great's father Antipater, the self-appointed right-hand man of Hyrcanus II. Upon his introduction he is characterized rather negatively as 'energetic by nature and rebellious' (*drastērios de tēn phusin kai stasiastēs, AJ* 14.8),[46] and the subsequent narrative reports how he schemes (e.g. 11), persuades (131, 141–143), bribes (81), threatens (156–157) and fights (bravely: 134) his way to prominence. But when this extraordinarily ambitious character is murdered, his obituary straight-facedly states that he 'stood out because of his piety, justice and devotion to the fatherland' (*eusebeiai te kai dikaioisunēi dienenkōn kai tēi peri tēn patrida spoudēi*) (14.283). One could again think that the discrepancy results from the local needs which the initial character sketch and the obituary serve: the former explains Antipater's rise and pits him against Hyrcanus, who, as we have seen, lacks all ambition; the latter follows the scene of Antipater's murder at the hands of Malichus, and describing the victim in positive terms is Josephus' way of condemning Malichus.[47] However, the fact that

43 Mason in Feldman 2000: XXXII.

44 Cf. Russell 1983.

45 *Akōn* (*AJ* 13.307, if the text is sound).

46 The adjective *drastērios* is used by Thucydides (4.81.1) of Brasidas; otherwise rare, it is a favourite word of Josephus and denotes an important trait (though of ambiguous morality) in successful leaders; cf. *BJ* 1.204, 226, 283; 4.392, 624; 7.196; *AJ* 2.139; 5.182; 7.9; 8.318; 9.27, 93; 10.219; 13.407; 14.8, 13.

47 Landau 2006: 128 also points out that the obituary looks ahead at the narrative about

the final assessment comes in the form of a clearly marked obituary and the fact that it goes so far as to ascribe to Antipater the two key virtues which elsewhere mark out good rulers (see above) speak against such an interpretation. It is more likely that Josephus gives us to understand that, whatever we may think of Antipater's ambition, it preserved the integrity of the kingdom.[48] Imparting another lesson about the dubious relation between power and moral goodness, he seems to be suggesting that good leadership, including doing what is just and pleasing to God, is determined as much by the effects of someone's actions (a matter of *ēthos*) as by their true moral qualities (a matter of *phusis*).

Herod

King Herod the Great is Josephus' most elaborate character. The extensive reports about him in *War* 1 and *Antiquities* 14–17 function in the broader context as a guideline for the interpretation of the subsequent war against Rome.[49] We will briefly consider his characterization, bringing together some of the points made in the previous sections.

Herod is chiefly characterized by a mix of virtues and vices shared between both accounts. Important virtues are his energy (*phusei drastērios*, *BJ* 1.204 at Herod's introduction; also 1.283) and his bravery (*aretē*) in military affairs (*AJ* 14.159; 15.114; cf. *pros to deinon eupsukhos*, *AJ* 14.355). Another characteristic virtue is the king's magnanimity (*megalopsukhia*), which may refer to his generous treatment of others, including his Roman patrons (*AJ* 15.48, 196; 16.140–141) or activities like his care for subjects in need (15.316) or splendid buildings (*BJ* 1.401–428).[50] A related trait, which may be ambiguous, is Herod's *philotimia*, which can mean 'love of glory' (*AJ* 15.271; 16.153), but also 'ambition' (especially to erect new buildings, *BJ* 1.403, 408, 419; *AJ* 15.296, 303, 330) and 'munificence' (*AJ* 15.312, 315, 328; 16.149–150, 158). Negative traits include Herod's suspicion of relatives and other courtiers (*AJ* 15.42, 183, 210, 258, 264–265; 16.119, 223, 334), his

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Herod, whose vices are in many ways the mirror-image of the virtues ascribed to Antipater here (making this another *sunkrisis*).

48 In the corresponding passage in *War* Josephus explicitly states that Antipater 'restored the government to Hyrcanus and preserved it' (*BJ* 1.226). Cf. also *AJ* 14.277: Malichus plots the murder, because he thinks (mistakenly and ironically) that this might secure Hyrcanus' rule.

49 Van Henten 2011b.

50 See *SAGN* 3: 206 (Huitink and van Henten) for the characterizing function of building and buildings in Josephus.

jealousy (*BJ* 1.463, 633–634; *AJ* 15.50, 66–67, 82, 16.248), and his violent attitude (*AJ* 14.165; 15.321).

In *War*, Josephus deals with Herod's many contradictions by dividing the narrative into two sections, one about his struggle for the throne and his rule (1.203–428) and one about his private affairs (1.431–673). The passage that forms the transition to the second section (1.431) suggests that Herod was successful as king but privately unhappy: 'Fortune, however, made [Herod] pay for his public success with troubles at home. The origin of his ill-fated condition was a woman, with whom he was very much in love' (the woman referred to is his wife Mariamme I). In this way, Josephus paints a fairly positive image of Herod as a successful ruler. His public deeds articulate the picture that emerges from his virtues, highlighting three main points: Herod is a very loyal and successful friendly king of the Romans (e.g. *BJ* 1.282–283, 387–393, 400; see also *AJ* 15.183–198, 361), a superb military commander (also emphasized in the direct characterization in *BJ* 1.429–430), and an avid builder (*BJ* 1.401–428). His negative sides chiefly come out in the narrative about Herod's inability to control the factions within his household, who are constantly at each other's throats and attempt to take over the throne.

In *Antiquities*, the picture is more complex, and ultimately more damning. Josephus deconstructs the positive side of the image in *War*. He does so in part by making small changes. One addition, situated in a period when the Parthians and Antigonus controlled Jerusalem and Herod had to bring his close relatives to safety at Masada, describes how Herod panicked when the wagon with his mother overturned while the enemy was chasing them; Herod's companions had to prevent him from committing suicide (*AJ* 14.355–358). This brief story is absent from *War* and a crack in the image of Herod as a courageous and cool-headed military commander. Another episode absent from *War* concerns Manaemus the Essene (*AJ* 15.373–379), who predicted that Herod would become king; his prediction implies that Herod lacks *dikaiosunē* and *eusebeia* (15.375–376; differently: *BJ* 1.400), the two main virtues of good rulers (see above).

Josephus also articulates the basic stereotype of the bad ruler as the stereotype of the tyrant by making explicit references to tyranny and by hints at the negative traits usually associated with tyrants (e.g. autocratic rule, arbitrariness, lawlessness, cruelty, greed, lack of trust, envy, murder of relatives).[51] In the case of Herod in *Antiquities*, Josephus makes the point that he is a tyrant

51 These traits are prominent in Suetonius' depictions of Nero and Domitian; see van Henten 2011a. For the example of Cleopatra, see van Henten 2005.

in a sophisticated way, by applying the idea of gradual character revelation. He feeds the readers with observations by others in the story that point to the king's tyrannical character (*AJ* 14.165; 15.70, 222, 321, 353; 16.1–5). After reporting Herod's first deed, the elimination of Ezekias' gang of robbers, Josephus notes already that prominent Jews became afraid of him: 'But the chief Jews were in great fear when they saw how violent (*biaion*) and bold (*tolmēron*) Herod was, and how much he longed for tyranny (*turannidos glikhomenon*)' (*AJ* 14.165). At the end of Herod's career Josephus presents us with the full picture of Herod as a tyrant in his revised story about the golden eagle episode (*AJ* 17.148–164): rage, pure anger, bitterness and cruelty characterize Herod's behaviour, as well as his conviction that the Jewish people despised him (17.148, 164). A flashback by Jewish delegates before Augustus after Herod's death connects Herod's tyrannical deeds with his character (*phusei*, *AJ* 17.304).[52] This implies that Herod was, in fact, a tyrant since his first public appearance, but that it became fully manifest only towards the end of his life.

Finally, in *Antiquities* episodes about Herod's public career alternate with episodes covering his private affairs, and this results in a more mixed picture of his character, too. *Antiquities* especially stresses to a much higher degree than *War* Herod's ambivalence towards his family. On the one hand he is, for example, determined to have his brother-in-law and High Priest Aristobulus III killed because he may be a competitor, but after the young man is murdered in one of the royal swimming pools, he is deeply moved by his death. Josephus makes this ambiguity explicit with the rare phrase 'sincere confusion of his feelings' (*sunkhusin tēs psukhēs alēthinēn*, *AJ* 15.60), which is repeated at 16.75, also referring to Herod. Herod's relationship with Mariamme I is another example, as he is torn apart by feelings of love and hatred towards her (*AJ* 15.211–212, 214).[53] At the same time, Josephus here seems to portray Herod as a dynamic character, who gradually succumbs to his bitterness and hatred, which eventually overcome the better aspects of his true nature.

Conclusion

Josephus interprets the history of the Jewish people and in particular its war with Rome largely in moral terms: leaders on both sides are categorized in terms of virtues and vices. Josephus' preoccupations in characterization inter-

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52 Cf. *BJ* 2.84, 88. Discussion in van Henten 2011a.

53 See also *AJ* 16.400–403.

estingly come to the fore in his concern to establish himself as a proper judge of history. Josephus' 'rhetoric of character' is at times quite sophisticated. This sophistication does not so much rise from subtle, implicit or novel techniques of characterization, but rather from the way in which Josephus elaborates and varies basic rhetorical models, such as that prescribed in the *progumnasmata*. He constantly analyses the character of his protagonists (especially breaking down the notion of virtue into many different component parts) against the background of a multi-layered conception of character, and uses several models, including gradual character revelation and character change, to explain and explore the relations between his protagonists' diverse and sometimes contradictory character traits and their actions and morality.

CHAPTER 15

Pausanias

*Maria Pretzler**

Characters in a Landscape

When you think of authors writing descriptions of human characters, Pausanias is certainly not the first ancient writer who would come to mind.[1] Thus, the invitation to contribute to this volume has been a pleasant challenge, and a chance to revisit Pausanias with new questions. In fact, he offers plenty of relevant material, and this is a particularly good opportunity to tackle the short narratives inserted as 'digressions' in the form of historical or biographical vignettes which are such an integral part of many ancient literary works and which have, in my view, never received enough attention.[2]

Pausanias' *Periēgēsis Hellados* ('*Tour around Greece*', often translated as '*Description of Greece*') was written from the early 160s (at the latest) to around AD 180.[3] It is a complex discussion, in minute detail, of the geography, memorial landscapes, traditions and monuments of Greece; Pausanias examines Greek cultural identity by investigating a region which could be seen as the most anciently and most quintessentially Greek.[4] The work shares features with a number of genres, particularly history, ethnography, geography and mythography, combining narrative, *ekphrasis*, and modes of 'scientific' writing as well as being strongly influenced by rhetoric, but the distinctive mix of these features deployed here is unique.[5]

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* I am grateful to the editors for challenging me to think about characters in Pausanias, for organizing such a stimulating conference, and for their helpful comments.

1 There is a long history of neglect, and at times even hostility, by literary scholars; see Habicht 1985: 98–101; Meyer 1954: 8; Pretzler 2007a: 12. The trend has been reversed since the 1990s, with fascinating results, e.g. Alcock, Cherry, Elsner 2001: vii–viii; Henderson 2001: 207; cf. Bingen 1996; Hutton 2005; Elsner 2001; Akujärvi 2005.

2 Cf. Pretzler 2010: esp. 94–104.

3 Bowie 2001: 21–23 (the shortest possible chronology, Book I finished by AD 165); Habicht 1985: 8–12 suggests that Book I was written in the 150s.

4 For a thorough introduction see Pretzler 2007a, esp. 1–31.

5 Hutton 2005: 247–255; Arenz 2006: 133–136; Bischoff 1938.

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Travelling in those days was a communicative activity—you would not bury your nose in a guide book and explore on your own, but you would stay for a while and find out about a place through conversation.[6] Nevertheless, Pausanias' informants hardly ever get more attention than phrases such as 'the Corinthians say' or 'the Spartans have a tradition'. We know they were there, but there is very little we, as readers, can find out about them: their presence in the text mainly serves to bolster Pausanias' own credentials as an on-site researcher.[7] Pausanias does, however, warn us that the local tradition has to be approached with caution.

> Bordering on the territory of Epidaurus are the Troezenians, more keen than others to glorify their local tradition. They say that the first to be born in their land was Orus. In my opinion, this is an Egyptian name and anything but Greek, but they insist that he became their king.
>
> PAUS. 2.30.5

These local informants provide the *Periēgēsis* with its most important assets, namely unique information which has never been written down before,[8] yet they can never be trusted: the text therefore becomes a constant multiple discourse between different local, probably mostly oral, traditions and the literary tradition, moderated by the ostensibly elusive, but also actively interventionist narrator. This narrator keeps a very low profile, but at the same time he is ever present, which explains why no discussion of the work is complete without a kind of character sketch[9] of this narrator who tells his reader, often lapsing into the second person singular, where to go and what to look at.[10] Sometimes, he speaks in first person singular, especially when he expresses personal opinions.[11] Usually it is through his eyes that you see a place, and so you get a sense of knowing him rather well, without actually knowing any specific details.

Looking at the list of literary devices used in characterization provided in the Introduction to this volume (→), we get a very paradoxical picture. If we want to characterize Pausanias himself, we have to rely solely on indirect

6 Pretzler 2007a: 35–41; cf. Pretzler 2004; Pretzler 2007b.

7 Jones 2001: 33; Pretzler 2005: 241–243; e.g. Paus. 1.35.7–8; 2.23.5–6; 7.23.7–8; 7.26.13; 8.25.7–11; 8.41.5.

8 Note Paus. 1.23.2, where this is made explicit.

9 E.g. Gurlitt 1890: 56–57, 130; Regenbogen 1956: 1012–1014; Meyer 1954: 15–18; Habicht 1985: 9–15; Bowie 2001: 21–25; Pretzler 2007a: 16–31.

10 E.g. Paus. 2.26.1; 6.22.8; 8.15.8; 8.35.1. See Akujärvi 2005: 145–165.

11 Akujärvi 2005: 25–178.

characterization, through the thoughts and opinions he chooses to divulge, and what we can deduce about his activities: in fact, the work never even mentions the author's (or narrator's) name and city.[12] We are walking alongside, so to speak, a shadowy figure who is always there, who selects what is 'worth seeing' and who guides our every step. As a reader, you want to get a sense of who this man is, because reading the *Periēgēsis* is very much a matter of trust, trust in the man who saw it all and who put it all together. In fact, for Pausanias himself, it is clear that he wants us to think like that: he says *idōn oida* 'I have seen, and therefore I know'.[13] While he never gives us the story of his own visits to Greece, his personal travel experience is nevertheless his main claim to authority.[14]

The many passages which reveal something about his narrator's character aim to establish the authority of one who has seen, enquired, analysed and who therefore knows what he is talking about: his credibility depends on it. Once early suspicions that Pausanias just compiled his works from books had been overcome,[15] the image most commentators saw emerge from the *Periēgēsis* was that of a 'dependable dullard': a man with hardly an agenda of his own, a kind of ancient version of a trainspotter, happy to compile accurate lists and to record facts, just reporting exactly what he saw, straightforwardly and sensibly, without literary pretension.[16] Some of these traits are plain to see when we are dealing with an author who patiently records details of over 200 victor statues in Olympia, a man who tells us that he bothers to read and record inscriptions even on empty statue bases.[17] But in recent years, the picture has been changing: we see a man who constantly reminds his readers that he is a *pepaideumenos*, a highly educated man who also hints at his wealth and status: his readers, almost certainly members of the same educated wealthy elite, would have been able to recognize him as one of their own.[18] Look further,

12 Diller 1956: 94; on name and title of the work see Habicht 1985: 5. The full title is mentioned in St. Byz. s.v. *Haimonia* (p. 50, line 5 Meineke); s.v. *Araithyrea* (p. 108, line 16 Meineke); s.v. *Sphakteria* (p. 594, l. 23 Meineke).

13 Paus. 2.22.3.

14 Pretzler 2007a: 16–31, 54–56.

15 Like virtually everybody dealing with Pausanias today, I am inclined to believe Pausanias on this. Note Wilamowitz' theory that the whole work was compiled from earlier lost literature, which influenced literary Pausanias scholarship for about a century. Wilamowitz 1877: 344–347, discussed in Habicht 1985: 165–167.

16 Alcock 1996: 241, 260–265; Hutton 2005: 22–23.

17 Paus. 8.30.5; 8.38.5; 8.49.1; see Whittaker 1991; Habicht 1985: 64–94.

18 Pretzler 2007a: 25–27; Pretzler 2004: 204–207.

and you find a confident intellectual who embarks on a massive project on the core cultural question of his own time: the question of Greek culture and identity.

Apart from giving us an impression, or at least some kind of idealized version, of himself, Pausanias also talks about hundreds of individuals, real or imagined. The *Periēgēsis* is full of names, and in most cases, names are all we are getting, perhaps with basic information about family connections, city of origin or position (e.g. a mythical king, or an obscure artist). In many cases, we hear nothing more about any characteristics of the persons who carried those names. Nevertheless, the names often characterize the places with which they are connected, particularly the ubiquitous eponymous heroes. Basic family connections are often the most important detail about these names: this fits the mythical character into a genealogy, and thereby links the place which shares their name with other places and defines some of their background and identity by a kind of 'family connection' between communities.

> When Azan, the son of Arcas died, athletic contests were held for the first time: there was certainly horse racing, but I do not know about other contests. Cleitor, son of Azan, lived in Lycosura and was the most powerful of the kings; he founded the city of Cleitor, and named it after himself. Aleus controlled his father's domain. As far as the sons of Elatus are concerned, Mount Cyllene takes its name from Cyllen, and Stymphalus gave his name to the spring and the city of Stymphalus near the spring.
>
> PAUS. 8.4.5–6

We may not hear much about these descendants of Arcas, but those cities gain a specific character through the mythical genealogy of such nondescript heroes with their unimaginative names which seem so obviously derived from already existing place names, and not the other way round. Simple naming, and listing of names, in Pausanias may not give a high profile to those many mythical nonentities, but it characterizes whole regions and communities in ways Greeks would have understood instinctively.[19]

19 Roy 1968 discusses the significance of this specific example.

The Logoi: Narrative Digressions

If we want more details we need to look at passages where Pausanias provides at least a minimum of historical, mythical and/or biographical narrative.[20] These passages are often described as 'digressions' because they diverge from the descriptions of sites and monuments, but we have to understand Pausanias' work as an integrated combination of sights and stories, *theōrēmata* and *logoi*,[21] and therefore, the term 'digression' is rather misleading. There are a few digressions dealing with specific individuals, although it is not quite correct to call them biographical. Pausanias focuses on the highlights in these individuals' lives, presents anecdotes illustrating their character, and explains their importance. The longest such excursuses deal with Philopoemen, Epaminondas and Aratus.[22] A number of other individuals also gain special attention, but in some cases, we just get a few remarks or a short anecdote, and in some cases, longer digressions might be better described as a historical narrative of the period with a special focus on a particular individual, for example a number of historical *logoi* on Hellenistic history inserted in the description of Athens.[23] It is quite difficult to explain why Pausanias found it necessary to discuss these individuals at greater length than others. All these passages are attached to specific memorials: in fact, in the case of Philopoemen, his *logos* is included in Tegea not because this was the most fitting place to discuss the Achaean general, but because it was there that Pausanias found an epigram in his honour which was worth including.[24] Pausanias tells us that he is influenced by a sense that some periods of Greek history were being forgotten, particularly the Hellenistic period.[25] Outstanding qualities or a significant impact on the fate of Greece are also plausible reasons; in fact, at the end of Philopoemen's life, Pausanias lists particularly distinguished characters: Epaminondas and Aratus are there, while he presents Philopoemen as the last of good men in Greece.[26]

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20 Despite the very different scope of biographical sketches in Pausanias, a comparison with Plutarch (→) is very useful to understand his context and the expectations of his readership.

21 Paus. 1.39.3.

22 Paus. 8.49.2–51.8 (Philopoemen); 9.13.1–15.16 (Epaminondas); 2.8.1–9.6 (Aratus).

23 Paus. 1.9.3–5 (Ptolemies); 1.9.5–10.5 (Lysimachus and other Successors); 1.11.1–13.9 (Pyrrhus of Epirus); 1.16.1–3 (Seleucus).

24 Pretzler 2007a: 80. Polybius was probably the main source, but would probably not have approved of this way of approaching characters (→).

25 Paus. 1.6.1.

26 Paus. 8.52.1–4.

Characterizations in these historical *logoi* are always indirect. Pausanias tells us about some of the actions of his characters, but he also lets us know how others honoured them. Direct speech is almost completely absent from these passages.[27] This is even more striking since Pausanias is willing to cite oracles, inscriptions or poetry in connection with these *logoi*.[28]

There are some longer historical passages which allow for more complex narratives, but most of this material comes in the form of historical or biographical vignettes—one or two paragraphs of concentrated information inserted into the text as background information or illustration: for this form of narrative, selection and reduction to the most relevant features is key, and every detail counts, while narrative coherence might be of secondary importance. We see Pausanias' approach to characterization distilled down to essentials.

Pausanias usually does not mince his words in these passages. He is less interested in giving a full biographical overview than in providing the most relevant details about a particular person and often also a historical period, and this frequently goes hand in hand with a decisive moral judgement. Some of these passages simply consist of direct characterization. For example, in the case of Isocrates, there is hardly any narrative, just a list of his most important achievements and qualities.

> On a pillar is a statue of Isocrates, who is still remembered for three reasons: the fact that he diligently continued to teach to the end of his life, just two years short of a hundred; his self-restraint in keeping away from politics and in not getting involved in public affairs; and his dedication to freedom which meant that he committed suicide because he was so distressed about the news of the battle of Chaeronea.
>
> PAUS. 1.18.8

Some lives are entirely defined by anecdotes: this is particularly clear in Pausanias' discussion of Olympic victors. Certain qualities of extreme *kalokagathia* were presumably taken for granted in any of the men who had achieved such success, and thus Pausanias merely enlivens his long catalogue with an occasional collection of stories which resemble folk tales. These stories, which mainly illustrate extraordinary strength and stamina, are often reminiscent of episodes from Heracles' or Theseus' early lives: Pausanias emphasizes

27 With the exception of one short sentence from Epaminondas, Paus. 9.13.2.

28 See, for example, Paus. 4.1.1–4.29.13, the long historical introduction to the Messenian book.

the quasi-mythical heroic status these individuals achieved, and shows their importance in local as well as common Greek tradition.

> Not far from the aforementioned kings is [the statue of] Theagenes, son of Timosthenes, of Thasos. The Thasians say that Timosthenes was not Theagenes' father, but Heracles, who appeared to the mother in the form of Timosthenes and had intercourse with her. In his ninth year, they say, he one walked home from his tutor he took a liking to a bronze statue of one of the gods in the marketplace, picked it up, put it on one of his shoulders, and carried it home. The citizens were angry about what he had one, but one respected man of advanced age asked them not to kill the boy and ordered him to bring the statue back from his home to the marketplace. Because of this, he was soon famous for his strength, and they talked about his feat in all of Greece.
>
> PAUS. 6.11.2–3

Other figures, those who were not already well defined by a very specific achievement such as an Olympic victory, allowed for a greater variety of comments. Where Pausanias gives himself enough space, the crucial detail which for him defines the character often comes in the first sentence, and the rest of the story is used to illustrate the impression which has been established from the beginning. Readers are usually presented with examples of a person's actions which illustrate the character traits highlighted by Pausanias. A more explicit verdict at the end may be used to reinforce the moral lesson we are expected to draw from the story. Pausanias tends to be selective in what he tells us: he has no problem with painting his characters almost entirely black or white. For example, in the case of Seleucus, the king's piety defines the whole biography, and some of the more unsavoury details, for example, the murder of Perdiccas, which was the turning point of Seleucus' career, are simply omitted.

> … Seleucus, who received unmistakable signs of his future good fortune. When Seleucus was about to set out from Macedonia with Alexander, he sacrificed to Zeus in Pella, and the wood on the altar proceeded to the image of its own accord and began to burn without anybody setting it on fire. After Alexander's death, Seleucus fled to Ptolemy son of Lagus when Antigonus arrived in Babylon, but then returned again and defeated Antigonus, killing him and capturing his son Demetrius, who had arrived with an army. …
>
> I am convinced that Seleucus was the most righteous and pious of these kings. Seleucus sent back to the Milesians and to Branchidae the

> bronze Apollo which Xerxes had taken to Ecbatana in Media, and when he founded Seleucia-on-Tigris and settled Babylonian colonists there, he spared the walls of Babylon and the sanctuary of Bel, and allowed the Chaldaeans to live nearby.
>
> PAUS. 1.16.1; 1.16.3

This passage is also a typical example of Pausanias' habit to back up his own opinion with evidence that the gods agree with him: readers are allowed to observe the signs which indicate the gods' favourable opinion of Seleucus, and who would disbelieve a characterization backed up by divine intervention?[29]

The same principles apply to a negative characterization. In fact anecdotes about historical and mythical figures punished by the gods appear much more frequently. Pausanias' verdict on Cassander is a particularly striking example:

> It seems to me that Cassander mainly rebuilt Thebes because of his hatred for Alexander: after all, he accomplished the destruction of Alexander's family. Olympias he had stoned to death by the Macedonians who were angry with her, and he poisoned the sons of Alexander, Heracles by Barsine and Alexander by Rhoxane. But his own life did not end happy: he was afflicted by dropsy, and from this came worms while he was still alive.
>
> His oldest son Philip died from consumption soon after taking the throne. The next son, Antipater, murdered his mother Thessalonice, daughter of Philip son of Amyntas and of Nicesipolis, accusing her of being too fond of Alexander, the youngest of Cassander's sons. With the help of Demetrius, son of Antigonus, Alexander deposed and punished his brother Antipater, but in Demetrius, he found a murderer, not an ally. Thus some god meted out justice to Cassander.
>
> PAUS. 9.7.2–4

It is worth noting the strongly moralizing tone, and the complete condemnation in this passage. Pausanias is hardly ever subtle in his characterizations, and once he has made up his mind, a whole life is interpreted along the same lines. Pausanias conveys a strong and unerring sense of what is right and wrong, and expects his readers to share the same moral code. For example, the restoration of an ancient city such as Thebes would usually find Pausanias' favour, but here he suggests that it was a good deed done for the entirely wrong reasons, so even

29 Other examples: Paus. 8.7.4–8 (Philip); 9.23.2–4 (Pindar); 9.33.6 (Sulla).

this respectful gesture towards a city with a venerable past is not allowed to become a redeeming feature for Cassander, and it seems that the gods agreed, with devastating consequences.[30]

Genealogy is also a crucial aspect of characterization in Pausanias, and this is particularly clear where the emphasis seems unusual. For example, we can compare the beginning of his biographical sketch of Ptolemy I with that of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

> The Macedonians believe that Ptolemy was the son of Philip, son of Amyntas, although he was called the son of Lagus, because when Philip gave Ptolemy's mother to Lagus in marriage, she was already pregnant.
>
> PAUS. 1.6.2

This version of Ptolemy's ancestry was probably invented at a late stage. Pausanias nevertheless uses it as the beginning of his account of the wars of the successors (1.6.2–9) and uses it to underline Ptolemy's central role in these conflicts. Despite the fact that Pausanias paints Philip II in a very negative light,[31] he is in this case more focused on Ptolemy's elevation to half-brother of Alexander, although some of Philip's ruthlessness and prowess as a diplomat and general also shines through.

The approach to Pyrrhus of Epirus is subtly different:

> This Pyrrhus was not related to Alexander, except by ancestry. Pyrrhus was the son of Aeacides, son of Arybbas, while Alexander was the son of Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus; and the father of Neoptolemus and Arybbas was Alcetas, son of Tharypus. There are fifteen generations from Tharypus to Neoptolemus, son of Achilles.
>
> PAUS. 1.11.1

Although Pyrrhus actually was a relative of Alexander, Pausanias explicitly emphasizes that it is merely a distant relationship, before launching into a complex account of how Pyrrhus became king, painting him as a mere bystander in the wars of the successors. This whole backstory,[32] despite obvious connec-

30 Indicentally, Cassander's re-foundation of Thebes is mentioned twice more (Paus. 4.27.10; 7.6.9), both less than enthusiastically, and there is also a reference to his re-foundation of Potidaea (5.23.3) as Cassandria. More negative comments are presented in 1.6.7 (the worst of the successors) and 1.25.7 (he hates Athens and installs a tyrant).

31 Paus. 8.7.5–8.

32 Paus. 1.11.1–5.

tions with Achilles and the Argiads of Macedonia, makes Pyrrhus seem like an outsider, perhaps in keeping with his adventures in Italy, which are related in some detail.[33]

Respect for great men of the past is often emphasized by references to the honours they received either in life or after their death, be it honorary statues, inscriptions and monuments, or even heroic cults. A report of the reactions of compatriots and visitors can demonstrate the great importance of a particular individual within his (occasionally her) community and beyond. For example, the general esteem for Epaminondas, even among former enemies, is particularly emphasized: Pausanias reports that three cities, namely Mantinea, Athens and Sparta, still had competing claims to the man who killed Epaminondas in the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE, and the Athenians even had a monument to go with their version of the story. Not only that, the emperor Hadrian himself had restored the tomb of Epaminondas, carefully combining old features with new additions, and personally composed an epigram in his honour.[34]

Characterizations and Art

One distinctive feature of the *Periēgēsis* is its attention to works of art, in particular thousands of sculptures, but also a considerable number of paintings. Pausanias is clearly alert to artistic style and to iconography as a means of expression, but we should bear in mind that *ekphrasis* in Pausanias is mostly concerned with what is depicted, not how it is shown, and he does not display the same interest in how an artist might convey character or emotions, particularly through painting, that we see in the works of some contemporary authors, particularly Lucian, but also the Philostrati.[35] Pausanias does show some interest in iconography, which is particularly important in identifying gods and understanding local interpretations of divinities. Attributes of images could provide information about a god or goddess, but this was often more about understanding the local interpretation of a particular divinity, which may or may not capture a particular character trait particularly well. Pausanias does, at times, emphasize that a statue reflected a particular insight into a divine character.

33 Paus. 1.12.1–13.1.

34 Paus. 8.11.5–6 (traditions); 8.11.8 (tomb).

35 Schönberger 1995: esp. 167–169; Becker 1995: 41–44; Elsner 2000. Pausanias: Pretzler 2007a: 105–114; Lucian: Pretzler 2009.

A similar approach to the depictions of human characters is rare. The best example is perhaps a relief in Argos:

> Beyond the theatre is a sanctuary of Aphrodite, and before the image is a stele depicting the poetess Telesilla. Books lie scattered at her feet, and she looks at a helmet in her hand, which she is about to put on her head.
>
> PAUS. 2.20.8

This passage serves as introduction to the story of a woman who was not only a distinguished poet, but also helped defend her city against the Spartans. The iconography of the artwork does not convey character in the modern sense, but still sums up the two most important things the Argives wanted everybody to remember about her. Pausanias uses his description here to back up his highly unusual story and demonstrate the importance of Telesilla in Argive tradition.

Through works of art, it was also possible to get a sense of individual artists. Pausanias claims that he can distinguish the individual styles of some artists, and perhaps, at times, it was also possible to catch a glimpse of the artist's personality. Daedalus, for example, was almost certainly an entirely mythical character, but there were a number of artefacts which were allegedly his work. Pausanias presents parts of the story of Daedalus, rationalizing some of the more fantastic details,[36] but what tells us much more about the importance of the artist is a sense of awe that Pausanias expresses when he encounters one of his works, and his efforts to know them all.[37] Pausanias never quite explains what these works look like, although we probably have to imagine them as early archaic sculptures. He states explicitly, however, that despite their simple form, these works conveyed a sense of a special kind of inspiration.[38] In the end, these very ancient, venerable works of art could perhaps bring you closer to the personality of Daedalus than all the fantastic stories about him, even if Pausanias does not quite manage to put it into words.

Although the guiding voice through the *Periēgēsis* is always that of Pausanias' unnamed traveller-narrator, he does report others' opinions, too, particularly those of local informants and, less frequently, literary authorities, especially Homer. Sometimes a number of these voices are allowed to contradict each other, a method well known from Herodotus.[39] Pausanias may then rise

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36 Paus. 6.4.4–7.

37 Paus. 2.4.5; 9.40.3–4; cf. 1.27.1; 9.11.4; 9.39.8.

38 Paus. 2.4.5. 'All the works of Daedalus, although rather uncouth to look at, are nevertheless distinguished by a kind of inspiration.'

39 Although this method is not applied in Herodotus' characterizations (→).

above the fray and make an authoritative decision, but he does not always do so, and a character can almost disappear behind various contradictory opinions. For example, Pausanias' discussion of Hesiod is almost the antithesis of characterization, since any 'facts' about the poet simply seem to buckle under the weight of tradition and perhaps also scholarly contention: too many voices may leave us with nothing to hold on to except texts of variably credible attribution, and Hesiod as a person or as an author remains elusive. Most of what we learn here is not about the archaic poet, but we can deduce a lot about the Greeks of Pausanias' era and their traditions.[40]

Intertextuality

Since the *Periēgēsis* is a trip through the memorial landscapes of Greece, and a lengthy treatise on the cultural memories of the Greeks, both intertextuality and internarrativity are key to Pausanias' project, and this also shapes the way in which he defines characters. I am using 'internarrativity' alongside the more common term 'intertextuality', since I want to stress that Pausanias strongly depended on oral tradition alongside texts,[41] which would mean that he would appeal to readers' knowledge of particular narratives, but not necessarily in the form of specific literary texts: in fact, when Pausanias reads works of art to decipher the stories they convey,[42] he reminds us that such narrative traditions were also transmitted through the visual arts, not merely in words. The *Periēgēsis* is conceived as a depository of memories, reacting to, and recording the impact of, various locations and objects of memory in the Greek landscape which represented multiple, often contradictory versions of the past. By the Roman imperial period, local traditions in Greece were strongly influenced by the canonical classical literary tradition, and local stories about mythical and historical figures sought corroboration through these texts or offered additional details which the original author had 'omitted'. The crucial literary reference works were first and foremost the Homeric epics, but also classical historiography, specifically Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, and Attic drama also had an influence well beyond the borders of Attica. Since Pausanias could sim-

40 Paus. 9.31.4–6. Cf. details about Homer, Paus. 10.24.2–3: at the end, Pausanias refuses to engage with the discussion, and he does not give his opinion.

41 Pretzler 2005.

42 Pretzler 2007: 112–114; e.g. Paus. 10.25.1–31.12 (Lesche of the Cnidians at Delphi); 3.18.11–16 (Throne of Apollo of Amyclae); 5.17.5–19.10 (Chest of Cypselus at Olympia).

ply assume that all his readers would know these canonical texts intimately and in great detail, a short reference was enough to make his intentions and opinions clear. All the great names in the following passage needed no introduction, and the main events in their lives are just ticked off in the shortest possible terms.

> After Miltiades, Leonidas, son of Anaxandrides, and Themistocles, son of Neocles, forced Xerxes out of Greece, Themistocles in the two naval battles and Leonidas in the battle at Thermopylae. But the commanders of Plataea, Aristides, son of Lysimachus and Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, do not count among the benefactors of Greece, Pausanias for his subsequent misdemeanours and Aristides because he imposed tribute on the island Greeks.
>
> PAUS. 8.52.2

These literary traditions were so strong and reliably recognisable that they could also be used indirectly, providing meaningful parallels which could illustrate Pausanias' point of view and yet again save him lengthy explanations.

> Not long afterwards the Argives celebrated the Nemean Games, and Philopoemen happened to attend the cithara competition. Pylades of Megalopolis, the most famous cithara player of his time who had already won a Pythian victory, was singing the *Persians* by Timotheus of Miletus. When he had begun the ode with 'Forging for Greece the great and glorious adornment of freedom' the Greek audience looked at Philopoemen and indicated with applause that the song referred to him. I have heard that something similar happened to Themistocles at Olympia, for the spectators there rose to honour him.
>
> PAUS. 8.50.3

This passage is a good example of metaphorical characterization, as defined in the Introduction to this volume: it depends on the fact that Themistocles is a major character in Herodotus' work:[43] the detail about his reception in Olympia might not be mentioned by Herodotus, but the passage and its impact depend on readers knowing much more about Themistocles, and why he received those honours. Pausanias' readers could be expected to understand the full significance of the parallel between the Athenian commander

43 Herodotus' characterizations, too, build on such connections (→).

and Philopoemen, who was less widely known. The Persian war connection is reinforced by yet another literary reference, implying that the audience within the story also saw the connection and approved of it. Thus Herodotus provides all the positive associations Pausanias wants to assign to Philopoemen: the fifth century historian is used to aid the characterization of an Achaean general who was active centuries after his death, rather than the less well-known Polybius, who had a lot more to say about his fellow-Megalopolitan, older contemporary and personal hero.

While some characterizations directly interact with information provided by specific texts, Pausanias was in fact more interested in covering aspects of the past which were not yet well known from widely read literature: the quest to track down rare insights and knowledge which could only be found in specific places is at the core of his project.[44] Thus, he often drew on widely circulating traditions about well-known characters which were not fixed in one literary work, but were subject to a complex literary and probably also oral tradition, and confronted them with details which could vary subtly according to who told the story, or where it was told. This is particularly true for prominent mythical heroes, such as Heracles or Theseus, but famous literary and historical figures were also part of the main cast of the collective Greek memory. Thus, some of Pausanias' short character studies clearly imply a conversation with his readers' memories.

For example, Pausanias discusses Demosthenes twice, and both times he simply takes it for granted that his readers know the crucial details.

> There is also [a statue of] Demosthenes, whom the Athenians forced to retire to Calauria, the island off Troezen, then received again, just to drive him out again after the blow of Lamia.
>
> Demosthenes went into exile a second time, crossing again to Calauria, and there committed suicide by poison, the only Greek exile whom Archias could not bring back to Antipater and the Macedonians. … this is what he got in return for his great love for Athens, I agree with the saying that a man who throws himself fully into politics putting faith into the people will never meet a happy end.
>
> PAUS. 1.8.2–3

The focus is on the suffering and death of Demosthenes in exile, and Pausanias' musings about the rewards (or otherwise) of public life at the end of the pas-

44 E.g. Paus. 1.6.1.

sage only make sense if you already know the life story of Demosthenes and his eminence in Athenian politics, not to mention the esteem his rhetorical style enjoyed among Pausanias' contemporaries. This short discussion of Demosthenes draws on the readers' previous knowledge and turns the Attic orator into a tragic character by focusing not on what he did, but by what happened to him at the very end: the achievements of his earlier life simply needed no introduction. A second passage on Demosthenes in the context of the description of Calauria, where he died, demonstrates a similar approach.[45] In this case, Pausanias launches into a story which is designed to prove that Demosthenes was not involved in the Harpalus affair. Yet again, readers are already expected to know details about the accusations of taking bribes from Alexander's fugitive treasurer which led to the orator's final exile.[46]

Intratextuality and Emperors

Reading Pausanias also means a constant grappling with intratextuality: since the main organizing principle is geography, many characters appear in different places of the *Periēgēsis*, and we do not know how far Pausanias expects us to read these scattered passages in concert. In fact, it is difficult to tell whether he expected anybody to read his work from cover to cover (or rather, from scroll I to scroll X), or whether he assumed that readers would try to target particular areas which attracted their special interest. If characterizations of specific figures in different places add up to a coherent whole, it might merely suggest that Pausanias' views were consistent, but his frequent cross-references might hint at a more systematic approach, where crucial information is held back, and then added at a more opportune moment, where the context might add more to our understanding of the character.

Hadrian is an interesting example, because we get an explicit characterization right at the beginning of the work.

> These are the original Athenian *eponumoi*. But later they had tribes named after Attalus the Mysian, Ptolemy the Egyptian and, in my own time, the emperor Hadrian, who went furthest in his respect for the gods and who contributed most to the happiness of all of his subjects. He never voluntarily started a war, but he defeated the rebellion of the Hebrews

45 Paus. 2.33.3–5.

46 Hyp. *Dem.* 3; Plu. *Dem.* 25.2–26.4.

> beyond Syria. Some sanctuaries of the gods he built from the beginning, others he adorned with dedications and equipment; he gave gifts to Greek cities, and sometimes even to those of the barbarians who asked him: all this is inscribed in Athens, at the sanctuary common to all the gods.
>
> PAUS. 1.5.5

This glowing assessment is later on corroborated by examples across Pausanias' Greece, as Pausanias comes across monuments and sites where Hadrian had funded new buildings or renovations of old sanctuaries. Hadrian is the most positive figure among the emperors, again and again he appears as benefactor, renewer of ancient traditions and thoroughly respectful of ancient Greek tradition, for example at the sanctuary of Poseidon Hippius at Mantinea:[47]

> I write about this sanctuary only what I have heard, just like all others who have mentioned it. The temple of our own time was built by the emperor Hadrian, who had overseers supervise the workmen, to ensure that nobody looked into the ancient sanctuary and that none of the ruins were removed.
>
> PAUS. 8.10.2

Because the *Periēgēsis* is a geographical work, we can also imagine the characterization of some of these particularly generous benefactors as literally dotted across the landscape, in stone and mortar, be it the *stelae* depicting Polybius in gratitude for his support in the settlement of the province after the Roman conquest,[48] or the grand monuments funded by Herodes Atticus.[49] Pausanias' judgement depends on how a historical figure respected the Greek memorial landscape, and whether their additions respect local tradition. At times, therefore, traces in the landscape can also hint at negative characteristics: the looting of ancient artworks, particularly of sacred images, reflects badly on any character,[50] and the scars left by Nero's attempt to cut a canal through the Isthmus

47 Cf. Paus. 1.42.5; 8.8.12; 10.35.1–2; Arafat 1996: 159–188.

48 Paus. 8.9.2; 8.37.2; 8.44.5; 8.48.8; Paus. 8.30.8–9 adds a short eulogy to the description of Polybius' stele at Megalopolis, explaining the background of these monuments.

49 Paus. 1.19.6; 2.1.7; 6.21.2; 10.32; Paus. 7.20.6 specifically mentions Herodes' Odeion in Athens, which had not been built when Pausanias wrote his description of Attica, but was too impressive to miss, while in Olympia, Pausanias ignores the large Nymphaeum: had Herodes gone too far? Cf. Pausanias' eulogy of Lycurgus, the Athenian politician, through a list of his building works (Paus. 1.29.16).

50 E.g. Paus. 9.27.3–4; 9.33.6.

are, to Pausanias and his readers, a vivid reminder of the emperor's hubris, and without a need to mention his name.

> He who tried to turn the Peloponnese into an island gave up before he had dug through the Isthmus. And the place from where they began to dig can still be seen, but they never advanced into the rock. Thus the Peloponnese is still mainland, as it is by nature. Alexander the son of Philip wanted to dig through Mimas, and this was his only project which did not succeed. The Pythia stopped the Cnidians' attempt to dig through their isthmus. This is how difficult it is for human beings to change by force what the gods have ordained.
>
> PAUS. 2.1.5

Nero is, in fact, not described as entirely bad, if we look elsewhere in the *Periēgēsis*,[51] but even when Pausanias reports Nero's grand gesture to give freedom to the Greeks, he immediately points out that the measure did not last: Nero's character is described as a 'noble character depraved by a vicious upbringing', and just as the emperor's own virtue was never allowed to develop, so the Greeks were not able to make the best of their freedom: internal conflicts led Vespasian to reverse Nero's decree, remarking that 'the Greeks had forgotten how to be free'—just as Nero himself had perhaps forgotten how to be good.[52]

Characterizing Gods

Describing the gods in Greece means combining original material, squaring it up against readers' expectations and previous knowledge from disparate local traditions, common knowledge and literary texts, and coping with a bewildering variety of viewpoints and variants of each divinity which could be found in the regions covered in the *Periēgēsis*. In fact, Pausanias' attempts to characterize the gods would deserve a much longer discussion than limited space allows me to present in this context.

The major Greek gods were complex characters: while Greek *poleis* shared similar gods which bore the same names and shared the same set of crucial characteristics, local variants were also very different, individual and specific

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51 Dedications: Paus. 2.17.6; 5.12.8; but note art looted by Nero: e.g. Paus. 5.25.9; 5.26.3; 9.27.4; 10.7.1; 10.19.2; Arafat 1996: 139–155.

52 Paus. 7.17.3–4. cf. 9.27.4, which adds an explicitly negative characterization in the context of Nero's looting of Praxiteles' famous statue of Eros at Thespiae.

to each community; in fact, one *polis* might accommodate multiple versions of one god or goddess, where each cult and sanctuary would emphasize different characteristics of the divinity in question. These differences and similarities between the traditions of different *poleis* were quintessentially Greek. Thus Pausanias' efforts to demonstrate the sheer variety of such versions of divinities in the Greek heartlands represent an examination of a defining characteristic of each place and community.

Below I am providing one striking example of Pausanias' discussion of a sanctuary, which demonstrates his approach particularly well, although often his descriptions are shorter and focus on just one or two details. Pausanias pays particular attention to names and especially epithets, which were often specifically local and might explain the character of this particular version of the divinity. Where he was able to look at the cult statue, he might draw conclusions from the iconography. These features of the divinity which could be directly observed are then combined with local stories about the divinity's relations with the community, often aetiological stories explaining the origins of the cult or peculiar features of local tradition. On his visits, Pausanias was also able to discover details about ritual practice in a particular sanctuary particular when it diverged significantly with what was considered 'normal' in Greek religion. Finally, he is also alert to the setting of sanctuaries in the landscape, hoping, perhaps, to deduce some glimpse of the divinity's character through the place where they chose to feel at home.

> The second mountain, Mount Elaeus, lies some thirty stadia from Phigalia, and there is a cave sacred to Demeter Melaena. The Phigalians acknowledge the story of the Thelpousians that Poseidon had intercourse with Demeter, but they say that Demeter did not give birth to a horse, but to Despoina, as she is called by the Arcadians.
>
> Afterwards, they say, she was angry with Poseidon and full of grief about the abduction of Persephone, so that she put on black clothes and went away to this cave for a long time.
>
> …
>
> They say that the image was made like this: a figure like a woman seated on a rock, except the head; she had the head and mane of a horse, and snakes and other beasts grew out of her head. Her dress reached down to her feet, and in her hands were a dolphin and a dove. Why the ancient image (*xoanon*) was made in this shape will be clear to any man not lacking in understanding who is well-versed in the traditions. They say that they called her Black Demeter (*Melaina*) because her clothes were black.
>
> …

> I sacrificed nothing to the goddess according to the local custom: individuals and the community of Phigalia at its annual public festival offer fruits from cultivated trees, grapes, honeycombs and unworked wool still full of its grease. They place these on the altar in front of the cave and then pour oil over them.
>
> They have a priestess who performs the rites, and with her is the youngest of the *hierodutoi*, as they are called: these are three of the citizens. There is a grove of oak trees around the cave, and a spring of cold water rises from the ground.
>
> PAUS. 8.42.1–2, 4, 11–12

Characterizing gods by encountering them, over and over again, in the different guises of local cults, was an extremely complex task: in this case, we are not looking for one well-defined character, but for Pausanias, this seems to have been a search for some more transcendent truths in the many faces and variants of Greek divinities.[53]

Conclusions

Pausanias' *Periēgēsis* presents us with a vast cast of characters, many merely mentioned, others discussed in more or less detail. All of them are almost coincidental to Pausanias' grand project, namely to give us a sense of the character of Greece—not just as a specific place, but as an idea and an ideal. In this grand project, nobody is allowed to hog the stage for a long time, most characters are dispatched quickly with a clear judgement and a brief description which defines their place in the grand scheme of things. It is possible to observe characterization in different contexts: as part of a longer narrative or isolated in form of a quick introduction; Pausanias has to cope with complete unknowns and figures familiar to his readers through literary and oral tradition, and we can see him adapt his mode of description according to these expectations. The special value of the *Periēgēsis* for an analysis of characterization is therefore, I would argue, the bewilderingly large number and variety of examples, the varying contexts and, due to the extreme brevity of most of Pausanias' character sketches, a clear emphasis on details which really mattered to the author in a specific situation.

53 See especially Paus. 8.8.3.

PART 3

Choral Lyric

CHAPTER 16

Pindar and Bacchylides*

Bruno Currie

Epinician is less rich in characterization than epic or tragedy. Its narratives are generally too short to explore abiding traits of character or to characterize in a dynamic and integrative way. Extended descriptions of appearance or emotions are rare. Dialogue tends to be lacking. We are seldom invited to speculate about character beyond what is on the page, and what is there is often meagre. On the other hand, nearly all techniques of characterization indicated in the Introduction to this book are interestingly in evidence within this corpus, and some poems are spectacularly rich in characterization. These poems offer the most satisfactory starting-point to the subject; the three most impressive cases therefore follow, in ascending order of complexity and scale.

Pythian 9

Of Cyrene in *Pythian* 9, Burton wrote: 'Pindar has succeeded in clothing Cyrene with more personality than almost any other figure in his stories except Jason in *Pythian* 4.'[1] She is described first by the primary narrator-focalizer (18–28), then by Apollo as secondary narrator-focalizer (30–37). A preliminary passing reference to her *physical beauty* (18 *euōlenon*) is followed by the primary narrator-focalizer's description, concentrating on her *actions*: first, her choice of life in general (18–25), consisting of the rejection of normal feminine pursuits (18–19) and the embracing of a heroic out-of-doors life (20–25); second, a specific occasion on which she was seen by Apollo wrestling bare-handed with a lion (26–28). Apollo briefly notes her *physical strength* (30 *megalan dunasin*), then expatiates on her various *qualities of character* (30 *thumon gunaikos*, 31 *atarbei … kephala*(*i*), 31a–32 *mokhthou kathuperthe … / ētor*, 32 *phobō*(*i*) *d' ou kekheimantai phrenes*, 35 *alkas apeirantou*). In case it were not obvious that these add up to sexual desirability, Apollo next ponders out loud whether it is permissible to 'lay his hand on her' on the spot (36–37). As Cyrene is char-

* This chapter, like its predecessors in *SAGN* 1–3, restricts itself to epinician.

1 Burton 1962: 42.

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acterized through Apollo's focalization, so later the *laudandus* Telesicrates is characterized through the focalization of Cyrenaean girls (97–100): 'girls saw you winning often … and prayed silently that you were their beloved husband or son' (with humorous gender reversal of the Cyrene-Apollo scene).[2] Not only a technique of characterization but also various traits of character link Cyrene with Telesicrates or athletes in general, especially her 'heart above toil' (31a–32).[3] Cyrene's *genealogy* (13–18), rehearsed at length prior to the primary narrator-focalizer's description (18–28), prepares for her characterization by emphasizing both 'overweening' human ancestors (14 *Lapithan huperoplōn*) and personified features of the natural world (Oceanus, Naïs, Gaea), befitting one who is to be settled on the 'third' continent (8).[4] Finally, *setting* also contributes to the characterization: the translocation from a windy, rugged Thessalian wilderness (5, 15, 30, 34, 51) to a lovely, fertile Libya (6a–8, 53, 55, 58) prefigures the transformation of Cyrene from virgin daughter of Hypseus to bride of Apollo and mother of Aristaeus.[5] In this process, 'beautiful Cyrene' (17–18 *tan euōlenon / … Kuranan*), the heroine, evolves into Cyrene, eponymous Libyan city(-nymph), 'fatherland of beautiful women' (74 *kalligunaiki patra*(*i*)).

Nemean 10

The climax or *kephalaion*[6] of the mythical narrative (cf. 55–59 and 89–90) consists in the shared mortality/immortality of Castor and Polydeuces and the 'choice' (cf. 59 *heilet'*, 82 *hairesin*) made by Polydeuces to share his immortality with his brother. Names, elsewhere a notable vehicle of characterization in epinician, are used especially creatively in this poem.[7] The twins are referred to as *Tundaridais* (38) before the narrative begins; the patronymic is of course

2 Carey 1981: 75, 98.

3 See Carey 1981: 70–71, 75, 76, 97.

4 Kirkwood 1982: 223 'The Lapith background is violent (as the adjective *huperoplos* suggests) and northern …, befitting this *agrotera* who hunts by night and wrestles a lion'; 224 'the presence of Oceanus in the genealogy and the fact that Hypseus' mother Creusa is a water-nymph (Naïad) and a daughter of Earth add a primeval element to the Thessalian ruggedness.'

5 Cf. Kirkwood 1982: 223.

6 Cairns 2010: 104.

7 For names as a window onto character in epinician, note especially B. 5.173, where the name Daïaneira ominously conjures up through its etymology ('man-/husband-destroyer') the story of Heracles' death (cf. Antiphanes, *Poesis* fr. 189.4–6 *PCG*, for the allusive power of mythological names: 'if the poet just says "Oidipous", [the audience] knows the rest'). This example shows that we should not require etymological plays on names to be made

conventional (*O.* 3.1, 39; *alias*), but imprecise when predicated of them both, as this narrative will go on to show. In the summary narrative of 55–59, they are both said to spend alternate days 'by the side of their dear father Zeus' (55–56), which is imprecise for the opposite reason. In the narrative proper, Polydeuces is called *Lēdas pais* (66)—correctly, but his maternity was never in question. In 73, Polydeuces is *ho Tundaridas*, inaccurately. Polydeuces then invokes Zeus as *Pater Kroniōn* (76): a formula (cf. 29 *Zeu pater*; *P.* 4.23, *Pae.* 15.5, *alias*), yet ironically accurate in Polydeuces' mouth. The authoritative statement of paternity finally comes from Zeus (80–82): 'You are my son; him, therefore, the hero who is her husband dripped as mortal seed when he lay beside your mother.' This is to take *epeita* as inferential, 'therefore', rather than temporal ('subsequently').[8] This translation and interpretation assume that in a world without DNA testing paternity is proven, in such a case, by the mortality of one twin; even Zeus was ignorant until now of which offspring was his.

Polydeuces' immortality, or rather his divine birth, thus emerges as a hidden quality of character that is revealed late, both in his life and in this narrative. Names here, and especially *antonomasia*, characterize indirectly. The continual variation in the signifiers is part of an attempt to grasp the essence of the signified, Polydeuces as immortal son of Zeus. But Polydeuces' decision to share his immortality and paternity with Castor, and to share the latter's with him, renders the two of them alike *both* Tyndaridae *and* Dioscuri; that is, while the revelation of Polydeuces' paternity (80) renders the preceding application of patronymics inaccurate in a first retrospect, Polydeuces' subsequent decision (89) renders them justified in a second retrospect. The patronymics characterize Castor and Polydeuces through contrast and analogy; and that contrast and analogy are reinforced by a further contrast with the Apharetidae. There is no doubting the paternity or the mortality of the latter pair. Their patronymic is applied only once in the narrative (65), with straightforward and stable reference. And here again setting also subtly characterizes; it is not a casual detail that the Apharetidae rallied at their 'father's tomb' (66).[9]

Names (patronymics) are a coarse-grained way of capturing the mortal/immortal character of the Dioscuri and of conveying what is involved in the sharing of that mortality/immortality; more fine-grained characterization is forth-

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explicit, *pace* Braswell 1988: 104, 370; Carey 1981: 137. For explicit examples, see: B. 9.12, 14 (Archemorus); B. 6.1–2 (Lachon); *O.* 6.43, 47, 55–57 (Iamus); *I.* 6.49–54 (Ajax). Arguable implicit examples: *P.* 4.6, 51–53, 61–62 (Battus: Currie 2005: 233); *P.* 4.28 (Medea; differently, Braswell 1988: 104); *P.* 4.119 (Jason: see below; differently, Braswell 1988: 370).

8 Cf. *Il.* 5.812–813 (Athena to Diomedes): 'you are not therefore (*epeita*) Tydeus' son.'

9 Cf. *SAGN* 3: 293 (Currie).

coming in 73–90. Polydeuces' choice is made comprehensible by the distinctive way he thinks and feels, revealed in *speech*. The value he attaches to 'loved ones / friends' is declared in his own words (78 *philōn*). His sense of justice is indicated by Zeus' speech (86), having been previously proleptically hinted at by the primary narrator-focalizer (57). These qualities of character resonate also through the non-mythical parts of the ode. Theaeus and his family are 'just men' (54), of whom the Dioscuri 'take care' (54), much as Polydeuces cared for Castor (85–86). The semi-divine twins are 'loyal' (54 *piston*) to this family, as they were to one another (78 *pistoi*); it is they who are responsible for the family's athletic successes (38, 49–54).

Polydeuces' *emotions* are explicit in his tears and groans on finding Castor fatally wounded (75–76), and implicit in his unhesitating decision to revive him (89–90). This is a notable technique found elsewhere in Pindar: in *Olympian* 6, Aepytus' (suppressed) anger at Evadne's pregnancy is explicit at 37–38; his concern for the newly-born Iamus remains implicit in 47–52. In both *Olympian* 6 and *Nemean* 10 we are left to infer that a turn-about in events has brought about a corresponding turn-about in feelings.[10] (We will soon observe a similar technique with Pelias in *Pythian* 4.) These emotions are important to the narrative: Polydeuces' is not a cold, rational, decision, but one springing from very human emotions, which makes that decision comprehensible. There is a palpable difference between Polydeuces' grief for Castor here and that of thoroughbred immortals for the mortals who are close to them in Homeric epic (Ares' for Ascalaphus, say, or Zeus' for Sarpedon, or even Thetis' for Achilles: *Il.* 15.113–114, 16.459–460, 24.84–85).

Other than here, Pindaric heroes do not weep or pray for death. Bacchylidean heroes do: Croesus (3.34–35, 47), Heracles (5.155–157, 160–162), and Proetus (11.85–98)—a sizable proportion of a much smaller oeuvre. The Croesus-scene in particular resembles the Polydeuces-scene: in each, we have tears and the wish for death; a remonstration with divinity; a divine intervention; and finally a form of immortality granted. Yet these similar scenes mask quite different characterizations. Croesus is desperate, resigned, recriminatory, passive; Polydeuces makes an active, heroic choice (77, 89–90)—a variant of *iuncta mors* or *Liebestod*, akin to Phaedrus' portrayal of Achilles as choosing to 'die after' Patroclus in Plato (*Smp.* 179e–180a).[11] We can see that characterization

10 Hutchinson 2001: 396 'events, and Aepytus' feelings, have been completely altered', cf. 391.

11 For Maehler 2004: 92, 93, Croesus is heroic, defiant. Carey 1999: 24, 25 emphasizes despair followed by dramatic *peripeteia*. Cf. Hutchinson 2001: 342, on Croesus: 'Divine criticism is pushed to the furthest point.'

is affected not only by genre, but by individual styles within a genre, or different conceptions of the genre. 'Where Pindar's myths emphasize heroic choice and struggle, Bacchylides' myths frequently emphasize human weakness and ignorance.'[12] This broad difference in active and passive conceptions of heroic character seen in Pindaric and Bacchylidean epinician can also be seen with Sophoclean and Euripidean tragedy, and the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in epic.[13]

Pythian 4

Pythian 4 presents an extraordinarily rich characterization of Jason and Pelias in a ninety-line section of narrative (78–167). Kirkwood comments: 'What is … remarkable is the strength of characterization, the differentiation and conflict of characters in this confrontation … Both are real persons, in contrast with most Pindaric figures. Pelops, Perseus, Tlepolemus, Iamus, and even Heracles are not so much living persons as abstract embodiments of divinely favoured *aretē*.'[14]

Jason is characterized directly through four successive descriptions of his physical appearance, focalized by (a) the primary narrator-focalizer (78–85), (b) Iolcians in the market-place (86–92), (c) Pelias (94–96), and (d) his father (120–123). He is characterized indirectly by his own speeches (101–120 and 136–156 = (g)); his first speech also contains direct self-characterization (especially 104–106). Pelias is characterized indirectly by the emotions attributed to him by the primary narrator-focalizer (73–75, 94–97), and through his own speeches (96–100 = (e) and 156–167 = (f)). He is characterized directly in Jason's speech at 109–112, and characterizes both himself and Jason directly, briefly, in terms of their respective ages, in his second speech (157–158). Each of these subsections, (a)–(g), calls for comment.

(*a*) *Lines 78–85*. The long physical description of Jason given by the primary narrator-focalizer is highly unusual for Pindar.[15] It marks Jason as an important character in this narrative after his conspicuous absence from the preceding Argonautic narrative (10–58). Closely comparable is the long physical description of Theseus at B. 18.46–60 (not an epinician), another unrecognized 'ephebe' returning to his paternal home.[16] Jason carries two spears (like The-

12 Quotation from Carey 1999: 21.

13 Sophocles versus Euripides: Knox 1964: 5. *Iliad* versus *Odyssey*: Cook 1999.

14 Kirkwood 1982: 162–163.

15 Köhnken 1993: 55, with n. 9. Cf. Segal 1986: 57–58.

16 Maehler 2004: 203 'Theseus … is … portrayed as the quintessential Athenian ephebe.'

seus, B. 18.49), and wears 'dual clothing': local Magnesian (Thessalian) dress, plus a leopard skin. Braswell argued that the two spears and leopard skin approximate Jason to the Homeric heroes.[17] But the utilitarian purpose specified for the leopard skin, to ward off precipitation, seems to point in a rustic direction (cf. Hes. *Op.* 543–545), and it has been taken to evoke mountain life or a gift of Chiron.[18] Perhaps we lack the requisite cultural or literary 'script' to make a definite interpretation, or the ambiguity may be at least part of the point. The hair worn long is an ephebic trait; it triggers the coming comparison to Apollo (87).[19]

(*b*) *Lines 86–92*. This *tis*-speech, the vocalization of an anonymous speaker on behalf of a group, is unparalleled in epinician and is a conspicuously Homeric (→) technique.[20] Following the 'objective' description of the primary narrator-focalizer, it presents a subjective, but collective and non-partisan, reaction to Jason's appearance. The Iolcians are 'awed' (86), and proceed to compare Jason with gods and heroes.[21] The signals again are mixed. The gods chosen, Apollo and Ares ('the bronze-charioted husband of Aphrodite'), suggest a mixture of warrior and lover.[22] The comparison with Otus and Epialtes is evidently motivated by Jason's impressive stature (79 *anēr ekpaglos*, in narrator-text), but coupled with Tityus, these comparisons suggest a pattern of transgression (in particular of a sexual nature, 92) followed by punishment: there may be ominous irony here.

(*c*) *Lines 94–96*. The individual reaction of Pelias contrasts with the collective reaction of the *tis*-speech. Whereas the Iolcians 'did not recognize him' (86), Pelias instantly identifies the stranger of the oracle (75–78). The only thing he seems to notice is the missing sandal, and he is the only person who notices it: 'straightaway he was amazed, gazing at the sandal plain to see [*arignōtos*: this, it should be noted, is Pelias' focalization] only on the right foot' (95–96). What is the significance of the single sandal and how does it characterize?[23]

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17 Braswell 1988: 174, 176 finds the two spears and the leopard skin 'normally' and 'often' worn by Homeric heroes; cf. Schwartz 2011: 932; differently, Kirk 1985: 267.

18 *Scholl. P.* 4.140a, b; Burton 1962: 154; cf. Kirkwood 1982: 183.

19 Burton 1962: 154; Braswell 1988: 179.

20 Braswell 1988: 181 'As the epic frame (86 and 93–94) shows, it is Homer's technique that the lyric poet is employing.' Cf. de Jong 1987; ead. 2001: 62–63.

21 See Segal 1986: 66–68.

22 Apollo as lover: *HAp*. 208–213.; *Il.* 9.559–560; *P.* 9 (Cyrene); *P.* 3 (Coronis).

23 Some views: Race 1986: 76 'Even his missing sandal symbolizes his half-way position.' Segal 1986: 58 'The key detail of the single sandal marks him out as distinct from others, an anomaly. But it also marks him out as the one chosen by the gods as the winner, the true king.'

Ambivalently, it seems: the deliberate wearing of one sandal might suggest a combat-ready ephebe, but the accidental loss of the other, a careless hick.[24] But we are interested not so much in the original significance of the single sandal as its significance in this narrative. It is surely significant that the sandal is not mentioned in the descriptions given either by the primary narrator-focalizer or by the assembled Iolcians; it features only in the report of the oracle received by Pelias and in Pelias' sizing-up of Jason. Thus it seems to signify, ambivalently again, Jason's power over Pelias (as his predestined killer) and Pelias' upper hand over Jason (as the one knows that destiny and recognizes its omen). The sandal, in other words, characterizes Jason and Pelias essentially in their relationship to one another.

(*d*) *Lines 120–123*. The reaction of Jason's father contrasts again with the group reaction of the Iolcians and the individual reaction of Pelias. No *gnōrisma* is mentioned and apparently none is needed: this is instant, instinctive recognition (120 *ton men … egnon ophthalmoi patros*), unlike other parent-son recognitions (Laertes-Odysseus, Aegeus-Theseus, Creusa-Ion) and more reminiscent, in this regard, of Odysseus and his dog Argus (*Od.* 17.290–327).[25] Aeson's focalization of Jason, 'finest / most beautiful of men' (123) captures, as it were incidentally, a crucial aspect of Jason's character: Jason as *Frauenheld*.

(*e*) *Lines 96–100*. Pelias is characterized directly by the primary narrator-focalizer as having a 'cunning heart' (73 *pukinō*(*i*) … *thumō*(*i*)). He is characterized indirectly through the emotions attributed to him (fear!): he received a 'chilling oracle' (73; *kruoen* is his focalization), warning him to be 'greatly on his guard in every way' (75) against the wearer of a single sandal; on hearing of the stranger's arrival (apparently), he came post-haste (94–95); addressing Jason, he 'suppressed his fear' (96–97). It is debatable exactly how Pelias is characterized through his first speech (97–100). His inquiry into the stranger's country of origin and parentage is in itself formulaic, as is his request for a truthful answer.[26] According to Burton, 'The context is indeed suggestive of rudeness and vulgarity, and Pelias' tone is displayed clearly enough in the highly emo-

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24 Ephebe: Vidal-Naquet 1986: 108; Hornblower 2004: 29; but see Fowler 2013: 206–208. 'Hick': cf. Pherecydes fr. 105 Fowler 'Pelias was going to sacrifice to Poseidon and invited everybody to be present … Jason happened to be ploughing near the river Anauris and crossed it unshod. On crossing it he put on his right sandal but forgot the left one, and so went to the feast.'

25 *Schol. P.* 4.213b, exercised by the implausibility of Aeson's recognition, invents the rationalizing explanation that Aeson had visited Jason in Chiron's cave in the interim.

26 Inquiry into nationality and parentage: cf. *Od.* 1.170, *alias*; *P.* 9.33–35; B. 5.86–88, 18.31–32. Request for a truthful answer: cf. *Od.* 1.169, 174; *alias*.

tive variant of *atrekeōs katalexon* in vv. 99 f. The impression of his character conveyed here is foreshadowed by Hesiod's description of him in *Theogony*, 995 f. … "the arrogant king Pelias, insolent man and wicked worker of violence."'[27] According to Giannini, however, 'The presence in these words of a provocative or intimidatory tone is doubtful.'[28] It is quite plausible that Pelias in 99–100 simply shows himself as a man who deplores disingenuousness (cf. 99 *ekhthistoisi … pseudessi*: compare Achilles, *Il.* 9.312–313), and that he flatters the stranger with the suggestion that an untruthful account of his birth must 'degrade' it (100 *katamianais*).[29] But if not rude or vulgar, Pelias' interrogation is certainly devious. Behind the routine-seeming inquiry is not simple courtesy, but Pelias' desire for specific knowledge: whether the stranger is a descendant of Aeolus, at whose hands or through whose wiles he is fated to meet his end (cf. 71–72). Here and throughout it is unclear to what extent we are entitled to appeal, with Burton, to an intertextual model (Pelias in early epic).[30] It is also unclear whether we may measure him against the negative stereotype of the tyrant.[31]

(*f*) *Lines 156–167*. The emotion behind Pelias' second speech is merely implicit. The speech-introduction ('he replied quietly / gently', 156–157 *aka*(*i*) *d' antagoreusen kai Pelias*), gives little away. Apparently, we know enough now about this character to infer the rest for ourselves (the principle of 'primacy': compare the pattern observed above for Aepytus in *Olympian* 6 and Polydeuces in *Nemean* 10). The key components of Pelias' character, cunning and fear, have, after all, been established early and clearly. We may also hope to understand Pelias' character with reference to the recognizable fictional role he plays: the king who sets hero a (supposed) impossible task to get him out of the way.[32] A

27 Burton 1962: 155–156. Cf. Segal 1986: 34 n. 4.

28 Giannini in Gentili et al. 1995: 456 'Dubbia in queste parole la presenza di un tono provocatorio e intimidatorio'; cf. Braswell 1988: 189. Köhnken 1993: 58 argues that *P.* 4.101–102 *tharsēsais … ameiphthē*, of Jason, shows that Pelias' speech was offensive; *Od.* 3.75–76 *antion ēuda / tharsēsas*, of Telemachus answering Nestor's inquiry into his identity, shows otherwise.

29 So, approximately, *scholl. P.* 4.172, 177 and Braswell 1988: 191. Cf. Köhnken 1993: 56.

30 Carey 1980: 150 '[Hes. *Th.* 994–995] does not help us with Pindar. If Pindar wants us to see through Pelias' intentions he must help us … That Pelias elsewehere has a sinister motive for suggesting the quest is irrelevant.'

31 Braswell 1988: 186 '[Pelias] resembles in some respects … a typical stage-tyrant.'

32 This is explicitly the role of Pelias at Hes. *Th.* 994–995; Mimn. fr. 11.3 West *IEG*. For others in this role, cf. Aeetes-Jason; Eurystheus-Heracles; king of Lycia-Bellerophon; Polydectes-Perseus. An international tale-type: Thompson 1955–1958: H1211 'Quests assigned in order to get rid of hero', H1212.1 'Quests assigned because of feigned dream.'

vital contribution is made by a striking discrepancy between character-text and narrator-text: Pelias' account to Jason of the oracle he allegedly received from Delphi (163) is exposed—for us—as a trick by our knowledge of the oracle he actually received (73, narrator-text). It is thus not the case that '[Pindar] gives us no hint that Pelias is lying.'[33]

(*g*) *Lines 101–120 and 136–156*. It is harder to establish how Jason is characterized in his two speeches. This is chiefly because Jason gives no indication that he knows he is actually addressing Pelias in his first speech, and because his second speech does not explicitly acknowledge that they have spoken before. But the second speech, which is notably more conciliatory in tone, implicitly 'corrects' the first.[34] In the first speech Jason addressed only the Iolcians (117 *kednoi politai*) and spoke of Pelias in the third person (109 *Pelian*, cf. 111–112); by contrast he opens his second speech with an elaborate periphrastic address (138 *pai Poseidanos Petraiou*). In the first speech, Jason called Pelias 'lacking justice' (109 *Pelian athemin*); in the second, he proposes that they both 'make their characters just' (141 *themissamenous orgas*). In the first speech, Jason referred to Pelias' seizure of his ancestral lands in evaluative and emotive language (110); that reference is toned down in the second speech (149–150). The difference between the two speeches and their implied characterization of Jason is striking, and surely interpretable; but the interpretation is vexed.[35] According to Braswell, Jason in the first encounter 'is still the ephebe', 'basically defensive', while in the second he is 'fully established as the legitimate claimant to the throne who moves to the offensive'; '[t]he dividing of the confrontation into two parts with the intervening scene in which Iason effectively assumes the leadership of his clan has thus allowed Pindar plausibly to present a now mature Iason capable of undertaking the great quest.'[36] But why should Jason undertake this 'great quest' at all, simply to reclaim his birthright? The division of the confrontation into two parts appears above all to be to Pelias' advantage, buying him the time to compose his fear and devise a stratagem. On one possible reading, the conclusion to the confrontation, 'approving this agreement, they parted' (168), implies the success of Pelias' stratagem.[37]

33 Carey 1980: 150.

34 See Köhnken 1993: 57.

35 Köhnken 1993: 57–58 sees an angry confrontation in the first exchange as being followed by polite diplomacy in the second.

36 Braswell 1988: 186. For a different explanation of the division of the confrontation into two parts, see Carey 1980: 150 with n. 146; Köhnken 1993: 55.

37 For a very different interpretation of 168 and of the scene as a whole, see Köhnken 1993: 58.

What character is revealed in Jason's first speech (102–119)? According to Burton, 'The tone of Jason's [sc. first] speech reflects an attractive character, calm, courteous, and resolute. He gives no sign that he recognizes Pelias; he confronts his insolence with the good manners learnt in the school of Chiron.'[38] Jason, indeed, gives no sign that he recognizes Pelias; *does* he in fact recognize him?[39] This question, crucial to Jason's characterization, is strangely infrequently posed. It is, notably, by Köhnken, who rightly emphasizes the narrator's silence on this point.[40] Köhnken, finding testiness in Jason's first speech, argues that he responds in kind to Pelias' speech, that Pelias' first speech is therefore provocative, and that Jason has recognized Pelias, so that his reference to 'Pelias lacking justice' (109 *Pelian athemin*) is an intentional retort.[41] One could just as easily argue the converse: that Jason has not recognized Pelias, that Pelias' speech is inoffensive, and that Jason speaks with an ill-advised candour about himself and his unrecognized interlocutor, which plays into the latter's hands. That might be what we would expect of a clash between Jason's youth, strength, and ingenuous simplicity and Pelias' fear, (fore)knowledge, and cunning. Medea will, subsequently, be Pelias' match (250 *tan Peliaophonon*); but is Jason, now? Has 'Chiron's teaching' (102) adequately prepared the hero for the challenges he is going to face, now in Iolcus and later? Jason boasts that, in the twenty years spent in Chiron, Chariclo and Philyra's tutelage, he has not 'said any word out of place (*ektrapelon*)' (104–105).[42] Does he do so now, in his first public appearance?

Much in the foregoing is very speculative, and it would be unwise to insist on the correctness of a particular reading of either character.[43] Thankfully, that is ultimately unimportant for our purpose. What is important is that Pindar's narrative here (quite untypically) invites us to read and speculate about character: these characters are mimetically conceived. True feelings and motives

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38 Burton 1962: 156.

39 Pelias' arrival by mule-cart (94; Braswell 1988: 187) probably did not suffice to identify the regent: cf. S. *OT* 750–753; Hdt. 1.59.4. Or perhaps we are to suppose Pelias alighted from his cart and addressed his questions to Jason from among the throng of ordinary Iolcians.

40 Köhnken 1993: 56 'Der Erzähler verschweigt …, ob Jason den fragenden Pelias auf Grund seines Auftretens identifiziert hat (eine Frage, die das begründende Epos wohl nicht offengelassen hätte), ob also seine Bemerkung über den gottlosen Usurpator (V. 109 …) als gezielter Angriff auf sein Gegenüber verstanden werden soll oder nicht.'

41 Köhnken 1993: 56.

42 For the reading *ektrapelon* and its interpretation, see *schol. P.* 4.186a; Braswell 1988: 196. Differently, Gentili and Giannini in Gentili et al. 1995: 130–131, 458–459.

43 Carey 1980: 149–151 offers a positive interpretation of Pelias in the second encounter.

are suppressed, both explicitly (96–97) and implicitly (156–167). That is rare for epinician (but note *O.* 6.37–38; also, of the *laudandus*, *N.* 10.29–30). It would be wrong in this narrative to suppose that, because Aeetes' duplicitous intent in revealing the whereabouts of the fleece is made explicit (243 *elpeto d' ouketi hoi keinon ge praxasthai ponon*), Pelias' intent, if duplicitous, would have to have been made explicit.[44] This ninety-line section of narrative provides (again untypically) integrative and dynamic characterization. The variously focalized descriptions of Jason, (a)–(d) above, build on each other, and the two speech-pairs (Pelias-Jason: 96–100, 101–120; Jason-Pelias: 136–156, 156–167) define each other complexly in turn. And Pindar's narrative guides us throughout very uncertainly in our reading of character. Its silences and indeterminacies are striking.[45] Köhnken sees these as characteristic of 'Pindars lyrische Erzählstil', contrasting the 'explizierend[e] Erzählweise' of Homeric epic.[46] '*Pindar's* lyric narrative style', perhaps; but not 'lyric narrative style', *tout court*: it is hard to think of Stesichorus narrating this way. The characterization here is untypical of Pindar in its extent and depth, yet entirely Pindaric for its complex, clipped, elliptical quality.

We need, finally, to consider another dimension to the characterization in *Pythian* 4 which is fully typical of Pindar: the interaction between the characters of the myth (i.e. of the narrative) and the characters of the reality of the composition. Arcesilas and Damophilus are characterized against the backdrop of the confrontation of Jason and Pelias. The situation of Arcesilas resembles that of Jason, as the legitimate ruler; but Damophilus' situation resembles Jason's, as a returning exile. Each has the potentiality also to resemble Pelias: Arcesilas as the king potentially fearful of the returning citizen; Damophilus as one potentially interested in seeing power wrested from the one who legitimately wields it. Moreover, character traits indicated for each link them to Jason. Arcesilas is metaphorically a 'physician' (270 *iatēr*), sc. of the city-state; a folk-etymology of Jason's name (119) as 'healer' is probably assumed in the mythical narrative.[47] Arcesilas' hand is to be 'gentle' (271

44 *Pace* Carey 1980: 150.

45 On the elliptical winding-up of the first encounter, cf. Burton 1962: 156–157 'Pindar omits all reference to the effect of this announcement on Pelias and passes at once to a new scene with a notable "cut" in the middle of the epode at v. 120. This "cut" would probably have been supplemented in Epic by an account of Pelias' reaction, perhaps in the form of a speech.' See esp. Köhnken 1993: 55 and nn. 7–8, 56 with n. 14.

46 Köhnken 1993: 58.

47 See above on etymological plays in epinician.

malakan khera), like Jason's voice (137 *malthaka*(*i*) *phōna*(*i*)).[48] Arcesilas' obligation to put the city back on its feet (270–276) recalls Jason's role of restoring order (106–107); already Jason's proposal to relinquish royal estates (148–149) 'zoomed' to the historical reality of reforms in late-archaic Cyrene (cf. Hdt. 4.161.3). Damophilus, like Jason, is 'just' by nature (280–281 *dikaian / Damophilou prapidōn*), avoids offensive speech (283, cf. 104–105), and hates *hubris* (284, cf. 112). This ode avoids simple one-to-one equations of the hero of the myth with the *laudandus* (for which see e.g. B. 3.61–66; *P.* 2.15–20, *P.* 6.19–46, *N.* 9.39–42) in favour of the more complex and shifting correspondences that are suited to the (assumed) personal and diplomatic circumstances of this particular commission.[49] Instead of black-and-white positive and negative *exempla* (compare Tantalus and Pelops in *Olympian* 1, Croesus and Phalaris at *Pythian* 1.94–96), Jason and Pelias are painted in shades of grey. Since Jason-Pelias cannot be mapped onto either Arcesilas-Damophilus or Damophilus-Arcesilas, a putative opposition between Arcesilas and Damophilus resolves into something more like harmonious affinity.

The political background of *Pythian* 4 is no doubt part of the explanation of this ode's extraordinary approach to characterization. But also, more simply, the ode's monumental length (itself perhaps a consequence of that political background) made its untypical approach to characterization both possible and necessary.

The Importance of Character to Epinician Narrative

The three poems discussed above are untypical; how important then is character to epinician narrative really? Like space (*SAGN* 3: 285, Currie), character generally tends to be invisible in epinician mythical narratives; sporadic indications of character may be offered when the narrative calls for it, or not at all. Thus, *Nemean* 7 narrates Neoptolemus' journey to and his death and subsequent hero cult at Delphi without any indication of the hero's character (33–47). Contrast Euripides' *Andromache*, a play in which Neoptolemus does not even appear![50] Ajax' suicide is narrated at *Nemean* 8.23–32 with only the barest indication of his character (24 *tin' aglōsson men, ētor d' alkimon*); con-

48 Note also esp. *N.* 3.55 *malakokheira*, in the context of healing, and Chiron's teaching.

49 On the circumstances, see Braswell 1988: 1–6.

50 On Euripides' play, cf. Allan 2000: 52: 'Most remarkable is the wealth of information given [sc. in the prologue] about Neoptolemus … It is notable that we get a sense of

trast, again, Sophocles' *Ajax*. In general, characters are more often actantially than mimetically conceived (again, *Pythian* 4 is exceptional).

However, character need not be developed at length in the narrative for character to be important to the poem. Sometimes a quality of character attached to the *laudandus* explicitly motivates the mythical narrative.[51] (But character seemingly performs this function less frequently than space: *SAGN* 3: 291, Currie.) In *Pythian* 6, Thrasybulus' filial devotion motivates the mythical narrative. After we have heard how Thrasybulus observes Chiron's injunction to honour one's parents (19–28), the poem segues thus into the mythical narrative: 'in former times, too, there was the mighty Antilochus, who was of this mind …' (28–29); the conclusion to the myth reiterates the link with Thrasybulus' father-loving character (44–46). In *Olympian* 6, with similar explicitness, Hagesias is compared with the hero Amphiaraus for their rare conjunction of prophetic and military skills (12–18). Sometimes it is not (only) a stable quality of character, but (also) a particular ethical choice (*proairesis*) that links hero and *laudandus*. In *Olympian* 1, Pelops decides to race his chariot with Oenomaus, despite the capital danger (81–85); so too, by clear implication, Hieron has determined to enter the single-horse race at Olympia: these are laudable 'heroic' choices of a kind made elsewhere by mythical heroes (*P.* 4.185–187) and athletes (*O.* 6.9–11). In *Pythian* 6, again, Antilochus decides to save his father's life even at the 'cost' (39 *priato*) of his own; so too, it seems, Thrasybulus has taken the decision to rescue his father's name from oblivion by commissioning the epinician for his Pythian victory, at a cost on which Pindar has the delicacy not to dwell.[52] Sometimes, again, it is physical resemblances between *laudandus* and hero that bring the mythical *exemplum* to the poet's mind. In *Isthmian* 4, the (only here) short (53–54) Theban hero Heracles, who goes to wrestle the giant Antaeus, parallels the short Theban Melissus, victor in the pancration

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the complexity of his character although he never speaks … We are asked to reconstruct his persona from the remarks of others …'. Also cf. van Emde Boas in this volume (Euripides, →).

51 Cf. Pfeijffer in *SAGN* 1: 224 'Sometimes the primary narrator motivates his narrative by relating it explicitly to the primary narratee', discussing *P.* 8.35–47.

52 In general for the victory ode as a rescue from death, cf. *P.* 3.112–115, *N.* 7.12–20, *I.* 1.67–68. Thrasybulus evidently commissioned *I.* 2 for his father's Isthmian victory, composed after the latter's death (note the past tenses at *I.* 2.37, 39–41); Thrasybulus' prominence in *P.* 6 (15, 44–54) suggests the same is likely to be true of that poem. Differently, Gentili in Gentili et al. 1995: 184–185 assumes that Thrasybulus drove the chariot for Xenocrates, at great personal risk, thus resembling Antilochus at the funeral games of Patroclus (*Il.* 23.301ff.). Cf. Currie 2016: 250.

(49–51). In *Pythian* 1, the physically infirm Philoctetes who sacks Troy (52–55) parallels by implication the physically infirm Hieron, who has just defeated the Etruscans.[53]

General Reflections on Character

Pindaric epinician also offers, in its non-narrative parts, much general reflection about character. The 'innate essence' conception of character is, of course, prominent; the buzz-word is *phua*.[54] Hence the interest in birth and a person's fate at birth (*O.* 8.15–16, *O.* 13.105, *N.* 7.1–8), hence too the attention lavished on heroes' births in mythical narrative (*O.* 1.26, *O.* 6.39–56, *I.* 6.45–54, *N.* 1.35–59). Excellence is hereditary and runs in families (*P.* 8.44–45, *P.* 10.12, *N.* 6.15), though plainly not all generations are successful (*N.* 6.8–16, *N.* 11.37–42, *P.* 4.64–67, *I.* 4.7–24). Circumstances enable (*O.* 12.13–19) or disable (*N.* 11.22–32) the display of native talent. But crucially, the 'innate essence' conception seems to accommodate a concept of 'character change.' The classic articulation is *Pythian* 2.72 *genoi' hoios essi mathōn*: 'may you [Hieron] become the kind of person you are on learning,' sc. the kind of person you are.[55] It is doubtful whether this should be seen just as a form of 'the encomiastic command, whereby the addressee is ordered as the best course to do what he has done.'[56] Rather, the encomiast's rhetoric seems meant to confirm the *laudandus* in an ethical course on which he is, or rather is stated to be, already embarked. The protreptics to virtue addressed to tyrants (*P.* 1.85–92, 4.276) are both congratulatory and exhortatory; descriptive praise is also normative, at least 'if you wish *always* to hear a sweet repute' (*P.* 1.90). Epinician can regard certain qualities of character as both already formed and in the process of being formed; the apparent paradox is no greater than the Aristotelian paradox that we become just by doing just things (*EN* 1105a17–21). Mythical narrative rarely depicts change in character (as opposed to changes in fortune, which are extremely common). A possible exception are the Proetides in Bacchylides' eleventh ode. Their initial offence against Hera was committed 'with mind still girlish' (47 *parthenia*(*i*) ... *eti psukha*(*i*): more easily taken as mitigating the offence than exacerbating it, as if their mind was less mature than it should have been), and they are shown

53 Cf. *scholl. P.* 1.97, 89b.

54 *O.* 2.86, 9.100–102, 11.19–20, 13.13; *P.* 8.44–45; *N.* 7.54–55; cf. *N.* 3.41–42, etc. Bowra 1964: 171–172.

55 On the expression, see Cingano in Gentili et al. 1995: 393; Carey 1981: 50.

56 Carey 1981: 50.

at the end of the narrative piously engaged in religious observance (110–112: but for Artemis, not Hera), and implicitly, as mature women, not girls (cf. 112 *gunaikōn*).[57]

Physical Appearance

Not surprisingly, the *laudandi*'s beauty and youth receive much attention (*O.* 8.19, *O.* 9.94, *O.* 10.103–105, *N.* 3.19); both qualities are conventional for recipients of praise-poetry (Ibyc. S151.46–48 Davies *PMGF*), and athletic victors in particular ('Sim.' *Epig.* 30.3 Page *FGE*; S. *El.* 685–686).[58] It is a natural expectation of epinician that fine physical form correlate with fine achievements (*I.* 7.22); in *Olympian* 9, this expectation is met by both the hero, Opous (65–66 *huperphaton andra morpha*(*i*) *te kai / ergoisi*), and the *laudandus*, Epharmostus (94 *hōraios eōn kai kalos kallista te rhexais*). But there is a counter-current too: personal prowess may be all the more impressive when discordant with appearance (cf. Tydeus, *Il.* 5.801; Archil. fr. 114 West *IEG*). In *Isthmian* 4, as we have seen, that counter-current is demonstrated with respect to both *laudandus* and hero: the pancratiast Melissus 'did not receive the stature of Orion, but is contemptible to look at, though grievous to fall in with in combat' (49–51); and Heracles, idiosyncratically in this ode, is 'short in form, but unbending in spirit' (53–54). In *Pythian* 1, Philoctetes is 'weak in body' and 'oppressed by his wound', but still the destined saviour of the Greeks (52–55); similarly with Hieron (see above). At *Olympian* 4.24–27, the grizzled Erginus, victorious in the games held by the Argonauts on Lemnos, proves that one can look older than one's years; it is unclear whether the *laudandus* Psaumis should be inferred also to have been prematurely grey.[59] Here, then, we have notions of lifelikeness, a deviation from 'ideal standards', and an acknowledgement that physiognomy can be an unreliable guide to character.

Unique personal characteristics are quite rarely indicated. Lynceus' preternatural eyesight, mentioned at *Nemean* 10.62–63, is a traditional detail, derived from the *Cypria* (fr. 15 Bernabé), and required for the comprehensibility of the narrative: the Apharetidae would not otherwise have killed Castor. The Arg-

57 See Cairns 2010: 295. On 47 *parthenia*(*i*) ... *eti psukha*(*i*), see Maehler 2004: 146; differently, Cairns 2010: 279–280. At *P.* 5.109–110, Arcesilas is praised for having 'a mind greater than his age.'

58 Cf. Carey 2000b: 171 and nn. 12–13.

59 See Lomiento in Gentili et al. 2013: 101–102, 438, after *scholl. O.* 4.39a, b; differently, Gerber 1987: 22.

onauts Zetas and Calaïs, sons of Boreas, have wings on their backs (*P.* 4.182–183): another traditional detail, one that is mentioned but not developed in Pindar's narrative. In two cases, however, unique personal characteristics are traditional but imbued with special significance in the narrative: Jason's single sandal (and his other attire) has been discussed above; no less significant, and no less enigmatic, is the ivory shoulder with which Pelops was born (*O.* 1.26–27).[60] On Pindar's reinterpretation of the traditional myth (cf. *O.* 1.28–29, 36), this has apparently become not so much a prosthesis required to repair the unfortunate anthropophagy as an innate mark of divine favour; we might compare, perhaps, the golden thigh sported by Pythagoras.[61]

The appearance and actions of the *laudandus* and the hero (especially in athletic poses) are regularly focalized by onlookers. At *Olympian* 10.100–105, the focalizer is the poet-*laudator*: '[Hagesidamus], whom I saw prevailing in the strength of his hand by the Olympian altar back then, fine in form and imbued with the youth that once warded off unseemly death from Ganymedes …' The descriptions of the appearances of Cyrene and Telesicrates, focalized by Apollo and Cyrenaean maidens respectively (*P.* 9.30–37 and 97–100), have been discussed above, as have the variously focalized descriptions of Jason's appearance in Iolcus (*P.* 4.78–85, 86–94, 94–96, 120–123). Jason's subsequent success in Colchis in ploughing with the fire-breathing bulls is focalized through the reactions of, first, a dumbfounded Aeetes and then of jubilant Argonauts (*P.* 4.237–238, 239–241). Similarly, the baby Heracles' strangling of the snakes is apprehended through the stunned reaction of the father Amphitryon (*N.* 1.56–58), the boy Achilles' hunting prowess through the amazed reaction of Artemis and Athena (*N.* 3.43–52), and so on: our own responses to an athlete's or hero's achievements are regularly channelled through another's responses within the text.

Qualities of Character

We are sometimes treated to a conspectus of a hero's whole life: their birth, lifetime exploits, and even afterlife being reviewed synoptically; so Pelops (*O.* 1.25–95), Heracles (*N.* 1.35–72), and Achilles (*I.* 8.47–61). In these cases, the heroes' births, lives, and afterlives are all equally remarkable and admirable. However, heroes' lives may also be marred by misdeeds; in Pindar, as elsewhere,

60 Most 2012: 270 'the reason for the ivory prosthesis remains entirely obscure.'

61 Pythagoras' thigh: Burkert 1972: 159–160.

Greek heroes are not saints. Tlapolemus killed Licymnius in anger (*O.* 7.27–31), before going on to be Rhodes' founding hero (77–80); Peleus had a hand in the death of his brother Phocus (*N.* 5.14–17), before being rewarded by Zeus with the hand of Thetis for rejecting Hippolyta's advances (31–34); Bellerophon, after several glorious exploits (*O.* 13.87–90), tried insanely to gain access to Olympus (91). Peleus and Bellerophon's misdeeds are passed over in *praeteritio*, but are not the less present to the audience's mind.

The Pindaric narrator is not reticent about passing moral judgment on the characters of his narrative (the Bacchylidean narrator more so).[62] Examples include the Moliones and Augeas in *Olympian* 10 (34 *huperphialoi*, 34 *xenapatas*, 41 *aboulia*(*i*)), Coronis in *Pythian* 3 (13 *amplakiaisi phrenōn*, 24 *tautan megalan aüatan*, 32 *athemin te dolon*, the last phrase also construable as Apollo's focalization), and Ixion in *Pythian* 2 (26 *mainomenais phrasin*, 28 *hubris*, 28 *aüatan huperaphanon*, 30 *amplakiai*). These examples are much more concerned to evaluate character than to understand personality. Coronis is promptly subsumed under a character-type: 'the most foolish breed among men' (21) who hanker after the unattainable (19–23); Ixion, strapped to the wheel, now and for ever exhorts mankind to repay one's benefactor well (*P.* 2.21–24). A possible exception—that is, an arguable attempt to understand personality—is Clytemnestra, murderess of Agamemnon and Cassandra, at *Pythian* 11.17–28. She is first roundly condemned by the primary narrator-focalizer as 'woman without pity' (22 *nēlēs guna*).[63] But alternative motivations for her actions are then floated by the narrator: anger at Iphigenea's killing or an adulterous infatuation (22–25)?[64] According to the ode's most recent commentator, 'The narrator is so horrified by Clytemnestra's crime that he struggles to find a motive which could possibly explain it … The overall effect … is to suggest that Clytemnestra's evil defies all understanding.'[65] In fact, the narrator finds two, individually sufficient and mutually compatible, motives. The posing of such unanswered questions implies that the character's psychology is not straightforwardly accessible to the narrator; in other words, the fictional

62 Carey 1999: 19 'Gnomic comment from the narrator within the myth is not absent from Bacchylides, but there is in general far less visible authorial judgement within the narrative.'

63 For similar emphatic phrases, at period end, in choral lyric, see B. 5.139 *artabaktos guna* (Althaea); A. *Ch.* 45 *dustheos guna* (Clytemnestra). There seems to be no proper equivalent with *anēr*; *P.* 2.37 *aïdris anēr* (Ixion) is much tamer in moralizing tone.

64 See Herington 1984: 139–141.

65 Finglass 2007a: 94.

character is treated as a real, autonomous, person.[66] Since Clytemnestra is a mythical, not a purely fictional, character, the double questions could be seen as reflecting the narrator's inability to decide between received mythological alternatives (cf. B. 19.29–36). But even so, it is hard to separate an attempt by the narrator to arbitrate between traditional alternatives concerning a character's motivation from an interest on the narrator's part in that character's motivation. It seems legitimate to recognize here an attempt to understand personality, not just to brand Clytemnestra guilty of a particular form of immorality. So also there is an attempt to understand the psychology of Pelias in *Pythian* 4 (see above), not just to evaluate him as immoral *hubristēs* (cf. Hes. *Th.* 995–996).

It is not possible to do more than touch on the qualities of character of the *laudandi*. These are, naturally, presented differently from the mythical heroes; for one thing, they are always positively appraised. They are often subject to social 'typification.' This may be illustrated by comparing the extended character-praise of Damophilus, Arcesilas and Thrasybulus at the end of *Pythians* 4, 5, and 6 respectively.[67] As model aristocrats, these men are prudent beyond their years (*P.* 4.282, *P.* 5.109–110), careful in their speech (*P.* 4.283, *P.* 5.111), agreeable at the symposium (*P.* 4.294–297, *P.* 6.52–45), skilled musicians (*P.* 4.295–296, *P.* 5.114, *P.* 6.49), and skilled charioteers (*P.* 5.115, 6.50–51). In contrast with this typification, there is obvious individuation in the description of the Theban pancratiast Melissus' character (whose 'lifelike' physical description has already been touched on above): 'resembling in his heart the daring of loud-roaring lions in the struggle, and in his cunning a vixen, who sprawling on her back awaits the swoop of an eagle; one must do everything to impair the enemy; he did not receive the stature of Orion, but is contemptible to look at, though grievous to fall in with in combat' (*I.* 4.45–51). The *laudandi* of epinician are also crucially characterized through their membership of micro- and macro-social groups. *Isthmian* 4 opens (it is a long 'opening', 1–29: one-third of the poem) with praise of the Cleonymidae, Melissus' clan; Melissus' Isthmian victory gives occasion to sing of *their* excellences (3–4 *humeteras aretas* … *haisi Kleōnumidai thallontes aiei*, etc.). The ode proceeds to catalogue their

66 Cf. A.R. 4.2–5 (Apollonius of Rhodes, →). The positing of alternative motivations for characters becomes typical for historiography and biography. See e.g. Hdt. 1.86.2, 2.181.1, 7.54.2–3, etc., with Baragwanath 2008: 122–130; Tac. *Ann.* 3.3.1 (… *an* …), 14.4.8 (*siue* … *seu* …); also see the chapters in this volume on Herodotus (→) and Plutarch (→).

67 *P.* 4.281–299, *P.* 5.109–117, *P.* 6.46–54. Cf. Braswell 1988: 380 'Behind both descriptions [sc. of Damophilus at the end of *P.* 4 and Thrasybulus at the end of *P.* 6] is the same aristocratic ideal of behaviour.'

ancient honours in Thebes, their proxeny, their lack of *hubris*, their activity as horse-breeders, their success in chariot-racing in various local and Panhellenic contests, and the loss of four of their members in a single military engagement. Melissus' achievement is also to be understood against this family background. In the (slightly modified) words of Hubbard, 'The praise of [relatives] provides the perspective of inherited nobility that lies behind all achievement in the Pindaric world; achievement is meaningless except as a broader reflection on one's entire family, clan, and social context.'[68] The *laudandus*' membership of a kinship group is also commonly balanced with their membership of the macro-social group, the city-state. In *Nemean* 6, extended praise of Alcimidas' clan (15–44) is followed by praise of Aegina through its Aeacid heroes (45–53); Alcimidas is related to both. In *Isthmian* 7, the *laudandus* Strepsiades is presented as the latest addition to the roster of Theban local heroes (Dionysus, Heracles, Tiresias, Iolaus, etc.: 1–21); in this he has been recently anticipated by an uncle, also called Strepsiades, arguably one of the city's heroized war dead (24–36).[69] Through his membership of such groups the *laudandus*' character is shown in heroic light.

The Poet-Laudator

Since Pindar was the subject in his lifetime of an extraordinary non-idealizing portrait bust (he is in fact the earliest Greek known to have been thus realistically represented), it is noteworthy how anaemic his self-characterization in epinician (probably) is.[70] The only consistent and uncontroversial aspect of that self-characterization, apart from the poetic profession, is nationality. Pindar is a Theban (*I.* 8.16; *O.* 6.85–87; *I.* 6.74; *P.* 4.299; *I.* 1.1), and hence a 'foreigner' in other city-states (*N.* 7.61; *P.* 2.68–69: the ode 'sent' across the sea); likewise, Bacchylides is a Cean (3.98), and a foreigner elsewhere (5.9–12, cf. 10.10). Pindar's Theban identity can on occasion have interesting repercussions for the mythical narrative. Thus, in *Isthmian* 6, the narrative of (the Theban) Heracles who augurs the glory of the son (Ajax) whom his Aeginetan host Telamon is expecting is inspired by the Theban Pindar's doing the same for the Aeginetan

68 T.K. Hubbard, as modified by Gerber 1999: 33–34. Cf. Carey 1989: 113, on 'the solidarity of the family in Greek thinking (i.e. the idea that a human being is part of a larger unit, not simply an individual in his own right).'

69 Currie 2005: 205–225.

70 For the bust, see Himmelmann 1993.

Lampon's son Phylacidas.[71] But Theban nationality amounts to a meagre form of characterization, and the only national stereotype that is explicitly conjured up is repudiated (*O.* 6.89–90 'Boeotian sow')!

The relevant technique of characterization here is obviously speech, involving both *ēthopoiia* and *gnōmai*. But complications, and qualifications, need to be recognized. First, there is the problem of who speaks. For several scholars, including the contributor on Pindar and Bacchylides to *SAGN* 1, 'there can be no doubt whatsoever that the first-person singular or plural occurring in the odes represents the poet … He is the primary narrator … This primary narrator is overt and visible. Especially Pindar refers to himself and his narrating activity in many of his odes, tells us about himself, and comments openly upon his stories, frequently using emphatic first-person statements to do so.'[72] For other scholars, including the present writer, Pindaric first-person statements have fluctuating reference: while some passages (on the whole, relatively colourless ones) are to be referred to the poet, others are to be referred to the chorus or *laudandus*.[73] There is, on this view, more than one speaker behind the epinician first person, and the scope for the characterization of the poet is accordingly diminished.

Ēthopoiia is a concern of epinician, as it is of oratory.[74] Roman oratory in fact provides a closer comparandum than Greek, where the split between *patronus* and *cliens* parallels that of *laudator* and *laudandus* in epinician (Greek oratory lacks a tradition of advocacy). However, in stark contrast with Cicero, Pindar and (even more) Bacchylides draw on their own lives and character infrequently and insubstantially.[75] Regarding their lives: it is doubtful whether *Pythian* 8.56–60 refers to a personal experience of the poet on his way to Delphi, rather than the *laudandus*; and doubtful whether *Nemean* 7.102–104 is the poet's defence of an unpopular earlier poem (*Pae.* 6).[76] This is not to banish all (substantive) autobiography from the poems.[77] Still, the epinician poets do not go out of their way to characterize themselves. Regarding their character: Pindar may purport to be forgetful of one commission (*O.* 10.1–3), or busy with another (*I.* 1.1–10), but these rhetorical poses do relatively little to char-

71 Indergaard 2010: 303.

72 *SAGN* 1: 216–217 (Pfeijffer).

73 Currie 2013.

74 Carey 1999: 17.

75 On Cicero's *ēthopoiia*, see May 1988.

76 On *P.* 8.56–60, Currie 2013: 259–263; on *N.* 7.102–104, Currie 2005: 317–321, cf. 321–330.

77 It is unclear, for instance, what to make of *P.* 3.77–79; Currie 2005: 387–388.

acterize the poet.[78] Nor does a professed tendency to sidetrack (*P.* 11.38–40, *N.* 3.26–27).[79] Claimed pre-eminence in poetic skill (e.g. *O.* 1.115b–116) is another typical element, belonging to the poet's 'seal' (*HAp.* 169–173; Thgn. 23).[80] The Pindaric *laudator* declares religious scruples (*O.* 1.52, *O.* 9.35–41), abjures envy (*P.* 2.52–53, *N.* 7.61–63), disavows contentiousness (*O.* 6.19, *N.* 7.66–67), and deprecates dishonest flattery (*N.* 8.35–36, aptly called by Bundy 'the *laudator*'s *proairesis*').[81] These are indeed ethical qualities of character, but they seem to be created *ad hoc* to promote the programme of praise.[82] Epinician *ēthopoiia*, unlike the *ēthopoiia* of oratory, is more concerned with constructing the character of the *laudator* (a rather shallow rhetorical construct) than of a historical person; again, the way Cicero draws on his own historical (or would-be historical) character is different.

Pindar's epinicians are full of *gnōmai* presented in the speaker's persona (in Bacchylides there is a greater tendency to place them in the mouths of characters). These too seem to characterize the speaker / narrator less than, say, Hesiod's or Phocylides', or than is envisaged at Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1395b12–17. Neither Pindar's ownership nor his endorsement of these *gnōmai* can be straightforwardly assumed.[83] They are, typically, commonplaces, and must often be understood to be in inverted commas even when not explicitly ascribed to an external source.[84] Moreover, their truth is not simply taken for granted: our understanding of them is quite often refined in the course of an ode.[85] There are notable differences in the self-presentation of Pindaric and Bacchylidean narrators-*laudatores*, arising chiefly from their different *ēthopoiia* and uses of *gnōmai*. The Pindaric narrator-*laudator* is more self-assertive and obtrusive, the Bacchylidean more self-effacing and restrained.[86] This difference is not equatable with a difference in the poet's characters any more than the difference in satirist's persona adopted by Horace and Juvenal. It is only tongue-in-cheek

78 Bundy 1962: 1 n. 4, 41–42.

79 Miller 1993–1994.

80 Carey 2000: 172 with n. 17, on the 'poet's claim to excellence.'

81 Bundy 1962: 40 n. 16.

82 Cf. in general Carey 2000: 173–176.

83 Kirkwood 1982: 23 '[*gnōmai*] are not original perceptions, and some are demonstrably well-known maxims.'

84 Commonplaces: e.g. *P.* 11.51–54 (cf. Archil. fr. 19 West; E. *Med.* 119–130; A. *A.* 471–474; E. *HF* 642–648). Explicit ascriptions to a source: *P.* 4.277–278, *P.* 6.21–28, *P.* 9.94–96, *N.* 9.6–7, *I.* 2.9–11.

85 Currie 2005: 78–81.

86 See Carey 1999: 18–21; Hutchinson 2001: 327–328; Most 2012: *passim*.

that recent critics allow themselves such comments as, 'Pindar was, I imagine, a difficult man to live with'; 'perhaps Pindar was simply haughty and arrogant as a person, Bacchylides sociable and affable.'[87] Probably few Pindaric critics nowadays would be tempted to dedicate a chapter to 'The Poetic Personality.'[88]

Conclusion

Epinician characterization takes very different forms according to who is being characterized: *laudator*, *laudandus*, or the characters of the mythical narrative. The *ēthopoiia* of the epinician *laudator* is very roughly analogous to the *ēthopoiia* of the speaker in (forensic) oratory, but we are dealing more with a rhetorical construct than a real person, mimetically conceived. The *laudandus* may be characterized directly by the *laudator* in terms of both his physical appearance (both idealization and deviation from ideal standards are found) and in terms of character (where typification is common: the 'ideal aristocrat'). At least as important is the *laudandus*' indirect characterization through analogy with the hero(es) of the mythical narrative, and through membership of the key micro- and macro-social groups (*genos* and *polis*). The characters of the mythical narrative are often not extensively characterized at all; however, when they are (as in *P.* 9, *N.* 10, and *P.* 4) an impressive array of direct and indirect techniques as well as different focalizations may be found. *Pythian* 4 is exceptional in the epinician corpus, and offers integrative and dynamic characterization of fully mimetically-conceived characters (Jason and Pelias).

87 Respectively, West 2011: 50 and Most 2012: 271 (note the continuation: 'it must be admitted that personality does not explain everything'). Cf. Carey 1999: 18 with n. 6 'It would be a mistake to interpret [Bacchylides'] more self-effacing approach in biographical terms.'

88 Bowra 1964: ch. ix.

PART 4

Drama

CHAPTER 17

Aeschylus

*Evert van Emde Boas**

A Queen's Silence and a King's Surrender: Framing the Debate

A moment early in our first extant play exemplifies the complexities involved in discussing characterization in Greek tragedy.[1] When the messenger of Aeschylus' *Persians* arrives onstage (249), he first reveals the totality of the Persian defeat in a lengthy lyric exchange with the chorus of elders (256–289), while seemingly ignoring the Queen, who is onstage but silent throughout. When the Queen finally speaks up (290), she remarks on her long silence:

> QUEEN: I have long been silent (*sigō palai*) because I was struck dumb (*ekpeplēgmenē*) by these disasters … Nevertheless we mortals are forced to bear the sorrows the gods send us; so compose yourself and speak … Who has survived, and which of the leaders must we mourn …?
>
> MESSENGER: Well, Xerxes himself is alive and sees the light of day—
>
> QUEEN: What you say is a great light for my house at least, a bright day shining out after a pitch-dark night.
>
> MESSENGER: But Artembares [is dead] …
>
> *Pers.* 290–302;[2] a catalogue of fallen captains follows

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1 Some of the main features of the critical debate about characterization in tragedy will be sketched below, but space does not permit a full overview, nor the presentation of more than a selection from the very extensive bibliography. A recent treatment with fuller bibliography is Rutherford 2012: ch. 7. For a recent discussion of Aeschylus specifically, see Seidensticker 2009 (including a brief catalogue of techniques of characterization (246–254), from which I have borrowed below); also full, but very different in approach, is Rosenmeyer 1982: ch. 8. *Prometheus Bound*, a play whose authenticity remains vexed, is left out of consideration below (for a discussion of its characters, cf. Griffith 1983: 6–12).

2 Translations are my own, based on Sommerstein 2008 (any text cited is also from that edition).

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Is it justified to 'read' character in the Queen's silence and her subsequent utterances here? For some critics, the moment is merely indicative of formal constraints of the genre, particularly of Aeschylus' inexperience with the recently introduced second actor: the fact that the messenger interacts with the chorus first is then an archaism, a remnant of single-actor plays (in which arriving actors could only address the chorus), and the Queen's 'excuse' for her silence serves merely as the dramatist's cover.[3] For others, the division is primarily a function of the play's structure, which juxtaposes the impact of the catastrophe on Persia as a whole (represented by the chorus) with the personal tragedy of Xerxes (represented by the Queen).[4] Among those scholars who do interpret the moment as a cue for the Queen's character, we find diametrically opposed views of what that character is like. Her silence has been seen as indicative of her 'queenly dignity', which 'would have been diminished by her participation in the lament', her reaction to the news of Xerxes' survival as a sign of her 'maternal devotion';[5] but that same reaction has also been interpreted as a 'brazen' reflection of the 'personal nature of her priorities', the mark of a 'selfish, superficial, and petulant' character.[6]

The discussion of this one moment turns out to be a microcosm of the complex critical debate surrounding characterization in tragedy, which has for some time hinged on such issues as the restrictions on character-portrayal imposed by the formal conventions of the genre (e.g. masks and costumes, the layout of the theatre, the formalized nature of tragic language and *Bauformen*)[7] the importance which the tragedians are thought to have accorded to characterization relative to the development of a plot or the achievement of certain dramatic effects,[8] and the exploration of ancient notions of char-

3 A view expressed most bluntly by Thomson [1941] 1973: 177; more nuanced are e.g. Michelini 1982: 29–30 (noting that the moment is 'psychologically plausible'), Rosenmeyer 1982: 191. Other commentators (e.g. Hall 1996) do little but refer to Aeschylus' penchant for long silences (see below).

4 So Garvie 2009 on 249–531, largely anticipated by Conacher 1996: 16–17.

5 Broadhead 1960: xli–xlii; similarly e.g. Groeneboom 1930 on 290–292, Taplin 1977: 87.

6 Harrison 2000b: 77–79; similarly Hall 1996: 7.

7 Such restraints are emphasized by e.g. Jones 1962, Gould 1978, Heath 1987: ch. 4; *contra*, e.g., Easterling 1990, Seidensticker 2009: 207–215. Although this volume adopts a liberal approach to what counts as narrative in drama (Introduction, →), the narratological focus of the series does preclude a full discussion of performance aspects, which will have determined to a significant extent how original audiences perceived tragic characters (it bears noting that this is true also for other genres such as Homeric epic, lyric, and oratory). Some remarks about costumes, masks, and setting will be made below, however.

8 The view that character in tragedy is subordinated to plot essentially goes back to Aristotle,

acter and personality, particularly as they relate to moral evaluation (see the Introduction, →). In Greek literature generally, but in Aeschylus in particular, there is the additional question of the extent to which external forces (gods, curses, etc.) are responsible for characters' actions and decisions. Then there is the further complicating matter of the mythical and literary tradition of which most tragic characters form a part. Finally, among those critics who, in spite of all these complications, accept that the tragedians were indeed concerned with character-portrayal (whether for its own sake or not), there is hardly ever consensus on the interpretation of individual passages or the overall view of individual figures.

I chose my example from *Persians*—arguably a relatively minor problem—deliberately, to show that this network of questions surrounding characterization in tragedy is ubiquitous and inescapable. A much more obvious candidate for 'microcosm of the debate' would be the 'tapestry scene' in *Agamemnon*, among the most discussed moments in all of Greek tragedy.[9] When Agamemnon is persuaded by Clytemnestra to step on the purple raiments, what does this reveal about his character? Does he secretly want nothing more than to step on the riches, because he is 'at the mercy of his own vanity and arrogance'? Is he a 'great gentleman', too tired to resist his wife? Is it rather the result of a god-sent blindness (*atē*)? Or are these the wrong questions to ask altogether, and should we abandon notions of psychology and character to conclude that Agamemnon surrenders 'only because it was dramatically necessary that he should do so', and in any case that the 'power of the scene is diminished by attempts to interpret the behaviour of the characters psychologically rather than symbolically'?[10]

Scholarship in recent decades has rightly moved towards a sophisticated middle ground—a qualified all-of-the-above approach.[11] It has little problem in

Poetics 1450a, although Aristotle's views on characterization have often been oversimplified (cf. e.g. Gibert 1995: 42–44). Much modern criticism is influenced in some form by Tycho von Wilamowitz' work on Sophocles (1917), which insists that the tragedians cared more about the impact of particular scenes than about the consistent portrayal of characters (or, for that matter, plots). 'Tychoism' was developed for Aeschylus by Dawe 1963. In qualified form—characters are only given those traits which are necessary to make it plausible that they act the way they do, never because of 'character for its own sake'—it has remained highly influential (but cf. Heath 1987: 116–118).

9 It is telling that an article entitled 'Presentation of Character in Aeschylus' (Easterling 1973) should be devoted exclusively to a discussion of this scene.

10 The views cited are those of, respectively, Denniston and Page 1957 on 931–939; Fraenkel 1950: 441–442; Lloyd-Jones 1962; Dawe 1963: 50, and Lebeck 1971: 76.

11 Best exemplified by (most of) the essays on tragedy in Pelling 1990a. It is perhaps not

seeing Agamemnon's decision as informed both by personal and external (i.e. 'double') motivations. It reminds us that characters cannot be separated from a play's action, from its themes, motifs and its 'pervasive metaphorical colouring',[12] nor from the literary tradition of which they form a part. Importantly, it shows that the characters that we find in Greek tragedy are very different from those found in modern naturalistic drama or nineteenth-century realist novels: tragedy does not normally deal in idiosyncratic figures of profound psychological depth, nor does it regularly present characters as undergoing significant development; rather what we get is 'a few basic traits, clearly and consistently delineated'.[13] Yet on the whole, crucially, recent criticism on tragedy has refused to dispense with character as a critical category altogether—few would agree with Dawe (cited above) that 'dramatic necessity' on its own is enough to explain Agamemnon's surrender—and works on the assumption that the tragic texts invite their audiences to think about figures' motives and emotions, and to constantly construct figures' personalities as they are presented with new actions and utterances.[14]

This theoretical preamble has seemed necessary because the issues involved are germane to any appraisal of characterization in Aeschylus' plays. The critical posture adopted in this chapter is that character *is* important in tragedy; its aim is to discuss, from a primarily narratological perspective, certain cues in Aeschylus' plays which invite audiences to construct character. I will, at the same time, mostly refrain from taking sides in ongoing debates about the 'right' interpretation of particular characters—debates which recent scholarship has, tellingly, not been able to settle,[15] even if it provides a check on some of the psychologizing (and de-psychologizing) excesses of the past.

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too much of an exaggeration to state that little has 'happened' in the debate since that collection appeared; insights from the cognitive sciences appear to offer interesting new directions for the discussion to take (first steps in Budelmann and Easterling 2010; also Introduction, →).

12 The phrase, often quoted, is Gould's (1978: 60).

13 Heath 1987: 119.

14 'Constructing' is Easterling's term (1990): note her emphasis on the dynamic nature of this process, and compare the similar emphasis in Budelmann and Easterling 2010, as well as our Introduction (→).

15 Pelling sagely remarks: 'When we see Agamemnon persuaded … we need not infer any motives peculiar to him …: we are content to be convinced that 'someone of such-and-such a type would naturally react like this' … [B]ut we can still ask how differentiated the concept of 'such-and-such a type' really is: do we mean simply *any* human at all who was so prosperous? Or any human with a wife like Clytemnestra? Or any human with a natural

Aeschylean Characters and Characterizers

Before turning to Aeschylean techniques of characterization, it may be helpful to provide a brief overview of the types of figure we find in the plays, and to touch on the question 'who characterizes?' A feature of the design of Aeschylus' plays, somewhat distinct from that of Sophocles (→) and Euripides (→) (if the extant plays can be taken as evidence for general tendencies), is the relatively short 'life-span' of many principal characters. We get few figures who dominate entire plays, characterized strongly early on and then seen in a variety of circumstances and from many different points of view (such as Oedipus and Electra in Sophocles, or Medea and Hecuba in Euripides). Eteocles in *Seven Against Thebes* and, above all, Clytemnestra in *Agamemnon* are the obvious counter-examples, but these may be contrasted with figures like Agamemnon and Cassandra (who appear mid-way through their play—though we have been well-prepared for Agamemnon's arrival—and depart after a short role), or Electra in *Choephori* and Orestes in *Eumenides* (who disappear or fade from view after a stronger early showing). This picture is considerably modified, however, if we include choruses: in that case, the Danaids in *Suppliants* and (to a lesser extent) the Furies in *Eumenides* are clearly the protagonists of their respective plays.[16]

The relative brevity of some characters' stage-life, together with Greek tragedy's inherent focus on a short period of time, complicates the possibility of gleaning consistent long-term character and of portraying character development.[17] This will be discussed further below, but it may be mentioned here that some glimpses of characters' past lives play a part in this (though this device is

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hubristic streak, or a weakness of stature, or even a certain gentlemanliness or tiredness? *We can easily find ourselves rephrasing the conventional questions in these slightly different terms*' (1990c: 254, my italics). We see this scenario played out in the most recent commentary on *Agamemnon* by Raeburn and Thomas (2011), who, after a thoughtful introduction to characterization (lvi–lxi), describe Agamemnon in the tapestry scene as 'the man whom excessive prosperity has pushed towards *Atē* (*away from his basic character*), the man whom overbearing persuasion compels to act *even against his better judgement*' (on 944–949, my italics). To be clear, I do not object to such a formulation—in fact I think this reading of Agamemnon is right (*pace* e.g. Denniston and Page 1957 on 931 ff., Seidensticker 2009: 233 n. 85)—so long as the problematic nature of terms like 'basic character' is borne in mind.

16 For the characterization of the Danaids—not extensively discussed below—see Bowen 2013: 22–23 and *passim*.

17 For ancient Greek thought on character development, see the Introduction (→) to this volume.

less used than in Sophocles, →): we hear a few details about Xerxes prior to the expedition (*Pers.* 753–758), only the barest outlines of the flight of the Danaids (*Supp.* 1–18, 336–337), much more about Agamemnon at Aulis (see below), and some striking details of Electra's life at the palace (*Ch.* 135, 444–450). Electra also provides the most plausible case for the presence of character development in Aeschylus (though she is not quite on a par with Sophocles' (→) Neoptolemus), changing from an insecure young girl into a more determined young woman after the recognition scene (only to promptly disappear). Change may also be detected in Clytemnestra (*A.* and *Ch.*) after the murder,[18] though exactly how much is left deliberately uncertain (see below). Orestes obviously undergoes a significant change at the end of *Choephori*, which serves as the basis for *Eumenides*, yet it is difficult to see in it much in the way of development. Whether or not Eteocles is changed upon hearing that his brother is at the seventh gate is a much-vexed issue.[19]

We may, in any case, observe a significant variation of degree between plays and within plays, with respect to the depth and types of characterization of principal characters.[20] Apart from the principal characters, there are a few strongly characterized (even idiosyncratic) minor figures: the Egyptian herald of *Suppliants*, the watchman and herald of *Agamemnon* and the nurse Cilissa in *Choephori* are good examples (the guard of Sophocles' *Antigone* may be compared).[21] Choruses are also given traits: the choruses of *Suppliants* and *Eumenides* have already been mentioned, other choruses are sometimes quite specifically drawn (especially those of *Seven Against Thebes* and *Agamemnon*).

Of some interest from a narratological perspective are characters who 'appear' only offstage, i.e. only in the narratives or descriptions of other characters. These are sometimes figures of enormous consequence for the play (e.g. the Aegyptiads in *Suppliants*, who may have been featured later in the trilogy, and Polynices in *Seven Against Thebes*), sometimes less so (e.g. the other pairs of attackers and defenders in *Seven Against Thebes*); their presentation is rarely complex (Amphiaraus in *Seven Against Thebes* is a notable exception). For other characters offstage presentations alternate with onstage

18 See Michelini 1980.

19 For Eteocles' character see below.

20 See also Seidensticker 2009: 215–240; I am skeptical, however, of his attempt to identify an evolution in Aeschylus' career towards more strongly individualized characters—there is, I think, more to certain 'early' figures such as the Queen (*Pers.*) and Pelasgus (*Supp.*) than he would allow (for Pelasgus see below), and in any case the limited evidence makes such hypotheses very shaky.

21 For minor characters, see Yoon 2012.

appearances, offering a variety of perspective, and sometimes, as noted above, a 'past life': notably, the *parodos* in *Agamemnon* contains a lengthy narration of Agamemnon's dilemma at Aulis and his killing of Iphigenia (184–249), which will be remembered when he finally appears at the palace; various characters in *Agamemnon* and in *Choephori* comment on Clytemnestra while she is offstage; Xerxes has been much-discussed by others before he himself features late in *Persians*. Of particular interest in this regard are first-person narratives (i.e. onstage accounts by characters of their own offstage lives), foremost among which stands Clytemnestra's deceptive account of her suffering (*A*. 855–894)—the finest example in Aeschylus of how characterization by the characters (whether of each other or, as in this case, of themselves) may serve at the same time, indirectly, as a potent device for characterization by the playwright (see below on this speech).

This neatly leads into a discussion of the question 'who characterizes?' and of the relation between that question and techniques of characterization. Drama lacks an authoritative primary narrator to explicitly ascribe traits, emotions and motivations; all direct characterization comes from the characters themselves or the chorus, and in each case the audience will have to evaluate the reliability of these assessments, and determine what it reveals about the characteriz*ing* speakers (focalization is important here).[22] Many indirect techniques of characterization, however, must be ascribed to Aeschylus (i.e. to the 'implied author'), and these are in fact his main instruments: they include characterization by appearance and setting (i.e. costume, masks, staging), characterization by speech, action, emotion, etc. Each of these techniques may also be used by the characters and chorus, raising the same questions about reliability and focalization mentioned above. With forms of metaphorical characterization, the question 'who characterizes?' becomes more difficult to answer, and too strict an application of formal narratological categories would, in fact, yield infelicitous results. For instance, when the chorus in the *parodos* describe Agamemnon as 'not criticizing any prophet' (i.e. Calchas) for the prophecy that leads to Iphigenia's slaughter (*A*. 186), the audience may be reminded of the Agamemnon of *Iliad* book 1 (who *does* criticize Calchas) and this intertextual contrast might tell us something—by way of metaphorical characterization—about the Agamemnon of this play; yet to ascribe that device to the narrating chorus rather than to the author would be absurd. Some techniques of characterization thus cut straight through narratological categories (and this is part of the reason why the topic is so complex in drama).

22 The notion that any character or chorus can serve as a straightforward 'mouthpiece' of the author rightly has little currency in recent criticism.

Explicit Ascriptions of Traits, Attitudes, and Motivations

There are many instances in Aeschylus of a character or chorus commenting explicitly on the behaviour, motivations and traits of either themselves (auto-characterization) or others (altero-characterization). There is also great diversity in these instances. Infrequent, and found really only with offstage characters, is the synoptic vignette portraying (relatively) permanent traits: thus, Eteocles describes one of his chosen defenders, Hyperbius, as 'brave ... faultless in form, in spirit, and also in the handling of arms' (*Th.* 504–508). Most other cases are limited to the use of a single epithet describing permanent traits, such as the repeated (and increasingly ironic) description of Xerxes as 'bold' or 'rash' (*thourios*, *Pers.* 74, 718, 754), and the significant and unique epithet 'of manly counsel' (*androboulon*, *A.* 11), used by the watchman to characterize Clytemnestra's 'heart' (*kear*).[23]

Much more frequent is the description of transient mental states and attitudes. Sometimes such attributions reveal very little about character, certainly when taken by themselves: the passage which opens this chapter provides a good example—the Queen's own explanation for her silence tells us, in the end, little about her other than that she is (or, perhaps, presents herself as) the kind of person who would be stunned into silence by the news of an overwhelming defeat, which is not saying a lot.[24] But such descriptions are of great significance when used in the context of the major tragic actions and decisions shaping a play, such as Eteocles' decision to face his brother (*Th.*), Agamemnon's decision to kill Iphigenia (as narrated by the chorus) and Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon (*A.*), Orestes' murder of Clytemnestra (*Ch.*), etc. How the behaviour and motivations of *dramatis personae* in such extreme circumstances may be explained, and how these explanations relate to more permanent characteristics, are among the questions consistently raised by tragedy, with its focus on precisely such extreme situations.

As Gill has shown, there often is an important variation in the perspective used to explain such major actions and decisions, a 'distinction between explaining acts by reference to the beliefs and desires of the person as agent,

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23 The use of this epithet is an interesting case of the 'primacy' effect outlined in the Introduction (→): this initial one-word characterization is strongly determinative of the presentation of Clytemnestra throughout the play.

24 The phrase the Queen uses for her temporal loss of senses (*ekpeplēgmenē*) may also have some thematic significance: as Hall points out (1996: ad loc.) *plēgē* ('blow') is a significant term in *Persians* in referring to disaster; at this moment that disaster is brought home to the Queen, and thus the personal sphere.

and … by reference to causes which are seen as determining behaviour in ways other than through the person's conscious agency.'[25] What is more, the characters often explain their own actions from different perspectives than outside observers, with the observers (normally the chorus) frequently crassly incapable of seeing underlying personal motives, and relating the action to some wider pattern of human experience. Thus, Clytemnestra herself describes her murder of Agamemnon as a personally motivated and deliberate action (1372–1394), to which the chorus can respond only by speculating about an 'evil … food or … drink' influencing her (1407–1408), and that her mind 'is driven mad by your blood-pouring circumstance' (1427). The picture is complicated later when Clytemnestra herself, now agreeing with the chorus, portrays the murder as the act of 'the thrice-fattened daemon of this family' (1476–1477) and tells the chorus not to 'reckon that I am the spouse of Agamemnon: no, taking the likeness of this corpse's wife, the ancient, bitter avenging spirit of Atreus … has paid him his due' (1498–1502). In the *parodos* earlier in the play, Agamemnon had a 'mindset that would stop at nothing' (*A.* 221), and 'brought himself to become the sacrificer of his daughter' (224–225), but at the same time is described by the chorus as under the influence of 'Infatuation' (*parakopā* 223, suggesting that his senses *were knocked sideways* by an external force).

Especially in the case of altero-characterization, such explanations are often combined with moral evaluations: thus the chorus describe Agamemnon's thoughts before the killing of Iphigenia as 'impious, impure, unholy' (*A.* 219–220), and later use the same word 'impious' about the murder of Agamemnon (*asebei*, 1493). Similarly, Darius' ghost is strongly critical of his son's bridging of the Hellespont (which, again, he can only ascribe to external influence): 'it was a powerful divinity that came upon him, to put him out of his right mind' (*hōste mē phronein kalōs*, *Pers.* 725). As with the diverging *explanations* for actions mentioned above, conflicting moral *evaluations* of one and the same action are sometimes (though not as frequently) expounded by different characters: the trial in the second half of *Eumenides* is devoted entirely to the contest between two such opposing evaluations.

A famous and intriguing case where all these variables—the attribution of a character's personal and external motivations, both by himself and others, and moral evaluation—are intricately intertwined, is the dialogue in *Seven Against Thebes* between the chorus and Eteocles immediately before his departure to

25 Gill 1990: 22. For the psychological terminology used by Aeschylean characters, see Sullivan 1997.

face his brother.[26] The chorus, attempting to dissuade Eteocles from his fateful decision, urge him to resist the madness which they see as the result of a positive desire for fratricide (677–678, 686–688, 692–694, 698, 718); Eteocles repeatedly confirms that he has indeed gone mad (695–697, 709–711), but he ascribes his madness to the inescapable curse of his father (*patros Ara* 695, cf. 709). The only respect in which he himself appears to make a motivated decision is a purely military one, avoiding 'shame' (683) in the impending duel (716–717) by facing his 'enemy' (675) without cowardice. Throughout, the chorus and Eteocles share an evaluation of the impending action as 'evil' (*kakos*, e.g. 678, 683, 687). Gill's conclusion is worth quoting at length:

> Eteocles' tone ... does not seem to be that of a person suppressing a covert passion for fratricide, but rather of someone experiencing a nightmarish loss of will ... and surrendering to (what he sees as) irrational forces at work within himself ... [W]hat is unusual—even bizarre and surd—in the dialogue is the way in which what would more naturally figure as an outsider's *explanation* for his act is presented by the participant as a *motive*, though one which functions by subduing or replacing the participant's own desire rather than constituting it.[27]

As the case of Eteocles and the chorus shows, attributions of motive and accompanying moral evaluations also play a complex role in the communicative strategies and rhetoric of speakers, particularly when the attributions and evaluations are 'second-person': other examples are the confrontation between the Egyptian herald and Pelasgus, who asserts his authority by noting that 'you have made a great mistake (*poll' amartōn*), and your mind has gone far astray (*ouden ōrthōsai phreni*)' (*Supp.* 915), and the chorus mildly chiding their returning king Agamemnon for his unsatisfactory motives for the Trojan expedition (*A.* 799–801). Similarly, the use of auto-characterization may perform complex communicative and rhetorical functions, particularly when such characterization is done for the benefit of an internal audience. Thus, Clytemnestra's description of herself as a loyal wife anxiously awaiting news about her husband (*A.* 855–905), plays a part in her deception of Agamemnon (though the chorus and Cassandra, also onstage, may hear things somewhat

26 The bibliography on the scene, and Eteocles' character in general, is vast. See e.g. Sewell-Rutter 2007: ch. 2 and 6, Lloyd 2007: 8–13, Seidensticker 2009: 221–228, Herrmann 2013 (all with further references).

27 Gill 1990: 25–26.

differently). At a higher level, of course, this speech does a great deal to characterize Clytemnestra for the external audience, both as a dangerously deceptive woman asserting her (masculine) authority by speaking (at all, and at length), and as a particularly powerful user of language and narrative.[28]

Characterization by Action and Focalization

A good deal of characterization by action (and vitally, in Aeschylus, by decision) has already been discussed above, and it may be noted that my discussion of explicit characterization by characters has at times veered into the territory of more implicit, indirect characterization: audiences will construct character based both on how figures (decide to) act and how they themselves and others talk about those decisions and actions. Yet not all actions important for characterization in Aeschylus are accompanied by *explicit* attributions of motive or moral evaluations: such explanations and evaluations are largely absent, for instance, surrounding Pelasgus' tortured decision about the Danaids (*Supp.* 333–489) even if Pelasgus does state his intention at the outset to act 'piously' (*eusebēs*, 340). This does not necessarily mean, however, that he is 'without character', or that it does 'not matter what sort of man Pelasgus' is.[29] He has been seen as a simplistic model king or as merely a foil for the Danaids[30] (one wonders if a character can be either without being at least *some* 'sort of man'), but there is some fleshing out in addition to typification: his irresoluteness (or, perhaps, his thoughtfulness) is underlined by his repeated use of the language of thought, decision and judgment (e.g. 397, 407–417, 438), and his driving concerns become clear as he weighs the sides of his dilemma (incurring the wrath of Zeus *Hikesios* versus the loss of life in a certain war), as he emphasizes the need to refer the case to the Argive assembly, and as finally his hand is forced by the Danaids' threat of suicide. There is tragic significance (which might have seemed greater still had we possessed the rest of the trilogy) in his failure to press the Danaids for an answer on why they refused the marriage with the Aegyptiads (333–341).[31]

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28 See *SAGN* 1: 245–247 (Barrett) for how the speech characterizes Clytemnestra *as a narrator*.

29 Kitto 1961: 26, 54; it is fair to say, however, that the real protagonist of the play is the chorus of Danaids. There is in fact some disagreement about Pelasgus' characterization: for some references see Lloyd 2007: 19 with n. 62. My own view largely coincides with that of Bowen 2013: 23–24.

30 Cf. e.g. Rosenmeyer 1982: 234. See below for characterization by contrast.

31 See Bowen 2013 on lines 333–341.

Characterization by focalization, too, has already been touched on, in that there is often in Aeschylus a significant difference in perspective used by different characters to describe the same action or person: how Aeschylean characters view the world is a significant component of their characterization. There is, at the same time, often a question whether the view of situations and actions that characters express outwardly matches with their inner 'true' views: this issue of reliability is sometimes made explicit, such as when the nurse Cilissa ascribes to Clytemnestra and Aegisthus an entirely different reaction to the news of Orestes' 'death' than the one they display in public (Cilissa claims that Clytemnestra is 'concealing the laughter inside over the things that have happened' and expects that Aegisthus will be 'pleased to learn' that news (*Ch.* 738–740, 765)—what we hear from Clytemnestra and Aegisthus themselves (691–699, 841–843) is very different). There is no way to test 'who is right' here, and this complicates the characterization of (as well as sympathy for) each of Clytemnestra, Aegisthus, Cilissa and the chorus in *Choephori*.

Group Membership

Aeschylus' tragedies are populated by kings and queens, husbands and wives (and a lover), parents and children, prophets and soldiers, messengers and nurses, humans, gods and ghosts. These categories are strongly determinative of characters in tragedy: they will have activated a range of expectations about traits and behaviour in the audience.[32] Scholars who see the role of characterization in Aeschylus as a minimal or exclusively functional one tend to assimilate his *dramatis personae* entirely to such categories, as types, but Aeschylus' practice does not bear this out. None of Aeschylus' kings (Xerxes, Darius, Eteocles, Pelasgus, Agamemnon (and Aegisthus?)) is simply interchangeable: rather, each differs sufficiently from the next to yield an 'individual, grasped and realized as distinct and different', possessing 'traits which group naturally' but which are not quite the same in each case.[33] Of course, it also matters that we see these kings in different situations, so that different aspects of character will be foregrounded: Pelasgus and Eteocles both are seen on the job, at critical

32 See the Introduction on cognitive schemas (→).

33 The phrases are borrowed from Pelling 1990c: 254–255. It is true that ancient criticism tends to focus on the typical, but there are exceptions (Introduction, →), and in any case 'in antiquity practice visibly exceeded critical theory' (Rutherford 2012: 288).

moments of peril for their state, but the nature (and proximity) of that peril is very different, and calls for different kinds of responses.[34]

Apart from social status (see above on minor characters), perhaps the most important social category on which Aeschylus' characters are mapped is that of gender, a topic too large to discuss here in any detail.[35] Gender is often a vital constitutive component of characterization, e.g. for the choruses of *Seven Against Thebes* and *Suppliants* (both portrayed as prone to extreme reactions and mood swings, the latter a trait which also seems to mark Electra in the recognition scene of *Choephori*). More significant is Clytemnestra, the supreme example of a female character who *transgresses* normal female behaviour. Clytemnestra's gender-related portrayal is complex: though she plans like a man and speaks like a man, she has not lost all traces of femininity (her motherly grief over Iphigenia is a driving force), and she has some dangerous traits which are specifically connected to her gender, particularly the powers of persuasion (especially with sex)[36] and deception.

Appearance and Setting

We cannot know for certain how masks, costume, movement and staging contributed to original audiences' views of certain characters. We do get some indications in the text of what the costumes may have looked like: Xerxes appears in rags (a point of great distress to his parents, *Pers.* 834–836, 846–848), the Danaids are dressed in 'un-Greek garb, with luxurious barbarian robes and headbands' (*Supp.* 235–236), the appearance of the Furies in *Eumenides* is detailed with particular vividness (*Eu.* 46–56). Tragic masks will certainly have presented some basic features (particularly age and gender). The mask has been seen as a hindrance to the presentation of character, in that it cannot express 'the flickering procession of ambiguous clues to inaccessible privacy';[37]

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34 To be clear, I am not saying that plot and action wholly determine characterization (i.e. which traits are presented), but that they determine *which kinds of traits* are presented most clearly. It is a vain, but instructive exercise to imagine these characters 'in each other's shoes': would Eteocles react to the Danaids as Pelasgus does? (His own confrontation with a band of panicky women seems to suggest otherwise.)

35 Some foundational works: Zeitlin 1996, McClure 1999, Foley 2001. Heath 1987: 158–162 is brief and helpful. For social categories in tragedy more generally, see Hall 1997.

36 The role of gender and sexuality in the *Oresteia* is central to Goldhill's reading of the trilogy (1984).

37 Gould 1978: 49.

these limitations have been called into question, however, and recent research shows that the range of expression possible with masks may have been very great indeed.[38]

The description of the appearance of offstage characters is a central feature of the 'Shield Scene' in *Seven Against Thebes* (369–676), a visual *tour de force* powerfully evoking the attacking warriors. Focalization plays a role here, too: Eteocles' leadership is in part determined by how he reinterprets the appearance of each of the attackers in different terms from those initially related by the scout.

Setting[39] is important for characterization particularly in the *Oresteia*: part of Clytemnestra's power in *Agamemnon* resides in the fact that she controls the threshold to the palace, a control which is played out most strikingly in the tapestry scene. The pervasive use of mirror scenes between the *Agamemnon* and *Choephori* (the return of Agamemnon and that of Orestes, Clytemnestra coming out to meet them, and above all the revelation of the corpses, with Clytemnestra and Orestes standing over the dead bodies) will have played out visually;[40] the contrast reflects in each case on the characters in question (particularly on Orestes).

The Language of Heroes (and Servants): Characterization by Speech

Like his fellow tragedians and many other Greek authors, Aeschylus has suffered from the perception that he was uninterested in (or incapable of) characterizing speakers by their language. While it is true that tragic language has a certain uniformity (e.g. the use of the trimeter, the avoidance of certain registers), to claim that Aeschylus did not vary the speaking styles of his character is to show some disregard for the material, even according to the most restrictive definitions of 'style' (and I would argue for a more liberal one).[41] It is telling that speaking style is sometimes thematized explicitly in the plays: Eteocles disparages the chorus for their vehement panic (*Th.* 182–202: they 'cry and howl', *auein, lakazein* (186); Eteocles' own language in this speech is strong). Agamem-

38 For general comments, see Seidensticker 2009: 209–211. For interesting observations on the neurological science behind the use of masks, see Meineck 2011: 148–158.

39 For the use of space in Aeschylus, see *SAGN* 3: 307–324 (Rehm).

40 See Taplin 1978: ch. 8.

41 For problems of defining 'style' in tragedy, see Rutherford 2012: 4–16. On Aeschylus' style, also see Rosenmeyer 1982: ch. 4.

non criticizes Clytemnestra's lengthy speech and her 'open-mouthed shouting in the fashion of a barbarian' (*A*. 914–930), and the propriety of her language given her gender is a recurring question in the play (e.g. 348–351, 592, 918; after her speech over the corpses the chorus is 'amazed at [her] language—how arrogant it is', 1399); the chorus also remarks on the riddling nature of Cassandra's language (1112–1113, 1152–1153), as does Cassandra herself (1178–1183); and so forth.

In each case, it is possible to back up these assessments with stylistic analysis showing that there really is something unusual about the language in question. To take the most clear-cut example, Cassandra[42] uses, statistically, more rare vocabulary than any other character in the play, including the chorus and even in iambics;[43] her language has a preponderance of 'surge features' (*otototototoi popoi da* 1076, *e e papai papai* 1114, etc.); and for some time she utters dochmiacs (a metre associated with excitement and agitation). Apart from measurable features like these, we might look to certain points of content with stylistic import: the richness and density of imagery, the rapid switches between past, present and future (also visible in her use of tenses), etc. 'Style' should, moreover, be seen to include conversational behaviour, and in this respect, too, Cassandra's language is remarkable: she fails to answer direct questions (e.g. 1119–1126, 1150–1161), directs questions and directives to entities that cannot answer (e.g. 1087, 1100–1101, 1114–1115, 1117–1118, etc.). Before all this, Cassandra has been silent for almost 300 lines, even when addressed directly (1035, 1047)—a peculiar type of linguistic behaviour in itself (and one for which Aeschylus was apparently famous (cf. Ar. *Ra*. 911–920), even if not all his silences are significant).[44] Together, these features present a picture of highly unusual language use, which cannot but invite audience members to construct an explanation for Cassandra's behaviour (something that we see the chorus trying, but failing to do).[45] The question remains to what extent such an explanation will involve

42 It is baffling to read in a commentary that Cassandra uses 'for the most part straightforward language' (Denniston and Page 1957: 165).

43 This is based on a count of absolute *hapax legomena*, i.e. words which do not recur even outside the Aeschylean corpus. The large majority of Cassandra's *hapax* are compounds, which add complexity and detail to her images (e.g. *melankerōi* 1127, *propurgoi … polukaneis … polunomōn* 1168–1169) or provide an ominous 'atmosphere' (e.g. *kakopotmos* 1136, *dusphatos* 1152).

44 For silences in Aeschylus, see Taplin 1972.

45 As is well pointed out by e.g. Budelmann and Easterling 2010: 292–298. Rosenmeyer's opposite claim ('We are not invited to consider why Cassandra acts and talks and sings the way she does', 1982: 223) is premised on the notion that Cassandra merely represents a generic type ('the misunderstood prophet'). But this suggests, by definition, that the

character as such (as opposed, for instance, to the overwhelming compulsion of her prophetic inspiration): critics have seen nobility and resilience in her silence (a refusal to engage with Clytemnestra) and in the dignified manner in which she copes with her visions and enters the palace to meet her doom. Her role certainly evokes pity (also for the chorus, explicitly: 1069, 1330) and pathos.

Cassandra is certainly something of a stylistic outlier, yet with other principal characters too, language contributes a great deal to characterization. Looking once more at the example of the Queen above, the fact that she interrupts the messenger on hearing the news that Xerxes is alive[46] (299–301) may be seen as a linguistic marker of the intensity of her feelings about her son. With respect to fully individualized speaking styles, Eteocles and Clytemnestra are the best-discussed examples,[47] but a case might be made for most other principal characters. Minor characters, too, appear to be distinguished by their language, specifically by colloquialisms, a greater use of generalizations and proverbs, and possibly by syntax.[48]

Metaphorical Characterization

Metaphorical techniques of characterization (by contrast or comparison) are among those most widely used in Aeschylus, yet also among the most complex. In part this is because, as noted above, they do not permit an easy answer to the question 'who characterizes?'; in part also because metaphorical techniques nearly always serve literary functions beyond characterization, to articulate

audience will have seen many figures behaving much like Cassandra before, which I find doubtful. On types see above.

46 Sommerstein's use of a dash to indicate suspended syntax is surely right, given the use of *men* and *de* in the messenger's utterances (299, 302), and the fact that the messenger needs two turns to answer a single question for information about both who survived and who perished (296).

47 For brief treatments see Seidensticker 2009: 227–228, 234–236 (with further bibliography); also Judet de La Combe 2001 (vol. 1): 46–53. On Clytemnestra see also Rutherford 2012: 299–307. In spite of these contributions, characterization through style in Aeschylus is, as Seidensticker points out (2009: 214), an area where much work remains to be done; modern linguistic and stylistic approaches may contribute much to our understanding here (cf. van Emde Boas 2017, fc.).

48 For colloquialisms and generalizations, see West 1990, Rutherford 2012: 296–297, Seidensticker 2009: 238. The latter also argues that lower-class characters are distinguished by violations of syntax.

larger themes and motifs central to the plays. An example used by Goldhill to make a similar point is instructive:[49]

> Look on the orphan brood of the eagle father, who died in the twisting coils (*plektaisi*) of the dreadful viper. Ravenous hunger presses hard on the bereaved children; for they are not yet full-grown so as to bring home to the nest their father's prey.
>
> *Ch.* 247–251

Orestes' words clearly refer to his family: he and Electra are the hatchlings of the eagle (Agamemnon) who was strangled by a viper (Clytemnestra). The extended metaphor serves an internal function in Orestes' communicative strategy, in that he portrays himself and his sister as weak and therefore needing the help of the gods, as he makes explicit in the next line ('So too …', *houtō*, 252). Yet the significance of the comparison does not end there, as Goldhill points out:

> [C]ertain associations of the viper—that the female destroys the male in copulation and that the children eat their way out of the womb in revenge—are strikingly appropriate to Clytemnestra and Orestes as he approaches the matricide.

And:

> [T]he image of Electra and Orestes as children bereft of an eagle father is deeply intertwined with the earlier—and later—language of the trilogy. Agamemnon and Menelaus embarked on the expedition 'like vultures' (*Ag.* 49 ff.) and it is an omen of eagles—the 'winged dogs of the father' (*Ag.* 135)—that promises victory to and delays the expedition at Aulis … Similarly the image of Clytemnestra as snake harks back not merely to the language of monstrosity associated with the queen throughout the trilogy, but also in the term *plektaisi*, ('woven things', 'coils') to the woven coils of the net in which Agamemnon died …

Thus, the imagery that Orestes 'chooses' to apply has a much wider significance than merely to characterize the members of his family (though it does do that, for instance by likening Clytemnestra to a vicious animal). Nor is it easy, to

49 Goldhill 1990: 106–108.

return to the question 'who characterizes?', to determine where the internal significance of the simile for Orestes' rhetoric ends and where the playwright's literary design begins, if such boundaries are to be drawn at all: are we to suppose that Orestes' himself intends for the association with cannibalistic snakelets to be felt?

The use of animal similes and metaphors is a recurring feature in Aeschylus, above all in the *Oresteia*:[50] Agamemnon, apart from being compared to vultures and eagles (see above), describes himself as a 'lion, eater of raw flesh' (A. 827); Orestes, accordingly, is a lion (*Ch.* 938) and an eagle hatchling (249–250, 501), but as Clytemnestra's son, also a snake (527). Clytemnestra has a particular wide range of animal counterparts, including a cow (A. 1125–1126), a bitch (1228), a 'lioness, sleeping with a wolf while the noble lion was away' (1258–1259), a spider (1492), a snake (*Ch.* 249), as well as an amphisbaena or Scylla (A. 1233).

The example of the lion, lioness and wolf neatly leads into another metaphorical characterization technique, that of contrast: the juxtaposition of Agamemnon and Aegisthus serves to characterize both, as does, for instance, the contrast between Cilissa and Clytemnestra, who both in their own way reminisce about Orestes as a baby (*Ch.* 750–762, 896–898, 908); Orestes is constantly compared (across plays in the trilogy) to his parents, by way of the animal imagery just discussed and the mirror scenes treated above; Electra explicitly wishes to be 'more virtuous' than her mother, 'and more righteous in action' (*Ch.* 140–141). Further examples are the frequent contrasts between Darius and Xerxes raised in *Persians*, and the confrontation between the reasoned approach of Pelasgus with the more unpredictable and emotional approach of the Danaids in *Suppliants*. These characters serve in some respect as each other's foils, though the use of such foils is not as sustained and developed as in Sophocles (→).

Finally, metaphorical characterization may build on intertextual connections, as in the case of Agamemnon's behaviour towards Calchas already mentioned above (A. 186). Given Aeschylus' early position in our extant evidence, we know much less about the extent of the use of such intertextual references than we do for later authors (Sophocles and Euripides (→), for instance, frequently hark back to Aeschylus).

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50 Cf. Heath 1999, Lebeck 1971.

Names

As Easterling points out,[51] in drama, with its 'intensely concentrated' experience, 'everything the stage figures do and say, and everything said about them, has to be taken as significant, even their names'. Naming is thus a good place to finish our overview of characterizing techniques in Aeschylus.[52]

The most obvious function of names is to connect figures to their mythological and literary tradition (cf. metaphorical characterization, above): the mere mention of a name such as Danaus, Eteocles, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra or Cassandra activates prior knowledge and triggers a host of corresponding expectations in audience members. It is often difficult to assess the precise extent of such expectations in the case of the original audience, given the state of our evidence: it is not certain, for instance, whether the story that Cassandra promised to sleep with Apollo but then reneged was received myth by the time of Aeschylus (who only sketches the story at A. 1202–1213); the myth of the Danaids, the basis for *Suppliants*, is notoriously unstable.[53] In the case of the (for the original audience, relatively recent) historical figure of Xerxes, the characterization that came with the name will have been of a qualitatively different kind.

The significance of names is often not simply traditional: Aeschylus is fond of etymologizing, i.e. of speaking names. The chorus of *Seven Against Thebes* remark that Eteocles and Polynices have perished 'in a manner fitting (*orthōs*) to their names, with "true glory" and with "much strife"' (*eteokleieis kai poluneikeis*, *Th.* 829–831);[54] the chorus in *Agamemnon* describe as 'appropriate' (*etētumōs*) Helen's naming, as she is *helandros*, *helenaus*, *heleptolis* ('hell to ships, to men, to cities', with a play on the root *hel-* 'destroy', A. 681–690). It is, again, important who does the etymologizing: it is the chorus who describe Helen as 'hell to men', and this in itself tells us something about the chorus and their view of the Trojan expedition. Apart from such explicit instances numerous implicit ones have been detected throughout the plays.[55]

51 1990: 89.

52 The lack of a name might also be significant (the Queen in *Persians* is never actually called Atossa).

53 Cf. Friis Johansen and Whittle 1980 (vol. 1): 44–55.

54 With Hutchinson's conjecture *eteokleieis*; *poluneikeis* is secure.

55 Cf. e.g. Fraenkel on A. 682 and 687, with further examples and references.

Conclusion

Though all of the techniques of characterization found in 'pure' narrative are also found in drama, the fact that some of them can be used only by (and through) the characters onstage has considerable consequences. Absent a primary narrator to ascribe motives and traits with (relative) authority, direct characterization is inherently open to questioning and subversion, and it is often a part of the design of Aeschylus' plays that a multiplicity of voices is allowed to reflect on the same character or action. Indirect characterization occurs at different levels: some onstage cues to character (costume, masks, staging, movement and speech) can be ascribed only to the dramatist, but he also allows his characters to describe, narrate and comment using similar techniques, and these techniques are then open to the same questioning and subversion as direct ascriptions. Metaphorical characterization is particularly complex with respect to the question who is responsible for that characterization.

The fact that various perspectives on action and character are combined in plays makes straightforward moral evaluations of the characters difficult, though the characters themselves often present such moral evaluations, sometimes conflicting ones. They also do much to *explain* their own behaviour and that of others, though here all the more Aeschylus has built in a diversity of perspective.

The focus of drama on brief and consequential episodes is greatly significant: the most important indicators of character are then decisions taken at moments of extreme pressure, raising the question how these decisions are shaped by (and revealing of) longer-term characteristics. In any case, the concentration of drama may explain why Aeschylus presents characters who are seldom deeply complex (if never *just* types), and who are given memorable, but brief, appearances. Some characters break this mould: Eteocles, Agamemnon, Cassandra and above all Clytemnestra justifiably continue to fascinate.

CHAPTER 18

Sophocles

Michael Lloyd

The Introduction (→) to this volume has a section on cognitive narratology which is very helpful for the study of character and characterization in Sophocles. This chapter will accordingly begin with an examination of the relevant schemas available to Sophocles and his audience, followed by a discussion of how the schemas are modified by 'bottom-up' processing in the earlier parts of the plays.[1] The chapter will then investigate the various textual techniques used by Sophocles to construct character throughout the plays. This will include discussion of the question 'who characterizes?' There will inevitably be a certain amount of overlap between these two sections, but it seems worthwhile to give particular attention to the presentation of characters in the earlier parts of the plays in view of the importance of the effect of 'primacy' discussed in the Introduction. Finally, the chapter will address the nature of character in Sophocles, with attention to such issues as the long-term stability of traits attributed to characters and the question of character development.

The Real-World Schema

The most basic schema used by Sophocles relates to human behaviour in general, and to the use by audiences of real-world interpretative skills for reading characters in drama. The real-world schema can be defined as 'the cognitive structures and inferential mechanisms that readers have already developed for real-life people'.[2] This will undergo fairly rapid adjustment, especially when reading texts from other cultures, but characters in Sophocles would not be intelligible without some sort of real-world schema. Brian Vickers began his book *Towards Greek Tragedy* by stating that in Greek tragedy 'people love and hate as we do', for which he has come under attack for ignoring 'the differences between ancient and modern constructions of affective relations and obliga-

1 The Greek word *skhēma* can, as it happens, mean 'character' or 'role', but 'schema' is used in a different sense in this chapter.

2 Culpeper 2001: 10; cf. 27–28, 63–69.

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tions'.[3] Our bottom-up processing will doubtless involve consideration of the implications of the words *philia* and *erōs*, but it would be impossible to understand *Antigone* without any experience of affective relations. Such experience can of course be more or less direct. We do not need to have experienced isolation and pain exactly like that of Philoctetes to bring relevant understanding and expectations to the play. This does not imply any belief in unchanging human nature, confusion between characters in drama and real people, or indeed naïve confidence in our understanding of real people.[4]

The real-world schema relates not only to aspects of character, such as emotions, but also to character-types. This schema is in some ways more problematic for Sophocles than for some other Greek authors in that his characters are figures from myth who rarely correspond to real-world character-types. He contrasts in this with the more realistic character portrayal in Euripides (→).[5] Nevertheless, the audience may apply a real-world schema even to figures who are remote from everyday experience. This is clear from some of the assumptions about characters such as Atossa and Agamemnon discussed in the chapter on Aeschylus (→). Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus*) immediately invites interpretation in terms of the king schema. This is suggested by his entry from the palace to address a group of suppliants, dressed in clothes appropriate to his royal status, and reinforced by the terms in which he is addressed by the Priest (e.g. *OT* 14, 40). The king schema is a predominantly literary construct and does not correspond directly to a specific human type with which the audience would have been acquainted, although Oedipus can be interpreted more broadly as a representative of political authority which would have real-world analogies.[6]

The real-world schema can be misleading when it is insufficiently modified by bottom-up processing as the play develops. Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood thus appeals explicitly to 5th-c. BCE schemas when she argues that 'the Athenian audience would have perceived Antigone as a woman out of her proper place acting against what is considered proper female behaviour'.[7] The origi-

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3 Vickers 1973: 3, criticized by Goldhill 1990: 103. Vickers actually knows something about *philia* and 'the interlinked social groups which give an individual his identity and political status' (113).

4 Cf. Easterling 1990: 88–89.

5 Cf. Arist. *Po.* 1460b33–34: 'Sophocles said that he portrayed characters as they ought to be, while Euripides portrayed them as they are', on which see Csapo 2010: 124–125.

6 Cf. Gould 1988: 148 = 2001: 250. On the ruler schema for Creon (*Antigone*), see Griffith 1999: 38 n. 114, 122 (note on *Ant.* 7–8), noting that a father schema comes to the fore in the Haemon scene.

7 Sourvinou-Inwood 1989: 140.

nal audience would indeed have brought to the play a real-world schema of behaviour appropriate to a young unmarried woman (*parthenos*), which seems relevant in the opening scene, but it becomes increasingly troubling when it is employed insistently by Creon as the play proceeds. Creon initially invites interpretation in terms of the schema of the good ruler when he expresses admirable sentiments about the importance of the *polis* in his opening speech (*Ant.* 162–210), but this too is soon modified.[8]

The Genre Schema

Secondly, Sophocles exploits a genre schema which creates expectations about how characters will be represented in a tragedy. We shall not e.g. be surprised to find that many of them are of royal status. On a less general level, an actantial or syntactic approach is relevant. All Sophocles' plays feature 'hero' and 'foil' figures, and our reading of these characters cannot be separated from our understanding of their roles.[9] The characters in *Oedipus Coloneus* can be related to their equivalents in other suppliant plays, with e.g. Creon in the role of the threatening outsider which in other plays is regularly a herald.[10] Prophets in tragedy are always right, so no informed spectator will have any doubt about the veracity of Tiresias (*Antigone*, *Oedipus Tyrannus*); it will also be assumed that his advice will be disbelieved or resented by the rulers to whom he addresses it. Theseus (*Oedipus Coloneus*) activates the 'Athenian' schema: 'Athenians in tragedy usually display virtue, piety, and respect for suppliants and the democratic principle of freedom of speech'.[11]

Plot requirements may supersede coherence of character but are not necessarily incompatible with it.[12] In *Oedipus Tyrannus*, for example, the play could not continue if Oedipus had immediately accepted Tiresias' statements of his true identity (*OT* 362 etc.), although this does not rule out an additional explanation in terms of character.[13] Creon's inclination to secrecy (*OT* 91–92) is consistent with his attitudes elsewhere (cf. *OT* 1429–1431; *OC* 755–760), but this

8 See e.g. the critique of Sourvinou-Inwood by Foley 1995. The various terms used for Antigone in the play (*pais*, *neanis*, *korē*, *numphē*, *parthenos*, *gunē*) are listed by Griffith 1999: 38 n. 113.

9 See Knox 1964.

10 See Burian 1974.

11 Hall 1997: 103.

12 See Wilamowitz 1917; Lloyd-Jones 1972.

13 See Goldhill 1986: 173–174.

fairly trivial character point would not in itself explain his words here and they also have the functional purpose of prompting Oedipus' revealing reply (cf. *OT* 1287–1288).[14] A Greek tragedy also comprises a variety of formal structures, which have their own integrity and momentum. An example is the iambic recapitulation of Electra's lyrics in her first speech (*El.* 254–309).[15] The forensic style of her speech in her scene with Clytemnestra (*El.* 558–609) is partly determined by the conventions of the agon (formal debate), and cannot wholly be explained in terms of character. The play has an intricate linguistic texture, from which a character cannot simply be extracted.[16]

The Myth Schema

Thirdly, there is the myth schema, i.e. what is known about the characters from earlier versions in literature and myth.[17] This schema is difficult to assess, since we cannot know for sure what knowledge Sophocles assumed in his audience. Nevertheless, it would clearly be insufficient to discuss Sophocles' portrayal of e.g. Heracles or Ajax as if he had invented these characters.

The name is the irreducible core of the myth schema. Seymour Chatman gives a lucid summary of Roland Barthes' influential discussion of the name in fiction: 'a kind of ultimate residue of personality, not a quality but a locus of qualities, the narrative-noun that is endowed with but never exhausted by the qualities, the narrative-adjectives'.[18] This is a more fundamental aspect of naming than the 'speaking names', which are especially prominent in Aristophanes (→); Ajax's association of his name (*Aias* in Greek) with the lament *aiai* is the most notable example in Sophocles (*Aj.* 430–431). One could develop Barthes' theory to illuminate mythical characters. The name is a rigid designator (which designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists and never designates anything else),[19] making it intelligible to say e.g. that the Helen of Homer's *Iliad* is the same character as the Helen of Euripides' *Helen*,

14 Cf. Culpeper 2001: 146: 'we can assume that character behaviour [sc. in fiction] has additional significance or relevance, so that our processing efforts will receive sufficient cognitive rewards'.

15 For discussion of this convention, see Lloyd 2005: 40.

16 On rhetoric and character in *Electra*, see e.g. Budelmann 2000: 66–71; Finglass 2007b: 173–176.

17 Yoon 2012: 2–3 contrasts anonymous characters, for whom there is no myth schema.

18 Chatman 1978: 131; cf. Barthes [1970] 1974: 196–197 (Section LXXXI).

19 Rigid designators: Kripke [1972] 1980.

although she has different traits and experiences. This aspect of names is also discussed in the chapter on Aeschylus (→).

The characters and main events of *Ajax* were well-known from earlier versions.[20] The first word of the play ('always') engages the audience in complicity with Athena's knowledge that Odysseus' behaviour is typical, and the opening dialogue expresses her traditionally close relationship with him. Odysseus' myth schema is also exploited in *Philoctetes*, where Achilles' contrasting myth schema is the basis for our reading of Neoptolemus.[21] In *Ajax*, the audience needs no elaboration of the epithet 'shieldbearer' (*Aj.* 19), the statement that Ajax was 'angry because of the arms of Achilles' (*Aj.* 41), Odysseus' enmity (*Aj.* 2, 18, 78–79, 122), or Ajax's heroic qualities (*Aj.* 119–120). Ajax's martial greatness can be alluded to as something well known (e.g. *Aj.* 154–161, 205, 364–365, 502), and it is essential to Sophocles' presentation of him that it can be taken for granted that he is a great warrior.

The myth schema of Heracles (*Trachiniae*) was also well-established. The first reference to him is as 'the famous son of Zeus and Alcmena' (*Tr.* 19), his labours are mentioned as well known (*Tr.* 29–35, 112–121), and other familiar features are his drunkenness (*Tr.* 268), violence (*Tr.* 351–365, 772–782), and sexual excess (*Tr.* 459–460). As with Ajax, significant aspects of his greatness are understood from the myth rather than established in the text.

Sophocles also exploits the myth schema in vignettes of characters who appear briefly offstage. Examples are Calchas (*Aj.* 749–755), Agamemnon (*El.* 566–569), Eurytus (*Tr.* 262–269), and Laius (*OT* 800–809). These brief descriptions, vivid as they are, gain resonance from what we know about the characters in other contexts.

Establishing Character

In some plays (e.g. *Ajax*, *Trachiniae*, *Philoctetes*), character is established by activation of the myth schema together with demonstration of the author's particular interpretation of it. The 'first appearance', an important characterization technique in Homer (→), is exploited by Sophocles as it is by most dramatists. Ajax (*Ajax*) would not be intelligible without the myth schema, but in that context his few lines in the opening scene establish a highly distinctive character.

20 See Garvie 1998: 1–6; Finglass 2011: 26–41.

21 See e.g. Knox 1964: 121–122; Schein 2013: 23–25.

In other plays, it is clear that Sophocles needs to do more to establish his characters. Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus*), for example, is characterized in considerable detail early in the play. This suggests either that Sophocles did not have an established myth schema for his character, however notorious his deeds may have been (e.g. Antiphanes fr. 189 K-A), or at any rate that he was determined to override any such schema as existed. Oedipus is indeed so notable an expression of the 5th-c. BCE enlightenment that it is difficult to imagine a remotely comparable figure being created very much earlier.[22] Oedipus' second speech (*OT* 58–77) illustrates many of his main characteristics:

> Pitiable children, I know why you have come, for I am well aware that you are all sick; and, sick as you are, there is none who is as sick as I. Your pain comes to each alone in himself, and to no one else, while my soul grieves for the city and for myself and for you together. So you are not rousing me from sleep, but be sure that I have wept much and gone down many paths in the wanderings of thought. I discovered one remedy in my investigations, and this I have done: I sent Creon son of Menoeceus, my brother-in-law, to the Pythian house of Phoebus, so that he might find out what I should do or say to save the city. And already when I reckon the passage of time it troubles me what he is doing, for he has been away beyond what one would expect, longer than the proper time. When he comes, then I would be bad if I do not do everything which the god reveals.

We see here Oedipus' pity for other people, capacity for cogitation, swiftness in taking action, decisive issuing of orders, impatience of the slowness of others, and confidence in his own abilities.[23] His character is established in considerable detail by the entry of Tiresias (*OT* 297), when he is challenged personally for the first time, and all of these traits remain prominent throughout the play. His sense of his identity and of his place in the world is qualified as the play proceeds, but it is essential to the meaning of the play that it is a very distinctive individual who is subjected to these challenges.

Electra and *Antigone* resemble *Oedipus Tyrannus* in establishing the character of the protagonist in detail early in the play. Sophocles' portrayal of Electra may develop that in Aeschylus' *Choephori*, but he does not seem to rely on the

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22 See, e.g., Knox 1957: 107, 137.

23 The memorable character sketch by Knox 1957: 14–29 focuses on the language used by and about Oedipus. Cf. Culpeper 2001: 199–202 for systematic study of the keywords of the speech of different characters in *Romeo and Juliet*.

myth schema and presents the main features of her character in her opening anapaests (*El.* 86–120): dwelling on the death of Agamemnon, obsession with the guilt of his murderers, determination to continue lamenting, liminal status, solitariness, and hope for the return of Orestes. Sophocles made so many innovations in the myth of *Antigone* that Antigone effectively has no myth schema.[24] The essentials of her character and motivation are presented in the course of her dialogue with Ismene in the prologue (*Ant.* 1–99). Sophocles notably presents character at the beginning of a play through dialogue, rather than by explicit description as is done by many other dramatists including Euripides (→).

Sophocles' technique in *Oedipus Coloneus* is somewhat different. He immediately establishes the character of Oedipus as a blind beggar who has been wandering for many years being looked after by Antigone (*OC* 1–22), but other aspects of his character only emerge in the course of the play: the benefits which he can bring to Athens, his love for his daughters and hatred for his sons, his resentment at his expulsion from Thebes, and his attitude to his past crimes. This is a notable example of the dramatic effect of the gradual revelation of character, and seems to contrast quite strongly with Sophocles' other plays.

Techniques of Characterization

The second section of this chapter will now investigate the various textual techniques used by Sophocles to construct character, beginning with the question 'who characterizes?' If the question is posed in these terms, as it is in the Introduction to this volume, then we shall need something like Wayne Booth's concept of the implied author: 'He is not the narrator, but rather the principle that invented the narrator, along with everything else in the narrative, that stacked the cards in this particular way, had these things happen to these characters, in these words or images'.[25] Metaphorical characterization by contrast, for example, cannot be attributed to any particular character within a play. The concept of the implied author is controversial, and it may be better to dispense with this personification of the norms and choices of the text.[26]

24 See Griffith 1999: 8.

25 Chatman 1978: 148, citing Booth 1961: 70–71. The term 'narrator' is used in this quotation, but a play could also have an implied author in the same sense.

26 See de Jong 2014: 19.

Direct Characterization

Sophocles has a good deal of direct characterization by individuals within the plays. Direct characterization here means explicit attribution of traits to an individual. This does not have to be reliable.[27] There are thus frequent assessments of Ajax (*Ajax*) by other characters, notably when Athena exhibits him to Odysseus in the prologue, when Tecmessa describes his nocturnal exploit (*Aj.* 284–330), when the messenger reports the words of Calchas (*Aj.* 749–779), and finally when the question of his burial is discussed (*Aj.* 1047–1401). *Oedipus Coloneus* also contains much direct characterization, especially of Oedipus himself. This is especially notable in the three discussions of his past crimes (*OC* 208–274, 510–550, 960–1002), and the concern with how far those crimes expressed his nature. Compare Oedipus' arguments with Creon (e.g. *OC* 800–810), Theseus' condemnation of Creon (*OC* 904–931), Creon's reply (*OC* 939–959), and Antigone's plea to Oedipus (*OC* 1181–1203). This direct characterization has a strong ethical dimension. P.E. Easterling remarks that *Antigone* is notably 'a play that invites judgement of its stage figures', and has used it as a case study of 'the way the text invites us to be actively involved in making constructions', e.g. about the reason for Ismene's claim to have shared in the burial or the reliability of Haemon's report of popular opinion.[28] There is also a certain amount of explicit self-characterization in Sophocles. Creon's self-defence is a good example (*OT* 583–602), with obvious parallels to the rhetorical use of self-characterization in the orators and in Euripides' *Hippolytus* (983–1035). On the other hand, there is relatively little direct characterization of Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, either by himself or by others.

Direct characterization in Sophocles is often subjected to ironic qualification. Athena's view of Ajax (*Ajax*) is incomplete, because she sees only a man brought low by his lack of *sōphrosunē*, and never shows any awareness of his undoubted greatness. Irene de Jong expresses this in terms of narratology: 'her divine focalization, though omniscient and coming early in the play, is not the dominant one'.[29] This is emphasized when similar criticisms are made later in the play by the Atridae, and Ajax seems all the greater for being attacked by such contemptible enemies. Oedipus (*Oedipus Coloneus*) is criticized in similar terms by Creon and by the more sympathetic Theseus and Antigone (e.g.

27 Contrast Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002: 60, who states that direct characterization can only come from 'the most authoritative voice in the text'. It does, however, seem useful to distinguish 'direct' from 'authoritative'.

28 Easterling 1990: 93, 94. Cf. Budelmann and Easterling 2010, citing also *Ant.* 20, 175–177, 441, 504–505.

29 De Jong 2006: 93; cf. Budelmann 2000: 184–185.

OC 592, 855, 1193), which sharpens the question of how he should be assessed. Choruses present particular problems here, as they have authority as choruses but are often misguided or partial.[30] Direct characterization can also conflict with indirect. Winnington-Ingram thus writes of *Trachiniae*, 'We are made to see Heracles in a repellent light. But that is not how Deianira saw him, nor Hyllus, nor the Chorus. They see him as a very great man'.[31]

Metaphorical Characterization

Indirect (metaphorical) characterization by contrast is Sophocles' most important characterization technique.[32] Each of Sophocles' seven surviving plays has a dominating individual at its centre. This individual is not necessarily on stage for the majority of the play, and may not even speak the most lines, but his or her centrality is never in doubt. Winnington-Ingram describes the Sophoclean hero as follows: 'A man or woman of excess, an extremist, obstinate, inaccessible to argument, he refuses to compromise with the conditions of human life'.[33] The distinctive good and bad qualities of these heroic figures are regularly defined by contrast with more moderate characters, e.g. Ismene (*Antigone*), Chrysothemis (*Electra*), and Creon (*Oedipus Tyrannus*). Odysseus (*Ajax*) and Theseus (*Oedipus Coloneus*) are also foils to the central figures, but are more substantial characters in their own right and create more complex contrasts.[34] Heracles and Deianira (*Trachiniae*) are figures of equal tragic weight, and much of the meaning of the play could be expressed in terms of the contrasts between them. Sophocles' contrasts between characters tend to focus on the central 'hero' figure, although in *Ajax* (for example) there are significant contrasts between Athena, Odysseus, and the Atridae as well as between those characters and Ajax. The most significant contrast in *Philoctetes* is between Odysseus and Neoptolemus rather than between either of those characters and Philoctetes.[35]

30 See e.g. Lloyd 2005: 71–75, with references to earlier discussions.

31 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 84.

32 Cf. Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002: 70 'When two characters are presented in similar circumstances, the similarity or contrast between their behaviour emphasizes traits characteristic of both'. Pfister [1977] 1988: 195 treats contrast as 'implicit-authorial characterization'.

33 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 9. Cf. Knox 1964: 1–4.

34 On the admirable features of Odysseus and Theseus, see e.g. Blundell 1989: 95–103, 248–253.

35 On contrasts between characters in *Antigone*, see Griffith 1999: 36–37.

Setting

Setting clearly has an important relationship to character in Sophocles. One need only to think of Ajax killing himself in an 'untrodden place' (*Aj.* 657), Antigone venturing out of the palace (*Ant.* 1), Heracles on Cape Cenaeum (*Tr.* 749–806), or Oedipus arriving at the grove at Colonus (*OC* 84–110 etc.). Sophocles' plays are pervaded by contrasts between the *polis* and wilder spaces outside, and our understanding of his characters cannot be separated from these contexts. Nevertheless, it would exaggerate the centrality of character to treat them merely as 'trait-connoting metonymies'.[36]

Metonymical Techniques

Focalization as a means of characterization is relevant to many characters in Sophocles, with their intense and sometimes distorted views of the world. Oedipus (*Oedipus Coloneus*) is characterized by his contrasting attitudes to his children (e.g. *OC* 337–360), his approval of Theseus (*OC* 569–574, 642, 1042–1043), and his hatred of Creon (*OC* 761–799). Conversely, Creon and Polynices are characterized by their inability to see beyond Oedipus' superficial squalor (*OC* 740–752, 1254–1263).[37] The ascription of properties to others can only illuminate character if we can test its accuracy.[38] We see enough of Odysseus to recognize as unfair the hostile characterization of him by Ajax (*Aj.* 103, 379–382, 388–389, 445), the chorus (*Aj.* 148–153, 189, 955–960), and Tecmessa (*Aj.* 971). The accuracy of Electra's obsessive focalization is constantly under examination in *Electra*, and with it our view of her character.[39]

Physical appearance is one of the main ways we judge character in real life, as is noted in the chapter on Aristophanes (→) in the present volume. It is also one of the most striking ways in which character is represented in many forms of literature, drama, and film. The use of masks in Greek drama meant that facial expression could not be used to express character, beyond the broad categories of age, gender, and status.[40] There is however a limit to

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36 Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 2002: 66, discussing a character in William Faulkner. On 'the thematic and symbolic importance of space' in Sophocles, see *SAGN* 3: 334 (Rehm).

37 See Easterling 1967: 6. Easterling (1967: 9 n. 1) also discusses inconsistencies in Oedipus' charges against his sons.

38 Cf. Margolin 2007: 73: 'One of the ways we infer that Quixote's grasp of reality is distorted is through his characterization of the people around him, for example seeing a group of prostitutes as "fair maidens" (I.3)'.

39 On focalized spatial description in Sophocles, see *SAGN* 3: 328–331 (Rehm).

40 The implication of the use of masks for characterization can be exaggerated, as is noted by Seidensticker 2008: 339–341.

the indeterminacy of dramatic characters.[41] In performance, they inevitably have a particular, even if not idiosyncratic, appearance and vocal timbre. Oedipus either limps or he does not limp.[42] We lack evidence for how Sophocles might have exploited these features for characterization. Jocasta's description of Laius ('Dark, just sprinkling his hair with white, and his form was not very unlike yours', *OT* 742–743) is memorable not least because it is so very unusual in Sophocles,[43] and even here there is no suggestion that appearance expresses character. Electra's degraded appearance (*El.* 1174–1187) is significant, but Oedipus (*Oedipus Coloneus*) is a notable example of character not being straightforwardly reflected in physical appearance.

The relevance to characterization of membership of specific groups has already been touched upon in connexion with Sophocles' use of schemas (e.g. king, *parthenos*). *Antigone* is notable for attempts to assign characters to relevant groups, including the large categories of male or female (*Ant.* 484–485, 525, 677–680, 740) and the micro-social group of the doomed family (*Ant.* 471–472; cf. *El.* 121–122, 341–342). Creon and Oedipus attribute to Tiresias the venality and charlatanry which they associate with the professional group of prophets (*Ant.* 1055; *OT* 386–389, 705), while Menelaus and Agamemnon characterize Teucer as an archer, a foreigner, and a person of low social status (*Aj.* 1120–1123, 1228–1230, 1263). Class is much less prominent as a defining feature of character in Sophocles than it is in Euripides (→).[44]

The ancient *Life* (21) remarked that Sophocles could 'create an entire character from a mere half-line or phrase', and there is space here only to hint at some of the ways in which he uses speech to indicate character.[45] Deianira (*Trachiniae*) has often been praised for the detail and subtlety of her characterization,[46] and this mostly derives from her own language which is marked by an awareness of misfortune (*Tr.* 1–5, 16, 41–42, 141–154, 375–379), fear (*Tr.* 22–23, 28, 37, 47–48, 175–177, 303–306, 550, 630–632, 663–671), awareness of the power of *erōs* (*Tr.* 441–448), fear of shame (*Tr.* 596–597, 721–722), the use of striking imagery (*Tr.* 144–150, 699–704), politeness (*Tr.* 227–228),[47] and pity (*Tr.* 243, 296–302, 307–313, 464). These characteristics are presented early in the

41 On the indeterminacy of characters in (non-dramatic) fiction, see Margolin 2007: 68–69.

42 Cf. Taplin 1983: 156.

43 Deianira's description of the appearance of the river god Achelous (*Tr.* 9–14) is obviously a special case.

44 On class in Greek tragedy generally, see e.g. Hall 1997: 110–118.

45 See e.g. Easterling 1977: 128–129; Rutherford 2012: 309–312.

46 See e.g. Lloyd-Jones 1972: 221 = 1990: 411.

47 On politeness and characterization, see Culpeper 2001: 235–262; Lloyd 2006: 239.

play, as (unlike Heracles) she would not have had an established myth schema. Creon makes extensive use of *gnōmai* in *Antigone* (175–177, 178–181, 182–183, 188–190, 209–210, 221–222, 295–301, 313–314, 473–476, 477–479, 493–494, 495–496, 520, 580–581, 641–644, 645–647, 649–652, 661–662, 663–665, 672–676, 738, 780, 1043–1044, 1045–1047, 1113–1114). The implications of this for his character, especially in contrast to Antigone, have been much discussed.[48] It is remarkable that *gnōmai* are also a feature of his language in *Oedipus Tyrannus* (*OT* 87–88, 110–111, 549–550, 587–589, 609–610, 613–615, 674–675, 1430–1431, 1516), a fact highlighted by the limited use made of them by Oedipus (*OT* 280–281, 296, 1409). Creon does not use so many *gnōmai* in *Oedipus Coloneus*, but he seems to be characterized consistently in the three plays as concerned with the welfare of the city, somewhat narrowly conceived, to the exclusion of wider (especially religious) issues.[49] Ajax also has a fondness for *gnōmai* (*Aj.* 292–293, 580, 581–582, 586, 646–649, 664–665, 678–682).[50] The Guard in *Antigone* is a notable example of a lower-status individual characterized by distinctive use of language.[51]

The Nature of Character in Sophocles

A fundamental issue of characterization in Sophocles, as in other dramatists, is to distinguish long-term character traits from behaviour which is provoked by the particular circumstances of the action. Seymour Chatman distinguishes traits from 'more ephemeral psychological phenomena, like feelings, moods, thoughts, temporary motives, attitudes, and the like', but also remarks that any of these ephemeral phenomena may be 'merely an exaggeration … of a general and abiding disposition'.[52] In a similar vein, Taavitsainen discusses 'surge features', defined as outbursts of emotion expressing 'transient and volatile states of mind' like anger.[53] It is doubtful whether purely ephemeral psychological

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48 See Foley 1996: 60; Griffith 1999: 36; Budelmann 2000: 67–68, 74–80. Other aspects of Creon's speech patterns have also been studied, e.g. his imagery and his use of the first person: see Griffith 1999: 36 n. 110, 162 (note on *Ant.* 207–210).

49 See Margolin 2007: 70 on the 'same' character in different works, although mythical characters clearly differ in some respects from invented characters.

50 See e.g. Lardinois 2006; Finglass 2011: 225–226 (notes on *Aj.* 292 and 293). Budelmann 2000: 78 n. 23 notes also Menelaus' use of *gnōmai* (especially *Aj.* 1071–1083).

51 See Long 1968: 84–86; Griffith 1999: 165 (note on *Ant.* 223–331), 193 (note on *Ant.* 388–400).

52 Chatman 1978: 126.

53 Taavitsainen 1999: 219, cited by Culpeper 2001: 190.

phenomena are of much significance in Sophocles. Anger, for example, tends to express a longer-term psychological disposition than Taavitsainen's definition might suggest.[54]

It was mentioned above that Sophocles establishes the character of Oedipus (*Oedipus Tyrannus*) before the tragic issues of the play emerge. He further demonstrates the long-term stability of Oedipus' character by showing him at five distinct stages of his life: (i) youth, as described in the earlier part of his autobiography (*OT* 774–793); (ii) the encounter with Laius (*OT* 794–813); (iii) the earlier part of the play, in which there is no personal threat to him (*OT* 1–296); (iv) the central part of the play, from the entry of Tiresias to the discovery of the truth (*OT* 297–1185); (v) the final scene (*OT* 1297–1530). Oedipus' main traits were sketched earlier in this chapter, and he manifests them in five separate phases of his life, which are further linked by the importance of memory in establishing continuity of character.

Ajax may be introduced at a moment of crisis and stress, but his lofty tone to Athena in the first scene (*Aj.* 112–113, 116–117) is in keeping with the way he spoke earlier in his life (*Aj.* 767–769, 774–775). The line which Tecmessa quotes (*Aj.* 293) shows that his mode of utterance is similar in a domestic context. Electra's quotation of earlier criticisms by Clytemnestra (*El.* 289–292, 295–298) reinforces the sense that the argument between them represented in the play is the latest in a long series. It is equally clear in *Trachiniae* and *Oedipus at Colonus* that the characters have traits which are consistent over time.

The main characters in *Antigone*, by contrast, are not established before the tragic crisis which is the subject of the play. Creon says at the outset that one cannot know the *psukhē* (inner self), *phronēma* (mentality), and *gnōmē* (judgement) of a man until he has been tested in political office (*Ant.* 175–177), and his behaviour thereafter is inconsistent and prompted by reaction to other characters.[55] Antigone has only just heard about Creon's edict at the beginning of the play, and Ismene is the first person she has told about her plans. She expresses herself in an excitable way, with disordered syntax, questions, and emotive vocabulary, and states a variety of motives in a way which suggests that she is only now in the process of formulating her response: family unity (*Ant.* 1, 10, 21–32), heroic honour (*Ant.* 72, 97), commitment to

54 For the angry disposition of Sophocles' heroes, see Knox 1957: 26–28; 1964: 21.

55 A. Brown 1987: 147 (note on *Ant.* 176) observes that these three words, whatever the precise distinction between them, 'are clearly meant to cover all intellectual and emotional qualities'. On Creon's failure to live up to the principles expounded in his opening speech, see e.g. Blundell 1989: 132.

the dead (*Ant.* 73–76), and the laws of the gods (*Ant.* 77).[56] This is not the place to discuss the coherence or validity of her position, but what is clear is that we cannot separate her longer-term character from her response to this particular situation. Ismene is also in the process of formulating her position, as is shown by her surprising decision to associate herself with Antigone's action (*Ant.* 536–537). Chrysothemis (*Electra*) is functionally similar to Ismene, in contrasting with a more assertive sister, and the main differences between them derive from the fact that her situation is long-established when the play begins.[57]

Griffith finds 'hints of a long-standing antagonism' between Antigone and Creon,[58] but there is nothing specific to suggest that their mutual hostility predates Creon's edict and Antigone's reaction to it. We could construct a history for Antigone's sarcasm (*Ant.* 31) or overt derision (*Ant.* 470), but this can also be explained as focalization prompted by anger at his edict. The same is true of Creon's response to Antigone's rejection of Ismene's attempt to share responsibility: 'I declare that one of these two girls has only now revealed herself to be crazy, while the other has been so from birth' (*Ant.* 561–562). This is a rhetorical exaggeration of the contrast between the sisters, and there is no convincing reason to suppose that Creon is referring to anything in particular prior to her present rebellion.

Jean Anouilh's *Antigone* (1942) illustrates the kind of characterization that Sophocles avoids. His Antigone has already buried Polynices when she enters for the first time, but she conceals this in her dialogues with her nurse, Ismene, and Haemon. These scenes, taking up about a quarter of the play, are essentially devoted to expounding her character and filling in the background to her decision to bury Polynices. This includes accounts of earlier episodes in her life and the portrayal of typical behaviour, e.g. Ismene's speech 'Je suis l'aînée. Je réfléchis plus que toi. Toi, c'est ce qui te passe par la tête tout de suite, et tant pis si c'est une bêtise. Moi je suis plus pondérée. Je réfléchis'.[59] The protatic figure of the nurse is designed specifically to keep introductory character portrayal separate from Antigone's key act of rebellion. This character portrayal is

56 See e.g. Foley 1996: 57, with references to earlier views.

57 For comparisons between Chrysothemis and Ismene, usually favouring the latter, see Easterling 1977: 124; Winnington-Ingram 1980: 241 n. 80; Blundell 1989: 158 n. 38; Finglass 2007b: 194.

58 Griffith 1999: 34 n. 103.

59 Anouilh [1942] 1961: 140–141.

reinforced by physical descriptions of the kind absent from Sophocles, e.g. 'la maigre jeune fille noiraude et renfermée que personne ne prenait au sérieux dans la famille'.[60]

Christopher Gill developed his distinction between character and personality to some extent through discussion of Sophocles, and it is worth quoting him at some length: 'The *Antigone* … is a play that I think one could discuss almost entirely in terms of the character-viewpoint. The protagonists stand before us as "characters", as responsible, choosing agents who luminously explicate their motives for action and invite evaluation on those grounds … In Sophocles' *Electra*, by contrast, everything seems to take place, virtually from the start, in the light of the intense, brooding consciousness of the central figure. The disputed issues are treated cursorily and no larger moral framework is provided for their resolution (or even for the exploration of their ambiguity). The events (real and feigned) and the secondary figures exist for us essentially as they impinge on the heightened emotions of Electra herself, whose "character" we are never encouraged to evaluate objectively'.[61]

So far as Electra is concerned, Gill's account does not do justice to how she combines an intense awareness of how her behaviour might be evaluated with persistent attempts to elicit sympathy and understanding for the intolerable position in which she has been placed. She thus responds to the rebukes of the chorus: 'I have been forced by terrible circumstances to do terrible things; I know it well, my passion does not escape me. But even in these terrible circumstances I will not restrain my desperate laments, while life is in me. Who, dear friends, who that thinks rightly, could expect me to listen to any word of consolation? Leave me, leave me, my comforters' (*El.* 221–229; cf. 131, 237–239, 254–257, 307–309, 616–621).

Gill's 'character' interpretation of *Antigone* is also rather one-sided, and should be qualified by what he would have called a 'personality' reading which puts more emphasis on external forces of which the agent may not be aware.[62] This could include the relevance of Antigone's heredity (*Ant.* 471–472), or of *erōs* to Haemon's opposition to Creon (*Ant.* 781–800).[63] There is clearly an issue in *Ajax* about internal and external elements in the characterization of Ajax

60 Anouilh [1942] 1961: 131. On Anouilh's portrayal of Antigone, see Deppman 2012: 526–527.

61 Gill 1986: 269. The distinction between character and personality is summarized at Gill 1990: 2–3.

62 See Easterling 1990: 93.

63 See Winnington-Ingram 1980: 92–98.

(*Aj.* 59–60, 243–244; 455–456), and corresponding unclarity about the nature of his normal self, when he is 'in his right mind'.[64]

Gill later adopted a new distinction between 'objective-participant' and 'subjective-individualist' conceptions of the person.[65] He now argues that Sophocles' heroes do not adopt 'ethical individualism' (as expressed e.g. by Nietzsche or Sartre), but that they 'appeal (in their second-order reasoning) to ethical principles which they regard as basic to their society'.[66] This seems to amount to saying that we (the audience) understand them better than do the other characters in the plays with their 'pre-reflective ethical principles',[67] rather than that we do not apply ethical standards to them at all. There is no need to deny that these exceptional characters elude easy moral assessment, but it is not clear that Gill's later distinction is especially useful for the analysis of Sophocles' characters.

Neoptolemus (*Philoctetes*) is the most promising example in Sophocles of character development. His behaviour later in the play may indeed be an expression of his true nature (*Ph.* 902–903, 1310–1313), but his understanding of that nature has changed significantly in the course of the play.[68] This development may be compared to that of Telemachus in Homer's *Odyssey* (→).[69] Eurysaces needs to be educated in the ways of his father so as to resemble him in *phusis* (*Aj.* 548–549), but Ajax himself thinks it foolish to try to educate his own *ēthos* (*Aj.* 594–595).

E.M. Forster, distinguishing 'round' from 'flat' characters, argued that '[t]he test of a round character is whether it is capable of surprising in a convincing way'.[70] Odysseus' pity for Ajax (*Aj.* 121–126) is a good example, although it is unexpected because of the mythological tradition rather than because of anything Odysseus has so far done in the actual play. A major question in the play is whether deception is 'in character' for Ajax, assuming that his 'deception speech' (*Aj.* 646–692) is indeed intended to deceive.[71] The speech is in any case surprising, and the play would be incoherent if the surprise

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64 Goldhill 1986: 182 discusses 'the tension between the internal and external in the make-up of man'; cf. Hesk 2003: 136–141; Thumiger 2007: 16.

65 Gill 1996: 116–118.

66 Gill 1996: 153.

67 Gill 1996: 118.

68 See e.g. Gibert 1995: 143–158; Fulkerson 2006: 52; Rutherford 2012: 289, 309–312; Schein 2013: 23–25.

69 See e.g. Whitby 1996.

70 Forster 1927: ch. 4.

71 See e.g. Gibert 1995: 120–135; Hesk 2003: 74–75.

were not convincing. Winnington-Ingram offers a subtle account of the 'ironic and oblique' preparation for Deianira's apparently uncharacteristic boldness in sending the anointed robe to Heracles in *Trachiniae*.[72] He also remarks in this connexion on the 'common tendency in Greek tragedy for changes of attitude to take place "between the acts"'.[73] Ismene's surprising decision to associate herself with Antigone's defiance is another example (*Ant.* 536–537). Knox observes that the first two choral odes in *Oedipus Tyrannus* (*OT* 151–215, 463–511) both suggest a lapse of time in which Oedipus arrives at a decision.[74] In *Oedipus Coloneus*, Oedipus' character does not change but is gradually revealed in its full depth.

The focus of this chapter on character does not, needless to say, imply that there is no more to Sophocles' plays than character portrayal. The autonomy of dramatic character is qualified, for example, by structuralist interpretations focusing, as Jonathan Culler puts it, on 'the interpersonal and conventional systems which traverse the individual, which make him a space in which forces and events meet rather than an individuated essence'.[75] In Sophocles, this is perhaps most striking in *Trachiniae*, where the character of Heracles as an individual is impossible to separate from thematic issues such as the contrast between civilization and barbarism.[76] Nevertheless, among Greek authors it is only in the biographers that character is more central than it is in Sophocles. Menander gives it equal prominence, but Aeschylus can subordinate individual character to the family or the gods while Euripides sometimes prioritizes abstract ideas. In Sophocles, as in Shakespeare, ideas and values are mainly of interest in so far as they are embodied in individuals.

In conclusion, the techniques of characterization summarized in the Introduction to this volume can undoubtedly be illustrated from Sophocles' plays. They have no external primary narrator, but narrative techniques may be attributed at the most general level to the implied author. There is also characterization by individuals within the plays, but it is often partial or misguided. Characterization of mythical figures must take account of the myth schema, which is better established for some characters than others. Drama differs from some other genres in focusing on a single episode, raising questions of how behaviour in often extreme circumstances relates to longer-term character. Many authors

72 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 78.
73 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 77.
74 Knox 1957: 17–18.
75 Culler 1975: 230.
76 See e.g. Segal 1981b: 60–108.

studied in the present volume define and judge individuals according to definite, often ethical, criteria. This is not the case with Sophocles, whose major characters tend to elude full understanding or definitive assessment.[77]

77 See e.g. Budelmann 2000: 88–89.

CHAPTER 19

Euripides

*Evert van Emde Boas**

Introduction

One of the basic tenets of this chapter will be that Euripides' practice of characterization is—as so many aspects of his dramatic technique are—not uniform: his method varies within plays and from play to play.[1] This lack of uniformity, compounded by the large number of extant plays, makes hazardous any attempt to capture Euripidean characterization technique in the span of a brief survey chapter.[2] On the other hand, several general points about characterization in Greek tragedy that have been made in the preceding chapters on Aeschylus (→) and Sophocles (→) are equally applicable to Euripides, and need not be repeated here at length: the fact that all the characterizing techniques used in narrative are found in drama as well, but without the direction of a primary narrator to provide authoritative access to motivations, beliefs, and traits; the significance in tragedy of multiple perspectives on characters' motivations provided by those characters themselves and by other characters—views which are all part of their intradramatic communication and therefore open to questioning; the difficulty of simple ethical evaluations of characters' behaviour in the face of this multiplicity of voices and the complex moral texture of the plays; and the fact that drama's focus on short, emotionally charged

* I am grateful to Bill Allan, Felix Budelmann and Koen De Temmerman for their probing and insightful comments.

1 For the diversity within Euripides' oeuvre, cf. e.g. Michelini 1987, Mastronarde 2010: esp. ch. 2–3.

2 I do not know of any work, either article- or book-length, that attempts to survey Euripides' characterizing techniques in all the plays. Much of use may of course be found in general works on Euripides (e.g. Grube 1941, Conacher 1967, Mastronarde 2010), as well as general works on tragedy (e.g. Heath 1987: esp. 115–123, Gregory 2005a). Wider debates about characterization in tragedy of course pertain also to Euripides (e.g. Gould 1978, Easterling 1990, Goldhill 1990, Pelling 1990c, Seidensticker 2008, Rutherford 2012: ch. 7, Thumiger 2013). Particularly useful are several works whose relevance extends well beyond the individual Euripidean plays which they have as their subject: Griffin 1990 (on *Hipp.* and *IA*), Mossman 1995: ch. 4 (on *Hec.*), Allan 2000: ch. 3 (on *Andr.*), Thumiger 2007 (on *Ba.*).

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episodes complicates the presentation of long-term character traits and character development.

In lieu, therefore, of a full (but shallow) survey of characterization techniques, I will in this chapter concentrate on two specific themes which have played a major role in the appreciation of Euripidean characters—realism' and 'ideas'—and on a few plays as case studies. These case studies are meant to be representative not necessarily of Euripides' practice as a whole, but at least of the diversity and range within that practice. In deference to the series' narratological focus I will end with some points about characterization in embedded narratives (prologues, messenger speeches, etc.—narratives according to a stricter definition),[3] and a brief examination of how such characterization interacts with other parts of the plays.

'As They Are': Realism and Character

From antiquity onwards, Euripides has been associated with a realistic portrayal of his characters. The *locus classicus* is an anecdote about Sophocles related by Aristotle in his *Poetics*, as an example of a possible defence that a tragic poet might raise against criticism:

> Next, if a poet is accused of creating falsehoods, a possible defence is to say that things are being portrayed as they ought to be. Sophocles, for instance, said that he himself made his poetic characters to reflect people as they ought to be (*hoious dei*), while Euripides made them as they are (*hoioi eisin*).[4]
>
> ARIST. *Po.* 1460b33–34

This notion has persisted, and many modern handbooks point to realism as a defining feature of Euripides' technique. Yet critics can mean very different—if not necessarily mutually exclusive—things when they refer to Euripidean 'realism'.[5] In some cases it denotes the opposite of idealism or heroization: on

3 The definition of narrative in drama as conceived in this volume is discussed in the Introduction (→).

4 Translations here and below are my own.

5 To be fair, many scholars point out that realism is not a straightforward concept, cf. e.g. Gregory 2005b: 260–265, Burian 2010: 133–134, Mastronarde 2010: 13. Some attempts to 'unpack' (Euripidean) realism are Michelini 1987: 111–114, Goff 1999/2000, Csapo 2010: ch. 4, Budelmann 2013.

this account, Euripides' characters are qualitatively different from the larger-than-life figures that we find in the other tragedians, and he has a particular penchant for portraying lower-class characters, women, and weak men, as well as a taste for the everyday and the mundane (this view can be traced back to Aristophanes' comic portrayal of Euripides;[6] it is, however, an only partly accurate reflection of what we find in the extant plays). On another approach, what makes Euripides' characters realistic is their psychological depth and the sense that we get of their inwardness, of the turbulent shifts and extreme emotions taking place within the mind of, for instance, a Medea, a Phaedra, or a Pentheus.[7] Yet another conceptualization of realism is prevalent among scholars arguing *against* its prominence in Euripidean (or generally, tragic) characterization: these scholars contrast realism with formalism, and argue that 'the experience of dramatic persons is stylized, simplified, and modified in ways which prevent [a] sense of a simple continuity or overlap between their experience and our own.'[8] On this reading, the constraints of the genre (masks, stylized language, etc.), combined with the rapid shifts of tone and the systematized use of distinct *Bauformen* (prologues, *agōn* scenes, stichomythia, etc.) which typify Euripides' oeuvre, make it impossible that any naturalistically consistent psychological portrait could be gleaned from any of the plays.

This sketch of the various dimensions of realism (still more could be added) goes some way towards explaining how Euripidean characters can have struck audiences and readers as both intensely familiar and wholly alien. Phrased in terms of the cognitive model outlined in the Introduction (→), some of the notions associated with realism, particularly those of the everyday and the 'low', have more to do with the kinds of knowledge schemas that are accessed by audience members as 'top-down' input (that is to say, Euripidean characters are believed to have reminded typical audience members more of people

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6 Especially in *Frogs*: cf. Ar. *Ra.* 842, 948–963, 1058–1064; also e.g. *Pax* 146–148, *Ach.* 410–479. Both the Aristotelian and Aristophanic evidence needs to be placed firmly in its context: see e.g. Csapo 2010: 120–125, Halliwell 2011: ch. 3.

7 In *Med.*, *Hipp.*, and *Ba.*, respectively. It is no coincidence that, Pentheus aside, this notion has been particularly associated with Euripides' portrayal of women (as Michelini (1987: 112) and Goff (1999/2000: 194) point out, this often speaks as much to critics' perceptions of female psychology as it does to Euripidean practice). The image of Euripides as a master at portraying psychology/emotions, too, can be traced back to antiquity: cf. e.g. [Longin.] *De subl.* 15.1–3.

8 Gould 1978: 49. Gould reiterated this position in his entry on Euripides in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (2012 [1996]): 'there are strands of "realism" in Euripides' writing for the theatre … But these are strands only in an extremely fragmented whole'.

they knew in their everyday lives than of kings and queens or the heroic figures they knew from other literature). Other dimensions of realism, specifically those of consistency and plausibility, rather pertain to the cognitive processes of character-interpretation themselves—processes which in the case of Euripides are thought by some to be so unlike those involved in the perception of 'real' people that the experience ends up being, at least to modern audiences, jarring.

All of these dimensions of (anti-)realism are in fact detectable in the plays, but in varying degrees and never sustained throughout an entire play. A more significant point is that the clustering of realism effects and variation in their use typically have dramatic effect, as a discussion of a single play may bear out.

Medea: A Case Study in Realism(s)

The first scenes of *Medea* provide a good example of how Euripides modulates his characterization techniques to achieve various effects. The play opens with a monologue by Medea's Nurse, quickly followed by a dialogue between the Nurse and the Tutor to Medea's children, who discuss Medea's present unhappy state and the further misfortunes that will be added to it.[9] These two figures are instantly characterized by group membership (class and age); presumably dress, masks and acting will have contributed to this.[10] Uniquely in tragedy, we see here two such lower-class characters talking together. The characterization is developed through various touches. The manner in which they address each other emphasizes their age and status: the Tutor addresses the Nurse as 'old house-slave (lit. possession, *ktēma*) of my mistress' (49), and the Nurse calls him 'old man, companion of Jason's children' (53) and later again 'old man' (63), referring to herself as 'fellow slave' (*sundoulon*, 65). Characterization by speech style may be detected in both slaves' use of generalizations (14–15, 35, 48, 54–55, 61, 85–86) and in the Nurse's somewhat rambling syntax (1–15, a single sentence); more generally we may note the 'loose' form of the dialogue between the two, which shifts in and out of stichomythia. Details of content add much to the effect: both slaves emphasizing their loyalty to their master (54, 61); the

9 On this scene, cf. Yoon 2012: 42–46 (a valuable discussion), Mossman 2011: *ad* 1–48, 49–95. On the Nurse, cf. also Willink 1988: 316–317, Luschnig 2007: 157–175 (overstated in some respects); for the Tutor, Page 1938: xiii.

10 That characterization in tragedy depends significantly on acting is self-evident, but beyond the narratological scope of this volume.

Nurse noticing that the children return 'having finished with their running' (46) and explaining to the Tutor that she is outside to vent her frustrations 'to the earth and the sky' (57);[11] the Tutor refusing to yield his news until persuaded by the Nurse (63–66), and then relating that he heard it 'while pretending not to listen, going to a game of draughts, where the old men sit' (67–69). All these touches do create a 'realistic', homely effect; yet it may be argued that this effect is not created for its own sake, but to provide, at the outset of the play, a poignant view of the domestic life that will be so comprehensively shattered, as well as a sympathetic perspective on Medea and her plight (though not one without ominous hints)[12] from two characters—one female, one male—who are not among the 'principals' yet operate within their *oikos*. Offering such a perspective on Medea before she appears seems, in fact, to be the main function of these two deftly characterized figures.

The touches of everyday realism fade with Medea's first appearance. The next few scenes focus on a series of interactions between the protagonist (who, like several of Euripides' female characters, dominates the stage for most of the play)[13] and various other figures (the chorus, Creon, Jason, and Aegeus). Before we see Medea, however, we only hear her, uttering curses and groans from within the house (96–165, Medea sings anapaests, interspersed with more composed chanted anapaests from the Nurse; the chorus join in in song at 131, the start of the parodos). When Medea finally enters the stage, she sounds radically different: in a long, carefully constructed speech, full of highly sophisticated rhetoric, and marked by the ingenious use of generalizations to assimilate herself to the chorus of women, she convinces that chorus to keep silent about her plans (214–270). Next, when faced with Creon, Medea again uses subtle rhetoric (although the arguments are very different) as well as effective supplication, in order to extract from him the single-day reprieve from exile that she needs to execute her plans (271–356). She sounds different again in her bitterly emo-

11 A scholiast (*schol.* E. *Med.* 57) commented that this is typical of 'those who are in dire circumstances and do not dare tell anyone about their misfortunes'. For scholia on this kind of realism, cf. Nünlist 2009: 252–253; such scholia typically relate behaviour to universal types rather than individual psychologies.

12 The Nurse mentions some troubling details about Medea's past and present in her opening narrative (36–45), and adds some more at the end of the dialogue with the Tutor (90–95).

13 E.g. Hecuba in *Hec.*, Electra in *El.* But this is certainly not a consistent trait of Euripides' oeuvre: in other plays the dramatic focus shifts from character to character in the course of the action (e.g. *Supp.*, *Ph.*), or sees one character initially dominant, who then disappears or fades before the play ends (e.g. *Andr.* and 'escape-plays' such as *IT* and *Hel.*). In other plays several of these tendencies overlap.

tional *agōn* with Jason (446–626; a typically Euripidean set piece), and then again in her confident supplication of Aegeus (663–763).

These striking shifts of tone and register proved too much for some scholars, who saw in them a challenge to any notion of consistent character-portrayal. Gould (already cited above) spoke of a variety of 'Medeas', who together make up an 'extremely fragmented whole' (2012 [1996]: 551); more trenchantly, Gellie found it 'most disturbing' that

> the reasons for [these switches] are to be found in the organisation of the surface processes of the play rather than in any attempt by the dramatist to let those processes emerge from a unitary personality structure. Medea seems to turn into whatever will ensure that the next thing will happen … Medea just escapes us.
>
> 1988: 17, 22

Yet such readings make too much of formalism. What they miss is that it is possible to construct a coherent sense of a character not only in spite of, but (in this case, at least) precisely because of, the different emotional and rhetorical registers which we see him or her employ. Medea's initial shift from extreme emotion to composed rhetoric can plausibly be taken as 'a first and forceful sign that Medea is able to subordinate her wildest emotions to her outstanding intelligence whenever it seems necessary for the achievement of her goals', and the subsequent variations in her rhetoric, similarly, as a display of her 'supreme skill at persuasion, at being all things to all men (and women)'.[14] This reading finds support in the various moments where Medea herself states that she has adapted, or will adapt, her speech and behaviour to suit her needs (368–370, 776–779); it is further reinforced by a sense that Medea is a something of a hyperactive mind-reader, supremely skilled at gauging and manipulating other people's desires, and obsessed with others' views of her herself (e.g. 9, 44–45, 292–305, 383, 1049).[15] Medea is characterized, in sum, from the outset by emotion, by focalization (i.e. the ways in which we see her perceive her

14 Citations from Seidensticker 2008: 342 and Mossman 2011: 44, respectively.

15 For mind-reading as dramatized in tragedy, cf. Budelmann and Easterling 2010; for this aspect of Medea, cf. Sluiter et al. 2013. Medea's 'heroic' fear of mockery by others was famously discussed by Knox 1977 (this article gave rise to the idea that Medea should be seen as masculinized, or that a feminine and a masculine side of her character are in conflict: Mossman 2011: 32–36 usefully critiques this, and at 36–48 discusses how Medea is characterized by her gender).

situation and others), and by speech—but by the modulations in that speech as much as by repeated patterns.[16]

Rhetoric, form, and character are, then, deeply interconnected in the first half of *Medea*, and these in turn are as deeply interconnected with plot/action: the opening scenes lay the groundwork for the play's murderous conclusion, but in the process reveal much about the subtle and dangerous character that fuels these developments. This characterization is supplemented by moments of direct and indirect characterization of Medea by other characters: some ominous comments by the Nurse have already been referenced above; later she warns the children to watch out for their mother's 'wild character, and the hateful nature of her self-willed mind' (*agrion ēthos stugeran te phusin phrenos authadous*, 102–104); Creon justifies his fear of Medea by saying 'you are clever by nature and experienced in many evils' (*sophē pephukas kai kakōn pollōn idris*, 285); Jason, too, comments on Medea's 'subtle mind' (*leptos nous*, 529). Of course, in each of these cases the aims and background of the speakers should be taken into account (Jason's comments about Medea, in particular, might be seen as problematic given his own questionable character); but taken together they reinforce the image of Medea as a dangerous, sophisticated user of persuasion.

To return to realism, we have seen that Euripides can use moments of social, everyday realism for dramatic effect, and that notions of realistically coherent characterization need not be seen as necessarily in conflict with Euripides' formalist tendencies.[17] What, then, about the third dimension of realism outlined above, that associated with psychological depth and a sense of inwardness? Here, too, Medea provides a powerful example, one which is suggestive of ways in which Euripides is actually different from the other two tragedians (insofar as extant, and it must be said that Medea is an extreme case even within the Euripidean oeuvre). The *Medea* offers a uniquely intimate view of the interior conflict of its eponymous heroine by outwardly dramatizing that conflict at several points in the play. The key scenes are Medea's famous 'great monologue' (1019–1080, not properly a soliloquy) and her later, shorter, reprise after the messenger speech and immediately before the filicide (1236–1250). These moments are prefigured at various earlier points in the play: in a

16 Although such patterns may be detected as well: see Mossman 2011: 46–48 (with further references).

17 Not all cases in Euripides permit explanation along the lines offered for Medea here: even so, it is not necessary to see shifts of formal mode as in themselves suggestive of 'fragmentation'. Rather, such shifts can often be seen to suggest 'different perspectives from which a problematic situation might be explored.' (Easterling 1990: 93)

way, the shift from emotion in the parodos to composure in the first episode, already mentioned, is one such moment; more directly relevant is Medea's self-exhortation after being granted her one-day reprieve:

> Come, now, Medea, spare nothing of what you know, scheming and plotting:[18] proceed to the terrible deed. Now courage is being tested: do you see what you suffer?
>
> 401–404

And the first time that she mentions filicide:

> I groan at the deed I must perform next: I will kill my children … I will leave the country … having steeled myself to do a most unholy deed (*ergon anosiōtaton*).
>
> 791–796

These moments show us a Medea in dialogue with (and within) herself,[19] and aware of the conflicting impulses under whose influence she makes her decisions. Medea's great monologue and her exit speech before the filicide expand these strands into full set pieces, the former speech in particular providing a remarkable view into Medea's emotionally tormented mind, as she decries her own destructive traits—'miserable that I am for my stubbornness (*tēs emēs authadias*)', 1038—and as she gives voice to different considerations (or even different 'sides' of her character)[20] in swift succession, particularly at 1042–1063 (note the frequent and varying use of psychological terms):[21]

18 The collocation of these two participles (*bouleuousa* and *tekhnōmenē*) with Medea's name (*Mēdeia*) in 402 is suggestive of a link between another verb meaning 'devise', *mēdomai*, and that name: a subtle instance of characterization by 'speaking' names, a technique which Euripides employs occasionally (like Aeschylus (→), and more frequently than Sophocles (→): cf. Collard 1975 on *Supp.* 496–497a, with addenda p. 442).

19 Medea reports another interior monologue—a specious one—to Jason at 872–883: a unique case of such a self-address being quoted in direct speech in the first person.

20 The notion that the speech dramatizes a conflict between Medea's reason and passion has fallen out of favour; the idea that it represents a struggle between her heroic (masculine) and maternal (feminine) instincts, both of which involve rational *and* emotional aspects, seems to be more widely accepted. There is vast bibliography on the speech, for which see Mastronarde 2002: *ad locc.* and Mossman 2011 *ad locc.*, supplemented with Rutherford 2012: 315–322 (perhaps most influential is Foley 1989; I would single out Gill 1996: 154–174, 216–226 as an outstanding reading).

21 For such 'composite mind' terminology in Euripides, cf. Thumiger 2007: 65–74. I pass over

> Aiai! What must I do? My heart (*kardia*) fails me, women … I couldn't do it! Farewell my former plans! … Yet what is the matter with me? Do I want to make myself a laughing stock …? I must dare to do these things; what cowardice on my part (*tēs emēs kakēs*), even to admit soft words to my mind (*phreni*) … Ah ah! Don't, my soul (*thume*), don't do this! Leave them be, wretched one, spare the children! …

In the exit speech, we see this same internal division:

> Come, arm yourself, heart (*kardia*)! Why do I delay to do the terrible and necessary evil? On, my unhappy hand, take up the sword … Do not play the coward (*mē kakisthēis*) and do not think of how dear your children are, how you bore them …

These moments show us a playwright at work who is, at the very least, interested in exploring conflict that occurs not *between* people but *within* people, and in portraying the extreme reactions of characters subject to extreme, competing, impulses—this is inwardness, to be sure (whether one wishes to call it 'psychological realism' will depend on one's view of psychology, particularly female psychology), and it is a form of inwardness which, with its emphasis on violent shifts, seems to be distinctively Euripidean.

Euripidean Characters and their Ideas: *Heracles* and *Phoenician Women*

Just as Euripides' characters have been seen as slaves to the playwright's formalism, they have been seen as nothing more than mouthpieces for his intellectual and philosophical interests. *Heracles* offers a celebrated example. Towards the end of the play, Heracles, who in a bout of madness has killed his wife and children, intends to commit suicide. Theseus arrives and attempts to console the hero:

> No one among mortals is untouched by fortune, nor among gods, if the stories of poets are to be believed. Have they not slept with each other in unlawful unions? Have they not dishonoured their fathers by throwing

the textual issues in the speech, for which cf. Mastronarde 2002: *ad locc.* with appendix, Mossman 2011 *ad locc.* (both with further references).

> them in chains for the sake of power? Yet they still live on Olympus and have borne their crimes. What then will you say, if you, a mortal, complain excessively about your fortune, while the gods do not?
>
> 1314–1321

Theseus proceeds to offer Heracles sanctuary and honours in Athens (1322–1339). Heracles replies:

> Ah! All this is besides my troubles, and I do not believe that the gods are content in illicit unions or that they bind each other's hands, and I have never accepted it and will not be persuaded of it, nor that one god is master over another. For a god, if he is truly a god, needs nothing. Those are the miserable stories of poets.
>
> 1340–1346

But, he goes on, he will accept Theseus' offer and keep on living, from fear that suicide might bring with it the charge of cowardice; 'I must,' Heracles consents, 'be a slave to fortune.' (1357)

Heracles' rejection of stories about gods' adulterous relationships is remarkable, since the madness which afflicted him earlier in the play was the direct consequence of Hera's jealousy over precisely such an amorous escapade by her husband Zeus (with Heracles' mother Alcmena). This theological principle is thus at odds with the very premise of the play (one of those 'miserable stories of poets'?); it also contradicts Heracles' earlier, and later, acceptance of his divine parentage and Hera's enmity (e.g. 1263–1264, and at the end of this very speech, 1392–1393).

These contradictions have been variously interpreted,[22] and the extent to which they reveal Heracles' character variously assessed. Some scholars have been happy to conclude that this is an expression of Euripidean, not Heraclean theology. We have then a Euripides who imposes his own novel ideas[23] on his characters, and who inserts these lines 'without regard for their consistency or

22 A few scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox: e.g. Burnett 1971: 176 (Hera is not actually motivated by jealousy), Stinton 1976 (Heracles' expresses disapproval rather than disbelief); the text does not favour such readings, however.

23 Euripides' work clearly shows an interest in, and influence from, contemporary intellectual currents in fifth-century Athens, although straight lines of direction of influence are never easy to draw: see e.g. Allan 1999/2000, Egli 2003; Heracles' rejection of anthropomorphic gods appears to reflect the ideas of the philosopher Xenophanes (for details see Bond 1981: ad loc.). For Euripides as 'philosopher of the stage', see also Wright 2005: ch. 4.

suitability in the mouth of Heracles simply because they represent a cherished belief of his own which he is concerned to express at this point in the play.'[24] Such a view of Euripidean poetics is problematic in general; in this particular instance it is all the more unhelpful because it divorces from its context something which is clearly closely integrated into it: Heracles answers Theseus point for point, and his theological statement forms part of a carefully constructed argument (see below). Others have argued that Heracles' rejection should be seen only as an expression of 'what the rhetoric of the situation demands' to refute Theseus' argument, and as irrelevant to the rest of the play or our view of Heracles as a person.[25] This seems intolerably weak: indeed, the incompatibility of Heracles' views mirrors the chaotic universe of the whole play, which is reflected also in its dramatic reversals of fortune and its unusual structure (with a divine appearance midway through the play).[26]

It appears, then, that the contradictions are not so easily resolved, and the question remains what brings Heracles to utter claims which run counter to the facts of his life. Are psychology and/or characterization part of the answer? It is significant that Heracles' rejection of the gods leads directly up to his acceptance of Theseus' offer of sanctuary. His initial proviso that 'all this [i.e. Theseus' consolation and offer] is besides my troubles' (1340) makes it clear that Heracles is concerned with framing that acceptance as one undertaken solely on his own terms:[27] he is not swayed by Theseus' divine *exempla* (which he pointedly refuses to accept), but rather by his own standards of virtue (the avoidance of a reputation of cowardice). We might then see his theological claims as 'the outburst of a proud man',[28] or even as the rationalization of someone yearning for some higher form of divinity—a rationalization which (although belied by personal experience) forms a necessary stage in Heracles'

24 Brown 1978, following Wilamowitz 1895 (among many others); Bond 1981: ad loc. agrees that the lines 'may well reflect Euripides' considered own view', but rightly sees this as an insufficient explanation in itself. A stronger view, that Heracles expresses not only what Euripides privately held to be true, but the rational, true world of the play (whose gods are then unreal) was famously expressed by Verrall (1905: 134–198, in weaker form at Greenwood 1953: 59–91); it has rightly met with near-universal rejection. For fuller discussion of such views, cf. Papadopoulou 2005: 88–92.

25 Bond 1981: ad loc.; similarly, Heath 1987: 61.

26 Cf. Mastronarde 2010: 69–71.

27 This reading depends on the reference of 'all this' (*tade*), and to a lesser extent on the supplement to a monosyllabic lacuna in the text of 1340. Halleran 1986 well discusses these issues, and the overall rhetorical structure of the speech.

28 Halleran 1986: 177; similarly, Papadopoulou 2005: 85–116.

shift away from suicide.[29] What is clear in any case is that Heracles' theological innovations are a desperate reaction to the extremity of his situation: they are the product of a superior will confronted with, and eventually forced to accept, utterly impossible circumstances. Heracles' speech, then, does invite speculation about what is going on in his mind; it will, however, not easily be understood as a window on his 'normal' thought patterns. If this moment is revelatory of stable character traits, it is so only very indirectly.

It is instructive to compare the revolutionary ideas of another Euripidean character, Eteocles in *Phoenician Women*. In the debate scene of that play (446–637), Eteocles utters a long speech (499–525) defending his continued rule over Thebes, in violation of the pact agreed with his brother Polynices. The speech subverts a host of reasonable norms which were presumably cherished by a majority of the original audience: Eteocles argues against the stability of moral concepts ('nothing is similar or the same for mortals, apart from the name given to it', 501–502), he professes exclusive fidelity to Monarchy (*Turannis*) as the 'greatest of the gods' (503–508), and defends wrongdoing in the service of single rule (524–525). Dangerous in themselves, such claims are all the more disconcerting because they are used to rationalize the violation of an apparently equitable pact (69–74) and, worse, fraternal strife. All this, in what are almost the first words that Eteocles speaks, casts a bleak light on the character. Both in content and in style, moreover, the speech aligns Eteocles with a problematic group familiar to contemporary Athenians: young men trained in sophistic technique and with their own self-interest at heart, who uprooted the traditional beliefs of their elders.[30] Characterization by speech in this case maps onto metaphorical characterization (implicit comparison).

Eteocles' shocking rhetoric, then, in contrast to Heracles', and coming at a very different kind of moment in the play and the character's part in it, seems straightforwardly indicative of a set of defining and troubling characteristics. The chorus immediately point out the ethical failings of Eteocles' rhetoric in their reaction ('this is not good', *ou … kalon tout'*, 526). And Jocasta, in her subsequent attempt at arbitration, underlines her son's problematic traits, by contrasting her own wisdom and experience with his youthful folly (529–530),

29 This is the reading ('optimistic rationalist') of Mastronarde 1986: 207–208, 2010: 169. It strikes me as not necessarily in conflict with one which foregrounds Heracles' pride (*pace* Halleran 1986: 177 n. 25).

30 As attested in e.g. Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Thucydides (e.g. 6.12–13), and Plato (e.g. *Ap*. 23c, *R*. 539b–c). For the sophistic elements of the speech, cf. Mastronarde 1994: ad loc., and (for the entire *agōn*-sequence) Lloyd 1992: 83–93.

and berating him for his pursuit of Ambition (*Philotimia*, 531–532), his excessive pursuit of single rule and 'happy injustice' (549–550), and his desire for wealth (553–558).

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion of *Heracles* and *Phoenician Women* is twofold: first, while it is true that a 'distinctive intellectualism ... characterizes Euripidean characters of various ages and both genders',[31] individual expressions should be read not merely as tokens of a general Euripidean predilection, but as the words of particular characters in particular circumstances. Secondly, as stated at the outset of this chapter, Euripidean technique varies: the expression of novel ideas in one instance may be a straightforwardly significant characterizing cue, but in another may rather express a character's extreme reaction to his or her misfortunes.[32] Mastronarde puts it well:

> No instance of the modern, scientific, or sophistic within the plays should be treated as inorganic or as a private expression of the poet. Each must be evaluated in terms of speaker and situation and of its role in the dialectic of viewpoints and ideas that runs through an entire play.[33]

The Nature of Euripidean Character

At this point some brief observations may be made concerning the nature and connotations of character which were thematized in this volume's Introduction (→). To take the question of individuation versus typification first: it has been argued, for Euripides as for the other tragedians, that 'it seems more fruitful to discuss ... characters in terms of classes ... than in terms of individuals'.[34] It is assuredly the case that certain societal and familial roles (mother, son, king) and categories such as age and gender[35] play a considerable role

31 Gregory 2005b: 263. Lloyd argues (1992: 36) that rhetorical sophistication in *agōn*-scenes is suggestive of character (in portraying speakers as skilled) more in Euripides' earlier extant plays than in his later ones, where rhetorical influence is more pervasive.

32 These explanations map onto the different kinds of attribution (in the technical, psychological sense)—dispositional, situational—outlined in the Introduction (→). The very different circumstances that Euripides places his characters in invite correspondingly different kinds of interpretative reaction.

33 Mastronarde 2010: 214.

34 Gregory 2005b: 261.

35 Euripidean women (a notorious topic) and men of different age classes are helpfully discussed in Mastronarde 2010: ch. 7–8 (with further references).

in patterning Euripidean characters. Yet individually, characters are not constricted by such typologies: Medea is a mother, a scorned wife, a foreigner, but through the combination of these roles and the addition of other traits (implacable anger, an overdeveloped sense of honour, dangerous sophistication) transcends simple categorization. Eteocles shares with other young men in Euripides (e.g. Hippolytus, Pentheus in *Bacchae*) a certain intransigence, but is little like these men in other respects, such as his use of sophistry for personal gain.

As for questions surrounding the permanence, shapeability, and observability of character: Eteocles' remark about the instability of moral concepts is illustrative of a wider concern among Euripidean characters with distinguishing truth from appearance and innate nature from convention. This unease extends to issues of character: Medea, Theseus in *Hippolytus*, and Orestes in *Electra* all lament the lack of external signs from which to glean easily a man's true character;[36] Orestes' long speech on this topic also rules out class, wealth, and beauty as determinants of morality. A lack of access to characters' interior is, then, not only fundamental to the genre of tragedy (which continually presents us with indeterminacies or conflicts of motivation and reasoning), but also something which is explicitly thematized by Euripidean characters. As always, however, it is important to remember that it is the characters speaking: Medea, Theseus and Orestes have all recently been disabused of previously held views about others (Jason, Hippolytus, and Electra's farmer husband, respectively), and their utopian wish for clear signs of character should be taken first and foremost as their emotional reactions to these reversals, rather than as expressions of an overarching Euripidean theory of character. Moreover, as we have seen in the case of Medea, Euripides perhaps more than any other dramatist from antiquity is concerned with providing, through outward dramatization, a window to the inner world of his characters.

Characterization in Embedded Narratives

I conclude this chapter by looking at techniques of characterization employed by Euripidean characters in embedded narrative portions—prologue narratives, messenger speeches, etc.[37] Characterization plays a role of varying importance in such embedded narratives, and characterizing material occurs in them

36 *Med.* 516–519, *Hipp.* 925–931, *El.* 367–400; cf. also *HF* 655–668.

37 For different varieties of embedded narrative in Euripidean drama, see *SAGN* 1: 269–280

with varying density. Much of this variation depends in rather predictable fashion on the place and function of such narratives in their plays. Thus, some agonistic narratives (i.e. narrative portions of *agōn*-speeches) are designed specifically to justify or condemn a character's past actions, and elaborate characterization can play a large role in such narratives. In *Trojan Women*, for example, both Helen and Hecuba present competing versions of Helen's abduction and subsequent behaviour at Troy, and as part of this, competing portrayals of Helen herself (914–965, 969–1032).[38] Helen's self-characterization is in fact rather thin, and this appears to be a deliberate ploy: she emphasizes her passivity in the face of the gods' irresistible power and so leaves little room for blame to be assigned to herself. She raises the question of her own agency in the rape ('What was I thinking when I went with the visitor?' 945–946) only to reject its validity ('Punish the goddess … I should be forgiven', 948–950). There are only a few touches of more affirmative self-characterization: by action (repeated but aborted: Helen's alleged attempts to escape Troy after Paris' death, 951–958), and by appearance (the few references to her beauty: 929, 936). Hecuba, for her part, reverses the situation by denying the Judgement of Paris and Aphrodite's role in Helen's abduction (another rationalizing rejection of anthropomorphic gods' roles in established mythological episodes) and filling the remaining vacuum of causation with Helen's contemptible character, marked by fickleness, lust, greed, and vanity:

> Seeing him [Paris], decked out in his oriental fineries and glittering with gold, you went out of your mind. You lived in Argos with few possessions, and you expected that if you left Sparta you would swamp the city of Troy, flowing with gold, with your extravagances. Menelaus' palace was not enough for you to revel in your luxurious tastes.
>
> 987–997

> And when you had come to Troy, … if news reached you that Menelaus' side was winning, you would praise him so that my son would be tormented in having such a great competitor for your love. But if the Trojans did well, Menelaus was nothing to you.
>
> 1002–1007

(Lowe). As is stressed there, embedded narrative is in fact a much more fluid category than a narrow focus on set pieces like prologues and messenger speeches would suggest.

38 For the women's rhetorical strategies, cf. Lloyd 1992: 99–112, Croally 1994: ch. 3. Similarly competing narrative conceptions of characters are found in e.g. *Med.* (Jason), *Hec.* (Polymestor), *El.* (Clytemnestra), and *HF* (Amphitryon and Lycus on Heracles).

The use of the Greek imperfect to represent typical/repeated behaviour and attitudes (e.g. 'was enough', *ēn hikana*, 996; 'you would praise him', *ēineis*, 1005) is a common instrument in such characterizing moves. Hecuba also uses counterfactual narration to demonstrate that more noble traits were lacking in Helen:[39]

> You say that … it was against your will that you stayed here. Where, then, were you found hanging yourself from a noose or whetting a sword—which is what a noble woman (*gennaia gunē*) would do if she were longing for her previous husband?
>
> 1010–1014

Such agonistic characterizations are, as always, to be evaluated in their dramatic context: Helen and Hecuba's speeches are designed to have an effect on the internal narratees (the chorus and especially Menelaus, who is present as judge); for the external audience, the characterizing strategies adopted by the two women are character cues in and of themselves.

Prologue narratives can serve to delineate not only the antecedents of a play's plot, but also some of the central traits of its characters. There is considerable variation between these narratives in the amount and techniques of characterization, although some patterns may be detected depending on the type of prologue speaker. For instance, none of the three title characters who perform this role (in *Andromache*, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Helen*) do much in the way of explicit self-characterization (Andromache does note her resistance to her concubinage and her care for her son, *Andr.* 36–38, 47–48; Helen emphasizes her marital propriety, *Hel.* 64–67). Of course, audiences are still able to infer much about these women from how they present their plight and the other characters involved in it, as well as by reflecting on the speakers' earlier literary lives (Andromache hints at her former life as Hector's wife, 5–6, activating connotations from her virtuous Iliadic presentation).[40]

The explicit ascription of traits, attitudes and motives to characters plays a greater role in prologue narratives delivered by anonymous minor figures (the Nurse in *Medea*, Electra's farmer husband in *Electra*, although the latter says much more about Aegisthus and Clytemnestra than about his wife), and in

39 Similar counterfactual narrations with a characterizing function at e.g. *Alc.* 633–635, *Med.* 490–491, *Andr.* 607–609, *Hec.* 1208–1213, *El.* 1088–1093.

40 For the 'skilful blend of the traditional and invented' in Euripides construction of Andromache in the prologue, cf. Allan 2000: 94–97.

some of the prologue speeches by gods[41] (see also below). In further cases, such as the suppliant plays *Heraclidae* and *Suppliant Women*, the prologue narrative teaches us little about any of the major characters' traits.

Messenger narratives, too, are generally sparing with the explicit ascription of characteristics, but the narration of characters' actions (valiant combat, strategic leadership, deceit, etc.) can contribute much to their overall presentation. Characterization is most pronounced in the case of messengers who are clearly on the side of or against one of the narrative's characters:[42] thus, in the messenger narrative of *Andromache* (1085–1165), the messenger portrays his master Neoptolemus as a valiant and impressive warrior (there are notable references to his appearance: 'a fearsome warrior to behold' 1123, 'shining in his bright armour' 1146, 'his handsome body' 1154–1155), who in spite of his pious behaviour at Delphi (1106–1108, 1111–1113) is mercilessly killed in an ambush arranged by a deceitful Orestes (1088–1096, 1109–1110, 1115–1116). Neoptolemus is an interesting case in that he does not appear onstage as a (living) character, so that the only way in which the audience is able to form a view of his character is through the words of others.[43] A more complex instance of this is Aegisthus in *Electra*, who also appears onstage only as a corpse, but who is characterized extensively throughout the play by the farmer, Electra herself, the messenger, and even Clytemnestra.

Aegisthus is also a good example of how it is impossible to separate characterization in embedded narratives from that in other parts of the play, and how character information can be presented in a piecemeal fashion. In the farmer's prologue narrative (1–53), Aegisthus' dominant trait is a (typically tyrannical) fear of overthrow, leading to his various schemes to eliminate Agamemnon's heirs and prevent the birth of further ones. This characterization is fleshed out in the long stichomythia between Electra and the 'stranger' (Orestes) (215–289), and particularly in Electra's message to her brother (300–338), which references rumours of Aegisthus' drunken outrages at Agamemnon's grave (323–331). The messenger speech (774–858) paints Aegisthus as an unsuspecting victim who unwittingly and hospitably welcomes his own killers into his

41 Particularly in *Hippolytus* (Aphrodite on Hippolytus and Phaedra) and *Bacchae* (Dionysus on Pentheus); less so in *Alcestis* (Apollo, though see below on Admetus' piety), *Trojan Women* (Poseidon), *Ion* (Hermes). There is also little characterization in the prologue speech by Polydorus' ghost in *Hecuba*.

42 For a comprehensive demolition of the notion that messengers are 'objective' narrators, cf. de Jong 1991: esp. ch. 2.

43 For such 'offstage characters', cf. de Jong 1990.

inner circle, but it also shows further hints of his fearful attitude (831–832).[44] Electra then launches the most sustained effort to characterize Aegisthus in her invective over his corpse (907–956, with narrative moments similar in kind to the agonistic narratives discussed above), adding traits such as cowardice, submissiveness, greed, effeminacy, and sexual lust. Even Clytemnestra, in her brief dialogue with Electra following the *agōn* (1102–1141), is forced to accept that Aegisthus has treated Electra cruelly, saying that 'such are his ways' (*tropoi toioutoi*, 1117), although she still sees room for change and predicts—in a moment of cruel dramatic irony—that he will no longer trouble Electra in the future (1119). All these presentations of Aegisthus—some in properly narrative portions of the play, some outside them[45]—are coloured by the perspective of their respective speakers; together they continually shape the audience's image of the character.

Similarly, for characters who do have onstage speaking roles as well as appearing in embedded narratives, characterization in the narrative parts can interact in significant ways with non-narrative parts. Onstage and offstage presentations are not always consistent: this is so for obvious reasons in the case of characters who are mad or possessed offstage (Heracles and Agave in the messenger narratives of *Heracles* and *Bacchae*); a more difficult and controversial case is Admetus in *Alcestis*, who is described by Apollo in the prologue narrative as a 'pious man' (*hosiou … andros*, 10), but appears to violate several standards of piety in the course of the play.[46]

Elsewhere, too, there is a delicate interaction between a character's presentation in a prologue narrative and their acted role: we have already seen that the prologue narrative of *Medea* hints at some of Medea's dangerous aspects, which will inform how she is perceived once her acted part begins. Hippolytus' onstage actions and speeches in *Hippolytus* are bookended by a prospective narration by Aphrodite (1–57) and a retrospective one by Artemis (1282–1324)—two very different divine perspectives on his actions (Aphrodite claims that she will 'punish Hippolytus for the wrongs he has done me (*hēmartēke*)', 21–22, whereas Artemis comes to Theseus to 'reveal your son's mind (*phrena*) as just (*dikaian*)', 1298–1299). In both these examples, the prologue speakers'

44 Some scholars (most strongly Arnott 1981) have argued that the messenger's portrayal of Aegisthus is wholly in conflict with that of others, and vindicates him; this view is rightly moderated by e.g. Cropp [1988] 2013: 4.

45 A case can be made that 215–289 and 300–338 are narrative even according to a strict definition. For narrative in Euripidean stichomythia, see Schuren 2014.

46 For the implications of the term *hosios*, cf. Peels 2016 (on this passage: 156–158 with n. 33). For the controversy about Admetus, cf. e.g. Parker's commentary (2007).

descriptions prepare the ground for the title characters' first appearances: the Nurse's description of Medea's behaviour (*Med.* 20–33) materializes in Medea's cries (96–167), while Hippolytus' first song and dialogue (*Hipp.* 58–120) bear out his hostility to Aphrodite as described by the goddess (10–19). This allows the characters' first actions to be interpreted as instances of a more typical, repeated behaviour,[47] and thus to have considerable characterizing force at the outset of a play.[48]

Conclusion

The genre of tragedy imposes a particular set of constraints on the presentation of character:

> There is … no privileged access for the audience to the interior world of any character; all actions have to be performed, and all thoughts spoken aloud, in the public space of the stage … There are no degrees of access to a character's thoughts or actions, beyond the black-and-white choice of whether a particular speech or action takes place on- or offstage (and, if the latter, in what form it is made known onstage) … [T]he tragic audience must use their … skills of hearing the private thought behind the public word to make human sense of the players' motivation.[49]

But 'constraints' is in some ways a misleading term: the dramatic form also affords unique opportunities, by inviting audiences to reflect on people's reactions to others and to their circumstances. 'Far from being a source of irritating obscurity, this ambiguity expands the intellectual and emotional significance of the drama.'[50]

Each of the Greek tragedians uses these opportunities in slightly different ways, and Euripides' approach is distinctive in several respects. First, he allows his characters to shift rapidly between sometimes widely divergent modes of 'the public word', complicating the effort 'to make human sense of the players' motivation' (there is no need, however, to give up that effort altogether, as

47 For such iterativity as a recurring feature of Euripidean prologues, cf. *SAGN* 2: 302–304 (Lloyd).

48 Cf. the notion of 'primacy' discussed in the Introduction (→).

49 Lowe 2000: 176–177.

50 Allan 2000: 88.

some scholars have argued). Second, he seems particularly interested in exploring conflict *within* characters, and dramatizing outwardly the tugs-of-war and reversals which take place in their interior worlds. Third, he embeds many of his characters' public words in the rhetorical, intellectual and philosophical discourses of his time, the effect of which is not only to frame the individual action or problem as part of wider human experience, but also to explore how the use and abuse of rhetoric and philosophy reflects on individual speakers at particular moments. Finally, Euripides' frequent and to some extent formalized use of embedded narrative passages offers scope for an even greater variety of perspectives on characters' actions and motivations.

What is also distinctive about Euripides, however, is the great variety in his technique: it is perhaps this above all which makes him a sometimes elusive, and often controversial author.[51]

51 This is not to say that there is no such variety in the work of the other tragedians. The notion that there is such as thing as the 'Sophoclean hero', for instance, obscures the considerable variation between Sophocles' (→) central characters. And the fact that many more plays by Euripides are extant than by Aeschylus or Sophocles inevitably contributes to the perception that his oeuvre was more diverse.

CHAPTER 20

Aristophanes

Angus Bowie

In the previous volume of this series, I described the use of space in Aristophanes as 'labile',[1] and a similar quality is to be found in his treatment of character. Basically, consistency of characterization comes a distant second to its use for purposes of humour and, more importantly, analysis of the themes of the play. In the last two plays, things change dramatically.

Masks

This shifting characterization means that features such as masks, costume and naming can offer only the broadest hints about the main characters, marking them as old or young, man or woman, rich or poor, slave etc., though they may encapsulate better the minor players. Uncertainty about the precise nature of masks in the fifth century means we cannot go very far in our speculations about this matter.[2] Reference to the mask of a character is limited to *Knights* 229–232, about Paphlagon:[3]

> don't be afraid: they haven't given him his own appearance, because none of the property-makers (*skeuopoioi*) wanted to represent him—they're afraid. He'll be perfectly recognisable however: the audience aren't fools.

The passage could very reasonably be taken to suggest that historical figures would normally have had a portrait-mask,[4] which would have raised certain

1 *SAGN* 3: 359.

2 Though see Wiles 2008 for discussion of how we should conceive the role of masks in Old Comedy. For a collection of ancient evidence, see Stone 1981: 19–59; for discussion, Dover [1967] 1987c: 267–278 (Dover's idea that Cleon had no distinguishing features and so a mask could not be made is demolished by Cratinus, *PGC* 228, as noted on p. 278).

3 Cf. also *Ach.* 1069–1070, of a Messenger, 'with his eye-brows puckered up as one with a striking message'. When in *Birds* the two men comment abusively on each other's appearance after their transformation, they are doing little more than exchanging insults (805–806).

4 So the later tradition, e.g. Pollux 4.143; scholia on *Kn.* 230–233; Platonius, *Diff. Com.* 69–81; see further Stone 1981: 31–38; Dover [1967] 1987c: 267–278.

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expectations, though the case of Socrates[5] in *Clouds*, who has characteristics which did not belong to the real person, shows that no simple mimesis of character was to be expected. One might think that fixed masks would have sat awkwardly with the labile nature of Old-Comedy characters, were it not for the fact that personal experience and cognitive research show that the human brain can endow masks with varying facial expressions.[6] Paradoxically then, one could say that the expression on masks does not only partially determine an audience's view of a character but is also determined by the other stimuli offered by that character and the play as a whole.[7]

Costume

The texts tell us more about dress.[8] This can be used simply as a short-hand to characterize, say, a poorly dressed Poet (*Birds* 915) or a self-important Inspector ('who's this Sardanapallus?', *Birds* 1021). It cannot easily play a part in representing changes of character, so that radical changes of character are marked by actual changes of costume: Demus is boiled and dressed as an ancient Athenian, when he has been freed from the domination of Paphlagon and embarks on a more sensible political course (*Knights* 1316–1334); the new youthfulness of Philocleon, now liberated from the courts, is marked by his dropping of Athenian dress in favour of Persian and Spartan (*Wasps* 1122–1173); and Pisetaerus and Euelpides don bird-costumes (*Birds* 801–808) for their newfound control of their city.

Disguise by costume is used in varying ways. The character who spends longest in disguise is 'Mnesilochus' in *Thesmophoriazusae*, shaved and dressed like a woman to infiltrate the festival. This enables him to take on a character that does not represent any significant change in nature, but produces a figure who plays adequately the role of a woman at the festival, but also purveys a comic male view of women as rather less moral beings than they (or indeed Euripides) are prepared to admit (see his speech at 466–519 and 544–572). In

5 On the characterization of historical figures, cf. Stark 2004: 287–315; Ruffell 2011: 48–52.

6 Cf. Meineck 2011.

7 So e.g. Wiles 2008: 386, of the figure of Mnesilochus on the Würzburg Vase: 'this face is flexible enough to be read in relation to three interlocking identities, the woman at a sacrificial ritual, the shaven-headed in-law of Euripides, and the hero Telephus. The eyes and mouth bespeak fear and threat in equal measure'.

8 See Stone 1981: 267–397; also Robson 2005.

this case, the disguise is used more to generate comedy about women than to mark a change in the nature of Mnesilochus.

Similarly, Dicaeopolis adopts Telephus' rags in order to make himself even more pathetic and persuasive before the Chorus.[9] The ploy seems to work, in that he eventually wins the Chorus over and gets away with abusive treatment of Lamachus, but there is no great change in his nature when he is or is not 'disguised'. If Telephus is used here to generate sympathy for Dicaeopolis, then it is significant that at the end of the play it is Lamachus to whom Telephan features attach: like Telephus he is wounded by a vine-prop, but Dicaeopolis refuses to play the role of Telephus' healer Achilles. The change is again less about the character's nature as such and more about changing the audience's perception of the character's moral status.

For Agathon in *Thesmophoriazusae*, costume and character are inextricably linked. Asked why he is dressed as a woman, he replies: 'I wear clothes that suit my intention (*gnōmē*). A poet must align his character (*tropoi*) to the play he has to write, so if he's writing a women-play, his bodily form (*sōma*) must partake of their characteristics (*tropoi*)' (148–152). As we shall see, if we substitute 'dramatic character' for 'poet', this almost sums up the nature of Aristophanes' highly labile mode of characterization: the character will take on whatever guise is needed for the play and its thematic analysis.

Finally, in *Frogs*, Dionysus is dressed in a mixture of Heracles and himself, as shown by Heracles' words, 'I can't suppress my laughter, when I see a lion-skin put on over a saffron robe!' (45–46). In part, of course, this bizarre combination has the practical purpose of allowing him to imitate Heracles' journey to Hades, but the contradictory nature of his garb also prepares for the way that in the play there is uncertainty about his identity: he changes clothes with Xanthias when he thinks it will advance his cause, and Aeacus has to conduct a trial to see which of the two is the god;[10] though he is several times surrounded by aspects of Dionysiac cult, most notably the Eleusinian Initiates (316–459),[11] he shows no recognition of the fact. It is not said if or when Dionysus doffs his lion-skin, but the parabasis seems a likely time; in any case, it is not wanted when, at the end of the play, he makes (if somewhat serendipitously) the 'right' choice and takes Aeschylus back to save the city.[12] The simplifying of his dress marks his return to the status of god of drama.

9 Interestingly, they make no comment at all about this change.

10 Cf. Goldhill 1991: 201–222.

11 Cf. Segal 1961; Bowie 1993: 237–238.

12 For this change in Dionysus, see Lada-Richards 1998; also Habash 2002.

Names

Though many of Aristophanes' names[13] are 'speaking' names,[14] they too can give only a basic sense of what a character may be like. Some indeed are not especially significant: in *Birds*, Euelpides ('Goodhope') is not notably more hopeful than Pisetaerus ('Trustyfriend'). Philocleon ('Cleon-lover') and Bdelycleon ('Cleon-hater') are transparent enough, as is Strepsiades ('Twister'). The nature of the Paphlagonian is immediately suggested by the echo of the verb *paphlazō* 'boil, seethe', recalling Homer's *kumata paphlazonta* 'boiling waves'; the tricksiness of Pseudartabas ('False Measure') is immediately announced by his name; and Praxagora indeed 'gets things done in the Agora'. Some names may carry special freight. Lysistrata does indeed 'disband armies' but, if Athena's priestess Lysimache lurks behind her name,[15] this reinforces the idea of a character who will be the city's benefactress. If Pisetaerus, 'persuader of his *hetairoi*', has echoes of the tyrant Pisistratus, it acts as an early indication of his final rise to tyranny, even if he is far from such a figure at the start.[16] There is, however, one case where a real person seems to get his character from his name rather than reality, Lamachus in *Acharnians*. He was a successful general, but his career and his involvement in the signing of the peace treaty in 421 suggest his characterization as the embodiment of war has less to do with any real character and more with the fact that his name is comically analysable as a compound of the rare intensive suffice *la-*, as found in 664 *lakatapugōn* 'a total pathic', and *makhomai* 'fight', so 'one much given to fighting'.[17]

The moment of revelation of a name can introduce a key facet of the play: Lysistrata is named in *Lysistrata* 6 with her peace plan soon following, and Paphlagon is marked as the cause of the trouble at the start of Demosthenes' narrative in *Knights* 44.[18] It may also mark a significant moment in the development of the plot, as when Strepsiades reveals to the Student his name and

13 See especially Olson 1992.

14 See generally Kanavou 2010.

15 See Lewis 1955; against, Henderson 1987: xxxviii–xl. For the fame of Lysimache, see Frazer on Paus. 1.27.5.

16 See Kanavou 2010: 105–107 for discussion of the name and meaning.

17 Cf. 1071 *makhai kai Lamakhoi*, 1080 *polemolamakhaïkon*; the boy who can sing only war-songs is son of Lamachus (*Peace* 1272–1294).

18 His 'real' identity as Cleon is then revealed by the references to leather (*burs*-words at 44, 47, 59, 104, 136, 139, 197, 203, 209, 369, 740, 852, and 892), and theft of the bread-cake at Pylos (54–57). This identity is acknowledged very late in the play, at 976.

rustic origins on entering the Phrontisterion (*Clouds* 134, 138), or Trygaeus at *Peace* 190 reveals to Hermes his name and the reason for his journey.

However, that names are not so significant as indicators of character is corroborated by the fact they can be revealed in some cases not only after the salient characteristics of a figure have been made clear, but even quite late in the play. Philocleon and Bdelycleon are named in *Wasps* 133–134, as the action is about to begin, but by then we have a very clear account at least of the former's character, and 'Philocleon' does not prepare us for his kaleidoscopic nature. For Dicaeopolis's name we have to wait until *Acharnians* 406, when he visits Euripides, by which time his early character is well established, and for Pisetaerus' and Euelpides' even longer, until *Birds* 644–645, when Tereus welcomes them into his home.[19] The Sausage-seller's actual name is revealed to be 'Agoracritus' only at *Knights* 1257, at the very moment of his triumph and accession as Demus' protector. This case, and the fact that Euripides' relative can spend the whole of *Thesmophoriazusae* without a name, are the clearest indications that names are not one of the most important ways of indicating character.[20]

Finally, in some cases, things are reversed as it were, and it is character that gives names to figures. The two slaves in *Wasps* are not named, but the reference to the 'stealing of a cake' from Pylos (54–57) suggests that one is Demosthenes, and the timidity and abstemiousness of the other points to Nicias,[21] whose command at Pylos Cleon took over, claiming Nicias has been too inactive.[22]

Direct Characterization and Indirection

As may be expected in drama, direct characterization is often found before the entry of a major figure, especially so in the prologues and just before the

19 For this motif, cf. Olson 1992: 308 n. 15.

20 It is possible of course that names were revealed at the Proagon, but we do not know: 'there is no reason to believe that a detailed description of the action of the play was required. The fact that the actors appeared unmasked, in fact, argues strongly against this interpretation of the ceremony' (Olson 1992: 306 n. 10). Only a small proportion of the audience would have been present then anyway.

21 For Nicias' cautiousness, cf. e.g. Cleon's accusations of cowardice in Th. 4.27–28, his caution over the Sicilian expedition (id. 6.8.4, 25.1, 71, 97; Plu. *Nic.* 16.8–9), and Aristophanes' *mellonikian* 'dither like Nicias' (*Birds* 639); for his dislike of parties, cf. Plu. *Nic.* 5.1.

22 A sensible discussion in MacDowell 1995: 86–87. On naming of contemporaries, see Olson 1992: 316–318.

introduction of some choruses. The prologues of *Knights*, *Wasps* and *Peace* are the only extended examples of narration used for characterization. Here again, however, we find that the explicit characterization does not necessarily give the full picture and there is regular use of 'indirection', whereby the audience is sometimes made to expect a particular type of character but things turn out to be more complex.[23]

It is in this 'indirection' that we encounter the major feature of Aristophanic characterization: his figures are extraordinarily volatile and inconsistent, adopting a wide-ranging series of characteristics which are not accommodatable in any 'realistic' model. The best account of this aspect is that of Silk.[24] He proposes the term 'recreative' for this type of characterization, which he sees as having two advantages:

> specifically, because Aristophanic people have (or are given) the capacity to recreate themselves anew; and generally, because the label tends to suggest that these people do enjoy some relationship with 'reality', but a less straightforward one than the mimetic relationship implied by 'realist'.[25]

In the prologues, Aristophanes has two techniques: the protagonist is either present, alone or with another, and reveals their own character, or absent and other figures provide the description. The first technique is seen in its simplest form in *Lysistrata*. The seriousness and concern for the city that characterizes Lysistrata is immediately visible in the way she alone has turned up on time, scorns the sexual innuendos of the other women and orchestrates the whole scheme.[26] This essentially serious nature then accompanies her throughout the play.

Elsewhere, the initial characterization proves not to be the main feature of the figure, but a sort of 'blind' which throws the main aspect into relief: the defeating of the expectations raised by the earlier scenes makes the true plot all the more striking. The salient characteristics of the protagonist are then sometimes introduced by a claim to have come up with a solution to

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23 This aspect of characterization can be lost in too typological an analysis of Aristophanes' figures, as in Sifakis 1992: 133–136.

24 Silk 2000: 207–255 (a revision of Silk 1990). See also Dover 1972: 59–65. For linguistic discontinuity, cf. Dover [1976] 1987b; del Corno 1997; Willi 2003, 2014: 175–185; also McClure 1999: 205–259.

25 Silk 2000: 221.

26 This is not to say she is entirely without humour: see Ruffell 2011: 58–60.

whatever problem they face. Thus Strepsiades begins *Clouds* with complaints about the war, his slaves, his son and his debts (1–24), but while the debts are the mainspring of the plot, this does not prepare us for the fact that the main comic aspect of the play is that he spends most of it attempting to cope with the intricacies of philosophy. The shift to this new topic is very sudden, marked by 'I've found a devilishly clever short-cut' (*Clouds* 75–76). However, if we expect a demonstration of the sort of intelligence that has come up with such a clever wheeze, we will be disappointed, as Strepsiades demonstrates nothing but deep stupidity when he enters the school. There are then further changes, which we shall discuss below.

A similar sudden revelation introduces Dicaeopolis' plan for a private treaty with Sparta: 'I'm going to carry out a great and amazing deed' (*Ach.* 128). He begins by discoursing on various theatrical and musical pains that he has suffered, before we discover that this is merely a priamel leading to his disappointment with the city's political behaviour. He presents himself as a poor farmer and the sole man in the city with its welfare at heart. The impression in the early part of the play is largely positive, as Dicaeopolis tries hard, if not entirely successfully, to make the assembly see how it is being duped, treats Amphitheus much more humanely than the officials and has a warming scene with his family at his Rural Dionysia (237–279). The audience's sympathy is further piqued by his adoption of the tattered clothes of Telephus, the most wretched of all Euripides' ragged heroes (393–489), and by his measured discussion of the blame to be attached to Athenians and Spartans in the war, which wins over half of the Acharnians (496–572). His discomfiting of Lamachus adds to this picture of a fine defender of peace over war (566–625). However that picture changes radically once he has set up his personal state.[27] His treatment of the Megarian's daughters is frankly little short of child-abuse (729–835); his treatment of another countryman, Dercetes, who like him has suffered in the war, is something of a shock (1018–1047); and his refusal to share his success with anyone except a wife who wishes to stymie the city's war-effort by keeping her husband from the battle-line may be amusing, but shows little concern for his former fellow-citizens (1048–1070): 'this man has discovered great pleasure in his treaty, but it doesn't look as if he is going to share it with anyone', as the Chorus say (1037–1039). We may laugh at his second discomfiting of Lamachus (1071–1143), but Lamachus is now on his way to defend Athens from attack, and scarcely deserves the mockery. One feels that the justice of Dicaeopolis' new state leaves something to be desired.

27 Cf. Bowie 1993: 32–35.

The technique is similar in the case of Pisetaerus. He and Euelpides begin the play hopelessly lost in the countryside, following the instructions of apparently incompetent birds: 'isn't it terrible that here we are wanting to go to the dogs and having made our preparations, but we can't find the way?' (27–29). He cannot cope with Athenian life and its incessant law-courts (40–41), and is seeking a 'place without *pragmata*' (44), where life is all pleasure. Everything seems to point to a comedy about the kind of idyllic never-never land suitable for such ne'er-do-wells, where for instance food appears automatically, as in plays such as Cratinus' *Pluti* or Teleclides' *Amphictyons*. Again, the transition comes out of the blue: when Tereus is recounting the pleasures of the birds' life, Pisetaerus suddenly bursts out 'Ah! I can see a grand design for the race of birds, and future power, if you do what I say' (162–163), and gives the birds the advice, 'establish a single city' (172). From this moment on, the former no-hoper takes control of the action and we do indeed get a never-never land, but one which is much more sinister in nature than expected, with its terrifying armies, its expulsion of any characters who might trammel its power, the deposing of the Olympian gods and the assumption of total tyrannical power by Pisetaerus.

In the second technique, the protagonist is kept off-stage and other characters, often slaves, provide the description; this has the advantage of building up suspense until the dramatic arrival of the protagonist. The protagonist is described in extreme terms: in *Knights*, Demus is said to be 'rustic in temperament, a bean-chewer, short-tempered … a difficult old man, half-deaf' (41–43). In *Wasps* and *Peace*, madness is at the heart of the characterization: Philocleon 'is suffering from the strangest disease' (*Wasps* 71–90); Trygaeus 'is mad in a novel fashion' (*Peace* 54).[28] The madnesses mark the protagonists out as somehow affected by divine or demonic forces (Bdelycleon uses the standard procedures to try to cure his father),[29] and prepare us for the larger than life or even superhuman feats they will perform, be it freedom from all human restraints, bringing peace or securing universal prosperity. In *Wasps* and *Peace*, the full extent of the madness is made clear when the protagonist arrives, as Philocleon makes manic attempts to escape through the smoke-hole, the door, under a donkey and so on, and Trygaeus appears triumphantly on his somewhat unsteady beetle. In a variation, Demus is held back for several hundred lines.

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28 In *Wealth*, Carion says of Chremylus that 'wise [Apollo] has sent my master away in a melancholy madness' (*Wealth* 11–12), but Chremylus is already on stage.

29 On madness and the divine, cf. Parker 1983: 243–248.

But here again we come up against indirection: the characteristic suggested in these prologues does not turn out in any simple way to be *the* characteristic of the figure. Despite his off-stage shouting at Zeus, Trygaeus is hardly mad once he has ridden his beetle to heaven, and though Philocleon has his wild moments, for much of the time he is relatively sane; both also go through a number of transformations as the plot proceeds.

Demus is more problematic. When he appears (728), he is suitably cantankerous and concerned about Paphlagon, but very soon starts to warm to the Sausage-seller and to see evidence of Paphlagon's deception; he decides where the competition between the two will take place, despite Paphlagon's desperate pleas that they not use the Pnyx (751–752); and there is more of the aged old man than of the tough bean-chewer in the pleasure he takes in the gifts and services the men bring him. That the play will end with Paphlagon's defeat is obvious, but this unexpected alienation from Paphlagon enables the audience to savour the gradual development towards it.

The surprise comes when the Chorus tell Demus that he has an enviable power to make all fear him, but that he is too easily led and deceived (1111–1120). His reply is that he knows what he is doing, and likes to 'nourish a thieving protector (*prostatēs*) and, when he's filled himself, seize him and strike him down' (1127–1130; cf. 1141–1150). Since Paphlagon is third in a sequence of such *prostatai*, this is perhaps a justifiable claim, but it becomes more problematic when, after his transformation, Agoracritus reveals to him how foolish he used to be, and Demus says 'I had no idea … Was I really such a silly old man? … I'm ashamed of my earlier mistakes' (1347, 1349, 1355). It is hard to negotiate this glaring contradiction,[30] and hard too not to think that here we do have a case where character is determined by story.[31] There is greater pathos and power in the scene since, if Demus was as much in control as he claimed earlier, there would be no real need for a saviour any more than there was with the earlier Flax-seller and Sheep-seller. In fact, his gratitude is greater and the magnitude of Agoracritus' achievement all the greater, if he reverts to being a slightly pathetic old man.

30 For a suggestion, cf. Brock 1986.

31 Against too facile a use of this idea, see Silk 2000: 209.

Character and Plot

These shifts in Demus' characterization allow the audience to look at this embodiment of themselves in a variety of different ways, and this is another major aspect of characterization in Aristophanes: such shifts are not there simply for laughs or the result of generic convention. They can play a major role in the creation of the plots and the analysis of the questions raised by the play. What follows is not however an attempt simply to restate the idea that character in Aristophanes is the servant of plot. Character and plot will be seen to have a dynamic and organic relationship whose function is to allow a deeper analysis of the questions raised by the play.

It is time to look at a chorus, and we will start with that in *Wasps*.[32] Our expectations about their character are firmly laid down by Xanthias' description of his master's jury-mania. We expect irrepressibility and physical toughness, and as they are about to appear, they are introduced as being like a nest of wasps, with stings, and wild as sparks (223–227). When they actually appear however, they are stumbling along in the mud and darkness, at the mercy of their sons; they sing a touching song about the kind of old-man's problems Philocleon may be suffering from; and they have to explain how they cannot buy their sons food. There is obvious humour in the surprising contrast here, but more importantly the scene offers an alternative way of viewing the city's old jurors: they are old men, poor and dependent on others. These two pictures will articulate the audience's responses to them and their profession through the play.[33]

The wasp-like violence of the Chorus envisaged by Xanthias finally manifests itself when Bdelycleon discovers Philocleon about to escape to the Chorus. The Chorus suddenly lose their frailty and engage in a furious battle, which is figured as a re-run of the Persian Wars. Philocleon calls on the autochthonous Athenian culture-hero Cecrops (438), while the Wasps present themselves as the opponents of tyranny (417, 464, 487) and monarchy (470, 474), represented by Bdelycleon. Ranged against them are the Eastern slaves Midas, Phryx and Masyntias (433), who like the Persians of old bring fire against Athens, and use the smoke to rout Philocleon and the Wasps (457, 459).

32 For another Chorus which shows radical shifts, see *Peace*, where they are variously Panhellenes, Athenians, and Athenian peasants; see Sommerstein 1985: xviii–xix.

33 The same technique is found in *Acharnians*, where the panicked Amphitheus describes the Chorus as 'tough old men, hearts of oak, hard, Marathon-fighters, tough as maple' (180–181), before they come in arthritically and lament their lost youthfulness. They too will assume a more vigorous attitude when the time comes.

This scene has a counterpart later, in the epirrhema of the parabasis where, now that Philocleon is no longer a juror, the Chorus have become calmer and more rational, and again stress their aged weakness ('O you who were once mighty in choruses and battles … that was before, before', 1060–1063). In their reminiscing about their fighting days, they talk of themselves as autochthonous (1076) and as hoplite-wasps who drove the Persians off with their stings (1081–1090), and describe the battle between the Athenians and Persians as 'when the barbarian came filling the whole city with smoke (*tuphōn*; cf. 457 *tuphe*) and setting it ablaze' (1078–1079). This is the mirror-image of the fight-scene, in that in the past it was the Athenians who were victorious, and the two scenes need to be read together. The epirrhema is a reminder that these Wasps, who earlier were presented as an obstacle to the solving of the problem of Philocleon and as rather pathetic old men who made ludicrous claims about their fierceness and strength, were also the men who saved Athens from its greatest peril, the Persians, and prevented just the kind of Eastern tyranny of which they accused Bdelycleon and were criticized for so doing (488–499).

Taken together, the two scenes thus raise the question whether their waspishness is completely bad, since it was precisely this which saved the city. This suggestion that the Wasps are central to Athenian well-being and safety is then corroborated in the antepirrhema, where they praise their work in the courts, defending the city from enemies within: 'packed in tight like this by the walls, bent over to the ground, like larvae moving around in the cells of the honeycomb' (1109–1111). The zeal of the old jurors may therefore have its faults, and may even be a little bit laughable, but they beat the Persians and the courts are the places where Athenian democracy is practised and defended. Their characterization swings between these two poles.

Similar points are made also through the changes in characterization undergone by Philocleon himself. He begins as the wildly youthful figure trying to escape the house, which demonstrates his mad desire for jury-service and is transformed first into a rather ineffective warrior, and then into a more calm and rational debater with Bdelycleon on the merits or otherwise of the courts. In the subsequent domestic court, however, he returns to the uncompromising juror of the start of the play, in his determination to find the dog Labes guilty. This reversion allows Aristophanes to pursue a comparison between the democratic courts of Athens and this private court. The courts have been pilloried and parodied in the previous part of the play, and are recalled also by the way in which the private court has many features of their procedures and appurtenances, such as the dock, clepsydra and voting-jars, even though there is only a single person to judge. Philocleon's reversion to a judge immediately prejudiced against the defendant ('he really looks the thief', 900), and the ease with

which he is tricked into voting the wrong way, then give the audience a taste of an alternative kind of justice, where everything depends on one man, who may be entirely unfit for the task. This prompts a reconsideration of the democratic courts: for all their faults displayed earlier, are they not in the end preferable to putting everything into one man's perhaps autocratic or incompetent hands?

After the deception at the end of the trial and his collapse ('So, I am nothing now!', 995), Philocleon really is 'recreated', this time as a young man. New clothes mark this reversal in character, as the old Athenian juror in his cloak and felt-shoes becomes a youth in Persian robe and Spartan slippers, and is taught posh aristocratic ways in preparation for a visit to a symposium (1122–1387). This transformation takes him into contact with another kind of judicial system, with which the democratic courts can once more be compared. When he refuses to go drinking because of the inevitable criminal charges that follow drunken behaviour, Bdelycleon reassures him he has nothing to fear 'if you associate with the great and good': either they will beg off the complainant or a witty remark learnt in the symposium will turn the whole thing into a joke (1256–1261). This introduces a third kind of justice, which one might call 'oligarchic', in which a rich and powerful elite can ignore or circumvent the courts. Again, the question is posed whether one is perhaps not better off with the democratic courts.

This last transformation also provides yet another way of looking at the attempt to cure Philocleon of his dedication to juries. The result of his attendance at the symposium is a drunken *kōmos*, on which he runs through the street attacking passers-by. This *kōmos* recalls another one from the start of the play, the entry of the old men in the parodos. Decrepit, poor old men, going to work by lantern-light early in the morning with their *paides*, are the polar opposite of the fit aristocratic youths riotously abroad from a night's drinking late at night with lamps and servants.[34] However, in contrast to the parodos, Philocleon's *kōmos*, like those of aristocratic youths, is far more destructive to those around; he seems now beyond the reach of the justice sought by those he has assaulted on the way. The animal imagery of the beginning of the play also returns, with the sons of Carcinus, 'the crab' (1509–1537) whom he worsts in wild dancing. Bdelycleon has succeeded in freeing his father from jurymania, but the old wild and waspish spirit that defeated the Persians and kept Athens safe in the courts is undimmed, but now out of control. Again, a question is posed: which *kōmos* do we prefer, that of the dedicated if somewhat waspish and laughable jurors or of the youth of Athens' gilded elite?

34 Bowie 1997: 8–11.

This then raises the greater question whether the city is better served by Philocleon the cantankerous juror or the grotesque and violent *kōmast*. The courts may be subject to sustained and, to some extent at any rate, justified criticism in the early parts of the play, but the shifting characterizations of the Chorus and Philocleon conjure up a more nuanced picture. Jurors can be violent and capricious, prejudiced, bamboozled and bribed, but they are also the great defenders of the city, as hoplites in their prime and in the courts in old age, and they are ultimately family men with all the travails and frailties of humankind. They are far from perfect, but the attempt to stop them doing their job itself has its risks: it may be that the waspish character of the Athenians is in the end best channelled into the protection of city rather than allowed free rein.

If Philocleon ends up apparently free of social control, quite the opposite happens in *Clouds*, which is unique in Aristophanes' extant plays in the way that its protagonist does not achieve some sort of triumph at the end, but is brought to see the error of his ways. Far from enjoying the successes and new status of a Dicaeopolis, Demus or Pisetaerus, he finishes back in the character he was before embarking on his 'devilishly clever short-cut' (76): the strongly moral aspect of the play is emphasized by this circular variation in character. Strepsiades begins the play as someone who does not appear to appreciate his good fortune: he has married into a very wealthy family, but complains about expenditure on lamp-oil as well as his debts; horse-owning was not cheap but plenty could afford it and what we know of his debts does not suggest they were abnormally high. This tight-fistedness triggers his determination to pursue his clever idea of learning philosophy, but this idea is the only evidence of intelligence, since once he enters the Phrontisterion, he becomes the hopelessly stupid rustic incapable of making any progress, which allows Aristophanes to make all manner of fun of contemporary speculations. However, when his son has done the course, he suddenly becomes capable of deploying the kind of tricky rhetoric that foxed him before (1214–1303), which seems to indicate that he has achieved his aim, and he even goes so far as to sing a self-*makarismos* (1206–1213). Sadly, as Macleod showed,[35] such songs are always a prelude to disaster in tragedy, and we soon see Strepsiades as a rather sad old man at the mercy of his clever and rather brutal son's command of philosophical argument. This forces him to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his attempt to escape his social obligations like debt and to abandon the gods, and he finally takes Hermes' advice to burn the Phrontisterion down, restoring

35 Macleod 1981.

himself and the city to their previous, unphilosophical character. It would be hard to call *Clouds* 'tragic', but the self-*makarismos*, the sudden *peripeteia* that Strepsiades suffers and his *anagōrisis* of his sins all give a tinge to his character that is not found in any other protagonist.

Double Characterization

So far we have considered changes in characterization which have been sequential. There is one case in Aristophanes, however, where not an individual but a Chorus is simultaneously doubly characterized, with one characterization of the figures in the play and the other of the (more acute members of) audience. This is in *Clouds*.[36] For Socrates, the Clouds are his divinities. He asks Strepsiades, 'do you wish to associate with the Clouds, our divinities?' (252–253), before initiating him into their rites, summoning them to the Phrontisterion and hailing their paying attention to him with 'O greatly revered Clouds, you clearly heard me when I called' (291); they are supposed to nourish idle sophists, seers, doctors and foppish poets (331–334). However, they in fact make their true nature clear from their very first entry. The students in the Phrontisterion (198–199) cannot go into the open air, but they delight in it (275–290), and their father is Ocean (277), not exactly a sophistic deity. Their own stated reason for coming to Athens is not to see philosophers, but because of the 'reverence for secret rites ... the gifts to the Olympian gods, high-roofed temples ... the most holy processions for the blessed ones and ... festivals at every season' (303–310); they hymn as rulers of the universe (563–574) the Sun, Moon and the Olympians, whose complaints they bring. Far from valuing idleness, they praise hard work (414–419) and the Stronger but not the Weaker Argument (1024–1030; cf. 959–960), and thrice warn Strepsiades of the consequences of his actions (810–812, 1114, 1303–1320). At the end of the play, Strepsiades tries to put the blame for his misfortunes on them, but they explain that 'we do this whenever we see someone falling in love with wrong-doing, until we cast him into disaster to make him realize he must fear the gods' (1458–1461).

If, in the cases we have looked at so far, the contrasting shifts in character are not easily reconciled in realist terms, here the changes are an integral part of the Clouds' nature and mode of operation. Paradoxically, it is Socrates who

36 For this, see Segal 1969.

reveals the truth.[37] When Strepsiades is bemused that the Clouds seem to be women at one minute and fleeces at another and can generally take a wide variety of forms, Socrates explains that 'they become whatever they want', taking appropriate shapes 'to mock the madness (*mania*)' of their victims (348–350): they have seen the effeminate Cleonymus, and so have become women. What he does not realize is that this is what is happening to him: they have taken the character of 'sophistic' deities in order to mock and punish a sophist; and the same is true for Strepsiades, since they have 'twisted' their nature to mock 'the son of Twister'. This double characterization allows them at once to be perceived as on Socrates' side and to fulfil the characteristic mythological function of clouds of punishing the wicked.[38]

A somewhat different kind of double characterization can be seen in the pairs Strepsiades and Phidippides, and Philocleon and Bdelycleon. Here it is social milieu which is doubled, but again the doubling is used for the analysis of the play's themes. In each case, a father is represented as a traditionally poor or rustic Athenian and the son (and wife in *Clouds*) as much more aristocratic. Strepsiades tells how he (43–48)

> had the most delightful country life, mouldy, unkempt, lying about as one pleased, full of bees and sheep and pressed-olives. Then I married the niece of Megacles, son of Megacles, I a rustic, she from town, classy, luxurious, very much the *grande dame*.

Like his mother, Phidippides with his horse-racing is firmly of the aristocratic milieu. Similarly, Philocleon is an old juror, but his son moves in much more grand company. In each case, these apparent contradictions in realist terms allow a perspective on philosophy and the law from rich and poor: for instance, Philocleon's passion for and Bdelycleon's dislike of the courts need to be viewed through the fact that each represents a different ideological stand-point, which means their view of the courts should not be seen as necessarily objective or uncoloured by that ideology.

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37 For the tradition of seers who can see the future for others but not for themselves, see X. *Smp.* 4.5; Pl. *Ap.* 22b–c, *Men.* 99c–d, *Ion* 534b–e.

38 Cf. the stories of Ixion, Athamas and Helen, with Bowie 1993: 127–130.

Minor Characters

Variation in the character of protagonists also plays a role in scenes with the intruders who often invade the stage in the latter part of plays. Here the variation is used less to deepen the characterization of the protagonist and more to create cameos that capture the spirit of the figure in question in a deft manner without descending into cliché. *Birds* has the richest sequences of these intruders, and Pisetaerus shifts his nature to help frame each. Thus, with the Priest, he acts as a *bōmolokhos*, drawing humour from the wordy Priest's prayer (863–894); the Poet is gently persuaded to leave by the gift of clothing, not because of any compassion on Pisetaerus' part, but because only thus will he stop reciting and leave (904–951); the Oracle-seller is given a witty taste of his own oracular medicine (959–991); and the Inspector is twice forcibly expelled with his voting-urns, in a scene more significant for the banishing of such democratic instruments than for the sudden violence of Pisetaerus (1021–1034, 1046–1057).

The Later Plays

In *Ecclesiazusae* and *Wealth*, the complexities of characterization we have discussed largely disappear and much greater consistency takes their place. The names become less significant and reminiscent of stock names in later comedy. Costume-change plays an important role in the women's victory in *Ecclesiazusae*, but it does not involve a change in the essential character of the men and women. Along with fantastical plots about riding to heaven on a beetle or taking over the world, characters with extreme variations of nature are no more. Praxagora achieves her aim through a simple vote in the assembly rather than a sex-strike and occupation of the Acropolis and, if Lysistrata is not a character of great diversity, Praxagora is even more matter of fact. Chremylus' universal prosperity comes about with the minimum of fuss; he is introduced by the 'madness' motif like Philocleon and Trygaeus, but this turns out to be Carion's take on his apparently odd behaviour rather than a feature of his nature, as in the case of Philocleon and Trygaeus. Minor characters in the earlier plays were generic, a poor poet, a grasping priest and so on, but in these plays more prominent characters too are much more so than before: Blepyrus remains an essentially bumbling old man, his neighbour and Chremes play their roles in a straightforward manner. The Old Women in *Wealth* are extreme caricatures but they are so in a consistent way. As realism takes over the plots, so it does the characters.

CHAPTER 21

Menander

Peter Brown

In the case of Menander's comedies it is generally agreed that consistency and plausibility of characterization are at a premium and that plot and character are often subtly and intricately interwoven.[1] It is also agreed that for his original audiences their knowledge of pre-existing traditions (tragic as well as comic) must have enabled his characters to stand out in sharper relief: Cnemon in *Dyscolus* against the tradition of the misanthrope in comedy; Moschion in *Samia* against the background of tragic heroes in analogous situations such as Hippolytus and Phoenix; and Polemon and Thrasonides in *Periciromene* and *Misumenus* respectively against the expectation that a soldier in comedy will be a boastful buffoon (an expectation doubtless encouraged by their warlike names). Any full study of the presentation of Menander's main characters would have to be a study of the entire play (to the extent that it has survived), of what is said about the characters as well as what they themselves say and do, of how they react to other characters as well as how others react to them, and also of the dramatic traditions behind the play—to say nothing of such elements as their physical appearance, use of props and style of delivery. The most recent study of his characters discusses the importance of visual elements, above all of masks.[2] In the context of this volume it makes sense to concentrate on textual elements and to focus particularly on passages of narrative, though I shall also examine how such passages relate to others in their plays. I shall not try to construct a hierarchy of different techniques of characterization, to decide whether (for instance) explicit remarks by other characters contribute more or less to the audience's view of a character than his or her actions in the course of the play; each technique contributes something, and their relative importance and effectiveness vary from play to play. Nonetheless some aspects can be singled out, and some examples can be offered.

1 See, for example, Arnott 1979: 352–357, accepting that plot is paramount but bringing out ways in which characters are presented as individuals.

2 Petrides 2014. See also Macua Martinez 2008, stressing the importance of names in conjunction with masks, an approach about which I expressed doubts in P. Brown 1987.

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There is no shortage of narrative in these comedies.[3] Most obviously, their prologues explain the background to the plot, but there are also what may be called ‘messenger speeches’ narrating events which have taken place off-stage in the course of the play, and there are sometimes narratives embedded in speeches of other types such as the forensic speeches in the arbitration scene after which *Epitrepontes* is named. That play also includes a proleptic narrative at 511–535 when Habrotonon explains to Onesimus what she plans to do and say when she goes indoors.[4] Some of these speeches are very long: *Samia* opens with a monologue by Moschion which must when complete have lasted for well over eighty lines, and Demeas' monologue at the beginning of Act III must have been not far short of it in length; the messenger speech in Act IV of *Sicyonii* was over 100 lines long. In plays whose total length rarely or barely exceeded 1,000 lines, this represents a significant proportion of space given to narrative. By no means all of the lines contributed to characterization, and these speeches were not necessarily the most significant way in which characters were presented to the audience. But they often played an important part in that presentation, whether explicitly or implicitly.

Prologues

Aspis

Some very explicit presentations of character come in prologues spoken by divinities. Thus in her prologue at *Aspis* 114–121, following an opening scene of dialogue, the goddess Chance tells us:

> The old man who was asking all the questions just now is by birth his uncle on his father's side; but in wickedness he simply beats all comers: he doesn't acknowledge relatives or friends; he hasn't given a moment's thought to the shameful actions in his life; he just wants to own everything—that's all he recognizes; and he lives all on his own, with an old woman as his housekeeper.

This is not only explicit but extreme: the old man has no redeeming features whatever. By contrast, his younger brother is introduced at 124–127 as ‘standing by birth in the same relationship to the lad, but of really good character, and

3 See *SAGN* 1: 297–305 (Nünlist).

4 See Nünlist 2002: 239–241.

wealthy, with a wife and one daughter'. It is a positive sign that, unlike his elder brother, he does not live on his own but has a wife and a child, and it is explicitly a sign of his goodness that he takes due thought for the niece who has been entrusted to his care and that he plans to marry her to his stepson and provide a generous dowry: the sentence about that is introduced at 130 with the words 'As I said, he's good'. In case we haven't got the point about the elder brother, he is referred to at 123 as 'this money-grubber' and at 140 as 'the wicked man'. The contrast between the two reinforces the presentation of both (an example of 'metaphorical' characterization).[5]

We have in fact already seen this elder brother, because the prologue follows an initial scene in which he betrayed his greed in less direct ways. At 33, on hearing the words 'Everyone came back with lots of money', he exclaims 'How splendid!'; at 82–86, at the end of a narrative which included the news that his nephew has been killed in battle, his only comment is 'Did you say you've brought six hundred gold coins?' 'I did.' 'And drinking cups?' 'Yes, weighing perhaps forty minas, no more—for you to inherit.' 'What? You don't think *that*'s why I'm asking, do you?'; and at 89–90 he professes not to be interested in this booty that his nephew had acquired: 'I don't care about that. If only he were still alive!' That was in dialogue with the slave who had accompanied the nephew on campaign and has brought the booty back. The old man's self-seeking hypocrisy is confirmed for the audience by his last words at the end of the scene, when he is left on his own: 'I think I'll go inside now too, to work out how one could handle these people most gently' (94–96).

The prologue goddess does not name the old man, nor the slave, nor six of the other seven characters that she mentions; the only character named (apart from the goddess herself) is Cleostratus (110), the nephew who is believed to have been killed. This is typical of Menander's prologues:[6] the important thing is to explain the family relationships, and a list of names would not help to make things clear. Cleostratus has already been named in the opening scene (14), and it is simplest for the prologue to refer to him by name; also, it is he whose shield gives the play its title and whose unexpected return in Act IV will be the catalyst for its denouement. The slave and the old man have addressed one another by name (19, 20, 22, 93), and it would no doubt have been simple enough to use their names in the prologue too, but Menander has chosen not to do so, referring to them instead as 'the old man' (114) and 'the slave' (122).

5 Wilner 1930 discusses this technique in Roman Comedy, with very occasional examples from the Menander that was then known.

6 See Raffaelli 1984: 98 n. 21 = Raffaelli 2009: 99–100 n. 33.

This perhaps gives the impression that the important thing about them is their function in the plot: the plot requires a virtuous and wealthy uncle with a wife, daughter, and stepson, a wicked uncle and a slave to thwart his plans, and also a nephew and niece; the uncles need to be given contrasting personalities, but the other characters barely need to be given a personality at all, though the slave does need to be clever.

Even the uncles do not require or receive a particularly complex or nuanced characterization. Immediately after the prologue the wicked uncle reappears with the words 'I don't want anyone to say that I'm utterly money-grubbing' (149, a sign that he is at least aware of public opinion, but effectively reinforcing rather than complicating his initial presentation), and in dialogue with the slave shortly afterwards he repeats his ploy of saying 'If only he were still alive!' (168–169). Also the explicit comments of others reinforce what we already know. In a stretch of dialogue in Act III the virtuous uncle says (starting with a sarcastic epithet) 'That fine brother of mine is driving me into such a state of distraction with his wickedness' (308–309); at 311 he again refers to him sarcastically as 'the noble gentleman'; at 313 the slave exclaims 'O, the abominable man!', and at 316 he calls him 'that utterly wicked man'. Later in the same scene the wicked uncle is called 'money-grubbing' at 351, and (again) 'wicked' at 369. This is the scene in which the other characters plot to thwart the money-grubbing plans of the wicked uncle, and Menander clearly wants us to remember the extreme presentation of him that we were given in the prologue. As far as we can tell, nothing happened in the play to modify this picture of him, though we cannot be sure about that since very little of the second half of the play has survived. We are assured by the prologue-goddess that he will get his come-uppance at the end of the play 'after making it clearer to everyone what sort of man he is' (144–146), which makes it sound as if the presentation of his character was the central point of interest in the play but does not encourage us to think that his character developed or changed in the course of it. The virtuous uncle is shown as being very distressed by his brother's behaviour, and at one point in their plotting in Act III the slave says to him 'I know very well that you naturally tend to feel embittered and depressed' (338–339); this will make it plausible that he has fallen seriously ill, as their plot requires them to pretend. But otherwise there is little to say about his character. In what survives of the play, we are given no explanation of why the two brothers have turned out so differently; we just have to accept the presentation of them that we are given, and the explicit remarks of the prologue goddess about both of them are very much in line with what we see in the course of the play.

Dyscolus

The one play of Menander which survives almost complete is *Dyscolus*. This differs from *Aspis* in having a prologue at the very start of the play (in the mouth of the god Pan), but is similar in putting the focus on a disagreeable character presented in extreme terms. In this case even the title of the play (*The Bad-Tempered Man*) invites us to see that character as the central figure, and he is the only character named in the prologue, apart from Pan himself. He is introduced in lines 6–13 as

> Cnemon, a most *in*human being, disagreeable to everyone, and with a dislike of crowds—crowds, did I say? He's had a pretty long life by now, and in all that time he's never willingly spoken to anyone, he's never opened a conversation with anyone, except that he has to address me, Pan, because he lives next door here and walks past my shrine—and he immediately regrets it, that's for sure.

Unlike Smicrines, Cnemon has married ('in spite of having such a character [*tropos*]', 13), but life with him was so intolerable that his wife has left him, and now (30–34) 'The old man lives all on his own with his daughter and one old slave woman. He carries wood, digs the ground, works non-stop, and, beginning with his neighbours here and his wife, right down to Cholargus, he hates absolutely everyone.' Cnemon is contrasted with his stepson (to whose house his wife has escaped) and with his daughter (a further case of 'metaphorical' characterization). His stepson, at 27–28, is 'a young lad with more sense than you'd expect at his age'; his daughter, at 29–31, 'has turned out as you'd expect from her upbringing, without a naughty thought in her head'—a perhaps surprisingly positive assessment of Cnemon's parenting, echoed in a remark at 384–389 by the boy who has fallen in love with her: he sees it as an advantage that she has not been brought up by women but by a father who 'is fierce and hates vice' (I shall return to that remark). The one further positive aspect of her character mentioned by Pan is that she is dutiful in her worship of the Nymphs who share his shrine; as a reward for that, Pan has made the son of a rich local landowner fall in love with her while out hunting in the area (36–44). That boy is not characterized by Pan in any way, except that he 'spends his time in town' (41); the fact that he does not spend his time working in the country will play a part in his presentation later in the play. We may also note that Pan at the beginning of his prologue, in setting the scene at Phyle in Attica, told us that the inhabitants of Phyle were people 'who manage to farm the rocks here' (3–4), making it clear even before he had introduced Cnemon by name how hard life was for him. Our first reaction on hearing

this might well be admiration for those who endure such a life and make something of it. However, Pan immediately diverts us from any such view by putting the focus on Cnemon as a disagreeable character presented in extreme terms.

This focus is for the most part maintained in the scenes that follow. The first thing we hear about Cnemon after the prologue (before we ever see him) is that he has thrown things at a slave who tried to approach him while he was working in his field, has attacked him with a wooden stake, and has chased him away (81–83, 108–121). Pan's narrative in the prologue is followed very quickly by the slave's narrative of that encounter, enlivened by direct quotation of what Cnemon had said to him when first approached: 'You infidel! You've come on to my land, have you? What's the idea?' (108–110), and 'What have you got to do with me? Don't you know where the public road goes?' (114–115). This prepares us for Cnemon's complaints in his monologue when he does appear:

> Now they're coming on to my land and chattering! I suppose I'm in the habit of wasting my time down by the road, am I? Certainly not! I don't even work that part of my land: I keep away from it because of the people going by. But now they come up on to the hills in pursuit of me—crowds of them, positive droves!

(We remember that he had been approached by one person.) The slave referred to Cnemon as 'a son of Woe, a madman, a lunatic' (88–89) and was afraid of being eaten alive by him (124–125); another character, after Cnemon has indeed threatened to eat him alive (468), calls him 'a grey-haired viper' (480). His stepson at 323–325 says 'The girl has a father who is unlike anyone there has ever been, either in the past or in our own time'. This is the presentation of a caricature rather than a character.[7]

However, Cnemon turns out to be more complex. We learn from his stepson that he is wealthier than his lifestyle might suggest (327–331), and we hear Cnemon himself denouncing the hypocrisy of people who turn a sacrifice to the gods into an excuse for a feast, and advocating a simpler style of worship (447–453)—a view with which most members of the audience might not sympathize but which they would surely recognize as based in principle. Also, the young lover, having heard from the stepson that Cnemon will rail against everyone else's lifestyle if the subject of his daughter's marriage is raised (352–356), intuits that he 'hates vice', as we have seen. There is no suggestion that Cnemon

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7 Cf. Schäfer 1965: 92.

himself is wicked, money-grubbing, or hypocritical—rather the opposite. What above all raises him above the level of a caricature is that, after he has fallen down the well in his courtyard and been rescued by his stepson, we see him reassessing his approach to life and explaining what lay behind it (713–729). He had assumed that he could get by without the help of others[8] and that in any case no one would ever come to his aid if he did need help. He now acknowledges that he was wrong: he could not have climbed out of the well unaided, and his stepson rescued him in spite of having been shunned by him for many years. None of this quite explains why he had been so monstrously antisocial,[9] and he is determined to continue to cut himself off from society, making his stepson responsible for looking after the family from now on—which frees the log-jam of the plot, since the stepson is happy to betroth the daughter to her suitor. 'Let me live as I wish', says Cnemon at 735, and he insists that the world would be a much better place if everyone were like him and content to live with moderate means (743–745). In any case, he assures the others that he, 'the disagreeable and bad-tempered old man', will stay out of their way (747). In other words, although he admits that his lifestyle has been based on mistaken assumptions, he cannot now change his ways, and he still thinks society is pretty rotten, even if not quite as rotten as he had previously thought. Nonetheless, he has explained himself to some extent, and we have in the course of the play gained some insight into his character. Our picture of him has developed, even if his character has not.[10]

Clearly Menander wanted to entertain us at the start of the play with an extreme portrayal and then to keep us guessing by inserting a few hints at greater complexity. In at least one respect Pan probably exaggerated, when he said he was sure Cnemon immediately regretted calling out the customary greeting to him as he walked past his shrine: as we have seen, we learn later that Cnemon does have an ideal of simple piety, so Pan's suspicion may well be unfounded. The same perhaps applies to his claim that Cnemon has never in his whole life willingly spoken to anyone, which implies that his misanthropy was a settled disposition from birth rather than a response to how he found the world; nothing quite justifies Haegemans' claim that he 'seems to have started life as a philanthropist',[11] but there are at least reasons for his misanthropy of

8 For Görler 1963 this is the key element in Cnemon's characterization, and the element that distinguishes him from his predecessors in the comic tradition of the misanthrope.

9 Cf. Schäfer 1965: 93–94.

10 On the unchangeability of character in Menander see Papamichael 1976 (pp. 5–20 on *Dyscolus*), Massioni 1998 (pp. 35–40 on *Dyscolus*); also Schäfer 1965: 95.

11 Haegemans 2001: 695. Haegemans is otherwise good on how we not only see Cnemon

which Pan gives no hint. I am also not sure that 'hating absolutely everyone' (34) quite gets Cnemon right; rather, he goes out of his way to avoid contact with other people.[12] Pan is thus in some ways less reliable than we might have expected a prologue god to be: he is our initial source of information about Cnemon, and he helps to provide a context for our appreciation of the scenes that immediately follow, but some later scenes modify the picture as well as amplifying it. I know of nothing comparable in other prologues, but we must remember that no other play is nearly as complete as *Dyscolus*. Similarly, this is the one play for which the setting can be seen to contribute significantly to the presentation of the characters (above all his stepson Gorgias as well as Cnemon),[13] but if other plays were better preserved we might be able to do more with them in this respect.

Sicyonii

The good and wealthy uncle in *Aspis* has his counterpart in the fragmentary prologue to *Sicyonii*, where the Sicyonian soldier who has bought a young girl and a slave is said to be 'very good, and wealthy' (14–15). In this case the presentation is slightly subtler, because the prologue-speaker is quoting the words of a third party at the time of the purchase, comforting the slave with the news that his purchaser was good and wealthy. Unfortunately, the prologue is so fragmentary that we cannot be quite sure that the Sicyonian soldier in question was the one who has a major part in the play, but the most recent editor argues that it is most probably him.[14] If so, he is given an initial favourable presentation; but that is as much as we can say.

Periciromene

The prologue-goddess of *Periciromene*, Agnoea (Misapprehension), similarly gives brief thumbnail sketches, in this case in her own mouth: the soldier Polemon is an 'impetuous young man' (128–129 Sandbach) and 'quite unreliable' (144, if that is the correct interpretation of the line); his rival Moschion is 'wealthy and always drunk' (142) and 'rather rash' (151); the girl they both love is simply 'beautiful and young' (143). However, one fuller detail comes at 164–165, where Agnoea says of Polemon 'I led him on, although he isn't naturally like that'. Polemon has cut off his girl-friend's hair in a fit of jealous rage, and the

through the eyes of other characters but can also see some other characters as foils for Cnemon.

12 Cf. Hesse 1969.

13 Cf. Lowe 1987: 131–132.

14 Blanchard 2009: l–lvi.

goddess says she has provoked him to do this in order to set in train the events which will lead to a happy outcome. She has already described him as 'impetuous', but, as Gomme and Sandbach say, 'Impulsive he might be and vehement, but not naturally brutal'.[15] The fact that his girl-friend allowed another man to embrace her has driven him over the edge, and the goddess wants to assure us that this was because of his misapprehension of the true state of affairs.

Samia

One prologue is different from the others I have mentioned in being spoken by one of the characters in the play, not by a divinity. This is the speech of the young man Moschion at the start of *Samia*. In lines 5–6 Moschion says he will give us an account of his adoptive father's character (*tropos*). In fact, all we then hear about are the ways in which his father has helped Moschion: he has enabled him to distinguish himself in various ways, and Moschion is duly grateful, but the only one to whom any kind of characterizing adjective is attached is Moschion himself, when he says at 18 that in return for his father's kindnesses he was 'well-behaved' (*kosmios*—a key term in the play, as we shall see). He does then tell us that his father was too 'embarrassed' to admit that he had fallen in love with a Samian *hetaira* (23, 27); and he himself is 'embarrassed' to admit to the audience that he had sex with the girl next door at a party (47–48). By the end of his speech we have gained some insight into Moschion's self-centredness and (in a small way) into his relations with his father. Moschion's unwillingness to come clean about what he has done will be crucial in the development of the plot, as will his father's reluctance to be open with his son about his own motives. The opening speech thus prepares us for much of what is to come, but in a less direct manner than the prologues spoken by a divinity.

'Messenger Speeches'

Aspis

The star piece of narrative in *Aspis* is the slave's account of the campaign in which he believes Cleostratus to have been killed (23–82). This is an opportunity for the actor to display his skill as a narrator, but it sheds little light on anyone's character, except that the slave's sententious remark at 27–28, 'It seems that it's useful not to be entirely successful, since the man who has stum-

15 Gomme and Sandbach 1973: 474 (on line 164).

bled tends to take care', combines with similar remarks elsewhere in the play (one of them very shortly before, at 20–21) to characterize him as a slightly pompous moralizer.[16] Otherwise it is the reactions of the wicked uncle that are of interest, as I have already noted.

Sicyonii

The lengthy messenger speech in *Sicyonii* (176–271, with seven or eight unnumbered lines missing) is delivered by a character whose only function in the play, as far as we can tell, was to deliver it. The narration is coloured, particularly in the opening lines, by verbal echoes of a messenger speech in Euripides' *Orestes*, and there are also similarities in the events described in the two plays. It is clearly a display piece, marked off from its surroundings, requiring the actor to imitate a number of voices in his narration of a debate at an off-stage sanctuary.[17] The speaker identifies himself with the crowd witnessing the debate, giving their reactions in the first person plural ('we all roared' [196], 'we didn't let him' [202], etc.). As a stranger who just happened to come across the debate, he cannot name those participating in it but refers to one of them as 'the slave' (200, 267), while giving a fuller account of another as 'a pallid young man, smooth-faced and beardless' (200–201), who 'wasn't utterly loathsome, but we didn't like him much, and he seemed to be rather a womanizer' (209–210).[18] Physiognomonic theory identified a pale skin as a sign of a lecherous disposition,[19] so the young man's appearance is enough to condemn him in the eyes of the watching public. Unfortunately the text becomes too fragmentary for us to be sure how a third speaker was described; it is presumably he who is referred to at 215 as 'very manly in appearance', though he starts by bursting into tears, tearing at his own hair, and crying aloud (219–221). He then holds the floor for over thirty lines (224–257), and the crowd side with him in the debate. Unlike the narrator, we are in a position to identify the participants, as the audience must have been, and in terms of characterization it is not clear that this speech told them anything they did not already know about the characters involved; rather, it engaged their interest in the fate of those characters by relating this crucial event in such a lively style. The final speaker in the reported debate secured the goodwill of the assembled crowd with his tears and with the apparent reasonableness of his speech, and no doubt he secured the goodwill of Menander's

16 Cf. Gomme and Sandbach 1973: 65 (on line 27); Arnott 1995: 150.

17 Cf. Nünlist 2002: 245–247.

18 Cf. de Jong 1991: 70 on the presentation of the two speakers in the account of the corresponding debate in Euripides' *Orestes*.

19 See Gomme and Sandbach 1973: 654 (on line 200).

audience too. Almost certainly, he is the man who was said to be 'very good, and wealthy' in the prologue.

Samia

A further lengthy speech reporting off-stage events is of a different kind, since the narrator is himself intimately concerned in what he reports, and his own reactions are of crucial importance for the development of the plot; also, it is addressed to the audience, and the speaker is alone on stage. This is the speech of Demeas at the start of Act III of *Samia*, which must when the text was complete have been some eighty lines long. Just as Menander began the play with Demeas' adopted son Moschion as the narrator of background events, so here it is not a detached observer who reports to us. Demeas had returned from abroad to discover his mistress Chrysis bringing up a baby as her own child; he now comes out from his house in a state of shock because he has learnt from a remark overheard indoors that the father of the child is Moschion, his adopted son. He narrates in detail the circumstances in which he overheard the remark, quoting verbatim the words of two different women (242–261).[20] On his way out, he has seen his mistress with the baby at her breast, which appears to confirm that she is its mother, but he cannot immediately bring himself to believe that his son is the father (272–279):

> I know very well that the lad has up till now always behaved himself well [been *kosmios*] and treated me with all possible respect [been *eusebestatos* towards me]. On the other hand, when I consider that the speaker was first of all his nanny and then spoke when she didn't expect me to hear her, and then when I look at the woman who loves the baby and has insisted on bringing it up against my wishes, I'm completely out of my mind!

Demeas' narrative had been calm and well ordered, and he has tried to think through the consequences logically. But, paradoxically, the result is what Gomme and Sandbach call 'the sudden, unexpected explosion' of his concluding words.[21] They go on to say 'This is characteristic of the man, a pattern to be repeated when his quietly threatening approach to Parmenon suddenly turns to fury, and when his reflections on Moschion's possible innocence end in the violence of the language in which he resolves to throw Chrysis out' (referring to

20 Cf. Nünlist 2002: 243–245.

21 Gomme and Sandbach 1973: 571.

321–324 and 352–354 respectively). In the first of these cases, Demeas explodes when Parmenon (his slave) has confirmed that Moschion is the baby's father but before he has had a chance to explain more fully that Chrysis is not in fact its mother, and Parmenon runs away to escape a thrashing. If Parmenon had been able to explain the whole situation, the play would have come to a premature end, so the plot requires Demeas to lose his temper at this point; but we have been prepared for it not only by the conclusion of his narrative speech just before but also by the fact that he was in any case angry at Chrysis' insistence on bringing up the baby rather than exposing it, as Moschion had known that he would be even before he appeared (see 80, 129–136).

When Parmenon has fled, Demeas controls himself with some difficulty and then again communes with the audience, this time explaining that it must be Chrysis who was responsible for seducing Moschion when he was drunk and that he cannot hold Moschion himself responsible for what has happened (343–347): 'It doesn't seem to me in any way plausible that a boy who is well-behaved [*kosmios*] and sensible [*sōphrōn*] towards everyone else should have treated me like that, not even if he is adopted ten times over, and not my son by birth—it's not that that influences me, but his character [*tropos*].' He decides to throw Chrysis out of his house but to keep his reasons to himself and say nothing about what he thinks he has learnt; the fact that she has brought up the baby gives him sufficient excuse (351–356). Again, it is crucial to the plot that he should keep his reasons to himself, but we have already learnt from Moschion's prologue that Demeas had tried to conceal his passion for Chrysis in the first place: Moschion's narrative complements Demeas' decision, just as Moschion's account of himself as *kosmios* complements Demeas' labelling of him with the same epithet.

Dyscolus

Bringing the audience up to date with what one has seen and done off-stage is one way to establish a special rapport with them. One character who does this several times is Sostratus, the young lover of *Dyscolus*,[22] most notably in his two monologues in Acts III and IV. Already in the first two acts we have formed the impression that everything Sostratus tries to do to make contact with Cnemon, the father of his beloved, is doomed to failure, and that impression appears to be confirmed by these two narratives. In Act III he reports on his fruitless day's work helping Cnemon's stepson Gorgias to dig his plot of land (522–545). The point of this had been partly because he hoped thereby to get a

22 Cf. Bain 1977: 203, 206; Blundell 1980: 61–63.

glimpse of Cnemon's daughter when she accompanied her father to his plot (next to Gorgias'), and partly to fool Cnemon into thinking that Sostratus was a farm labourer and thus suitable to marry his daughter. In fact Cnemon and his daughter never appeared, which was perhaps just as well, since it is clear from Sostratus' account that he would never have fooled Cnemon: he began by wielding his mattock over-enthusiastically ('being a young thing, as I am', 526), did his back in, and now feels stiff all over as well as sunburnt. It is not altogether his fault that he has failed to achieve his objective, but he appears to be making no progress in his quest; his account is ruefully humorous at his own expense.

At the beginning of the next act we learn that Cnemon has slipped and fallen in climbing down the well in his courtyard in order to retrieve a mattock and a bucket that had fallen into it. This is the crucial turning-point of the play, the event which forces Cnemon to reconsider his whole approach to life, and we see it from several different perspectives before Cnemon himself appears. The slave woman, who reports it to us, appeals to others to help get him out (620–638): we have previously seen him terrorizing her, but he has clearly not forfeited her loyalty. Gorgias hears her appeal and goes in to rescue Cnemon, together with Sostratus. While they are inside, we hear the reactions of the cook Sicon, whom Cnemon had earlier threatened to whip when he asked to borrow a casserole dish. As far as Sicon is concerned, Cnemon's accident proves the existence of the gods, because 'no one ever goes unpunished after mistreating a cook' (644–645). This remark is in character but will not altogether command the assent of the audience: we may agree that the gods are behind Cnemon's fall, and that he fully deserved it, but not because of his treatment of the cook alone. Next Sostratus comes out from Cnemon's house, Cnemon having now been rescued, and tells us how wonderful it was to be standing next to his beloved at the top of the well while Gorgias climbed down to bring Cnemon back up. The girl, he says, tore at her hair, and wept, and beat her breast (673–674)—another character who has not been alienated by her father's mistreatment—while Sostratus was so struck by her beauty that he several times let go of the rope on which he was supposed to be helping to haul Cnemon up to safety; he could barely restrain himself from kissing the girl (675–689). He appears not to be aware that he has squandered a unique opportunity to impress the father of the girl he wants to marry, but this is consistent with his presentation from the start of the play as a boy of more energy than sense. His speech tells us nothing about Cnemon but a lot about Sostratus, and it acts as an entertaining curtain-raiser for Cnemon's reappearance, wheeled out and injured but rescued from the well entirely thanks to the efforts of Gorgias.

Epitrepontes

There is a similar build-up in Act IV of *Epitrepontes* to the appearance of Charisius, the young husband whose marriage appears to be on the rocks at the start of the play but is restored by the end. Charisius, like Cnemon, has a speech in which he reassesses his own conduct, and it is entirely possible that this was his first appearance in the play altogether. There is a great deal missing from earlier acts, so (as usual) we cannot be certain, but it would be a striking effect if he did not appear until this point, given that the very opening words of the play concerned the fact that he had set himself up with a prostitute in spite of having married recently and much of the dialogue since then has revolved round his relations either with the prostitute or with his wife. We have seen his father-in-law complaining about his behaviour (127–141), and we have heard the prostitute, Habrotonon, remarking on the strange fact that Charisius is not interested in having any sort of sexual relationship with her (430–441). By the time we see him appear we know that he had walked out on his wife on learning that she had given birth to a baby that must have been conceived before their marriage but that he himself had once raped a girl at a night festival and thus become father of a baby. Habrotonon has pretended that she was the raped girl, so everyone now believes that Charisius has not only abandoned his wife but is the father of Habrotonon's baby; most of the characters know nothing about his reasons for abandoning his wife or the fact that she had given birth. Act IV opened with a dialogue between his father-in-law and his wife in which she resisted her father's pressure to return to her original family home. Unknown to the audience, Charisius was overhearing this conversation from indoors, and it has had a profound effect on him. The curtain-raiser for his appearance on stage is a speech by his slave, Onesimus (878–907), reporting on Charisius' strange behaviour inside the house. Unlike Sostratus in Act IV of *Dyscolus*, Onesimus keeps the focus on Charisius and says nothing about himself, but the seriousness of the moment is lightened by the fact that he has little idea what is going on and describes Charisius' reactions in terms of a fit of madness. Charisius himself then appears, a shattered man, and painfully reassesses his 'clumsy and brutish' (918) treatment of his wife. In one sense, his self-realization is of less consequence than Cnemon's, since he will shortly learn that he himself is the father of his wife's baby and that his wife, not Habrotonon, was the victim of his rape; this opens the way to a reunion with his wife, who is already known to wish to stay with him. As far as the resolution of the plot goes, there was no need for Menander to show Charisius going through this mental torment. However, the effect of his discovery of the full truth at 952–958 would have been far less moving if he had not done so. The sequence is initiated by Charisius' overhearing of his wife's conversation

with her father. As Nünlist has noted, it would have been theatrically ruinous to show Charisius overhearing on stage while the conversation was taking place.[23] Onesimus' narrative report is thus necessary for explaining to the audience what has triggered Charisius' self-reproaches, and it also enables us to hear those reproaches twice over without making us feel that Charisius is simply repeating himself. In addition, as Blundell says, 'the arrangement also means that when Charisios appears he does not have to explain about his eavesdropping. In fact there is no need for any narrative elements that would detract from the emotional intensity'.[24]

Misumenus

A particularly lively case of a slave reporting on his master's off-stage fortunes comes in Act IV of *Misumenus*, at 284–322 Sandbach = 685–723 Arnott. In this case the slave Getas bursts from indoors on to a stage already occupied by another character, Clinias, and walks up and down giving vent to his feelings about the events he describes, while Clinias repeatedly tries to attract his attention, succeeding only after forty lines. Getas reports a conversation between his master Thrasonides, Thrasonides' beloved Cratia, and Cratia's father, enlivened as so often by verbatim quotation, including (it seems) quotation of what Getas would have said to the other two if he had been in Thrasonides' place (315–318 = 716–719). Getas' own feelings are made clear by his opening words (284–285 = 685–686): 'O highly-honoured Zeus, what abnormal cruelty they're both showing, what inhumanity, by the Sun!' He twice uses proverbial expressions to convey the father's unresponsiveness to Thrasonides' pleas (295 = 696 'a donkey listening to a lyre', 303 = 704 'a pig on a mountain, as the saying goes'), and he criticizes him for his lack of humanity towards Thrasonides (302 = 703, 316–318 = 717–719). Thrasonides, as reported at 305–310 = 706–711, has made a passionate declaration of his love for Cratia, but she has remained unmoved by it; this is not new information for the audience—it was very strikingly set out by Thrasonides himself in the very opening scene of the play—but Thrasonides' situation seems more hopeless than ever now that Cratia's father has turned up to reclaim her from him.

23 Nünlist 2002: 241.

24 Blundell 1980: 34.

Conclusion

I have not discussed every narrative speech in Menander, but I have tried to show how such speeches combine with other parts of the plays to present the main characters and how characters are presented sometimes by themselves and sometimes by others, in both cases with varying degrees of explicitness. The narrative speeches delivered in the course of the plays, often incorporating verbatim quotations, are among the liveliest and most striking devices for presenting characters to the audience. I have touched only briefly on linguistic characterization, on which much fruitful research has been done,[25] and I have said practically nothing about one of the most discussed aspects of Menander's characterization, the way in which he liked to play games with his audience's expectations by presenting stock characters in surprising ways. I have tried to keep the main focus on the relationship between characterization and narrative, and one thing I hope to have brought out is the variety in Menander's use of standard narrative devices.

25 Arnott 1995 offers a helpful survey.

PART 5

Oratory

CHAPTER 22

Lysias

*Mathieu de Bakker**

> Only one writer, however, fully appreciated the potential of dramatic characterisation, the speechwriter Lysias, who in several surviving speeches creates a vivid and consistent portrayal of the speaker.
>
> CAREY 1994: 40

Introduction

The orator and logographer Lysias has bequeathed us a set of forensic speeches that stand out for their conciseness, liveliness and insights into everyday Athenian life. Their transparent Attic style makes them highly suitable as a first introduction to ancient Greek literature. As a consequence, many students nowadays grow up with Lysias' characters. They may ridicule the gullibility of the cuckolded Euphiletus (Lys. 1), pity the victim of Simon's bullying (Lys. 3), wonder about the fuss over the uprooted olive stump (Lys. 7), imagine Lysias' anger about the murder of his brother Polemarchus (Lys. 12), or marvel at the indignant speech of Diodotus' daughter (Lys. 32). These speeches are attractive because one can so easily identify with their speakers, who, like their problems, appear to be human and timeless, in spite of their historical setting in late fifth and early fourth century BCE Athens.

Behind this—almost deceptive—accessibility, however, lie subtle strategies of characterization. For these, Lysias was already praised in antiquity, and it was in particular his talents in *ēthopoiia* that guaranteed his reputation as a canonical orator.[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his essay *On Lysias*, formulates this as follows:

* I thank the editors of this volume for their useful guidance, numerous valuable suggestions and meticulous editing and Hannah Kousbroek for correcting my English. Unless indicated otherwise, I refer to Lysias' speeches (OCT edition of Carey 2007). The translations of the passages are mine.

1 *SAGN* 1: 333 (Edwards). See Büchler 1936: 11 for an overview of the places in ancient literature where Lysias' *ēthopoiia* is praised.

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> For he became the best (*kratistos*) of all orators in observing human nature (*phusin*) and in attributing to individuals appropriate emotions, characters (*ēthē*), and deeds.
>
> D.H. *Lys.* 7

As Hagen points out in his discussion of this passage, we should be aware of the specific meaning of *ēthos* and *ēthopoiia* within ancient Greek rhetorical theory[2] and avoid equating the terms with our concepts of 'character' or 'personality'. In antiquity, *ēthos* used to be defined in terms of (moral) categories, and although we do not know whether Lysias actively propagated such theories,[3] most specialists agree that he did not portray his speakers and their opponents as individuals, but made their behaviour and utterances adhere to certain distinctive and recognizable types.[4]

This approach can be understood from a generic point of view. Lysias drafted his speeches for clients who had to convince large and potentially hostile audiences of their own integrity and the plausibility of their account.[5] His narratee was drawn by lot from a pool of citizens from different tribes and backgrounds, and was temporarily granted ultimate authority to decide where to place his vote. After this, no appeal could be made to a different court. As the ancients attached more value to the argumentative content of the speech itself (*pistis entekhnos*) than to the independent testimonies of witnesses (*pistis atekhnos*), a convincing characterization of those involved in the lawsuit could

2 Hagen 1966: 5, and compare Usher 1965: 99 n. 2, with further references. See also the Introduction to this volume and Grethlein 2013: 17 on the concept of *enargeia* (mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the same paragraph) in relation to Lysias' characters, and Bruss 2013 for a comprehensive discussion of Dionysius' account of Lysias' *ēthopoiia*.

3 In a scholion on Hermogenes (*Rhetores Graeci* 4, 352, 5–11) reference is made to *paraskeuai*, rhetorical exercises supposedly drafted by Lysias that were related to characterization. See Motschmann 1905: 9–15.

4 *Pace* Usher 1965. Devries (1892) was one of the first to identify a set of clearly defined types of character in Lysias' speeches, and his views were followed by Bruns (1896), Motschmann (1905), and Trenkner (1958). See, too, Büchler 1936: 12–14, Carey 2000a: 203, Cooper 2007: 210–211, Bruss 2013: 36–37, and compare Carawan 2007a: xvii: 'The way a character conforms to type, as others regard him, often seems more important than what actually happened'.

5 As concerns the difference between Lysias as a logographer and the other orators, Todd observes (2007: 3): 'As far as interpretation is concerned, for instance, the distinction between litigant and logographer means that questions of persona, voice and characterization operate very differently in Lysias from the way they do in the speeches of Cicero, or even from those speeches delivered in their own person by Attic Orators like Aiskhines, Andokides, or (in his major public cases) Demosthenes.'

be crucial and make the difference between life and death, or between exile and living at home.[6] Thus Lysias may have applied a certain degree of typification to allow the average member of the jury to recognize the characters involved and thereby enhance the credibility of his speeches.

Furthermore, the speeches had to be composed with an eye on their performance. Juries usually did not remain silent during their delivery, but responded vocally to the drama as it unfolded on the stage.[7] Any sensible orator should take this situation into account. Clarity and consistency about the main events of the case, as well as the characters involved, were of crucial importance, and too much complexity was to be avoided. Important elements and arguments were to be repeated, and doubtlessly experienced orators resorted to expressions, ideas, and narratological and argumentative methods that were popular and familiar to their audience.

Finally, the narratee was supposed to represent—at least during jury-service—the democratic laws and institutions of the Athenian state, which meant that Lysias could make his clients appeal to certain values that were commonly shared and held in esteem.[8] Such appeals certainly had an impact in the politically charged atmosphere in Athens in the late fifth and early fourth century BCE, in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and the traumatic regime of the Thirty. This latter period of lawlessness gravely affected the lives of many, not least that of Lysias himself. A number of his cases directly or indirectly deal with the behaviour of his clients or their opponents during this regime. In these speeches, he draws a connection between the jury and the democratic faction that rose up against the Thirty. It is the jury's task to vote in the interest of the restored constitution, and—to quote the end of the speech *Against Philon*—to condemn behaviour that is 'alien to democracy as a whole' (Lys. 31.34).

This chapter will analyse the ways in which Lysias portrays the characters of those involved in the lawsuits. Research into this subject has often been conducted along the lines of stylistic analysis, and many have argued that Lysias sought to endow the language of his speeches with certain individual characteristics, so as to make them befit his clients.[9] Statistics indeed reveal

6 See Arist. *Rh.* 1354a–1355a, where arguments based on proper reasoning are qualified as the 'most authoritative kind of proof' (*kuriōtaton tōn pisteōn*).

7 Bers 1985.

8 See Carey 1994: 36–38 for the list of qualities that were used when a speaker needed 'to project a personality which invited belief' (36), among others a selfless attitude in supporting the community.

9 Including Usher (1965), who identifies differences in the language between the speeches, but does not deliver statistics.

differences in vocabulary and constructions between the speeches, but they themselves—let alone their *narrationes*, where the differences are most clearly identified—are generally too short to yield conclusive evidence.[10] Moreover, if Lysias indeed wished to highlight individual traits of the language of his speakers, this had to be done within certain limits to avoid hampering the clarity of the content or distracting the jury from the arguments. The most promising approach to these stylistic differences appears to be to look for certain trademarks in the language of individual speeches. One can think here of the frequent use of relative attraction and articular infinitives by the speaker in the case against Philon (Lys. 31),[11] and the relatively frequent use of clause-initial *kai* ('and') and *kagō* ('and I') by Euphiletus in the *narratio* of *On the murder of Eratosthenes* (Lys. 1).

In this chapter I will, however, focus upon the narratological means by which Lysias makes his speakers portray themselves, as well as their opponents. As we know relatively much about the narratee that Lysias had in mind when he composed his speeches—whether they were meant to be genuinely delivered or to function as exercises—his strategies of characterization may be studied from the point of view of cognitive narratology. To what extent did he 'frame' the characters of his speeches within recognizable categories that were identifiable for the jurymen, and how did he distribute this information across the speech? I will argue that, like Herodotus (→) and Thucydides (→), Lysias appears to work with a default set of terms and *topoi* that are clearly morally defined and recognizable, and are often repeated more than once throughout the speech.[12] Starting from these, as I hope to show, he adds elements that are demanded by each individual case, and carefully weaves them into his speeches wherever he considers them most effective. After reflecting upon these explicit means of characterization and the distribution of characterizing elements, I will follow in Carey's footsteps (1994, 2000a) and discuss Lysias' method of implicit,

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10 For some statistical evidence, see Büchler, who follows Motschmann 1905 in denying that Lysias used mimetic language to present his various characters (Büchler 1936: 30–39). His statistics do not reveal major differences in style between the speeches. Moreover, his methodology can be questioned as he does not differentiate between *parataxis* and *hypotaxis*, and incorporates statistics on figures of speech that were only defined much later in antiquity. For the latter problem, see Slings 1997, and see also Todd 2007: 52, criticizing Büchler for considering repetition a characterizing device. For a methodologically more consistent stylometric analysis with an eye on determining which speeches are genuine, see Dover 1968; for a different approach see van Emde Boas fc.

11 Büchler 1936: 30–31, Usher 1999: 77.

12 For an overview and discussion of many of these *topoi*, see Vögelin 1943.

'metaphorical' characterization by contrasting the opponent's behaviour with that of the speaker and that of other persons involved in the case.[13]

Given the limited space, I will concentrate upon a selection of forensic speeches (Lys. 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 24, 31, 32), and leave the few epideictic speeches ascribed to Lysias (such as the *Epitaphios*) aside. As Lysias' characterizing strategies are not restricted to the narrative parts of his speeches, observations on character in the non-narrative parts need to be included here, especially when they refer back to, or interrelate with, information that has been given in the narrative parts.

Characterization: Terms, Topoi, Distribution

The *exordia* of most forensic speeches in Lysias' corpus usually contain words of a general, moralizing nature, either meant to condemn the opponent right from the start, or to raise sympathy for the speaker. Within the selection of speeches analysed for this chapter, they revolve around the concepts of '(in)justice' (*dikē, dikaios, adikos*, 1.2; 3.2, 3; 7.1, 2; 13.1, 3; 31.3; 32.1, 2, 3), 'hybris' (*hubris*, 1.2, 4), 'wickedness' (*ponēria, ponēros*, 7.1; 24.2 (bis); 31.3), 'awful(ness)' (*deinos*, 1.2; 3.1; 12.1; 32.1), 'shame(lessness)' (*aiskhunō, aiskhros*, 1.3; 3.3; 32.1, 3), 'piety' (*hosios*, 13.3, 4). 'reproachful action' (*hamartia, hamartēma, hamartanō*, 7.1; 12.2; 31.2, 4), and 'daring' (*tolmē* 3.1; 12.2; 31.1 (bis); 32.2). Some, but not all *exordia*, give, apart from these generic moral expressions, more specific information about the nature of the crime committed. In *On the murder of Eratosthenes*, the defendant mentions the adultery of his victim (1.4) and in *Against Agoratus*, the plaintiff immediately charges Agoratus with murder (13.2, 4; see below). Two defence speeches highlight the disingenuousness of the charge by calling the plaintiffs 'sycophants' (7.1; 24.2). Altogether, the opening words leave no doubt about the character of the opponent, who is portrayed in a negative manner right from the beginning.

The content of the *exordia* allows Lysias to frame the subsequent narrative and invite the jury to evaluate the specific events of the case against the background of these general moral categories. To stimulate this, Lysias makes these terms recur when specific details of the crimes are revealed. The *dokimasia* case *Against Philon* provides a good example of this strategy. This case concerns the election by lot into the senate of a certain Philon, whom the speaker accuses of disloyalty to the city during the revolt against the Thirty. In the *exordium*, he

13 For contrastive characterization, see also Kucharski 2009.

qualifies Philon's character as 'daring in many respects' (*polla tolmēros*, 31.1), a claim he substantiates by narrating Philon's behaviour at the time of the revolt, when he chose to cross the border and live as a metic in Oropos (31.9) rather than support one of the warring factions and show himself to be a committed citizen. The speaker evaluates this behaviour as a betrayal, pointing out that Philon 'dared (*etolma*, 31.10) to betray us, when he saw that we were successful'. In the ensuing part of the speech, the speaker accuses Philon of robbery. Setting off from Oropos, he stole goods from the old and infirm who had been left in the farmsteads while their owners had gone to the coast to fight against the Thirty (31.17–18): 'he dared (*etolmēsen*, 31.19) to steal goods from those to whom others preferred to give from their goods out of pity with their poverty'. The other moral terms that Lysias chooses in the *exordium* likewise recur later in the speech when Philon's behaviour is fleshed out.[14]

In revealing the characteristics of Philon, Lysias focuses on his deeds and chooses a distribution that goes from bad to worse, evaluating them initially from a private perspective before expanding on their public consequences. He first deals with Philon's evasiveness at the time of the revolt against the Thirty. Worse is to come, however, when he is accused of abusing the unstable situation in the city for the purpose of stealing goods (31.17–19). This *aiskhrokerdeia*, 'the shameless pursuing of profit for one's own interest', is a specific characteristic of Philon, and is evident from his own mother's decision not to entrust her estate to him but adopt another son instead, so as to ensure that she was properly buried (31.20–22). In the last part of the speech, Philon's behaviour is evaluated in a public context, his escape to Oropos is elevated to 'draft-evasion' (*lipotaxia*, 31.28), and his betrayal of the democratic faction is upgraded to a betrayal of 'the city as a whole' (31.26) and of 'the ancestral gods' (31.31). Instead of holding a place in the senate, the defendant should lose his citizenship rights (*atimia*, 31.29; 33). By placing the elements that characterize Philon in this speech in an increasingly public frame, Lysias turns a person of questionable private merit into a danger to the common good, and changes an individual *dokimasia* hearing into a political lawsuit about the (past) behaviour that is to be expected from those who serve in the senate.

In the speech *Against Agoratus*, Lysias distributes the characterizing material in a different way. The case concerns a murder charge against Agoratus,

14 '(In)justice' (*dikē, dikaios, adikos*): 31.5, 11 (ter), 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27 (ter), 28, 33; 'wickedness' (*ponēria*): 31.25; 'reproachful action' (*hamartia, hamartēma, hamartanō*): 31.12, 20, 24 (bis), 27, 28, 29, and observe in particular the *figura etymologica* in the summative statement *hamartanei hamartēmata* (31.23).

who acted as an informer on behalf of the Thirty and thereby became responsible for the death of a number of its opponents. In the *exordium*, the murder charge is unambiguously laid out (*apekteine*, 'he murdered' 13.2), and in the rest of the speech, the charge is explicitly repeated twenty-three times.[15] On top of that the verb *apokteinō* 'kill' recurs ten times in the refutation of the murder claim that Agoratus apparently made in his own defence, that of Phrynichus, the leader of the oligarchy of four hundred in 411 BCE.[16] The insistent repetition of the word *apokteinō* throughout the speech has the effect, not of a frame, but of a refrain, between which the speaker—a relation by marriage of one of the victims—fills in further aspects of Agoratus' character step by step.

Initially, Agoratus fades into the background when the speaker dwells upon the political situation in Athens after the Peloponnesian War, portraying a climate of lies and intimidation by which the oligarchs, with the help of Sparta, seek to conclude a peace deal that will give them unlimited power. Fearing the resistance of prominent military officials, they encourage Agoratus to act as an informant (13.16). It is here that we learn about his low status, a 'slave, born out of slaves' (13.18), no member of the conspiracy itself but only 'useful' for their plans. According to the speaker, the oligarchs devise a plot by which it appears as if Agoratus will deliver his testimony against his will, staging a fake arrest in the Piraeus, and a fake supplication at an altar in Mounichia. Agoratus' disingenuousness is revealed when he refuses to embark on a ship that his guarantors hastily provide so that he can escape (13.23–28). The slow pace of the narrative here enables the narrator to highlight the slave status of Agoratus, who is dependent upon these guarantors for his safety (13.23) and runs the risk of being tortured (*basanizō*, 13.25; 27) when cross-questioned. Once he is brought before the senate, Agoratus lays false charges not only against the military officials, but also against his own guarantors (13.30; cf. 13.58–59), which reveals his character to be as low as his status. Athens, Lysias seems to imply, lost its military elite (as well as its walls) due to the lawless regime of the Thirty, and, to add insult to injury, it was a slave who brought this about. After lengthy reflections upon the deadly consequences of Agoratus' actions, the narrator returns to his character at the end of the narrative and blackens Agoratus' reputation with *topoi* that are also found in other speeches. He describes him as an arch-sycophant (13.65, compare Lys. 7 and Lys. 24), and as a convicted adulterer (13.66, compare Lys. 1). A further section deals with his brothers,

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15 With *apokteinō* ('kill'): 13.28, 42, 43, 48, 53, 54, 59, 61, 63, 64, 84, 85, 86 (bis), 87 (bis); with the qualification *phoneus* ('murderer'): 13.33, 42, 92, 93; with *apothnēiskō hupo* ('be killed by'): 13.4, 87, 95.

16 13.70 (bis), 72 (bis), 73, 74, 75 (ter), 76.

all of whom were caught red-handed in criminal activities, for which they paid with their lives (13.67–68). The ensuing section exposes the lies about his involvement in the killing of Phrynichus and about his status as a citizen, which, according to the speaker, allowed him to take a seat in the law courts and the assembly (13.73). A last piece of slander is found at the end of the *argumentatio*, where Agoratus is said to have beaten up his own father and robbed his stepfather of his possessions (13.91, compare Lys. 3 and Lys. 31).

The combination of the repetition of the murder charge and the step-by-step blackening of Agoratus' character in the course of the speech has the effect of creating a Thersites-like character, a caricature of a human being who, in his baseness, is hardly surpassed by any other characters in Greek literature. Just as in the case against Philon, in the last part of the speech, the private lawsuit is upgraded to a case of political interest, as the speaker points out that the jury that acquits Agoratus shares with him the responsibility for the death of those against whom he informed (13.92–97). Perhaps Lysias chose this strategy to compensate for a weak legal case, as Agoratus could only be convicted if he were caught 'in the act' (13.85–88), which remained difficult to prove in the case of an informant. A sharp focus upon Agoratus' character may then have been the best rhetorical tool that Lysias had at his disposal, and, by introducing his mostly topical material step by step against the background of the refrain of 'murder', he might have expected his client to win the day.

Characterizing by Contrast

In most of his forensic speeches, Lysias highlights the negative characteristics of the opponent by contrasting them with those of the speaker. A clear example of this strategy is found in the speech *Against Diogiton*, of which parts are preserved in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' essay *On Lysias*. In this inheritance case, Diogiton is portrayed as a villain for refusing to grant the children and grandchildren of his deceased brother Diodotus the due portions of his estate. In the opening chapters of this speech, Lysias' client, the granddaughter's husband, evaluates Diogiton's disloyal behaviour in terms of daring (*etolma* 'he dared', 32.2), injustice (*mallon ē ta dikaia poiēsas* … 'and not by doing justice', 32.2) and shamelessness (*aiskhrōs* 'shamelessly', 32.3). Just as in the speech *Against Philon* (see above), these moral concepts frame the narrative that follows, in which they all recur more than once, e.g. respectively, *su etolmēsas … eipein* 'you dared to declare' (32.15, cf. 32.20, 27), *tous d' emous adikeis* 'you wrong my children' (32.17, cf. 32.13, 21) and *eis touto ēlthen anaiskhuntias* 'he came to such a degree of shamelessness' (32.20, cf. 32.13, 17).

Diogiton's 'shameless' way of handling his brother's estate is put in an even more unfavourable light in contrast with the behaviour of the plaintiff. In his opening sentences, he seeks the sympathy of the jury by admitting that it is 'most shameless' (*aiskhiston*, 32.1) to be in conflict with one's relatives, and that he initially tried to deal with the affair discreetly (32.2), but that the seriousness of the case leaves him no other option (32.1). His wife's family has sought refuge with him (32.1), whereas Diogiton refuses even to heed the advice of his own friends not to go to court (32.2). Throughout the speech, the speaker presents himself as a dutiful and loyal husband, who offers shelter to his relatives, and piously responds to his mother-in-law's supplication (32.11) by arranging a family meeting so that Diogiton can account for his behaviour.

It is during this meeting that Diogiton's shamelessness is further exposed by Diogiton's daughter, the mother-in-law of the plaintiff, who lays bare—in a harrowing invective presented in direct speech—his impiety towards his deceased brother and his lack of loyalty to her children (32.13, 17).[17] It is only at this point that we learn more about Diogiton's motives, when she accuses him of shifting his allegiance to his new wife's (her stepmother's) children, whom he raises 'in great wealth' (32.17). The description of the reaction to the invective further isolates Diogiton, as everyone—even Diogiton's friends, who had forced (32.12) him to go to the meeting and give account of his actions—is speechless and in tears (32.18).

By singling out Diogiton for his shameless impiety in the *narratio*, the plaintiff prepares the jury for his *coup de grâce* in the *argumentatio*:

> For Diogiton places all men in so much suspicion towards one another that they can neither when they live nor when they die trust their closest relatives more than their worst enemies.
>
> 32.19

As in the cases against Philon and Agoratus, Lysias uses the end of the speech to evaluate Diogiton's actions, which characterize him as a morally depraved person, within a public frame. The disloyal behaviour that Diogiton displays among his relatives allows the plaintiff to present him as a credible danger to the social structures in the city as a whole. This means that the plaintiff's decision to go to court not only testifies to his loyalty towards his family, but also to his selfless attitude towards the city, which he seeks to protect from an

17 Usher observes (1965: 118–119) that direct speech has the effect of highlighting the selfish, unsympathetic character of Diogiton.

individual whose behaviour threatens the *oikos*, the foundation of the city as a whole. His role as plaintiff can therefore be compared to that of Diogiton's brother Diodotus, who sacrificed his life on behalf of the city when he was enlisted in an infantry campaign in Ionia (32.7), and whose trust in his brother was so bitterly betrayed. This willingness to sacrifice oneself on behalf of the city is a topical characterization of the Athenians within the extant funeral orations.[18] Its presence in the speech *Against Diogiton* may well be explained as a means to further the sympathy of the jury. Thus a case that on first sight seemed 'most shameless' (*aiskhiston*, 32.1) is eventually presented as a heroic enterprise from which the entire community is to benefit.

For another example of Lysias' characterizing strategy, we can look at *Against Simon*. This speech describes the escalation of a conflict between two Athenians about the favours of a boy prostitute called Theodotus. Although it is a defence speech, and although the case revolves around street violence in full, public daylight, Lysias' strategy of characterizing is similar to the one adopted in the inheritance case against Diogiton. Simon's deeds and character are evaluated by way of a similarly limited set of concepts that are repeated throughout the speech, such as daring (*tolmē, tolmaō, tolmērōs* 3.1, 20, 22, 25, 26, 29, 39, 45, cp. *thrasutēs* 3.45), shamelessness (*aiskhron* 3.17) and hubris (*hubris*, *hubrizō*, 3.5, 7 (bis), 17, 23, 26, 40).[19] Added to this are more specific terms that highlight the violence and drunkenness of Simon and his gang (*tuptō* 'beat up' 3.8, 17, 18, 23, 29, 45; (*sug*/*ek*)*koptō* 'knock (out)' 3.6, 16; *biāi* 'with violence' 3.7, 15, 29, 37, 38, 46 (bis); *methuō, methē, paroineō* '(being) drunk' 3.6, 12, 18, 19, 43). On top of these, Simon's behaviour is qualified as 'criminal' (*ponēros*, *ponēria* 3.9, 30, 45; *panourgos* 3.44) and 'against the law' (*paranomos*, *paranomeō* 3.5, 10, 17, 37, 44).[20] These latter terms are often found in other speeches, but are not part of the register in *Against Diogiton*, perhaps because they might be felt as inappropriate in the case of a relative, and therefore made Lysias decide to make Diogiton's awful acts speak for themselves.

Just like the plaintiff in Diogiton's case, the defendant of the speech against Simon presents himself as the opposite of his opponent in every respect.[21] He

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18 For striking examples see Lysias 2.48–53 (on Myronides' Geraneia campaign, 458–457 BCE) and Demosthenes 60.27–31, in which the selfless sacrifice of some of the eponymous heroes of Athens is connected to that of the Athenians who fell at Chaeroneia (338 BCE).

19 Cf. Carey 1994: 43. Kucharski believes (2009: 41–43) that especially *hubris* here hints at sexual violence.

20 See Kucharski 2009: 45–46 on *ponēria* ('criminal behaviour') and *tolmē* ('daring') as consistent traits in the case of Simon.

21 Kucharski 2009: 46: 'his character traits diametrically oppose those of Simon in all three

portrays Simon throughout as the one who looks for trouble (3.6, 8, 11–13, 15–18), and himself as reluctant and seeking to avoid conflict.[22] He claims that he initially decided to cope with the bullying in silence (3.9) and even moved out of town (3.10) to prevent escalation. In the fighting incidents, the speaker carefully describes his actions as evasive (3.13) or at most defensive (3.8, 18), and he claims to have only seized Theodotus (3.17, 37), and not to have lashed out at his opponents (3.37). The aggression of Simon and his gang, on the other hand, even extends to innocent bystanders, such as the fuller Molon and others who stand in their way and receive blows (3.16).

Furthermore, the defendant mentions his impeccable record as a citizen in performing the duties that the state demands (3.10, 47), and portrays Simon's behaviour in opposite terms, especially in the anecdote about his army service, which is marred by his late arrival in the battle of Coroneia, his subsequent altercation with the commander Laches, and his discharge without honours from the army (3.45).

The defendant also consistently claims to speak the 'whole' truth (3.3, 10), although it may reflect badly upon his character and position. This is contrasted with Simon, who is qualified as a liar and perjurer in the *argumentatio* (3.21, 23, 25, 28, 31, 35; cf. *panta autōi tauta sunkeitai kai memēkhanētai* 'all this has been plotted and contrived by him' 3.26). The speaker specifically draws attention to Simon's opportunism in bringing the case to court no less than four years after the incidents took place (3.19–20).[23] This litigiousness of Simon is introduced at a later stage in the speech (3.44), and stands in contrast to the image that the speaker gives of himself as someone who shies away from the spotlight and—as in the case of Diogiton's accuser—only enters court when 'necessity' (*anankē*, 3.3, 48) forces him. If it had been up to him, he claims, the case would never have ended in court (let alone the Areopagus court) given its trivial nature (3.40, 43).[24]

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respects, where the latter is represented as failing so badly: mental sanity, violence (*hubris*) and litigiousness (sycophancy). Yet again, as in the negative *ēthopoiia* of his adversary, they are closely tied with each-other.' Todd believes (2007: 284–286) that the character of the speaker is not flawless, and that this is a deliberate strategy of Lysias to make him more credible.

22 See Usher 1965: 105–106 and Carey 1994: 41 on the speaker's shyness and modesty.

23 Cf. Kucharski 2009: 45, identifying five characteristics of Simon that make him befit a typical sycophant: (1) making false charges; (2) sophistical quibbling; (3) slander; (4) litigiousness; (5) acting (long) after the event.

24 Compare the way in which Lysias points at the spotless record of his family in the speech *Against Eratosthenes* (12.4–5). They were never before in court, as opposed to the

Finally, just as in the speech *Against Diogiton*, the opponent is isolated in his wickedness as his behaviour is contrasted with that of the others who are involved. This concerns, in the first place, Theodotus, who, according to the speaker, happily prefers his company to that of Simon (3.5, 31). Another role is awarded to the fuller Molon and the anonymous bystanders, who choose his side, according to the defendant, and even receive blows when they seek to help him (3.16, 18). Their support for the defendant in the *narratio* subtly encourages the jury to do the same. Just like the ordinary Athenians who helped the defendant in the fight, the jurymen are made aware of an ugly series of events and asked to choose the right side. Lastly, there are Simon's friends, who can be divided in two groups. The first are those who join him, but refuse to become engaged in the actual fighting (3.12) and try to restrain him when he breaks into the defendant's house (3.7). The second do partake in the fighting (the defendant mentions their names in 3.12), but repent and apologize soon afterwards (3.19, cf. 43) as the speaker expected them to do (compare 3.7, 13). Simon, however, is the only one who, in the words of the speaker, does neither, but, on the contrary, files a lawsuit against the defendant that in its timing and lack of proportion is revealed to be an opportunistic and disingenuous attempt to enrich himself and damage the defendant, who, though a good citizen, may have to leave the state.

The characterization strategy in the speech *On the olive stump* (Lys. 7) is similar. It was also delivered in the Areopagus court and concerns the defence of a landowner who was charged by one Nicomachus with the accusation of illegally uprooting a sacred olive stump from his land. Just as in the case against Simon, the defendant presents himself as the victim of 'wicked sycophants' (7.1; compare 7.20, 23, 38) and contrasts their litigiousness with his lifestyle away from the spotlight (7.1). In this case, too, the defendant claims that he was charged 'so much later in time' (7.42), whereas it would have made more sense to call for witnesses and catch him red-handed if he was really guilty of uprooting the stump. In contrast to the 'lies' of the plaintiff Nicomachus (e.g. 7.11) and his refusal to admit the evidence of witnesses (7.19–20, 22–23, 34–38, 43), the defendant portrays himself as careful and accurate.[25] He gives

members of the Thirty, whom he describes as sycophants. In the speech *On the invalid and his pension* the speaker also presents himself as a better citizen (24.3), who helped the democrats in their resistance against the Thirty (24.25) and has never been in court before (24.24).

25 On the accuracy of the defendant, see Usher 1965: 107 and Carey 1994: 42: 'the reckless folly of removing the stump does not befit the calculating personality that surfaces from the speech.'

a detailed account of the history of the plot of land from which the stump was allegedly removed (7.4–10, observe especially the precise time indications in 7.9–10), provides witnesses to confirm this overview (7.10–11), and alleges that others acknowledge his accuracy (7.12). He also hints at the self-evident accuracy of the members of the Areopagus court, who are responsible for the inspection of the sacred olive trees and send out inspectors every year (7.25, 29). Given their seniority and expertise, they should give precedence to what they 'know for themselves' (7.30) and to the defendant's allegedly spotless record of services to the state (7.31, 41). Comparable to the cases against Diogiton and Simon, the plaintiff is isolated (7.33), whereas the speaker hints at the interests of the community as a whole (7.33), which will be threatened if he is convicted. The jury is thus reminded of the opening phrases of the speech, where we find an *adunaton* stating that 'even unborn children should be fearful about the future' in the light of the arbitrariness of Nicomachus' charge (7.1).

Contrastive Characterization: Two More Complex Cases

A complication to the scheme of contrastive characterization arises in the case of Euphiletus' defence speech on the murder of Eratosthenes (Lys. 1). If we believe the account of the defendant, he killed the man who seduced his wife after catching him red-handed, and refusing his supplication and offer of a sum of money (1.25, 29). As there were witnesses present at the killing, the rejection of the supplication cannot be denied, which places Euphiletus in a potentially less favourable light. Lysias solves this problem in three ways. First, he makes Euphiletus mitigate the formal, religious status of the supplication by denying the accusation that Eratosthenes had sought refuge at the hearth (1.27). Second, he makes Euphiletus consistently refer to himself as a law-abiding man, who, in the interest of the city as a whole, exacts the capital punishment that is prescribed in the case of adultery instead of enriching himself by way of a private arrangement:

> … neither did I do this for money so as to become rich instead of poor, nor for any other advantage except the punishment according to the laws (*kata tous nomous*).
>
> 1.4

> I did not agree upon a sum of his money, but instead found the law of the city to be of more authority (*kuriōteron*).
>
> 1.29

He further develops this argument by pointing at the threat to the common interests of his fellow-citizens if adulterers were to be spared and could continue to confound the city's social fabric (1.32–33, 47).[26] Third, in his description of the behaviour of Eratosthenes and his own wife, he highlights issues of religious (in)decency. Eratosthenes lets his eyes fall on her for the first time in the context of the funeral of her mother-in-law, an occasion at which Euphiletus himself must have been present as well (1.8). Furthermore, his wife appears to wear make-up although her brother had died less than thirty days earlier and she was officially in mourning (1.14, 17). Moreover, as the servant reports to Euphiletus, she accompanied Eratosthenes' mother to the temple during the Thesmophoria, presumably to meet her lover (1.20).[27] Given that the adulterers appear to show contempt for matters of religious sanctity, Euphiletus' rejection of Eratosthenes' supplication becomes easier to condone.

The contrast in behaviour is furthered by the way in which Euphiletus' gullibility is portrayed. This is often held to be an individual trait, typical of a farmer with modest means who lives an honest life in a 'small house' (*oikidion*, 1.9).[28] These characteristics may, however, also have been highlighted because of the contrast with the sophisticated plotting of the affair by Eratosthenes, who uses Euphiletus' servant to seek contact (1.8) and, ignoring her marital status, holds on until she gives in (observe *khronōi*, 'in the course of time', in 1.8 and 1.20). This servant plays an important role in covering up the traces of the affair, as she hurts the couple's infant so as to distract Euphiletus' attention, when he returns from his land unannounced (1.11). The conversation that Euphiletus reports between himself and his wife on that occasion is painful, too, when she accuses him of 'hitting on the maid' (1.12), and while 'pretending to be joking'

26 Compare Sickinger 2007: 291: 'litigants speak a generic language of law in order to elicit goodwill for themselves, incite anger against and mistrust of their opponents, and inspire in dicasts a sense of obligation to vote in their favor—since the law naturally stood on their side.'

27 Todd points out (2007: 52–53) that the characterization of Euphiletus' wife is complicated as it initially takes some time for her to yield to Eratosthenes' advances, but once she has given in she actively participates in the affair.

28 Cf. Usher 1965: 102–105. Porter hypothesizes (1997) that Lysias makes the characters in this speech conform to generic types that are familiar from comic adultery narratives, with an eye on engaging his audience. For contrary views, see Nývlt 2013 and Colla 2015. The latter argues that although Lysias was inspired by literary models in portraying his characters, he ultimately started working from models as they appeared in everyday life. Trenkner claims that Lysias in this speech 'imitated the novella' (1958: 159), but again, the contemporary evidence is thin.

(*prospoioumenē paizein*, 1.13) locks her husband out. When Euphiletus learns the truth, Eratosthenes is said to have seduced 'many other women' (*allas pollas*, 1.16) too, and to practise adultery as a profession (*tekhnē*, 1.16). Further insult is added by the reaction of the servant, who initially denies any wrongdoing, and only stops lying when confronted with Eratosthenes' name (1.19). In spite of her disrespectful behaviour towards her master, he offers her securities in response to her supplication (1.20).

Altogether, Lysias' characterizing strategy appears to be to create as many contrasts as possible between Euphiletus as a hard-working man of an honest profession and the shrewd and amoral Eratosthenes, whose *tekhnē* consists of seducing women, and who conspires with accomplices within the houses of his victims and is also helped by his own mother. In this light, Euphiletus' killing of Eratosthenes is presented as a selfless feat as a result of which the city is liberated from a persistent threat to its female population and to its social cohesion.[29]

The last speech to discuss here is Lysias' accusation speech against Eratosthenes (Lys. 12), a former member of the Thirty, who had received a pardon after the restoration of democracy. Lysias held Eratosthenes responsible for the death of his brother Polemarchus, but in his speech targets the entire group of Thirty, and focuses on their collective guilt for all the evils that befell Athens after their defeat in the Peloponnesian War. Thus the speech provides an example of characterization by group membership, as the well-known traits of the group (cruelty, lawless killing, greed) reflect upon the individual, with whose conviction Lysias also aspires at a precedence that he can use against any other still living member of the group. Furthermore, it is the only speech of which we know that it reflects an actual performance in court by Lysias, and, from the perspective of characterization, worth including here as the orator talks about himself, and is not writing a speech on someone else's behalf.

Despite his unique, personal role in this case, it is striking to see how similar the terms and *topoi* are that Lysias uses to describe himself and his family as well as his opponents, and how much his technique of contrastive characterization matches that of his other speeches. Again, Eratosthenes' behaviour, as well as that of the Thirty, is evaluated in general terms of daring (12.2, 22, 84, cf. 41, where Lysias mentions the daring of those who speak on Eratosthenes' behalf),

29 Porter (1997: 61, 80), Cooper (2007: 212) and Todd (2007: 50–51) follow Carey (1994: 41) in pointing out that Euphiletus' characterization may also be explained in light of the accusation: a man of such gullible straightforwardness could never have devised such an intricate plot to kill Eratosthenes. Cf. *SAGN* 1: 333–336 (Edwards).

criminal behaviour/hubris (12.5, 39, 52, 75, 84, 86, 94,[30] 98), litigiousness and 'sycophantism' (12.5), 'shameless greed' (*aiskhrokerdeia* 12.19, observe in particular Melobius' theft of the earrings of Polemarchus' wife, which he snatches from her ears, and compare 12.7, 78, 83, 93), lack of respect of sacred customs (intrusion of private space, 12.8; perjury, 12.9–10; denial of proper burial, 12.18, 87–88, 96, 99; lack of respect for gods and their temples, 12.96, 99; lawlessness, 12.23, 48; mendacity, 12.27, 48).[31] Meanwhile, Lysias evaluates himself and his family in terms that are no different from his other speakers. As in most other cases discussed above, Lysias is 'forced' (*ēnankasmai*, 12.3) to go to court, although he and his family have never been involved in any form of litigation (12.3–4) and always lived according to the law (12.4) and, despite being metics, in full support of the city, to which they donated large sums of money (12.20).[32]

Apart from this largely topical contrast, a specific characteristic of this speech concerns alleged crimes of the Thirty against the Athenian democratic constitution and the city itself. This theme runs through the entire speech, and as such makes it more political than the other speeches in the corpus. The Thirty are presented as traitors and enslavers of Athens (12.39, 48, 51, 58, 71, 93), and held responsible for the dismantling of the city-walls and the docks in Piraeus (12.40, 63, 99). They are recidivists, too, in that some of them, Eratosthenes included, also took part in the oligarchic revolution of 411 BCE (12.42, 65, 75). Lysias lays the most emphasis in his *narratio*, however, upon the way in which the Thirty came to power and subverted the democratic course of events. He describes how they infiltrated the tribes, appointed *phularkhoi* ('chieftains') who told their members whom to vote for (12.44), and intimidated the assembly on the day that Theramenes proposed to install the Thirty, making use of the Spartan commander Lysander to put a knife to the throat of the Athenians:

30 Observe the superlative *ponērotatos* ('most criminal') at the end of the speech. The same superlative is used at the end of the speech *Against Simon* (3.45).

31 See Murphy 1989 for a discussion of the typical characterization of the oligarchs in this speech.

32 Observe the personal use of the verb *dēmokrateomai* ('to live in a democracy', 12.4), which is unique within Lysias' forensic corpus. As a metic, Lysias emphasizes that his family live by the rules of their host for decades, and now appeals to a democratic jury to support him in a case against a group of 'litigious criminals' (*ponēroi … kai sukophantai*, 12.5) who ruined his fortune in a single day. According to Usher (1965: 114–115) it is the political nature of the case that makes Lysias reluctant to give much information about his own character.

> And as for all men in the assembly who were good (*agathoi*), when they recognized the set-up (*paraskeuēn*) and the inevitability (*anankēn*), some of them remained there and kept quiet, whereas others left, so that they were conscious of at least this, that they had voted nothing evil for the city. But a few criminals and men with evil intentions (*oligoi … tines kai ponēroi kai kakōs bouleuomenoi*) voted in support of the commands that had been given.
>
> 12.75

In Lysias' version, the city falls apart into two opposite classes, a majority that was bullied into silence, and a greedy minority of 'evil-doers' who abused the temporary weakness of the Athenian political system to further their own interests.

Lysias contrasts the course of affairs at the time of the installation of the Thirty with the proceedings and freedom of vote in the current lawsuit.

> For now no one forces (*anankazei*) you to vote against your opinion.
>
> 12.91

For him, taking part in the official Athenian legal system can be seen as a statement against Eratosthenes and his allies, whom he repeatedly accuses of putting Athenians to death without trial, a fate they shared with his brother Polemarchus (12.17, 33, 36, 83). Lysias again uses a poignant contrast, put in legal terms, to highlight the difference between then and now:

> The contest (*agōn*), however, between the city and Eratosthenes is not one of equal terms. For he was plaintiff (*katēgoros*) and judge (*dikastēs*) of those who were judged, whereas we are now involved in accusation and defence. And they killed people who had done nothing wrong without trial (*akritous*), whereas you think it fit to judge those who have destroyed the city according to the law (*kata ton nomon*) …
>
> 12.81–82

Throughout the speech, Lysias connects his private interest in suing Eratosthenes with the larger interest of the city (12.5, 23, 62), thereby making his individual case against a single member of the Thirty into a collective impeachment of the entire group by the city's restored democracy. For this purpose, he consistently uses the second person plural (e.g. 12.57–58) when he refers to the Athenian citizens who suffered at the hands of the Thirty. It is they who now man the jury, which makes them representatives and defenders of the current constitu-

tion. The effect of this is, as in other speeches discussed above, to isolate the opponent, who, as one 'of the worst criminals' (*ponērotatōn*, 12.94), belonged to a group of 'tyrants' (*turannoi*, 12.35) that worked towards the enslaving of the Athenian people.

Conclusion

The above overview of a selection of forensic speeches in the *corpus Lysiacum* reveals a consistent methodology in characterization. Lysias prefers clarity to complication, and describes the individuals involved in his cases by making use of clearly understandable moral categories right from the beginning. In the course of the speeches he keeps repeating the qualifications mentioned in the *exordia*, and inserts more specific characteristics step by step. In this he often focuses upon the acts of the speaker and the opponent (metonymical characterization), as was seen in Lysias' speeches *Against Philon* (Lys. 31) and *Against Agoratus* (Lys. 13). Furthermore, Lysias uses contrastive characterization so as to highlight particular traits of his client or his opponent. Typically, for instance, he contrasts the shamelessness of the latter with the selflessness of the former.[33] In addition to such commonplaces, there are elements that are specific to each case, and which are largely determinative in further characterizing the individuals involved. Thus, in the speech *On the murder of Eratosthenes* (Lys. 1), the cunning of the adulterer and his circle is contrasted with Euphiletus' gullibility; in the speech *Against Simon* (Lys. 3), the non-violent, conflict-avoiding character of the speaker is contrasted with the aggression of Simon and his gang; in the speech *On the olive stump* (Lys. 7) the plaintiff's lack of accountability is contrasted with the defendant's accuracy, whereas in the case *Against Eratosthenes* (Lys. 12), the contrast is expressed in political terms, with Lysias as a champion of the restored democracy, fighting against one of its former attackers. In the case *Against Diogiton* (Lys. 32), the contrast revolves around loyalty to one's relatives, a quality the speaker possesses to a high degree, in contrast to the accused. Furthermore, Lysias also makes contrasts visible between the speaker, opponent, and other groups, such as Simon's friends (Lys. 3), who behave considerably better than their ringleader, and Eratosthenes' accomplices (Lys. 1), who take part in the conspiracy against

33 Carey 1994: 41: 'Lysias simply selects one or two distinctive characteristics and by presenting these consistently creates the illusion of depth of characterisation.' Compare Carey 2000a: 204: 'The speaker's character is a blank page to be filled in by the speech-writer according to his needs.'

Euphiletus. These transparent, contrastive schemes of characterization can be explained in view of Lysias' narratee, who could be any Athenian citizen from any background and tribe, and may not have had much education. Too much complexity should therefore be avoided or at least not stand in the way of a straightforward understanding of the main incidents of the case as well as the characters of those involved. Given the decisive nature of verdicts in lawsuits, and the specific, performative demands of their setting in court, this clarity was of utmost importance, together with a consistent emphasis upon the interests of the democratic community on whose behalf the jurymen cast their votes. In this light it remains questionable to what extent Lysias, either in substance or style, attempted to characterize individuals beyond what was needed in the case. From the above discussion it appears that the demands of the Athenian jury system were overriding in composing his speeches, and ultimately account for their accessibility and enduring appeal.

CHAPTER 23

Aeschines and Demosthenes

Nancy Worman

Introduction

Roland Barthes famously termed character a reflex of discourse, in order to highlight that it is embedded in language and cannot be extracted from its linguistic setting to formulate conceptions of 'real' personality.[1] Most of us struggle with the stringency of this insight, especially when analysing discourses that purport to be factual and thus to give a true picture of events and the people centrally involved in them. In such cases scholarly analyses often merge fact and fiction, historical and discursive realities, so that (e.g.) how Thucydides represents Cleon converges imperceptibly with what we know about him as an historical figure. As Aristotle was aware, oratory presents us with a further puzzle in this regard, since it borrows techniques from fiction, especially drama, while aiming to convince audiences that only truth is on offer. Thus, for instance, orators may include characteristics suggestive of tragic heroism in narratives that depict themselves or others as brave and beneficent. One of the most interesting aspects of this discursive moulding in oratory arises from the fact that it inevitably involves the body in performance, which means that, as in drama, movement and spectacle (i.e. body language) supplement speech. Not only this, but the orators' emphases on their public characters and those of their prominent opponents entail pointed contrasts between their own performances of character in the courts or assembly and their opponents' in various public settings (e.g. the agora, the gymnasium). Unlike drama, however, oratorical spectacle is radically constrained by its conceits of truth-telling, so that orators strive to emphasize palpable, well-witnessed matches between how they characterize themselves and others and how they and others appear to audiences.

Aeschines and Demosthenes are masters of such effects in oratorical narrative, repeatedly inflecting their telling of events with suggestive metonymies

1 Barthes [1970] 1974: 67–68; see Goldhill 1990, and cf. the discussion of Barthes' formulation in the Introduction (→), where De Temmerman and van Emde Boas point out that Barthes regards character and discourse as 'accomplices'.

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that mock their opponents' statures, intonations, dress, and deportments. By means of such colourful touches they aim to shape audiences' perception of what character types they are witnessing in action on the oratorical platform or in the courts. In this chapter I want to focus on these metonymic techniques as a central cluster of effects that the orators combine with other direct and indirect indications of character. These techniques tend to focus especially on dress and deportment, as well as facial expression and vocal style. In narrative and in direct invective Aeschines and Demosthenes make use of a broad array of characterization strategies, including indications of social standing (i.e. inclusion in micro-groups), significant actions in events of consequence, and comparison to figures in myth and history (i.e. metaphorical devices). While in their narratives the orators make liberal use of these techniques, at points when they focus on character assassination most concertedly their depictions pivot especially on metonymies highlighting the body in performance. And rightly so—for what could be more persuasive and damning than encouraging one's audience to recognize one's opponent for who he is by witnessing his visible traits?

In focusing thus I do not mean to suggest that orators do not litter their speeches more generally with other types of attributions and insults; they very much do. In the framing of circumstances and in narrative sequences orators usually depict themselves as upstanding and their opponents as craven and cowardly or obnoxious and aggressive, often using direct labels (e.g. *anaidēs* 'shameless', *ponēros* 'base', and *miaros* 'tainted', are common slurs).[2] They also cast their enemies' actions in the worst possible light, filling in these labels with narrative details of despicable behaviours and charging them with bribe-taking, pandering, and general depravity. My point in highlighting metonymic techniques in the speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes is to draw attention to the features of oratory that are most unique to its characterization, precisely because it is like drama a performance genre, but unlike drama it purports to offer unvarnished presentations of agents and events.

The speeches of these two polished and influential orators draw into uniquely sharp focus the connections between the control of Athenian domestic and foreign policy and the traits of the good orator and his artistry. This may be why these speeches more than any others in the Greek oratorical corpus concentrate attention on details of character. Demosthenes and Aeschines go to great lengths to highlight their differences, each carefully building up his depiction of his opponent's weaknesses in sharp contradistinction to his

2 See Worman 2008: 219–221 for a fuller survey of terms and their implications.

own strengths. This attention to detail underscores the interest of both orators in the crafting of character, as well as their awareness of the delicacy with which mimetic effects would be most persuasively deployed in narrating events of civic consequence. Scholars have shown quite convincingly that these speeches were revised, perhaps repeatedly, with an eye to publication, and the images explored below strongly indicate a purposeful honing of the interconnections among certain aspects of these defaming portraits. Their fine-tuned approaches seek ultimately to discredit their opponents' lifestyles and thus their leadership, centering their depictions on cravenness and greed in the civic arena as these are mediated by theatricality and affectation.[3] While such techniques may bear a complicated relationship to strategies of characterization within conventional narrative settings (e.g. epic poetry), emphasizing them should contribute greatly to our appreciation of the highly crafted and essentially fictional quality of character depiction in ancient oratory.

'Demosthenes' and Womanly Contrivance

In recent years scholars have frequently focused on Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchus* as a primary example of the legal handling of homosexuality and prostitution.[4] From Aeschines' presentation of the case, it appears that if one could prove that a citizen had prostituted himself, the punishment was the effective removal of his citizen's rights, since he himself had treated his body in an unfree manner. While the increased interest in ancient sexual practice has contributed to the heightened attention that this speech has received, in fact the charge of prostitution (*graphē hetaireseōs*) targeted but one of many craven behaviours that could result in disenfranchisement. These included violence toward or neglect of one's parents and throwing away one's shield in battle. Although the speech for the defence is not extant, we know that Demosthenes, the real target of Aeschines' attack, defended Timarchus. And although the respective character failings of these two men, as sketched by Aeschines, are quite distinct, it is clear that the inferences proliferating from the charge were intended to taint Demosthenes' character as much as Timarchus'.

In Aeschines' narration of events as well as in his direct invective, Demosthenes' inclinations and actions together share a close association with the

3 Cf. Worthington 1991, Gagarin 1999.

4 E.g. Dover 1978, Foucault [1976] 1985, Halperin 1990, Hunter 1990, Winkler 1990, Cohen 1992, Sissa 1999.

prostituting behaviours of his client Timarchus (cf. 1.123–126). He exhibits a penchant for soft, womanly clothes (1.131), pursues wealth by preying on young men (170–175), and uses an overwrought oratorical style that is in keeping with such tastes (1.167). Let us focus for the moment on the ways in which Aeschines deploys dress as a metonymy for character. Aeschines' depiction of Demosthenes' clothing makes use of a kind of gendered diminution: If, he says, someone were to take 'these fancy little cloaks' (*ta kompsa khlaniskia*) and 'the soft little tunics' (*tous malakous khitōniskous*) that Demosthenes wears while writing his maligning speeches, and hand them around to the jury to touch, the toucher would be hard pressed to tell whether they were men's or women's wear (1.131). The diminutives are straight out of iambic poetry and thus comic and insulting, suggesting as they do a needy beggar at the door as well as a world of prostitutes and cooks.[5] It does not help matters that Demosthenes sports in addition a sobriquet in keeping with his feminine garb, since being called 'Batalos' (which Dover captures as 'Bumsy') comes from his 'effeminacy and degeneracy' (*ex anandrias kai kinaidias*).[6] Aeschines' combination of metonymic indicators (i.e. the soft, slight clothing) and the nickname with its metaphorical associations effectively frames Demosthenes' actions as suspect, since together they craft a moral disposition that any upright Athenian would disdain. Thus both figures endanger Athens, Timarchus by his shameless plying of his body, Demosthenes by his effeminate inclinations.

As I address below, Demosthenes would later come back at Aeschines for his role in the second embassy to Philip, the precise charge for which is somewhat vague.[7] In his defence Aeschines offers his narrative of what happened on the embassy, again using terms that suggest comic depictions and expanding upon his framing of Demosthenes' character as depraved, womanly, and affected. He characterizes Demosthenes as a contrived presence: 'engaging in curious deportments as usual' (*terateusamenos, hōsper eiōthe, tōi skhēmati*), rubbing his head (*kai tripsas tēn kephalēn*) and playing the role of a comically puzzled outsider who cannot understand why his fellow citizens delight in passing their time in foreign gossip (2.49). When he addresses Philip he 'squawks out some

5 E.g. Hippon. fr. 32 W. 4–5.

6 Cf. 2.88, 2.99, 2.151; also 1.181. See Winkler 1990: 176–177 on the difficulty of translating this label; also Davidson 1997: 167–182. On Batalos or Battalos, cf. Aeschin. 1.126; D. 18. 180; cf. Eupolus fr. 82. See Dover 1978: 75, Henderson [1975] 1991: 203.

7 MacDowell argues (2000: 14–22) that it was probably misconduct on an embassy (*parapresbeia*), rather than something more strictly tied to the reviewing of officials' accounts (*euthunai*) such as the taking of bribes.

murky introduction' (*phthengetai to thērion prooimion skoteinon ti*), since he is beset by stage fright (2.34–35). And when, as Aeschines tells it, Philip encouraged Demosthenes to take heart and not think it as bad as dropping lines in the theatre, the orator was too shaken and lost control of his words (2.35). Unlike his theatrically trained opponent, Demosthenes has trouble performing; Aeschines adds that he suffered a 'strangling' (*ankhonē*) from frustration that he performed so poorly (2.38). Aeschines links his graceless performance to his odd speaking style, depicting it as clearly evident in the awkwardness and pandering exaggeration he displays when trying to make up to Philip for his bad performance (2.113).

Aeschines also claims that one of the primary characteristics of this awkward, strangled panderer is that of effeminizing deceit. Both orators accuse each other of verbal trickery and Aeschines makes colourful use of the charge. At one point he depicts Demosthenes as a 'Sisyphus' who claps his hands at another's flattering portrait of Philip (2.42), while tricking his peers in the service of his own good reputation.[8] This deportment in itself broadcasts his contriving character, while also making him seem unscrupulous, like the demagogues in Aristophanes.[9] In addition, it is in keeping with Aeschines' depiction of Demosthenes as an artful schemer, an insult on which Aeschines will elaborate some years later in his speech against Ctesiphon. While Demosthenes may scorn Aeschines' imitation of Solon's formal, manly deportment as a misplaced emphasis on surface effect (see below), Aeschines mocks Demosthenes' performative contortions as indicating his effeminacy and deception.[10]

Aeschines' portrayal of Demosthenes thus invokes an association common in Greek poetry between deception and feminine or slavish behaviour.[11] Indeed, this connection is only one aspect of a larger range of scorned behaviours associated with women and slaves and used as a central underpinning for the defamation of public speakers.[12] In Aeschines' speech the insult could not be more pointed. After bringing some slaves to the *bēma* as witnesses that Demosthenes is lying, Aeschines challenges him to declare himself a 'womanly man and unfree' (*androgunos … kai mē eleutheros*) if he is found to have commit-

8 Sisyphus' famous punishment was levied for his craftiness (Hom. *Il.* 6.153); his putative parenting of Odysseus (S. *Ph.* 417, E. *Cyc.* 106, E. *IA* 524) reinforces the association with deceit.

9 See Worman 2008: ch. 2 for an analysis of this imagery.

10 Contrast Aeschines' controlled deportment and athletic metaphors. See Harris 1995: 19–21; also Ober 1989: 283 and the objections of Lane Fox 1994: 138–139.

11 See Zeitlin 1981, Bergren 1983.

12 Worman 2008: Introduction.

ted perjury (2.127; cf. 148, 179). The juxtaposition suggests that Demosthenes' effeminate contrivances contrast badly even with the behaviours of slaves.

Add to this cluster of effects that Aeschines repeatedly calls Demosthenes a *kinaidos*, one version of which includes insinuations about a physical uncleanness that extends to his mouth ('whence his voice comes,' *hothen tēn phōnēn aphiēsin*) (2.88; cf. 23).[13] The phrase suggests coyly that Demosthenes' organ may also have been used in other 'unclean' ways, those particularly related to his feminine affectations.[14] Aeschines may hint at this particular weakness earlier, when he portrays Demosthenes as a corrupt seller of his body's parts who nevertheless claims to 'spit' (*kataptuei*, 2.23) on bribes.[15] In addition, he again calls attention to Demosthenes' nickname Bat(t)alos as a joking proof of his character (cf. 1.126, 131, 164). Whether this nickname means 'chatterer' or 'bugger', Aeschines links it to *kinaidia* as well as to the ruses and pandering of the contrived speaker (2.99).[16] By imbedding such insults in his rehearsal of events from Demosthenes' past that he presents as familiar, Aeschines manages to suggest that these are attributions and labels recognized as apt and used by everyone.

At the end of his speech, Aeschines foregrounds the performance of character in a manner that further taints Demosthenes' embodied presence with suggestions of corruption and simulation. As mentioned, he represents himself as becoming entangled through his commitment to public service with a fabricator and a cheat (2.153) who possesses womanly wiles; here at the end he begs the jury not to expose his family to one so craven and womanly (*anandrōi kai gunaikeiōi*, 2.179). Soon he follows this with a more direct inhabiting of character, asking how it is not pitiful to look upon the face of one's mocking enemy and hear with one's ears his slanders (*pōs de ouk oiktron idein ekhthrou prōsopon epengelōntos kai tois ōsi tōn oneidōn akousai*). This he must endure, however, since like a brave general his body is dedicated to danger (*dedotai to sōma tōi kindunōi*) (2.182). Aeschines repeats this offering up of his body in the final line of his speech, as evidence of his stalwart character in the face of his enemy's tainted accusations, which could end in his death: 'And now this body

13 Both passages claim that Demosthenes' body either has 'nothing unsellable' (23) or is unclean (88). Cf. Aeschin. 1.126, 131, and the remarks of Dover 1978: 75 regarding 'Battalos'; also Barthes [1970] 1974: 109–110 on lodging 'sexual density' in the throat.

14 For comic imagery see Worman 2008: ch. 2 and Epilogue. For Roman analogies, see Corbeill 1996: 97–127.

15 Cf. D. 18.196, where he deems Aeschines 'one who must be spit upon'.

16 Yunis (2001: on 18.180) thinks that Demosthenes' reference to the nickname must have to do with a speech defect, since he would not refer to it if it indicated submissive sex.

I and the law hand over to you' (*to de sōma ēdē touti paradidōsin humin kai egō kai ho nomos*, 2.184).

Both orators depict each other as imitators and fabricators, as indulging in grand pronouncements (*semnologeō*; cf. Aeschin. 2.93) and as being sophistic wordsmiths. But clear distinctions emerge in Aeschines' emphases on grotesquery and fabrication (versus his own manly embodiment), to which the dispute over whether Demosthenes should be crowned in the Theatre of Dionysus contributes some important details.

When Demosthenes' ally Ctesiphon brought forward a proposal in 336 BCE that Demosthenes be crowned in the Theatre of Dionysus for his civil service, Aeschines immediately opposed it. A primary contention that he repeats in his prosecution of Ctesiphon is that a citizen cannot be crowned as a public benefactor in the Theatre of Dionysus prior to the performance of tragedies and before a mixed crowd. Instead, he contends, the appropriate place for this is the assembly, so that the crowning takes place only before citizens (3.41–48, 176–190, 203–204). Aeschines follows each reference to law and precedent by narrating in damning terms details from Demosthenes' political career, which he repeatedly highlights with gestures he finds revealing of craven, depraved, and self-serving behaviours.

A pair of images in Aeschines' first focused indictment of Demosthenes' character provides a fitting point of entrance into this foregrounding of the mismatch between crowning and character. Here Aeschines seeks to prove Demosthenes' pandering and contrived self-promotion by zeroing in on two public gestures. First, he depicts him fawning over ambassadors from Philip, for whom he secured first seats in the theatre, furnishing cushions and rugs for them in so unseemly and toadying a manner that he was (Aeschines claims) hissed at by his fellow citizens (*hōste kai surittisthai dia tēn askhēmosunēn kai kolakeian*, 3.76). Add to this that upon the death of Philip Demosthenes celebrated publicly in crown and white robes (*stephanosamenos kai leukēn esthēta labōn*, 3.77), even though his own daughter had died only some days earlier. In what may appear at first glance to be a random story and slur, Aeschines works into his character defamation a moment of public self-crowning that renders suspect Demosthenes' claim to the benefactor's crown, since it makes him seem only too eager for this laudatory headgear and willing to come by it however he can. Note as well that Aeschines' depictions emphasize public witnessing and (in one case) public condemnation of his opponent's conduct, so that once again he (Aeschines) positions himself as merely the focalizer of a general opprobrium.

As Aeschines' condemnation of this bad citizen builds momentum, he gathers together the elements that make up this whole-body and in-costume ap-

proach to character assassination. He breaks off from his recounting of recent Macedonian advances in order to draw a connection between Demosthenes' bizarre speaking style and his despicable behaviour and deportment. He derides the 'repulsive and unruly locutions' (*ta miara kai apithana rhēmata*) that this depraved man (*kinaidos*) employs, which he calls 'strange things' (*thaumata*, 3.166–167). In keeping with this outrageous usage, Aeschines mocks Demosthenes as 'pirouetting' around the *bēma* (*kuklōi peridinōn … epi tou bēmatos*, 3.167) during an assembly speech on Macedonian policy.[17] The description is interesting for its suggestions of dance movements performed to dithyrambs, which later enter the stylistic lexicon as indicating overly elaborate styles.[18] And in fact, Aeschines quotes lines from Demosthenes' speeches as examples of chiming periodic usage and outlandish metaphors (3.166–167). Later on he ridicules Demosthenes for his melodrama and tone—'Why the tears? Why the shouting? Why the screeching voice?' (3.210; cf. 3.209)—pointing out that Demosthenes' own body is not imperilled by the charge. The focus on displays of emotion and heightened tone contributes a further detail to the cluster of effects by which Aeschines mocks Demosthenes' character as changeable and contrived.

Aeschines also repeatedly draws attention to the character effects exhibited by Demosthenes' eager head, deploying it in his invective as a metonymic device that indicates shameless self-promotion. Thus just after highlighting Demosthenes' tone and dramatic affect, he focuses in on Demosthenes' 'tainted and accountable head' (*tēn miaran kephalēn tauten kai hupeuthunon*), declaring that the man would commit any violence to it in return for damages (3.212). Aeschines makes sure that his audience will perceive that there is something unseemly about the juxtaposition of this head-beating for gain with its being crowned in the sanctified setting of the Theatre of Dionysus.

Aeschines offers as the most egregious example of Demosthenes' capitalizing on his own body the case of Midias, with which he assumes the audience will be very familiar. Aeschines seems to be playing on the image of the pious and dutiful citizen, which Demosthenes emphasized in his own narrative of events, by transforming him from victim to mercenary and revising his self-

17 The speech referred to was delivered after Macedon put down a Spartan uprising, which occurred just before Aeschines brought his case (cf. 3.163–165). Cf. Aeschines' later description of Demosthenes as 'leaping to the *bēma*' (3.173) in his speedy assent from the law courts to the assembly platform. See Pearson 1976: 8 and cf. Hall 1995: 53, who also cites Aeschin. 1.71.

18 E.g. Pl. *Phdr.* 283d3; Arist. *Rh.* 1406b2, 1409a25, Cic. *De Orat.* 3.185, Hor. *Od.* 4.2.10, D.H. *Dem.* 7.20–22. See Worman 2015: 240–242, 305–306.

depiction so radically that his audience should not only not embrace the vision of him as *khorēgos*, they should not even regard him as welcome in the theatre. Given Aeschines' own background in the theatre, this seems to be a pointed exclusion that extends from Demosthenes' supposedly craven behaviours to his failures as an orator. Throughout Aeschines' emphasis is on bodily and vocal control, habits of character trained in the body through citizens' proper exposure to and participation in performance poetry.

Further, Aeschines' portrait of Demosthenes as a grotesque and outrageous speaker who does not belong in heroic settings also makes use of metaphorical characterization by comparing him to the figure of Thersites in the *Iliad* (2.211–277). Aeschines projects this famously disruptive scene onto the Theatre of Dionysus, envisioning what would happen if some poet mounted a tragedy in which Thersites were crowned as a means of indicating how ridiculous it is to crown someone like Demosthenes.[19] He remarks wryly that no audience would accept the crowning of Thersites, since Homer depicts him as 'unmanly and a panderer' (*anandron kai sukophantēn*). He then challenges his audience with the possibility of a surreal outcome to the crowning of Demosthenes, in which Greek morals themselves would rise up in righteous indignation: 'Were you to crown such a man,' he declares, 'do you not think that you would be hissed at by the judgments of the Greeks?' (*ouk oiesthe en tais tōn Hellēnōn doxais surittesthai*) (3.231). The effect of this projection is a nightmarish drama, in which plot is so mismatched with protagonist that the audience rises up in revolt. A further implication may well be that this is the only kind of theatre of which Demosthenes is capable, one so outrageous and ill-suited that his fellow citizens should not countenance it. Although this type of metaphorical characterization is not very common in these speeches, both orators make use of them at pivotal moments in their narratives, as the examples of Creon and Solon (see below) also reveal.

Toward the end of his prosecution, as at the end of his embassy defence, Aeschines envisions for his audience another full-body oratorical drama. In this one he asks the juror citizens to deliberate not only with their ears but with their eyes as well (*mē monon tois ōsin, all' kai tois ommasin*), in order to assess those who support Demosthenes. You will not find them among companions on the hunt or in the gymnasium, Aeschines claims, since Demosthenes' only training is less physical than mercenary: pursuing men of property (255). Gazing on this man of pretence (cf. 3.256), the jurors must recognize

19 On Thersites' character, cf. Kirk 1985; Rose 1988; Thalmann 1988; Martin 1989: 110–113; Seibel 1995; Worman 2002: 66–67, 91–94; Marks 2005.

that Demosthenes assumes that they have reached such a peak of stupidity that they think they have fostered in the city the goddess Peitho rather than a sycophant (3.256). Aeschines then calls upon the jurors to imagine that the old lawmakers and leaders of Athens, beginning (as one might expect) with Solon, have crowded the speaker's platform to pass judgment on Demosthenes and his cohort (3.257–259). In his final statement Aeschines calls additional witnesses, in a move that elaborates on invocations in tragedy: Earth, Sun, Virtue, Understanding, and Education (3.260).[20]

'Aeschines' and Theatricality

In his speeches against Aeschines Demosthenes offsets in illuminating ways his opponent's portrayals of contrived oddness, effeminacy, and depravity versus manliness, moral rectitude, and an embodied solidity. While he shares with Aeschines tactics common in oratory more generally that represent one's opponent as a cheat and a deceiver, he emphasizes a set of conventions that suggest a central difference between the two orators. Demosthenes' portrayal of his opponent evidences a keen awareness of the impact that theatrical ability can have in the courtroom and the assembly, especially given that theatrical techniques are not only impressive but also familiar, since they tie the speaker to traditional plots and characters. While from Aeschines' perspective Demosthenes cuts such a strange figure in oratorical settings as to verge on the grotesque, Demosthenes reinforces this sense of his own novelty by depicting Aeschines' strengths as hinging on traditional dramatic tactics, which he reveals as fictionalizing and theatrical distractions.

Thus, for instance, when he accuses Aeschines of treacherous and un-citizen-like behaviour in the embassy to Philip Demosthenes depicts Aeschines as shouting him down with threats of indictment and theatrical exclamation (*kai iou iou*, 19.209). A clear opposition emerges in Demosthenes' speech, one that sets up Aeschines' own but in reverse: the theatrical wordsmith who only falls silent in the face of moral rectitude, versus the cautious and quiet type who chokes when faced with corruption. The imagery Demosthenes employs anticipates for his audience the fabricating powers of his voluble opponent, and how much he may achieve in dramatic impact while falling short of the truth. Demosthenes also represents Philip as a chorus leader (*khorēgos*) attendant on

20 See esp. E. *El.* 866–867; also A. *Ch.* 1–3, 399, S. *El.* 86–87, 110–112.

the performance of this actor's fellow players (19.216).[21] He cautions the audience against paying attention to Aeschines' vocal powers, which he contrasts to his own more paltry abilities. He further insists that he and his opponent are not engaged in an orators' contest (19.216–217), seeking to focus his audience's attention on the distinction between show and substance. Throughout Demosthenes' narration of events, references to *khorēgoi* and contests foreground dramatic settings, with their attendant suggestions of fiction and falsehood.

It is thus Aeschines' theatrical training that furnishes Demosthenes with the most pervasive imagistic framework for his opposition between a fine dramatic style and meagre or inaccurate content.[22] Aeschines, he says, engages in 'new' contests (*agōnas kainous*) as if they were plays (*dramata*), and is surely a 'terribly clever' (*pandeinos*) man (19.120; cf. 121). Here Demosthenes seeks to connect this dramatic cleverness to a moral and class judgment of Aeschines' type: it indicates his theatrical style on the one hand, but also the special kind of depravity (*kakian*) that results from a life of paid performance. This life involves bribe taking and the wholesale vending of oneself (19.121)—precisely the kind of debasing habits that might lead seamlessly to serving a decadent tyrant. Later in his speech (2.246–247) he returns again to this theme of Aeschines' acting abilities, now introducing another metaphorical characterization in a distinctly meta-performative manner: he has the clerk read some lines spoken by Creon from the *Antigone* (175–190) about what makes a good politician.[23] The part of Creon is one that Demosthenes claims his opponent knew well, although Aeschines himself does not quote Sophocles in any of his extant speeches.[24] Demosthenes also notes that Aeschines always played the part of the third actor (i.e. that assigned to the least talented) (19.247) and emphasizes that this third actor is often a tyrant, thus suggesting a further metonymical association with Aeschines' character.

Demosthenes also represents Aeschines as merely aping an upstanding citizen, now echoing his opponent's use of Solon as a metaphorical indication of his own upright character. He recalls Aeschines' invocation of Solon's contained embodiment of character (1.25–26) in order to mock his use of it (19.251) as a negative example of how a public speaker ought to comport himself.[25]

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21 Cf. Halliwell 1991: 290, who points out that Demosthenes depicts Philip as having a taste for crude entertainments like mime and lampoons (D. 2.20).

22 Cf. Rowe 1966, Lane Fox 1994, Hall 1995, Easterling 1999.

23 Note that this play itself places emphasis on the violent effects that craven or tyrannical speech may have on the health of the city: e.g. *Ant.* 180, 505, 509.

24 Cf. Fisher 2001: 293. See also Ford 1999 on Aeschines' use of poetic texts.

25 Cf. Demosthenes' interest in deportment (Cic. *Orat.* 8.26–28), although some found his

Aeschines' imitation (*emimēsato*) of the great statesman's deportment (*tou skhēmatos*) was far less valuable to the city, says Demosthenes, than reproducing the quality of his mind and soul would have been (19.253). Aeschines' own deportment includes a debased alteration of Solon's that reveals his true motivations: he holds his hand out, but with the palm up—for taking bribes (255).[26] Demosthenes adds a curious detail to this performance, when he completes the portrait with the following image: 'Putting his little cap [*pilidion*] on his head, he struts about and abuses me' (19.255). He then has the clerk read an elegy of Solon (1.3) in which he warns Athens that not the gods but greedy men of ill counsel will be the city's ruin. Plutarch claims that Solon wore such a cap when performing his elegies (*Solon* 1.8); and Deborah Steiner has recently demonstrated the relationship of this little cap to iambic contention, the kind of invective that poets and statesmen engage when chastising their fellow citizens.[27] This character mimesis comports with Aeschines' portentous speaking style (*semnologei*) as well as his practising and honing of his 'miserable' volubility (*dustēna*) (19.255).[28]

Demosthenes' depiction of Aeschines' theatricality and dramatic vocalizing, then, indicates that such powers are inherently vulgar and untrustworthy, since they point to inbred artfulness and the selling of one's talents. As Demosthenes tells it, Aeschines transacts this self-marketing in many settings: doffing his poet's cap, traipsing around the stage, parading through the agora, or palming money in the Macedonian court. Aeschines' sheer ability has caused him to fail to distinguish between surface effect (i.e. deportment and delivery) and integrity, so that he makes a poor politician while imitating a good one. Again, the portrait is clearly cast in terms not only of dramatic devices and costume but also of class: the purely physical abilities of Aeschines look like the cheap tricks of a lowbrow wrangler in contrast to the quiet nobility of the refined Demosthenes.

As in the speech on the embassy, in the speech on the crown Demosthenes makes repeated references to Aeschines' volubility (e.g. 18.82, 132, 199) and overly emotional style (18.292; cf. 278), here also relating both to his experi-

style a 'vulgar, ill-bred, and effeminate imitation' (Plu. *Dem.* 9.4). Cf. also Cleon, who was apparently quite a mobile and gesticulating speaker (Plu. *Nic.* 8).

26 Zanker 1995: 45–49, 85–89 argues that the statues of Demosthenes and Aeschines reflect this contrast, which could suggest the influence of Demosthenes' portrayal of himself and his opponent.

27 Steiner 2014: 14–18.

28 Note that such attributions better capture Demosthenes' own fondness for rehearsing. Cf. Demades fr. 75; and see Cooper 2000.

ence as an actor. The labels that forge this connection are often colourfully abusive, as when he terms him a 'tragic ape' (e.g. *autotragikos pithēkos*, 18.242). Later Demosthenes is more ironic: toward the end of the speech, he claims that Aeschines is only an effective actor in the high tragic mode (18.313) when defending those in whose interests he toils.[29] Such a speaker chews up the scenery, in effect, indulging in the kind of tonal excesses (e.g. shouting, groaning) that are better suited to ponderous tragedy. The contrived Demosthenes is at pains to represent his opponent's powerful vocalizing and dramatic delivery as indicative of a lack of restraint, suggesting that such a practiced and overblown style is directly related to Aeschines' questionable upbringing and mercenary lifestyle.[30]

Here again Demosthenes mocks this loud, dramatic style in quasi-comic language that points to Aeschines' 'tyrannical' tendencies. He claims, for example, that Aeschines 'murdered' the part of Oenomaus (18.180) in a performance at Collytus; and he depicts Aeschines' acting with the 'Heavy Groaners' (*Barustonois*) as a 'war' (*polemos*) with the audience (18.262). Demosthenes couples these slurs with ridicule of Aeschines' family background, claiming that Aeschines' mother was really named Empousa, the licentious, child-eating monster who frightens Xanthias and Dionysus in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (285–293). This moniker is appropriate to one who 'does everything,' which suggests licentiousness or even prostitution (*panta poiein*, 18.130).[31] The son of a monstrous, scandalous mother, himself a tragic ape, Aeschines appears in Demosthenes' depiction as a dweller in some mythic borderland with few civilizing influences. And since he is a natural born actor, by parallel logic he is a 'counterfeit orator' (*parasēmos rhētōr*, 242).

Patricia Easterling has discussed whether this connection with the theatre is meant to raise questions about Aeschines' trustworthiness, since this is the realm of mimesis.[32] Although she concludes that this is not necessarily the case, it is important to emphasize again that Aeschines' connections with the theatre underscore his theatrical style, which Demosthenes depicts as

29 I.e. Aeschines is only 'the best actor' in the worst circumstances (cf. 18.242–243, 259–260; also 19.199, 206–209). See Usher 1993: ad loc.

30 Again, this conflation of verbal technique and moral type has a long history in Greek literary culture: see Winkler 1990: 66–67, O'Sullivan 1992: 145–150.

31 On this type of female chthonic monster, see Johnston 1995. Yunis (2001: on 18.130) points out that such nicknames are common to prostitutes; the *panourgos* label ('doing everything') connotes a general profligacy and lack of scruples, cf. Worman 1999. Most commentators regard this attack as utilizing a common topos, what Harding (1987: 30) refers to as 'mother-jokes' (cf. Dover 1974: 30–32, Pearson 1976: 81, Hunter 1990: 317–318).

32 Easterling 1999; see also Harris 1995: 30–31.

one of simulation and overkill. Further, his acting involved selling his body's talents, bringing him perilously close to the behaviours of a common prostitute, labourer, or a slave.[33] Demosthenes' focusing of his character assassination on theatrical mimesis suggests that his opponent's dependence on conventional techniques does not so much elicit elevating poetic and heroic associations in his audience's assessment of his character as reveal his mimesis as limiting, stale, and debased.

Judith Butler has argued that all choices of dress and deportment, as well as intonation, facial expressions, vocabulary and phrasing are performative.[34] The dramatic stage and oratorical arena clearly redouble the sense of the body as amassed through signification, and not only because these are formal performance settings with particular conventions. What is more important for our purposes—and perhaps especially so in the case of oratory—is the fact that speakers' depictions of each other's characters involve such carefully turned narratives and techniques of depiction. From this perspective the body is a startlingly unnatural object, something not only fenced in by social delimitations but also crafted by story-telling and invective. Both the orator doing the talking and the 'orators' in his (usually mocking) portrayals show the audience who they are by their emphases on metonymies indicative of character, including mocking depictions of tonal modulations and facial expressions as well as dress and deportment.

That said, the disputes between Aeschines and Demosthenes reveal their quite different attitudes toward the theatricality of oratory. Aeschines' approach is essentially conventional, which is why Demosthenes' innovating styles appear to him to be so outlandish and difficult to characterize. This is in keeping with Aeschines' attachment to traditional civic education, as well as his own well-trained actor's approach to persuasive performance, which assumes implicitly that a well-flowing, full-throated dramatic style should win the day and that audiences should worry less about the fabricated qualities of the performance and be comforted by its familiarity. Demosthenes' emphasis on this very conventionality reveals aspects of it that Aeschines' more mainstream approach seeks to circumvent—that is, the connections between dramatic mimesis and simulation or deception, since the charge of lying is such a familiar one among the orators. This theatricality also stands in sharp contrast to Demosthenes' innovations of style and delivery, which the traditionalist

33 Both orators make similar claims about such selling: cf. e.g. Aeschin. 2.127 regarding Demosthenes. Unlike Demosthenes, however, Aeschines emphasizes the sexual aspects of his enemy's salesmanship.

34 Butler 1990.

depicts as contrived, even grotesque, but not recognizably theatrical. In fact, it seems possible that had Demosthenes been a more talented actor, Aeschines would have found less to criticize in his oratorical crafting of character. But in that case Demosthenes would not have been such an innovator, nor such an effective mocker of his opponent's conventional modes.

PART 6

Philosophy

CHAPTER 24

Plato

Kathryn Morgan

Any discussion of character in the Platonic corpus is complicated by the fact that Plato not only employs techniques of characterization as author, but pervasively makes character an object of analysis. Two obvious examples of this latter feature are the survey of the character types (aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical) that correspond to the different types of constitutions in *Republic* Book 8, and the discussion of the ruler's art of 'weaving' the fabric of the state by mingling courageous and moderate dispositions through education and eugenics in the *Statesman* (306a–311b).[1] As my previous chapters on Plato in this series have suggested, narrative form cannot be separated from philosophical content. When, in Book 1 of the *Republic*, Socrates narrates how Thrasymachus disapproved of the turn taken by the discussion and 'drew himself up like a wild beast and let himself loose upon us as though he intended to tear us to pieces' (336b), this is not merely an instance of metaphorical characterization by Socrates, but resonates with later passages in the dialogue where the appetitive part of the soul is characterized as a wild beast that needs to be tamed and controlled. Although my discussion here will focus mainly on narrative technique, this other level of interpretation should be kept constantly in mind. We should, moreover, be aware that for both ancient and modern interpreters, a Platonic dialogue has as its goal cognitive and ethical transformation in the reader.[2]

Diogenes Laertius (3.48) defined dialogue as 'a discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters (*ēthopoiias*) of the persons introduced (*tōn paralambanomenōn prosōpōn*) and the choice of diction' (transl. Hicks). This formulation is useful because it directs our attention to an important characteristic of the Platonic dialogue, the intimate connection between philosophical thought and character. In the dialogues where Socrates plays a primary role, he crafts an argumentative strategy that is tailored for the character of a particular inter-

1 'So if there are five types of cities there would also be five types of individuals' (*R.* 8.544e).

2 So e.g. Procl. *in Ti.* 5e–f ('Plato sketches the outlines of our duties through his very representation of the best men') and Gordon 1999: 80–84.

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locutor, and the character of the interlocutor emerges through the answers he gives, especially given Socrates' fundamental insistence that the person whom he questions answer what he really thinks. His philosophical quest thus proceeds in an *ad hominem* manner.[3] Dialectic exchange can only be successful if the interlocutor has 'the appropriate qualities of character and intellect';[4] in many dialogues, the interlocutor proves not to have the requisite qualities and the discussion ends in an impasse. As Blondell observed in her influential analysis of 2002: 'The entire text of a Platonic dialogue may … be understood as a vehicle for characterization'.[5]

Diogenes also tells us (3.9–10) that Plato was influenced by the thought of the Sicilian comic playwright Epicharmus, and (3.18) that he was the first to bring the mimes of Sophron to Athens and drew character in his style (*ēthopoiēsai pros auton*). Although the influence of Epicharmus on Plato's characterization has been asserted, this is not a safe inference from the text of Diogenes.[6] When it comes to Sophron, it is not unlikely that Sophron's presentation of rich characters portrayed in scenes taken from everyday life could have served as a model for Plato or at least have been seen by ancient literary critics as an important forerunner of his practice. *Mimesis prosōpōn* was regarded by ancient literary critics as a distinctive feature of Platonic dialogue.[7]

Plato's dialogues, both those with a frame narrator and those without, offer more than ample scope for the examination of characterization, and all the more so given this volume's inclusion of dramatized *ēthopoiia* within the remit of its inquiry. Still, it is in the framed dialogues that the construction of character through narrative is most obtrusive, and many of my examples will be taken from such dialogues. I will investigate Platonic characterization under several rubrics, such as characterization through setting or speech patterns. Yet important recurrent problems cut across these categories and will receive separate treatment (although resolution is beyond the scope of this contribution). Chief among these are the assessment of Socrates' character and Socrates' irony. Is the central character presented to us in the dialogues inimitable, honest, and heroic, or unscrupulous, competitive and insincere? Or is he some combination of these or additional qualities? That such different and incompatible readings are possible is due in part to Socrates' irony.

3 Kahn 1983: 76; Gordon 1999: 31, 79; cf. Beversluis 2000: 9, 116.

4 Gill 2002: 149.

5 Blondell 2002: 53.

6 Gordon 1999: 69–70, relying on the work of McDonald 1931.

7 Haslam 1972: 18–24, but see Ford 2010: 228–229.

Physical Description

Characterization through physical appearance is rare in the Platonic dialogues, and all the more significant when it does occur. For an example of indirect characterization of this kind, we may see *Hippias Major* 291a, where the sophist Hippias protests to Socrates that he would not want to talk with a man who asked questions about spoons and cookery. Socrates responds 'That's right! For it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words when you are finely dressed like this and finely shod, and renowned for your wisdom among all the Greeks', a comment that invites an inference about the splendour of Hippias' costume, and 'highlights with pointed metonymies Hippias' vanity, which extends from his overblown talk to his elaborate dress'.[8] Again, Socrates' remark at *Meno* 80c, that Meno has compared him to an electric ray because Meno wants to be compared in turn, and that 'I know this about all handsome men, that they enjoy being described in images' implies that Meno is good-looking.

Socrates' satyr-like appearance and its implications are thematized in Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium* as we shall see, but there the point is that his exterior appearance is belied by his 'interior', his soul. This contrast is of a piece with core philosophical material in the dialogue, where the philosophical lover of beauty is said to move beyond physical beauty to spiritual beauty and finally to the contemplation of the Form of Beauty. Physical appearance is often an irrelevance from the philosophical point of view: the job of the philosopher is to move beyond appearances to the truth. As Worman has pointed out, Plato constructs Socrates in opposition to an elite imaginary focused on the perceptual apprehension of character type, one that assessed moral and social status by such indicators as dress, vocal tone, and vocabulary.[9] The contrast between the Socratic exterior and interior was important in the work of another Socratic, Phaedo of Elis, whose dialogue *Zopyrus* confronted Socrates with a travelling physiognomer. When asked to diagnose Socrates' character on the basis of his appearance, the physiognomer said that Socrates was stupid (judging by his bull neck) and a womanizer (judging by his protruding eyes). Although those present ridiculed this assessment, Socrates declared that this was indeed his nature but that it had been overcome by reason.[10] A different point is being made here than in the *Symposium* (the power of reason to overcome nature), but the clash of inner and outer again represents the difficulty of understanding Socrates.

8 Worman 2008: 203.

9 Worman 2008: 166.

10 Kahn 1996: 10–11.

The issue of the relationship between the inner and outer person recurs several times in the corpus. It lies behind the eschatological myth narrated by Socrates in the *Gorgias*, where Zeus has to change the method by which souls are judged. In the Age of Cronus, souls were judged while still alive, so that the appearance of the body could screen that of the soul: handsome and wealthy sinners were mistakenly being sent to the Isles of the Blest. Zeus institutes a procedure whereby the soul is judged after death and 'naked' so that the maiming and scars caused by an unjust life can be seen (*Grg*. 523a–525a). The same issue underlies the introduction of the boy Charmides in his eponymous dialogue, where Socrates is the narrator. Charmides is astonishingly beautiful, so much so that Socrates almost loses control of himself. Everyone else is similarly entranced, he tells us:

> he appeared amazing to me in his size and his beauty, and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him, so confused and thunderstruck were they … and it was less astonishing that men of our age were like this, but I was also paying attention to the boys, how none of them looked anywhere else, not even the smallest, but they all looked at him as if he were a statue.
>
> *Chrm*. 154b–c

This type of thick description is only possible in a narrated dialogue. It characterizes both Charmides and Socrates. We learn that Charmides is beautiful (although, interestingly, his beauty is described only in the most general terms; the reader experiences it through its effects on others) and that Socrates is much affected by him (he is 'simply a white measuring-line' when it comes to the beautiful, 154b). Yet we note too that despite Socrates' protestations of helpless admiration, he still has time to look around at people *other* than Charmides and assess his effect on them. We suspect (not for the first or the last time, if we are experienced readers of Plato) that Socrates is exaggerating his own weakness. This suspicion is confirmed when Socrates asks Critias whether, in addition to his beautiful body, Charmides has a well-formed soul (154d), and much of the rest of the dialogue is spent putting the young man through his intellectual paces. The final element in the understanding of Charmides' character could be supplied only by the external narratee. Charmides would grow up to be a member of the oligarchic junta, the 'Thirty Tyrants' that ruled Athens immediately following the end of the Peloponnesian War. A reader should therefore juxtapose the shy boy of the dialogue with the type 'murderous oligarch'; Charmides' life will be far from fulfilling the promise of his youthful beauty.

With Charmides we may contrast the young Theaetetus. In the frame of the *Theaetetus*, two external narrators (who are also Socratic disciples) meet in Megara and discuss a meeting that one of them has had with a mature Theaetetus, who is dying from battle wounds and dysentery and is on his way back to Athens. Contemplation of his virtues reminds them that Socrates had prophesied a great future for him, which in turn leads them to listen to the reading of a dramatic dialogue between Socrates, Theaetetus, and his maths teacher, Theodorus. As this internal dialogue opens, Theodorus enthusiastically praises Theaetetus to Socrates: 'If he were beautiful, I would be afraid to speak emphatically, in case I should seem to someone to desire him. But as it is—don't be annoyed at me—he is not beautiful, but resembles you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, except that he has these less than you.' (143e). When Socrates starts his conversation with Theaetetus he moves from the question of whether they resemble each other physically to whether they share an intellectual resemblance as well, an issue that becomes the pretext for further discussion.[11] The presence of the dialogue frame here enables us to compare the characters of the young and mature Theaetetus, if only sketchily. It pointedly confirms Socrates' skills as a judge of character but also reinforces the tension between character and appearance.

One final aspect of physical appearance that will concern us here is transient manifestations of emotions such as humour, temper, shame. Shame, sometimes leading to anger, can be a potent motivator in philosophical discussion. This emotion is thematized in the *Gorgias* (where each of Socrates' interlocutors is backed into an argumentative corner by Socrates' manipulation of their sense of shame), but operates in other dialogues as well.[12] We have already considered the example of Thrasymachus drawing himself up like a wild beast, a simile that communicates the tension and energy we are to imagine he displayed. Similar to this is Socrates' summary comment on a passage of dialogue where he has made Thrasymachus contradict himself 'Thrasymachus agreed with all my suggestions not as I now easily narrate it, but with difficulty and being dragged along, with an amazing amount of sweat, since it was summer, and then I saw it, although I had never seen it before—Thrasymachus blushing' (350c–d). As was noted in *SAGN* 1: 363, Plato makes Socrates' narrative control obtrusive here: the characterization of Thrasymachus through his sweat and blushing is particularly emphatic because Socrates makes it a cap to this

11 For the philosophical significance of Theaetetus' likeness or unlikeness to Socrates, see Blondell 2002: 251–313.

12 Kahn 1983, McKim 1988, Gordon 1999: 22–27.

section of narrative and narrates it out of temporal sequence. A blush is, of course, evidence of shame or modesty. In Thrasymachus' case it is shame at being bested in an argument. In the case of more attractive and younger interlocutors it can be both. Thus Hippocrates in the opening scene of the *Protagoras* blushes when Socrates suggests that he might want to become a sophist (shame). What is more, Socrates is able to see this (the dialogue starts when it is still dark) because the day was just dawning: an instance of metaphorical characterization, as Denyer observes: 'here the physical dawn coincides—in both time and colour—with something's dawning on Hippocrates intellectually'.[13] In *Euthydemus* too (275d) the boy Clinias blushes when confronted with a difficult question he does not know how to answer (again shame). At *Charmides* 158c Charmides blushes when asked whether he is sufficiently temperate (a claim that had previously been made for him by his cousin), and this blush made him even more beautiful, since his modesty became his age.[14]

Another characteristic emotion in the dialogues is amusement, whether gentle, self-depreciating, or triumphant. When the sophist Euthydemus has confused young Clinias, his brother Dionysodorus whispers to Socrates, 'smiling all over his face', that Clinias will be refuted no matter what answer he makes (*Euthd.* 275e). To this cruel complacency we may contrast the smile that is the sign of a gentle and philosophical temperament, as when Zeno and Parmenides smile at the intellectual precocity of the young Socrates (*Prm.* 130a, cf. 136d), or Socrates smiles at a good objection from Simmias ('Socrates looked keenly at him, as he was often accustomed to do, and said with a smile …', *Phd.* 86d).[15] There are few displays of grief in the dialogues. Only in the *Phaedo* are we presented with the shrieks of Socrates' wife in the face of his imminent death (60a) and the tears of his friends when he has drunk the poison (117c–d). On both occasions Socrates takes steps to have the weeping stop; there is to be no self-indulgence. Both the grief of his friends and Socrates' quelling of it are indications of character and the nature of their relationship.

The kind of overt comment that remarks on signs of emotion is most at home in the narrated dialogues, although it is possible to achieve these effects in a dramatic dialogue also, as when Socrates says to Polus 'Why do you laugh

13 Denyer 2008: 74; cf. Gordon 1999: 26–27.

14 Cf. *Lysis* 204b–d, where much is made of the embarrassed blushes of Hippothales in the face of erotic teasing.

15 Cf. *Phd.* 102d, where Socrates observes, with a smile, that he is talking like a book, and 115c where Socrates laughs and comments that all the arguments about immortality have done nothing to convince Crito.

at this, Polus?' (*Grg.* 473e). There will be less of this in the 'late' dialogues, where the philosophical expert in charge of the discussion is not Socrates, and where the interlocutors are less fully characterized.

Setting and Class

We saw in *SAGN* 3 that most Platonic dialogues take place in a restricted number of settings, most often a palaestra or other semi-public location or a private house (exceptions were the dialogues that present the trial and death of Socrates, which are associated with the Royal Stoa in the Athenian Agora, the law court, and the prison, and two dialogues that take place in the countryside, *Phaedrus* and *Laws*). These settings characterize the participants as members of a leisured class within the polis, who do not need to work for a living, but can spend time exercising, gossiping, flirting, and, most importantly, engaging in intellectual discussion and politics. Plato's own family was an old and a wealthy one, and several members of it have parts to play in the world of the dialogues: Critias, Charmides, Glaucon, and Ademantus. The house of the rich metic Cephalus in the Piraeus hosts the discussion of the *Republic*; the house of Callias, the richest man in Athens, is crammed with visiting sophists and hangers on in the *Protagoras*; the house of the tragic poet Agathon is the scene of the *Symposium*. All of them can accommodate large numbers of people, and many of these people know each other (there are several overlaps between dialogues). The characters in the dialogue are, then, drawn for the most part from a restricted sociological range.[16]

In this world of affluence, Socrates is something of an oddity. He is not wealthy himself (in the *Apology* his rich friends propose to pay on his behalf any fine levied by the court), although he is a member of the hoplite class, for which there was a property qualification. The only time we are told of his house, it seems modest. At the opening of the *Protagoras*, Hippocrates visits Socrates at home while it is still dark, finds Socrates in his bedroom, and sits on the end of his bed. The word used for bed here, *skimpous*, denotes a small couch or pallet, and Socrates' domestic situation contrasts vividly with the spacious residence of Callias that he and Hippocrates are soon to enter. His priorities, unsurprisingly, are not in the realm of worldly possessions. Socrates' frequent use of the craft analogy may associate him with lower-class types such as cobblers, and he is sometimes characterized as crude (*agroikos*), both by

16 Beversluis 2000: 29–30.

himself and by others.[17] Indeed, Worman has argued that we should read the Socrates of the dialogues as 'low' sort, an iambic contender who frequently uses comic topoi and parodic, insulting speech. On this reading, Socrates is given a 'resistant, outsider's stance', one that punctures the overblown elite discourse of sophists and other professed experts.[18]

Another indication of the status of Socrates and many of the interlocutors is the frequent references to pederastic passion and relationships, as well as flirting. In this arena Socrates seems to be comfortably assimilated within the elite. It seems to be a running joke that Socrates is the *erastēs* of Alcibiades, and a famous scene in the *Symposium* plays out a farcical scenario of pederastic jealousy and hurt feelings ('Please protect me, Agathon', says Socrates, 'My love for this man has proved to be no light matter. Ever since the time I fell in love with him it's not been possible for me to look at or talk to a good-looking man—not one—or this one here does unbelievable things in his jealousy. He abuses me and can scarcely keep his hands off me.' 213d). The same dynamic underlies the opening of the *Phaedrus*, and the dialogues where Socrates tries to discover who the beauty of the day is (*Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Theaetetus*). It generates witty exchanges and adds much spice to conversation, but it also marks those who participate in it as citizen males with the leisure time to woo and pursue their love interests. At the philosophical level this world of physical desire and passion adumbrates a higher realm, where desire is desire for truth and passion leaves the earthly body behind.

Assimilation to Mythological Paradigms

At *Theaetetus* 169a–b Theodorus compares Socrates to Sciron and Antaeus, who force passers-by into a trial of strength (in this case, the defence of the Protagorean Man-Measure doctrine). The comparison is ironic and doubly allusive. Like Sciron, Socrates inveigles his victim into a seemingly harmless task but then plans an ambush. The comparison with Antaeus implies that Socrates is an almost unstoppable dialectical wrestler.[19] Although Socrates accepts the identification and comments that he has been battered by many a Theseus or Heracles, the experienced reader knows that Socrates is rarely bested in argument (perhaps, then, Socrates should be associated rather with Heracles or

17 Worman 2008: 157, 188.
18 Worman 2008: 154–167.
19 Morgan 2000: 246.

Theseus). We see a similar phenomenon at *Protagoras* 340a, this time combined with a Homeric quotation. Uncertain about how to combat Protagoras' argument, Socrates calls to Prodicus 'as the river Scamander in Homer called on the Simois when hard pressed by Achilles, with the words "Dear brother, let us both together stem the hero's might"'. Socrates implies that opposing Protagoras is like fighting Achilles, parades his own skill at poetic quotation, and assimilates the discussion to epic warfare.[20] Quotation of Homer is relatively frequent in the Platonic corpus and often comes from the mouth of Socrates.[21] Poetic citation is a marker of cultured elite status,[22] yet such citations also encourage us to read Socrates as a heroic figure.[23] They may trigger an ongoing subtext for large stretches of individual dialogues, as in the *Republic* when Socrates' disapproving citation of *Odyssey* 11.489–491 (Achilles' pessimistic assessment of existence among the dead) at *Republic* 386a–d is taken up again at 7.516d–e to characterize political existence among the dwellers in the cave. The *Odyssey* passage comes from Odysseus' visit to the land of dead, and it has been plausibly asserted that katabatic themes surface repeatedly in the *Republic*, with Socrates serving as an Odysseus-like figure.[24]

Identification with a mythological prototype seems to have been a common move in the late fifth century, at least as Plato represents it. In the *Hippias Major*, Hippias boasts how he has gained fame by giving advice to young men about how they ought to behave, but it turns out that this catalogue is actually put in the mouth of Nestor (286a–b). Hippias thus assimilates himself to an epic prototype. Similarly at *Phaedrus* 261b–c Socrates mentions 'Arts of Speech' written by Nestor, Odysseus, and Palamedes during their leisure time at Troy, but Phaedrus suspects that the name Nestor disguises Gorgias, and that Odysseus hides Thrasymachus and Theodorus. Mapping intellectual conflicts and characters onto the mythological world elevates the issues and achievements of Socrates and his rivals.

20 Cf. *Euthd.* 297c, where Socrates' battle with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus is compared to Heracles' encounter with the Hydra and crab (Worman 2008: 210), and *Euthd.* 285c–d, where complex allusions to Medea and Marsyas may serve a protreptic function (Collins 2015: 113–116).

21 Yamagata 2012 argues that Homeric quotation may have been a characteristic of the historical Socrates.

22 Halliwell 2000.

23 Cf. Yamagata 2012: 133 on *Ap.* 28b–d.

24 O'Connor 2007: 57–63.

Socrates

Socrates as Narrator

In *SAGN* 1: 361–364 I explored the phenomenon of Socrates as narrator in five dialogues where he reports a previous conversation. Some of the conclusions reached there may now be repeated. I shall return shortly to the question of irony; for now we may note that Socrates characterizes himself with a goodly amount of humorous exaggeration and self-depreciation which may or may not be taken seriously. In addition to the examples cited in *SAGN* 1, we may mention Socrates' report of his reaction to Protagoras' argumentation centred on Simonides' poem at *Protagoras* 339e:

> At first, like someone struck by a good boxer, everything went black for me, and my head swam when he said these things and the others shouted in approval. Then—to tell you the truth—so that I could have time to consider what the poet meant, I turn to Prodicus …

Socrates narrates his momentary intellectual discomfiture as though it had been a physical experience, although we may imagine that everything did not, in fact, go black for him. A similar situation recurs at *Euthydemus* 303a–c, where Socrates declares that he lay speechless, as if he had been struck a blow by the argument, and was so affected by the applause given to the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus that he agreed that he had never seen men so wise and was 'absolutely enslaved' by their wisdom.

As narrator, Socrates attributes a great deal of knowledge to himself and at times seems omniscient. It is clear that he pays careful attention to the dynamics of a conversation, noticing not only the movements and emotions of the speakers, but also of the audience. He is a master of conversation management. This is most clear in the narrated dialogues, as we can see from the *Protagoras* example above where he makes his strategy explicit. Yet his control is clear even when it is not obtrusive. The Socrates of the *Euthydemus* declares himself to be incapable of holding his own with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but he still directs the discussion, both at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic level.[25] Even a dramatic dialogue like the *Gorgias* showcases Socrates as a 'psychological strategist' who defeats an opponent by picking an

25 Collins 2015: 57–59 and 45–144 *passim* (see particularly 58: 'this ubiquitous character orchestrates a good deal of the marketplace contest both while he is engaged in it and when he narrates it later').

apparently uncontroversial premise to start the discussion, one that will trigger no resistance from his interlocutor.[26] Socrates' attention to detail characterizes him and is replicated at the intellectual level as he keeps careful track of the progress of an argument, watching for problems and inconsistencies.

His observations, of course, characterize his interlocutors. Thus in the *Lysis* Socrates narrates that he engineered a conversation with Lysis after learning that Hippothales was in love with him. A group gathers in a palaestra, and Lysis eventually comes to sit down near Socrates, who narrates how

> Hippothales when he saw that several people were standing around used them as a screen and stood where he thought Lysis would not see him, afraid that he would annoy him ...
>
> *Ly.* 207b

When Socrates has given Lysis a salutary dose of cross-examination about the nature of friendship,

> I looked away towards Hippothales and almost made a mistake, for it came into my head to say 'This is how, Hippothales, you ought to talk to your boyfriend, humbling and reining him in, not puffing him up and pampering him like you do'. But when I saw him in agony and thrown into confusion by what was being said, I remembered that even though he was standing nearby he wanted to pass unnoticed by Lysis. So I got a hold of myself and held back from my comment.
>
> *Ly.* 210e–211a

Hippothales' thoughts and fears seem to be perfectly transparent to Socrates, and this enables a lively presentation of a nervous and besotted individual. Socrates' psychological expertise corresponds to the requirements for a competent orator listed towards the end of the *Phaedrus* 271e–272a:

> He is competent to say what sort of person is convinced by what sort of discourse. When someone is present he can perceive clearly and prove to himself that *this* is the person and *this* is the character now really in front of him about which he had previously had discussions, and he must apply to it *this* discourse in *this* way in order to create conviction about *these* things.

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26 McKim 1988: 45.

Socrates seems to have an aptitude for this kind of analysis. Most readers of the dialogues have been content to take his conclusions at face value, although those disposed to mistrust his intellectual honesty would doubtless urge us to accept them only with reservations.[27]

Socrates Characterized through Metaphor

Socrates' perplexing and (for some) disturbing character is reflected in the efforts made by himself and others to describe himself through metaphors. We must mention first the famous passage in the *Apology* (Plato's imaginative reconstruction of Socrates' defence speech at his trial) where Socrates compares himself to a gadfly:

> I was attached to the city by the god—if you will allow me to say something rather ridiculous—as to a large and noble horse that was rather sluggish because of its size and needed to be roused up by a gadfly. I think that the god has imposed me on the city as this sort of thing.
>
> *Ap.* 30e

We note here both the insight with which Socrates describes the annoyance he causes and the characteristic humour with which it is presented. He presents himself as an insect and draws attention to the ridiculous nature of the comparison, perhaps in an attempt to diffuse the hostility of the jury. Similar to this is Socrates' comparison of himself to a bee at *Phaedo* 91c. In this conversation just before his execution, Socrates worries that if his argumentation is deceptive, he might, like a bee, leave a sting in his interlocutors even after he is dead. Paradoxically, the reader is aware that Socrates' arguments, whether deceptive or not, did indeed leave a sting in the minds of his interlocutors, as witnessed by the existence of the dialogues themselves.[28] Characterization through metaphor becomes a heuristic tool when it comes to Socrates. Both Socrates and his interlocutors (and ultimately the readers of the dialogues) are encouraged to explore the extent to which any given metaphor is fitting and the implications that this has for the nature of the soul and of philosophy. Thus in the opening pages of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates refuses to be drawn into a discussion of the rationalization of myth because he has not yet learned to 'know himself', whether he is a 'more complex beast than Typhon and more inflamed, or a more

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27 So, for example Berversluis 2000.

28 It can be no accident that the same metaphor was used to describe Pericles in the *Demes* of Eupolis (102 K-A): of all the orators, only his speech remained in the mind of his audience, like a bee sting.

gentle and simpler creature, sharing naturally in a divine and un-Typhonic portion' (*Phdr.* 230a3–6). In the *Theaetetus* Socrates famously compares himself to a midwife (148e–151d). His interlocutor confesses persistent worries about the nature of knowledge and Socrates says that this is because he is 'pregnant'. He then observes that most people think that he (Socrates) is extremely odd and causes people to be at a loss. This is because he is a midwife—though a midwife of souls rather than bodies. This lengthy interlude is broadly apologetic in that it attempts to explain why association with Socrates is sometimes annoying and sometimes ineffective; it also characterizes Socrates as methodologically self-aware.[29]

When interlocutors characterize Socrates, they express his strangeness through animal, human, and mythological metaphor. Meno says that Socrates bewitches and enchants him so that he is at a loss (*Men.* 80a), implying that Socrates is some kind of eristic magician.[30] He expands upon this by referring to Socrates' broader reputation for causing perplexity and by making a 'joking' comparison of Socrates to an electric ray, which numbs anyone who touches it (*Men.* 80a–b). Socrates, however, disputes the accuracy of the comparison (he is only a ray if a ray makes itself numb as well as others) and flirtatiously impugns Meno's motives in making a comparison. The characterizing effect here is complex. Socrates' reservations about the comparison demonstrate his conversational rigour, but they also leave space for speculation about the role of irony here (is Socrates *really* as numb as he claims?). In addition, the reader learns in passing that Meno is good-looking. Socrates asserts that Meno made a likeness of him so that he would in turn make a likeness of Meno; this is because all handsome men enjoy images of themselves (*Men.* 80c). Now, the comment about good looks comes as a surprise: the (unproductive) discussion so far has been about the nature of virtue and physical appearance has not featured at all. It (metonymically) helps to characterize the social milieu in which the conversation takes place, that of the elite male in the late fifth century BCE, where homoerotic flirting is commonplace. Yet it also has an important role to play in the conversational dynamic. Socrates may imply that Meno is good-looking because Meno is frustrated and might abandon the discussion; Socrates compliments him to induce him to continue. The passage thus characterizes Socrates not only explicitly through metaphor, but implicitly by showing his manipulation of his situation through humour and irony.

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29 For a more detailed consideration of the midwife metaphor and its ramifications, see Blondell 2002: 266–277.

30 For Socrates as sorcerer see Belfiore 1980.

The most elaborate characterization of Socrates comes in the *Symposium*, in Alcibiades' drunken speech in praise of Socrates. Alcibiades compares Socrates to the statues of Silenus that open up to reveal images of the gods, along the way giving a physical characterization of Socrates as looking like the satyr Marsyas. But, he says, the comparison does not end there. Like Marsyas, Socrates is a committer of outrage (*hubristēs*), a composer of melodies and flute-player (although unlike Marsyas, he needs no instrument) (*Smp.* 215a–c). He is mad about beautiful boys and claims to know nothing, both characteristics of Silenus according to Alcibiades (*Smp.* 216d), yet inside he is a miracle of sobriety and temperance. Even the usual practice of attempting to describe a character by comparing someone to a mythological hero (or the reverse), e.g. Achilles to Brasidas or Pericles to Nestor fails in the case of Socrates, who is beyond comparison (*Smp.* 221c). His arguments, too, are like hollow Silenus statues: ridiculous on the outside but golden and virtuous within (*Smp.* 221d–222a). This drunken *tour de force* of course characterizes Alcibiades as much as Socrates but is a fitting end to our consideration of characterization through metaphor. It not only attempts to capture the strangeness of a unique character, but foregrounds obtrusive reflection on the process of crafting character metaphors.

Socratic Irony

Socrates is often called ironic, although there continues to be a lively debate on what we should take this to mean.[31] Aristotle (*EN* 1108a22) called pretence in the form of understatement *eirōneia* (its opposite is pretence though exaggeration, *alazōneia*). At 1127b23–26 he comments, 'Self-depreciators, who understate their own merits, seem of a more refined character, for we feel that the motive underlying this form of insincerity is not gain but dislike of ostentation. These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do.' (transl. Rackham) The *eirōn* (self-depreciator), *alazōn* (braggart), and *bōmolokhos* (buffoon) were all types that operated in comedy. When characters claim that Socrates is engaging in *eirōneia*, this is not meant as a compliment and makes him guilty of an offense against sincerity. Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, exasperated by the course the argument has taken, and by Socrates' self-presentation as ignorant and timid ('I was afraid when I looked at him … trembling a little, I said: "Don't be harsh with us, Thrasymachus … I think it's much more appropriate for us to be pitied by you clever people …"', *R.* 336d–337a), has an outburst:

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31 Vlastos 1991; Nightingale 1995: 114–119; Gordon 1999: 117–133; Worman 2008: 198.

> When he heard this he burst out laughing very scornfully and said, 'By Heracles', he said, 'this is that habitual irony (*eirōneia*) of Socrates. I knew this and said previously to these people that you would not be willing to answer but would be ironic (*eirōneusaio*) and do anything rather than answer.'
>
> *R.* 337a

For Socrates' opponents insincerity is a defining characteristic of his intellectual procedure. They accuse him also of twisting their words and talking off the subject (*Grg.* 489b–c, 491a–b, 497b). Even Socrates' admirer Alcibiades accuses him of irony, 'he lives his life continually ironizing (*eirōneuomenos*) and joking' (*Smp.* 216e), and reports him speaking 'very ironically (*eirōnikōs*) and very much in his accustomed manner' (*Smp.* 218d). More than one point is at issue here. First is the matter of specifying a certain aspect of Socrates' character in several dialogues of the corpus. When he proclaims ignorance, how seriously should we take him, and what is the nature of this ignorance?[32] Second is the problem of the extent to which Socrates is a reliable narrator. If he is disposed to humour, exaggeration, and irony (whether through false modesty or through making statements that imply the opposite of their surface meanings) how do we know whether to trust his narratives? Yet centuries of readers have projected themselves into the story world and taken the character of Socrates for an authoritative guide, even a paradigm for the philosophical life. Doubts on this front have led to studies such as that of Beversluis, for whom Socratic irony is a form of aggression: 'His ostensibly self-deprecating remarks are always thinly-veiled criticisms of his interlocutors'.[33] On such an approach, Plato's character Socrates is (demonstrably) insincere and an argumentative fraud.

The solution to this interpretative quandary is beyond the scope of this essay, yet as we leave this issue it is worth asking why Plato has chosen to present Socrates in this way. As Vlastos remarked, Xenophon did not do so.[34] As was the case with Socrates characterized through metaphor, the irony of Socrates bespeaks his uniqueness and the feeling that he is, as a character, difficult to grasp. If he is an *eirōn* we are tempted to understand some of his

32 He states in the *Apology* his opinion that he was wise because he recognized his own ignorance (21d) and that human wisdom amounts to very little (23a–b). When he says he knows nothing, this might be a product of philosophical conviction. Self-depreciation/irony would then be a consistent approach to life, and Aristotle would be wrong to take this as pretence.

33 Beversluis 2000: 259.

34 Vlastos 1991: 32.

more troublesome interlocutors as the opposing comic type of braggart, and to see their encounters as in some sense comic. Yet the stakes are high: life and death for Socrates, and thus no ordinary comedy. Blondell speaks aptly of Socrates as the embodiment of the serio-comic (*spoudaiogeloion*). Given that this presentation is Plato's literary construction it is fair to infer that difficulties in interpreting Socrates are part of the philosophic project.[35] When the reader undertakes the task of assessing the nature of his irony, she is engaged in ethical investigation and coming to the grips with the mystery of philosophical motivation.

The Interlocutors

Socrates' interlocutors are an essential ingredient in the Socratic dialogue. Indeed, the presence of interlocutors is a more enduring narrative phenomenon in Plato's works than Socrates himself is, although the intensity of their participation changes. As we have seen, they are drawn from a fairly restricted social background. Women are not directly represented (apart from the brief appearance of Socrates' wife Xanthippe in the *Phaedo*), although Socrates does claim to report the speech of two unusual women: Diotima the seer (*Symposium*) and Aspasia the partner of Pericles (*Menexenus*). Craftsmen are absent despite Socrates fondness for using craft metaphors when he attempts to understand a given expertise.[36] Socrates' youthful friends are all members of the Athenian leisured elite; their elder lovers, friends, and relatives are, for the most part, similar. Many (with the exception of metics such as Cephalus) entertain political ambitions, and therefore seek out interactions with travelling intellectual professionals such as Protagoras and Gorgias. This latter group generates Socrates' most lively conversations, since the result of the encounter is often the debunking of intellectual pretension and a challenge to prestige. This is why the action of these conversations is so often characterized in hunting, military and athletic metaphors.[37] Yet whether the dialogue partner is a sophist, an ambitious youth, a general or some other category of established citizen, the discussion is always brought home to the character of the interlocutor. As the general Nicias says:

35 Blondell 2002: 69 sees Socrates as mysterious both because of his ironical manner and because his contradictory nature allows him to embody the paradoxes of the human condition.

36 Beversluis 2000: 29–30.

37 Louis 1945: 53–55, 57–63, 212–217.

> whoever gets very close to Socrates and engages with him in conversation, is compelled, even if he begins by talking about something else, to go on being led around by him in speech until he falls into giving an account of himself, how he lives now and how he has lived his previous life.
>
> *La.* 187e–188a

Socrates is interested not just in examining propositions but in examining lives, and every encounter showcases the character of the interlocutor.

We have already surveyed some of the techniques employed by the Socratic narrator to characterize those with whom he speaks. The self-professed experts are shown to be arrogant, reluctant, and, to varying degrees, helpless in the face of Socrates' questioning. In spite of his argumentative skill, however, they remain unpersuaded; Callicles' response (in a dramatic dialogue) is instructive: 'Somehow or other you seem to me to be right, Socrates, but my experience is that of the many: I don't entirely believe you.' (*Grg.* 513c). In non-narrated dialogues, the speakers are characterized by the arguments they make and by their reactions to Socrates' comments. Let us take Euthyphro as an example. This prophet and religious expert is on his way to prosecute his father for murder when he runs into Socrates and has a discussion about the nature of piety (one that ends in *aporia*). Euthyphro's complacency is communicated by the several times he draws a distinction between himself and his expertise and the crowd. He confesses that the Athenians laugh at him in the assembly when he makes a prophecy, even though they all come true. He sympathizes with Socrates over the impiety charge on which he is being prosecuted but maintains that the Athenians 'are jealous of all people such as ourselves' (*Euthphr.* 3c). When Socrates doubts his expertise, he declares that if he could not distinguish holy from unholy deeds 'Euthyphro would be no different from the general run of men' (5a). Later, when he cannot defend his understanding of piety, he is confused, without, however, suspecting that there is any failure on his part; the arguments simply will not stay put, and he suspects that Socrates is to blame (11b–d). With a more skilled interlocutor, this suspicion would build into outright hostility; in the current instance it merely results in Euthyphro's swift exit from the scene. Euthyphro is painted in broad strokes; we might say he embodies the type of unjustified intellectual complacency, but he is individualized by the specifics of his profession, his naivety, and the nature of the activity that brings him into contact with Socrates (prosecution of his father because of his convictions).

The interlocutors in the dialogues are also carefully characterized by their speech. Alcibiades' drunken intervention in the *Symposium* is chaotic, flowery, and extravagant, while the speech of Phaedrus in the same dialogue is poetic

in some of its rhythms and is full of Gorgianic features. In the *Gorgias*, Polus too speaks in a style that is recognisably Gorgianic. The speech attributed to Lysias and read by Phaedrus, Lysias' admirer, in *Phaedrus* is clearly Lysianic in its use of particles such as *kai men dē*, and may indeed be a Platonic parody of Lysias' prose.[38] Thrasymachus in the *Republic* is aggressive and forceful, perhaps reflecting his reputation for a powerful and emotionally stirring style.[39] Socrates himself usually speaks in a down-to-earth fashion, characterized as we have seen by humour and irony, but even he can be carried away on occasion, as when he verges on 'dithyrambic' speech in the lines preceding *Phaedrus* 238d and 'epic' as he brings his speech to a close at 241d–e.

'Late' Dialogues

In the dialogues that are conventionally called 'late' Socrates begins to take a back seat in the discussion and cede his place either to a mysterious 'Eleatic Stranger' (*Sophist, Statesman*) or to the philosopher-politicians Timaeus and Critias (*Timaeus*, *Critias*). In Plato's final dialogue, *Laws*, Socrates is absent altogether and the philosophical expert is an Athenian Stranger, speaking to a Spartan and a Cretan. In *Sophist* and *Statesman*, the interlocutor is a well-behaved philosophical novice, young Socrates (a younger namesake of Socrates). In *Timaeus* and *Critias* Socrates and two others listen in turn as the narratives of cosmology and Atlantis unfold. Although these works do have some stretches of lively interaction, they never rise to the same density of characterization as the rest of the 'earlier' dialogues, and serious conflict is absent.[40] This seems to have been a conscious choice on Plato's part. Often quoted in this connection is the remark of the Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophist*. When asked whether he would rather conduct his explanation as a speech or do it through questioning, he replies 'It's easier to proceed talking to someone else, Socrates, when one's respondent is docile and doesn't cause trouble' (217d). For positive exposition of complex ideas, dialogical warfare is unsuitable. The late interlocutors are, then, to a greater extent 'flat' characters, or as Beversluis uncharitably puts it 'they cease to be recognizable individuals with minds of their own and tend to be faceless straightmen who can be relied upon to produce the desired response'.[41]

38 Shorey 1933.

39 Worman 2002: 154, 2008: 204.

40 But see also Gill 2002: 151, 'The main speakers in the later dialogues are varied and distinctively characterized, at least as regards philosophical method and project'.

41 Beversluis 2000: 378.

There is, of course, another way of looking at this, and at the presentation of Plato's two Strangers. This is the approach of Blondell, who sees philosophic reasons for the move towards blandness and lack of individuality in interlocutors and the indeterminate identity of the Eleatic Stranger. Theaetetus and young Socrates in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* are relatively colourless because they are young and unformed, uncorrupted by life in the Athenian polis. Yet they both have great potential. The Eleatic Stranger (Blondell notes how significant it is that he has no name) is unengaged in Athenian life and transcends intellectual parochialism. His creation would then free Plato from the baggage of historicity and Socratic characterization. On this reading, the Stranger is the type of the ideal philosopher and models the transcendence of the particular that it the ultimate goal of Platonic philosopher.[42]

Conclusion

For all of his idiosyncrasies, Socrates prides himself on his intellectual and argumentative consistency. Once he has established something through argument, he will not back away from it, even if it means ridicule or death; as he says at *Crito* 46b, 'not now for the first time, but always, I have been the sort of man who obeys nothing other than the argument that appears best to me as I consider it. I cannot now, when this fortune has befallen me, throw out the arguments that I spoke previously.' The goal of philosophy is to create a stable character and Socrates embodies that goal. The non-philosopher, on the other hand, may be at the mercy of his passions (or, if he has political ambitions, of public opinion). Socrates' interlocutors vary widely in their character and are never merely types, even though they may emerge as strongly representative of certain categories of people such as sophists or generals.[43] They are drawn with vivid detail (the urbane Protagoras at the centre of his chorus of admirers, the good-natured metic Cephalus who potters off to attend to sacrifices when the discussion gets too much for him, the enthusiastic Hippocrates who wakes up Socrates in the wee hours of the morning), reinforcing in their variety Gill's fundamental point that each dialectical encounter has its own integrity and significance.[44] The dialogues are rooted in the specific: individuals in particular situations with particular beliefs and ambitions, strengths and weaknesses.

42 Blondell 2002: 314–396.

43 Beversluis 2000: 8–9; Blondell 2002: 68–69.

44 Gill 2002: 153.

Socrates' task (and the task of philosophy) is to make them look beyond the particular to the universal and to transform moral instability and irresponsibility into reasoned virtue. Plato's characterization does ample justice both to the engagingly idiosyncratic and to the aspiration towards a moral and intellectual uniformity of the highest calibre.

PART 7

Biography

CHAPTER 25

Xenophon

*Luuk Huitink**

The Importance of Character

The starting point of *Cyropaedia* is an observation about the problems of instability and disobedience in the city and the household. It then proceeds to hold up the Persian king Cyrus the Great (c. 600 or 576–530 BCE) as a paradigm to show that humans can be ruled on the basis of knowledge (*epistamenōs*), just like cattle and horses: here was a man who not only acquired a large empire, but also stably ruled over subjects who were 'willing to obey (*ethelēsantas peithesthai*)' (1.1.3).[1] The narrator frames character as the central factor in explaining Cyrus' success:

> Therefore we have made an investigation of this man, on the ground that he is worthy to be wondered at (*hōs axion onta thaumazesthai*),[2] looking into who he was by birth (*gennan*), of what quality his natural endowments (*phusin*) were and what sort of education (*paideiai*) he enjoyed that he so greatly excelled in ruling over men. So, all we have learned or think we know about him, we shall attempt to relate.
>
> 1.1.6

In a further programmatic passage,[3] the narrator next gives Cyrus' noble lineage—he is the son of the Persian king Cambyses and Mandane, the daughter of the Median king Astyages—and comments on his *phusis* or inborn qualities:

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1 All references are to *Cyr*., unless specified otherwise; all translations are mine.

2 *Pace* Gray in *SAGN* 1: 391, the verb does not mean 'admire'. As Baragwanath 2012: 632 and Harman 2012: 444 show, *thauma*-language is throughout Xenophon's corpus associated more with 'wonder' and 'scrutiny' than with 'admiration' and 'praise'. I add that, *pace* Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 59, 63, this sets *Cyr.* apart from the explicit language of praise used in Xenophon's own encomiastic biography *Agesilaus* and Isocrates' Cyprian orations; cf. *Ages.* 1.1 (*epainon*), 10.3 (*enkōmion*; cf. Isoc. 3.7, 9.8). This does not imply that Xenophon does not intend readers to evaluate Cyrus positively, but it does mean that their engagement with Cyrus should go deeper than uncritical praise (or blame, for that matter).

3 Cf. Azoulay 2004b: 321, Sandridge 2012: 15.

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> It is still now reported in stories and songs by the barbarians that he was by nature (*phunai*) most beautiful in appearance (*eidos men kallistos*) and most benevolent in soul, most eager to learn and most ambitious (*psukhēn de philanthrōpotatos kai philomathestatos kai philotimotatos*), so that he endured every labour and engaged in every dangerous enterprise for the sake of being praised.
>
> 1.2.1

There then follows a lengthy narrative, which treats Cyrus' childhood and education, partly set at the Median court of his maternal grandfather (1.2.1–1.5.1); his second departure for Media and the war against Assyria, in the course of which he carries out many military reforms and also effectively replaces his uncle Cyaxares as the sole ruler of a unified Persian-Median empire (1.5.2–7.5.36); the consolidation of his government and, very briefly, the expansion of the empire (7.5.37–8.6.28); and his old age and death (8.7.1–28). The narrative spans Cyrus' entire life,[4] but the coverage is very uneven, with the lengthy second part probably covering only a single year in fabula-time.[5] An epilogue (8.8) exchanges narrative for analysis once more and argues that after Cyrus' death the Persian empire changed for the worse under his descendants. The epilogue has been variously interpreted,[6] but if, as I think likely, Xenophon in part wishes to impart to his readers that a government is only as good as the character of its leader(s),[7] it once more underlines just how crucial Cyrus' character is in explaining his success.

Character between Philosophy and Narrative

Cyropaedia does not offer its readers many clues as to the intentions of its author. However, the work has since antiquity most commonly been read as belonging to the genre of *politeia*-literature on the best forms of government. Cicero, for instance, saw it as a 'mirror of princes', claiming that Xenophon did not portray Cyrus 'true to history (*ad historiae fidem*)', but 'as a model

4 The relentless focus on Cyrus is relieved by the insertion of a number of subplots, which temporarily hone in on other characters; for these so-called 'novellas', see Gera 1993: 1–2, 192–279.

5 Due 1989: 49–50, Tuplin 1997: 100–103; see *SAGN* 2: 385–396 (Beck).

6 See Gray 2011: 246–263 for analysis and further references.

7 Sandridge 2012: 88.

of just rule (*ad effigiem iusti imperii*)'.[8] On such a reading, Cyrus embodies Xenophon's views of the 'ideal' military and political leader, being 'a useful figure to be clothed as his author likes'.[9] Thus, the direct characterization of Cyrus quoted above resonates with several Xenophontic preoccupations, including the emphasis on Cyrus' nobility, which seems to be a condition for successful leadership in Xenophon's thought,[10] and the attribution to Cyrus of key virtues which Xenophon elsewhere, too, singles out as contributing to a leader's success (this includes Cyrus' beauty, as this quality inspires loyalty).[11] It is also relevant that the passage is focalized through the descendants of Cyrus' original subjects, because people's recognition of a leader's virtues is what according to Xenophon ensures the all-important 'willing obedience' mentioned at the outset (the impression which people have of Cyrus is a recurring theme).[12]

In a broader narratological analysis along these lines, Stadter calls *Cyropaedia* a 'utopian vision'.[13] Drawing attention to the fact that it contains almost none of the precise indications of time and geographical locations we expect from a work of historiography, he claims that the universe of *Cyropaedia* is a transparently fictional Shangri-La, which is moreover populated by several actually fabricated characters. He then proceeds to read the narrative as one might read *Memorabilia*, as a series of loosely connected scenes, 'each an example of virtuous behaviour in human relations'; he is not prepared even to pose the question of Cyrus' 'imperial goals' (how he came to rule the empire that earlier belonged to his uncle Cyaxares), because doing so would 'imply that the *Cyropaideia* is a history, and Cyrus a real person, who can be judged on the basis of his actions.'[14] Such a reading also implies that Xenophon may sacri-

8 *Q.fr.* 1.1.23; cf. D.H. *Pomp.* 4.1.7 for a description of Cyrus as a 'likeness (*eikona*) of a good and happy king'. See Nickel 1979: 58, Gera 1993: 11. Cf. Connor 1985: 461–463 for a brief sketch of *politeia*-literature. Due 1989: 30 and Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 56 note the similarities between the proems of *Cyr.* and Xenophon's political treatise *Lac.*

9 Gera 1993: 2; such analyses are developed in detail by e.g. Due 1989, Gray 2011.

10 Tamiolaki 2012: 576–577. It is intriguing to note that Pheraulas, one 'of the people (*dēmotōn*)', but 'not like a lowborn man (*ouk agennei andri eoikōs*)' (2.3.7), should in the end forfeit his acquired power and wealth (8.3.35–50)—he is unfit to rule and he knows it.

11 On these virtues in Xenophon, see above all Sandridge 2012: 59–78. Cf. Due 1989, Mueller-Goldingen 1995, Azoulay 2004b, Gray 2011.

12 Cf. Gray 2007: 7–8, 2011: 15–18 on 'willing obedience', and 100 on focalization as a way of underlining the importance of the open manifestation of virtue in Xenophon.

13 Stadter 1991: 468 = 2010: 374.

14 Stadter 1991: 490–491, 2010: 398–399.

fice consistency in Cyrus' characterization on the altar of his didactic purposes, because these may differ from one scene to the next.[15]

However, by presenting *Cyropaedia* as the result of an investigation into Cyrus' life and career ('what we have learned'), Xenophon also aligns it with the genre of historiography.[16] And it has been argued that interpretations of *Cyropaedia* as being largely fictional underestimate the extent to which it contains recognizably historical elements in the accounts of Cyrus' Persian education and his military and political reforms.[17] Partly on this basis, it has been claimed that Xenophon's identification of a Persian king as his 'ideal' ruler was intended to shock his Greek audience,[18] although the work's historicity has also been used by Carlier to support the claim that, far from presenting Cyrus as a positive paradigm, Xenophon really intended to expose the weakness of Persian institutions.[19] Furthermore, not all scholars have been prepared to discard the fact that *Cyropaedia* offers what is after all a largely continuous narrative. Thus, Nadon approaches it as one might *Anabasis*, insisting that events and speeches must be analysed within their dramatic context, evaluated against the contingencies faced by the characters and in light of the movement of the story as a whole. For him, the real story of *Cyropaedia* is Cyrus' relentless pursuit of power and he claims that the narrative shows how Cyrus acquires his empire by dishonest means; he makes much of supposed inconsistencies between Cyrus' short-term actions and speeches and his alleged long-term goals.[20]

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15 Cf. Gera 1993: 115. Her example is Cyrus' scathing remark about the value of exhortatory speeches (3.3.55), though elsewhere he delivers such speeches. But her point can be disputed, because what Cyrus actually argues is that delivering exhortatory speeches is pointless only if the audience is otherwise uneducated in military virtue—this plainly does not hold for Cyrus' well-trained army.

16 Cf. Sandridge 2012: 4. See Due 1989: 117–135 and Gera 1993: *passim* for Xenophon's engagement with historiography (notably Herodotus).

17 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985 = 2010, Hirsch 1985: 61–97 and Tuplin 1997: 95–154, 2012 defend *Cyr.*'s value as a legitimate historical source (and, implicitly, its status as a work of historiography) for Old Persia.

18 Cf. Hirsch 1985: 41–42. It is true that Cyrus generally enjoys a fairly good reputation in Greek literature (cf. Gera 1993: 7–8), but that is not the same as turning him into the 'ideal' ruler. We would be better able to assess the 'shock value' of Xenophon's choice if we knew more about Antisthenes' works entitled 'Cyrus' (for which see now Prince 2015: 145–146).

19 Carlier 1978 =2010.

20 Nadon 2001: esp. pp. 24, 40. Less radical, but similar analyses are offered by Tatum 1989; Azoulay 2004b.

Even if we are not prepared to accept Carlier's and Nadon's conclusion that Xenophon puts Cyrus in a bad light (their readings are ultimately dependent on the questionable *a priori* assumption that Xenophon is an 'ironical' author who always means the opposite of what he says),[21] it is revealing that they base their case in large part on *Cyropaedia*'s narrative format. For no matter how schematic and unhistorical the narrative may be in certain respects, Xenophon chose to answer a *universal* question (what is the 'ideal' form of government?) in *particularizing* terms ('Cyrus, who was such-and-such a man and did such-and-such things'), and this must surely influence views of Cyrus' 'ideality' and 'exemplarity'.[22] For example, the programmatic statement quoted above does not simply flag up Cyrus' nobility, but stresses his specific ethnic identity as half-Persian and half-Median, and this will prove relevant later on, when the 'ideal' government which he establishes as king is founded, according to Xenophon, on a mixture of specifically Persian and Median institutions.[23] Furthermore, the superlative formulation of Cyrus' character (he possesses *kallos*, *philanthrōpia*, *philomathia* and *philotimia* to an outstanding degree) may be thought to make him a supremely successful leader, but also a unique and not so easily imitated one (how many Cyruses do you know? Can you be Cyrus?).

There is, I think, a still more important point to the in-built tension between the universal and the particular, which can be brought out by reminding ourselves of the fact that several ancient authors claim that *Cyropaedia* was Xenophon's answer to Plato's *Republic*.[24] That work sketches a truly utopian society, in which everybody knows their place and all upheavals (really all 'happenings') are prevented. Xenophon, by contrast, chooses to dramatize the ways in which an exceptional leader needs to deal with particular, concrete problems, in the conviction that such problems will inevitably rise: there is a down-to-earth, realistic 'as good as it gets (or got)' quality to Xenophon's theory of leadership. Furthermore, as Vandiver has argued, while Plato casts *philotimia* ('ambition, love of honour') as a vice and an undesirable catalyst of change, Xenophon posits himself as its defender, both acknowledging it as a driving force in political life and attempting to give it a place.[25] And it is difficult to

21 See Dorion 2010 for a critical account of the intellectual underpinnings of this 'Straussian' approach to Xenophon.

22 Cf. Sandridge 2012: 8–9.

23 8.2; see Gera 1993: 293–295. Perhaps not coincidentally, this is the point at which she thinks the positive portrait of Cyrus darkens.

24 D.L. 3.34, Aul. Gell. *Noct. Att.* 14.3.

25 Vandiver 2014.

see how he could argue his case without showing how an ambitious character (who is, indeed, a 'character' in the 'he's quite a character' sense of that word) negotiates his way through life without narrating how that character achieved his ambitions. Also important, finally, is Sandridge's insight that there are inherent tensions between the three virtues which Xenophon ascribes to Cyrus, especially between the first (*philanthrōpia* 'love of humanity') and the third (*philotimia*); for instance, readers familiar with the literary tradition on Cyrus may well ask how Cyrus fulfilled his ambition of becoming the ruler of a vast empire in a 'philanthropic' way; again, the narrative format is Xenophon's medium of choice to show how such contradictions may be solved (and perhaps not entirely solved).[26]

Cyropaedia derives much of its interest and energy from the fact that Xenophon does not always explicitly answer such questions. In particular, while the beginning of the narrative characterizes Cyrus in very explicit terms and gives readers the impression that they are 'on top of' him, the narrator later largely withdraws explicit comments and at certain moments even distances the readers from his protagonist, instead making it more easy to identify and empathize with the characters with whom Cyrus comes into contact and whose lives he shapes, even if their dispositions and responses may not be 'ideal'.[27] This also opens up alternative and at times unsettling perspectives on Cyrus. Thus, in what follows I will argue that Xenophon makes Cyrus exemplify his 'ideal' leader, but also that he dramatizes the conduct of this leader in ways which suggest that understanding and dealing with him are not always easy or straightforward. This sort of reading is in line with ancient critics' assessment of Xenophon's style as being marked by *apheleia* or simplicity. For one important ingredient of that style is the implicit delineation of character: readers are to infer from simple statements of fact what a certain person is like.[28]

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26 Sandridge 2012: 107, 120.

27 Shifts in the narratorial voice are a Xenophontic peculiarity and seem designed to create uncertainty; cf. Bradley 2001: 70–71 = 2010: 535–536 on the narrator's 'withdrawal' from *An.* after Book 1, and *SAGN* 2: 147–163 (Rood) on a shift in the temporal scheme after Book 2 of *HG*, whose imprecision is eloquent of Xenophon's view of the chaotic texture of Greek history after the Peloponnesian War.

28 [Aristid.] *Peri aph.* 40–42.

Cyrus' Education

The first phase of the narrative deals with Cyrus' upbringing and education (*paideia*), though, somewhat oddly, while Xenophon offers a systematic exposition of Persian educational practices (1.2), we are not told how Cyrus functioned in it, except in a later analepsis.[29] The narrative really only starts with a set of instructive incidents that take place during Cyrus' prolonged stay at the court of his Median grandfather Astyages (1.3–4), which interrupts his Persian education. These chapters abundantly characterize Cyrus through a wide variety of means, which are geared towards elucidating his innate and acquired traits, respectively.[30]

To begin with, the narrator motivates a number of actions in terms of the attributes which he singled out at the beginning as characteristic of Cyrus' nature in general. He so suggests that in important ways the man was already present in the boy, which is in line with other stories that instantiate the familiar motif of the child destined for great things.[31] Thus, the readiness with which Cyrus petitions his grandfather on behalf of his peers is 'due to his benevolence (*philanthrōpian*) and ambition (*philotimian*)' (1.4.1) (these virtues here operate *in tandem*), while his inquisitiveness is attributed to his 'being eager to learn (*dia to philomathēs einai*)' (as well as to his Persian education; 1.4.3). When Artabazus tries to steal a kiss from Cyrus, it is because he was struck by 'his beauty (*tōi kallei*)' (1.4.27).[32] The fact that Cyrus works hard to get the better of his peers in various activities (see especially 1.4.4–5, on horsemanship) is an only slightly more implicit early demonstration of the narrator's initial assertion that Cyrus 'endured every labour' as well as a nice realistic touch. On the other hand, Cyrus receives only little formal instruction, and the anecdotes concerning hunting and war rather imply that he is a 'natural born' huntsman and soldier, thus enriching our picture of Cyrus' *phusis*.[33]

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29 1.3.16–17; see *SAGN* 2: 387–389 (Beck).

30 Cf. Due 1989: 150–152.

31 Herodotus' account of the young Cyrus (1.107–122) is particularly relevant. Cf. Pelling 1990b: 213–214, 226 for the Greek habit of retrojecting aspects of a man's later life onto his childhood.

32 Cf. Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 96–97, and Dihle [1956] 1970: 25 on Xenophon's habit of exemplifying explicitly mentioned moral traits through narrative instantiations of them. The relation between the two is not always unproblematic, though (cf. Rood in this volume on Xenophon's (→) historiography).

33 Cf. Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 98. Two other traits which will remain with Cyrus are also here introduced for the first time: his wit, as demonstrated in a series of frank remarks

Xenophon's insistence on Cyrus' pre-eminence among his peers (1.3.1, 1.3.12, 1.4.5, 1.5.1) is also a standard feature of stories of the youth of future kings, which often foreshadow the protagonist's position in later life (cf. Hdt. 1.114). There are also more specific prefiguring 'firsts', ranging from the concrete—for instance, Cyrus' distribution of food to his servants as a reward for their services (1.3.7) establishes a lifelong habit (see especially 8.2.3) which underlines the continuity between managing a household and managing the state noted in the proem—to the symbolical, as when Cyrus' first battle pits him against the Assyrian crown prince (1.4.16–24), who as king will be Cyrus' chief opponent. The narrator does not forego the opportunity of indirect characterization through comparison here: after Cyrus' risky but impressive hunt on rough terrain (1.4.8), we learn that the Assyrian prince, by contrast, takes care to hunt 'safely (*asphalōs*)' and uses attendants to drive the animals to level ground (1.4.16): this is the man who as king will leave the initiative in battle to Cyrus and his own supreme command to Croesus. The foundations of the clash between Cyrus and Cyaxares are similarly laid in the first hunting scene. First scolding him for his rash behaviour, Cyaxares quickly gives in, adding a comment which reveals much about their future relationship: 'Do as you wish,' he says, 'for you now seem to be our king' (1.4.9).[34]

This strand of Cyrus' characterization is balanced by Xenophon's keen interest in child psychology, something which is largely absent from standard Greek narratives about the early years of great men. For example, when the young Cyrus in Herodotus addresses his grandfather 'rather freely' (Hdt. 1.116.1: *eleutherōterē*; the word connotes nobility), the implication is that his manner betrays his royal ancestry: already he behaves like the king he will become. But when Xenophon reports, perhaps echoing the Herodotean passage, that Cyrus 'rashly (*propetōs*)' answered Astyages, he explains it with a reference to 'what may be expected from a boy (*pais*) who is not yet shy (*hupoptēssōn*)' (1.3.8). A similarly motivated action is Cyrus' hugging of Astyages upon their first meeting: this forward behaviour is excused with the statement that Cyrus was 'by nature an affectionate boy' (1.3.2). Also in line with Cyrus' youthful impulsivity is his tendency to show, and act on, his emotions: given a luxurious Median robe, he 'was delighted (*hēdeto*)' (1.3.3); when Astyages fell ill, he wept, because he 'was very afraid (*huperephobeito*) that his grandfather would die' (1.4.2); he

during a dinner with his grandfather and mother (1.3.4–12), and his eagerness to gratify others (the key term is *kharizesthai*: 1.3.12, 1.3.13, 1.4.2). Both these attributes help explain his talent for making friends.

34 Due 1989: 55–56. See also the first battle scene, in which Cyaxares 'followed behind' Cyrus (1.4.22), a characteristic order, as will become clear.

'vehemently desired (*epithumōn ... sphodra*)' to go out on a hunt (1.4.6), and when on a different occasion Astyages refused to let him, he became 'sulky and sullen-faced (*aniaros ... kai skuthrōpos*)' (and so got his way) (1.4.14); after his first battle, Astyages recognized that he was 'high on daring' (*mainomenon ... tēi tolmēi*), which manifested itself through his inability to keep his eyes off the corpses left on the battlefield (1.4.24).[35]

Xenophon is not interested in this aspect of Cyrus' characterization for its own sake, however. Rather, they allow him to show that a naturally virtuous character driven by such virtues as *philotimia* is prone to excess if it is not tempered by an awareness of one's limits and a certain amount of discretion in dealing with others (virtues which elsewhere are called *sōphrosunē*, *enkrateia* and *pronoia*).[36] He completes his portrait of the young Cyrus by relating how he gradually becomes more self-aware. As he grew older, he became less talkative and used a gentler voice, and was 'gradually filled with shame (*aidous ... enepimplato*)', so that he often blushed and behaved less 'rashly (*propetōs*)', but began to leave behind his 'puppyish behaviour of jumping up to all (*to skulakōdes to pasin homoiōs prospiptein*)' (1.4.4). Xenophon elaborates this remark in two similes: during a hunt, Cyrus cries out 'like a well-bred puppy (*hōsper skulaki gennaiōi*)' (1.4.15), while later, during his first battle, he unthinkingly launches an attack 'like a well-bred, but inexperienced dog (*hōsper ... kuōn gennaios apeiros*)' (1.4.21). These similes hint at Cyrus' development, but also cast him as not yet having attained his due position in life: for Cyrus will not grow up to be a 'dog'; such comparisons to animals are elsewhere in *Cyropaedia* reserved only for Cyrus' social inferiors.[37] Cyrus' increasing shyness is encapsulated in a memorable phrase: while he used to blame Astyages' steward Sacas for not always allowing him access to his grandfather, he now 'became a Sacas unto himself' (1.4.5).

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35 Cyrus' sulking and battle-*mania* may remind us of heroic models of behaviour, notably Achilles. There may be an intertextual reference to Pl. *R.* 439e–440a (as also suggested by Vandiver 2014: 97), where a similar anecdote about gazing upon corpses serves to establish the base, 'desiring' part of Plato's tripartite soul. Xenophon himself operates with a notion of a bipartite soul, containing a good and a bad side, one of which may 'conquer' the other (6.1.41). Xenophon, then, may be implying that Cyrus has not yet learned to make his 'good soul' prevail in all situations. If so, the anecdote illustrates Cyrus' immaturity rather than, as Nadon 2001: 160 will have it, 'a cruel twist to Cyrus' soul'.

36 Cf. Vandiver 2014: 94–95.

37 Cf. e.g. 1.6.19, 2.2.26. Drawing analogies between man and dog may reflect a Socratic habit; cf. e.g. *Mem.* 2.7.13–14, 4.1.3.

In the most intriguing episode which highlights Cyrus' development his friends ask him to request Astyages' permission for them to go out hunting, but Cyrus answers that for reasons unclear to himself he finds himself no longer able openly to approach his grandfather: 'I do not know what kind of man I have become (*hostis anthrōpos gegenēmai*)'; but he is 'stung (*edēkhthē*)' by the prospect of his friends turning elsewhere to procure favours (1.4.12–13). For the first time, Cyrus becomes aware (if only dimly) of the fact that *philanthrōpia* and *philotimia* cannot always be pursued without losing one's own sense of honour and self-esteem. However, the sequel shows how he finds his feet: he finally 'ordered himself to take the dare' and speak to Astyages in the 'least painful (*alupotata*)' but most effective way (1.4.13). There follows a quite extraordinary dialogue, which reveals Cyrus' sense of inferiority in that he compares himself to a slave:

> 'What would Astyages do if he caught a runaway servant?' 'Chain him and force him to work.' 'And what if the servant came back of his own accord?' 'Beat him, so that he would not try to escape again.' 'Then prepare to beat me, because I am planning to run away and take my agemates out on a hunt.' 'I forbid you to go: it would be a fine thing if I let my daughter's son stray out for a few pieces of meat!'
>
> 1.4.13, paraphrased

Hitherto, Cyrus' manner of expressing himself has been characterized by a frank bluntness (see especially 1.3.1–11), but he now pursues his goal indirectly, through an argument by analogy, the point of which is presumably that Astyages is revealed to pronounce a judgement on his own grandson which he would not be prepared actually to carry out. In this respect, the episode constitutes another 'first': several subsequent episodes will show Cyrus using argumentative techniques which are reminiscent of those used by Socrates in *Memorabilia*,[38] although he is here not yet as sophisticated and successful as Socrates: Astyages flatly denies the validity of the analogy with the words 'my daughter's son'.[39] Cyrus responds by passing his time 'sulky and sullen-faced', until his grandfather gives way (1.4.14).

Interestingly, much about this episode remains unclear. The narrator refrains from clarifying how Cyrus learned to argue in this specific way (one may con-

38 Gera 1993: 28–29.

39 Cf. Gera 1993: 28–30 and Tatum 1989: 109–110 for different thoughts on Cyrus' point and failure.

trast the reference to Tigranes' sophistic education at 3.1.14; see below), but also from telling us why Cyrus thought this was the 'least painful' way of handling his problem,[40] and from elucidating the precise point of the analogy—in short, he makes no effort to fill the gap that has opened up between what Cyrus says and what he wants. Paradoxically, to some readers the very artificiality and formality of Cyrus' new way of speaking may suggest a certain depth and individuality of character. Xenophon does not, I think, cast a sinister light on Cyrus—discretion in human interaction is sensible and a sign of maturity—but he does suggest that 'the man Cyrus has become' will not always be easy to read. And here another paradox makes itself felt. As my survey has shown, the childhood narrative largely deals with the characterization of Cyrus in transparent ways: much of his conduct is explicitly motivated by the narrator in terms of his inborn virtues, his youth or his emotions and desires. These strategies of characterization point to an integrated concept of character, in that the reader is given the tools to categorize Cyrus' behaviour using familiar frames of reference. If there is anything to 'wonder' about, it is the remarkable degree to which Cyrus possesses the virtues ascribed to him. In the remainder, however, precisely when Cyrus' engagement with the world around him becomes more complex, the narrator for the most part refrains from making explicit characterizing comments about his protagonist. He now places different demands on the reader.

Virtue in Action, or: When Worlds Collide

Cyrus' education is concluded with the long conversation on the art of ruling between him and his father Cambyses (1.6). His innate and acquired abilities are now perfected and enable him successfully to deal with all eventualities.[41] In that sense, Cyrus may be called 'a constant, unvarying figure, a static embod-

40 And there is uncertainty about who is spared pain, Cyrus or Astyages; contrast Bizos' translation in the Budé edition ('sans s' attirer aucun ennui') with Gera's 1993: 29 ('without paining his grandfather'). Against Gera's interpretation it may be objected that it is difficult to see how Astyages could be expected to be *less* offended by a direct question than by being caught in a dialectical trap, and that the foregoing paragraph has focused on *Cyrus*' predicament.

41 Nickel 1979: 57–58, Due 1989: 148. There are (often implicit) back-references to Cyrus' *paideia* throughout, in particular to the conversation in 1.6, which show Cyrus putting theory into practice; e.g. when Cyrus chooses a 'healthy' location to construct a camp (6.1.23), he follows Cambyses' advice (1.6.16).

iment of success'.[42] It need not be concluded, however, that the main thrust of the narrative is 'revelatory' rather than 'exploratory'.[43] For Cyrus still needs to negotiate the sometimes competing demands of his various character traits and the narrative explores several concrete ways in which he does so, often leaving it to the reader to figure out exactly what 'lesson' they should draw from it.

In many parts of the narrative, to be sure, things proceed in a fairly unproblematic way. For example, at one point Cyrus predicts (rightly, as the sequel shows) that, if the Persians allow their Median and Hyrcanian allies to divide the spoils, they will later 'remain with us more gladly', and he argues that this benefit outweighs the likelihood of the Persians getting less in the short term (4.2.42–45). The narrator does not state explicitly that Cyrus' policy is informed by the *philanthrōpia*, in particular its subspecies 'generosity' or *kharis*, which has been part of his *phusis* from the start, by his wish to bind the allies to him (a mark of *philotimia*) and by the *enkrateia* he has acquired. Rather, readers are called on to draw that conclusion for themselves in an active engagement with Xenophon's theory of successful leadership;[44] the explicit characterization of Cyrus in the childhood narrative enables them to do so. They may also notice how Cyrus' policy plays upon characteristic traits of the Medes, who are throughout described as given to luxury, and of the Persians, who have the virtue of *enkrateia* drilled into them from an early age.[45] They may admire Cyrus' skill in 'using' the right people in the right ways, without them becoming less happy as a result (making good use of people is certainly part of what Xenophon thinks proper *philanthrōpia* is).

It is more often the case that the characterization of the figures who help shape the narrative's events 'is dictated by the particular qualities in Cyrus which their interaction with them will reveal'.[46] Thus, throughout *Cyropaedia*, minor figures are often given one or two constant traits, which embed them in Xenophon's scheme of virtue and configure their particular relationship to Cyrus. In the case of opponents, this strategy serves to contrast Cyrus' virtues with their vices; the method of characterization through comparison is continued from the childhood narrative. For instance, Gobryas typifies the Assyrian king as both jealous and cruel, when he tells Cyrus how the king killed Gobryas' son because he was a better hunter (4.6.2–7) and castrated Gadatas

42 Tatum 1989: 94.

43 Stadter 1991: 491 = 2010: 399.

44 Due 1989: 167 observes that although a term like *philanthrōpia* is itself only sporadically used, Cyrus is depicted as possessing this and other virtues throughout.

45 Cf. Gera 1993: 76–77 for the luxury of the Medes in *Cyr.*, and 1.2.8 for Persian *enkrateia*.

46 Stadter 1991: 488 = 2010: 396; cf. Due 1989: 53, Tatum 1989: 94–96.

because he was more handsome (5.2.28); Gobryas' own desertion exemplifies the resentment which the Assyrian king's behaviour inspires in his subjects. Whereas the childhood narrative allowed us to see that the Assyrian king was less suited to a life in arms than Cyrus (see above), we can now also contrast Cyrus' immunity to jealousy and his efforts to gratify his subjects rather than antagonize them. In the case of Cyrus' friends and allies, the same strategy serves to show how Cyrus turns different types of people into willing subjects and makes fruitful use of them. For instance, of Cyrus' two steadfast Persian friends, Hystaspes is repeatedly singled out for his wit and provides light relief when needed, while Chrysantas stands out because of his intelligence and often backs up Cyrus' plans with cogent arguments; the Mede Artabazus, who enters the story when he steals a kiss from Cyrus by pretending to be one of his relatives (see above), continues to act on the basis of his loyalty to Cyrus then created.[47] Incidentally, as if to underline the schematic nature of these characterizations, the narrator withholds the names of many figures when they are first introduced. For instance, Artabazus has to wait till 6.1.9 to be named: until then, he is only identified with a reference to the incident that defines his relation to Cyrus and motivates his acts of loyalty, as 'the one who once claimed to be a relative of Cyrus' (4.1.22, 5.1.24). The Assyrian king is never named at all.[48]

Yet, this is only part of the story. More elaborately told episodes often exhibit a greater complexity, suggesting alternative ways of making sense of the world and opening up views of Cyrus which leave room for a wider range of responses. A prime example of such an episode concerns the story of the (unnamed) Armenian king, a vassal to Cyaxares who no longer meets his obligations of paying tribute and sending troops, because he has heard about the war waged on Media (2.4.12). Cyrus mounts a campaign against him, promising Cyaxares not only to ensure that the Armenian king will fulfil his obligations but also to make him a greater friend than before (2.4.14). The Armenian king is not much of an opponent: 'stunned' (*exeplagē*) by Cyrus' approach, he responds by 'being afraid (*ephobeito*)', 'hesitant (*oknōn*)', 'lacking nerve (*ouk etlē*)' to fight, and by being altogether 'helpless (*aporōn*)', and withdraws into the mountains (3.1.1–5). The king is soon coaxed out from his stronghold and

47 Cf. Due's 1989: 62–65, 68–73 elaborate treatment of these three figures and citation of relevant passages.

48 Cf. Tatum 1989: 164–165, 175–177 for further comments on the narrator's naming practices. An important character like Cyaxares is also first introduced by highlighting his relation to Cyrus: he is Cyrus' 'mother's brother' (1.3.12) and Cyrus' 'uncle (*theios*)' (1.4.7, 8, 9) before he is 'Cyaxares' (1.4.9); cf. Due 1989: 56.

put on trial for his life, but it quickly becomes clear that his *aporia* extends to his rhetorical abilities, when he is forced to admit that it would be just if he were to be put to death (3.1.6–13). At this point, the king's son Tigranes asks permission to plead his father's case. Cyrus consents, because he knows that Tigranes used to take lessons with a certain sophist and he 'very much desired (*panu epethumei*)' to learn the results of this education (3.1.14). A dialectical conversation ensues, which quickly turns from the question *if* the king should be spared to the question *why* he should be spared. Of particular interest is Tigranes' point that his father has learned discretion now that he has been caught. Cyrus cannot believe that a single day can have turned the king from *aphrōn* to *sōphrōn*, for that is to believe 'that self-control is an affectation of the soul (*pathēma* … *tēs psukhēs*), like pain, not something it needs to learn (*mathēma*)' (3.1.17). Tigranes denies that the king's new-found *sōphrosunē* is fleeting, because through his defeat he 'is conscious (*sunoiden heautōi*)' how much better Cyrus is than he (3.1.19), and fear of Cyrus will ensure the longevity of his submission (3.1.24). Cyrus remains unconvinced: 'it is typical for the same man to turn insolent in good fortune and quickly back off when he blunders and, when he is let off, to grow arrogant again and cause trouble' (3.1.26). The exchange is brought to a close only when Tigranes argues that, were Cyrus to 'gratify (*kharisaio*)' the king by sparing his life and allowing him to continue to rule, 'he would be most grateful (*megistēn an soi kharin eideiē*)' (3.1.29). Cyrus 'was very pleased (*huperēdeto*)' with this, realizing that his objective of making the king a greater friend than before can now be fulfilled (3.1.31): he displays great generosity to the king, and asks for significant benefits in return. When the Armenians go home after a celebratory dinner, some praise Cyrus' 'wisdom (*sophian*)', some his 'firmness (*karterian*)', some his 'mildness (*praotēta*)', yet others his 'beauty and height (*to kallos kai to megethos*)' (3.1.41).

This episode is another lesson on how an opportune display of generosity helps to turn a disobedient vassal into a useful ally, but this time the conclusion that *kharis* will inspire *kharis* is weighed against a number of alternative approaches to the problem. First, Cyrus' chosen course of action conflicts with the concept of justice he himself laid down at the beginning of the trial: instead of being punished, the Armenian king will be rewarded for his insubordinate behaviour. Secondly, there is the suggestion that instilling fear is a suitable way of ensuring obedience, which is rejected because Cyrus dismisses the deeply ingrained traditional wisdom that suffering leads to insight.[49] The narrator

49 Cf. Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 154–156 on the background and Xenophon's reactions to it

does not make it easy for his readers to adjust themselves to Cyrus' way of thinking. One reason for this is that the initial characterization of the Armenian king does not only provide readers with a negative model of leadership which contrasts unfavourably to Cyrus, but also produces associations with a familiar type of ruler from Greek historiography (and elsewhere) whose abilities do not match his aspirations: Herodotus' (→) Croesus is one prominent example which comes to mind. It is readers' experience of such models which makes that they cannot but seriously consider the approaches which Cyrus rejects.[50] Furthermore, the narrator creates a certain distance between Cyrus and the readers by making two references to his state of mind which are puzzling rather than elucidating. When Cyrus 'is pleased' with Tigranes' practical solution, readers may wonder (and have wondered) whether this is because he has learned something or because he has found a convenient moment to put a stop to the proceedings.[51] It is in any case surprising that Cyrus should not simply accept, but even enjoy, taking a practical decision without much regard for the wider ethical dimensions of the case. The reference to Cyrus' 'desire' to engage in a bit of rhetorical argument in any case implies that for Cyrus, at least, the whole debate was not much more than an amusing diversion.[52] To be sure, the happy ending which Xenophon has given the story guides readers to support the Armenians' perception of Cyrus' 'wisdom', but, like them, they may also find it difficult to attach a label to this wisdom: does Cyrus' conduct instantiate 'firmness' or 'mildness', or does neither term quite cover it? They may even sympathize with those Armenians who simply admired Cyrus' outward appearance and, perhaps like them, acquiesce in the impossibility of scrutinizing Cyrus' conduct further.

Nowhere do these techniques and their consequences become clearer than in Cyrus' confrontation with his uncle Cyaxares. The two characters are contrasted from the beginning,[53] but the conflict between them really deepens when Cyrus wishes to follow up his first victory against the Armenians by pur-

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elsewhere. However, the fact that Xenophon may elsewhere express the same opinion should not prevent us from weighing the arguments against the narrative here.

50 For Croesus, *pathēmata* are *mathēmata* (Hdt. 1.207.1), and he does comply out of fear (Hdt. 1.156.1). It does not help that the effects of *kharis* are not subjected to dialectical scrutiny. Moreover, as Tamiolaki 2012: 576 n. 48 points out, the proem of *Cyr.* (1.1.5) states explicitly that the reciprocity between Cyrus and his subjects was based on fear.

51 The former view is defended by Gray 2011: 370, the latter by Tatum 1989: 143, Gera 1993: 97, Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 153.

52 Gera 1993: 91.

53 See above and cf. Due 1989: 56–58, Tatum 1989: 119–123.

suing the enemies into their own country. In a long speech, Cyaxares cautions *enkrateia* and *sōphrosunē* (4.1.14–18), but in the introduction to that speech the narrator tells us that his real motives for recommending an end to the war are the fact that he was 'secretly jealous (*hupephthonei*)', did not wish to engage in further risky business (*mē palin kinduneuein*) and 'happened to be enjoying himself (*peri euthumian etunkhanen ōn*)' (4.1.13). Although Nadon aims to show that Cyaxares' speech is sensible,[54] the narrative does not prove the Median king right, and the motives imputed to him indicate that he is prepared to use the rhetoric of virtue in the service of his emotional needs. Cyaxares does allow Cyrus to recruit any volunteers from the Median army he can find to launch a small campaign, but the unintended consequence is that almost all Medes leave with Cyrus. Cyaxares' discovery of what has happened makes him 'fall into an animal rage (*ebrimouto*)'[55] and this, the narrator adds, is in line with his reputation for being 'savage (*ōmos*)' and 'senseless (*agnōmōn*)' (4.5.9), thus adding an aspect of his character which had not been particularly visible till now, but which is confirmed when he sends a letter to summon back the Medes, who respond to this news by falling silent, 'especially because they were aware of his savagery (*ōmotēta*)' (4.5.19).

There can be no doubt that Cyaxares represents a negative model of leadership, in fact the most elaborate such model *Cyropaedia* has to offer: Cyaxares' vices are as many as Cyrus' virtues.[56] To an extent, the shift of allegiance on the part of the Median troops from Cyaxares to Cyrus, which effectively makes the latter the new sole ruler, is presented as following naturally from the fact that Cyrus knows how to handle soldiers while Cyaxares does not. The question whether Cyrus also actively and intentionally pursued this transference of power is, however, kept vague.[57] Due thinks that Xenophon's 'vagueness and ambiguity' in this respect springs from his 'lack of interest',[58] but other scholars argue that the simple narration of the event tells its own, sinister story.[59]

54 Nadon 2001: 89; *contra* Gray 2011: 270.

55 Cf. Gray 2011: 272 for this word.

56 Tatum 1989: 118 points this out well.

57 It is only at 7.5.37 that it is said that 'Cyrus finally desired (*epithumōn … ēdē*) to establish himself as he thought befitted a king'.

58 Due 1989: 25.

59 Hirsh 1985: 81 speaks of a 'coup', Tatum 1989: 123 of 'disempowerment', Carlier 2010: 345 of the 'seduction of [Cyaxares'] troops', Gera 1993: 100 of the 'usurpation' of power. All these 'dark' interpretations presuppose an intention on the part of Cyrus which is nowhere made explicit in the text. This is not to say that Cyrus did not have that intention before, but rather that Xenophon deliberately keeps matters vague.

Arguing against such 'dark' readings, Sandridge points out that, although Cyrus deceives Cyaxares several times (in order to be able to continue the war against Assyria), against the background of the wider literary tradition on Cyrus, which shows how Cyrus came to power by force and design, Xenophon's story is rather innocent.[60] Another line of attack is taken by Danzig, who argues that everything which happens in the story shows Cyrus operating on principles endorsed in Xenophon's philosophy, especially the concept of proportional justice, according to which everyone should get what he deserves on the basis of his moral capacities: Cyaxares does not deserve to rule, while Cyrus does. Thus, some scholars may protest that Cyrus mistreats Cyaxares, but '[i]t is hard to find a principle in Xenophon that would justify such a protest'.[61]

These arguments are true as far as they go, but they arguably ignore how Xenophon, in the final showdown between the two protagonists, firmly puts the spotlight on Cyaxares (who occurs in no other account of Cyrus' story and may well be an invented character) and offers a convincing picture of the predicament in which he finds himself. Things would be easy if Cyrus were made openly to state the lesson Danzig thinks we should draw from it, but while he frames the final debate with his uncle in terms of justice (*dikaiosunē*), he makes his uncle admit that *every individual action* he has undertaken was just (5.5.13)—he may be right, but if so, Xenophon ensures that the lesson is hard to swallow. Cyaxares soon stops responding to Cyrus' questions, and his silence is not necessarily an indication that Cyrus' case is unanswerable. Rather, for Cyaxares 'justice' is not the point at all. What matters to him is that he, a descendant of kings and himself a king, is humiliated (5.5.8). This is why he says to Cyrus, 'the greater your benefactions are, the more they weigh me down' (5.5.25). His final points are worth quoting in full:

> If I seem to you to lack judgement in taking these things to heart (*agnōmonōs enthumeisthai*), then apply all these points to yourself (*eis se trepsas*) instead of me and see what you think. (…) As for what pertains in particular to my own experience (*tōi emōi pathei*), if someone should treat the Persians whom you were leading in such a way that they followed him more gladly than you, would you believe him to be a friend? I think not, but more of an enemy than if he had killed many of them. And what about this? If you, with the best intentions, told one of your friends to take however much he wanted and then on hearing this he took as much as he was

60 Sandridge 2012: 91–92.

61 Danzig 2012: 538.

> able to and left, and became rich with what belonged to you, while you did not even have a limited number of things at your disposal, would you be able to regard that person as a blameless friend?
>
> 5.5.28, 31–32

Cyrus breaks off the conversation, but ensures Cyaxares that he will continue to be honoured. And so it is, though Cyrus needs to persuade the Medes to give Cyaxares gifts (5.5.37) or even to call on him (5.5.39). The effect on Cyaxares is no less real for that: 'he changed to the opinion that Cyrus was not alienating them from him and that the Medes were not paying him any less attention than before' (5.5.40). However, the fact that Cyaxares is appeased does not mean that the reader cannot be impressed by the power of his words—Cyrus, too, has evaded humiliation since childhood, as we have seen, and this makes Cyaxares' point ('what if you were me?') rather pointed. On a different level, this same point also invites the reader to step into the shoes of Cyaxares ('what if *you* were me?'). Cyaxares is, perhaps, a rather more straightforward 'example' for many readers than Cyrus.

Conclusion

Here, then, are some of the ways in which Xenophon keeps the readers engaged with his story of unmitigated success. He acknowledges the complexities and potential contradictions involved into putting theory into practice, suggests alternative ways of dealing with the situations with which Cyrus is confronted and is ambiguous about Cyrus' own intentions and desires. Furthermore, the characters whom Cyrus confronts are more interesting than the scholarly habit of ranking them on Xenophon's scale of virtue suggests, because they tap into realms of experience which readers can take seriously. When Stadter maintains that, '[i]f the narrative is not convincing, it is because Xenophon cannot overcome the reader's sense, based on his own experience, of the way such situations resolve themselves in real life',[62] he fails to appreciate an important aspect of Xenophon's narrative art. As studies on characterization have shown, in interpreting characters in narrative it is not easy to leave behind 'the cognitive structures and inferential mechanisms that readers have already developed for real-life people' or for familiar literary constructs.[63] And Xenophon

62 Stadter 1991: 490 n. 58 = 2010: 398 n. 58.

63 Culpeper 2001: 10–11.

does not ask us to do so when reading *Cyropaedia*. In fact, the power of the work to a large extent resides in the way in which it stages confrontations between his ideal leader and a far from ideal world. And in assessing Cyrus' character, one is at times reminded of Aeschylus' words in the *Frogs* about a lion cub that has been reared in the city and now needs to be dealt with.[64] But whereas Aeschylus recommends forcing the lion to conform to the city's laws, Xenophon controversially suggests that the lion should be allowed to determine them: that is for the best, even if it is not easy.

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64 Ar. *Ra.* 1431–1433.

CHAPTER 26

Plutarch

*Judith Mossman**

Introduction

Broadly speaking, Plutarch uses five principal methods of characterizing his subjects in the *Lives*: direct comment, whether narratorial or through the reporting of other characters' opinions or public opinion (in these cases *who* characterizes is of interest and the choice of who makes the comment can be important); the characters' own words (whether in direct or indirect speech); the anecdote; and the alternative version (here, too, who characterizes can be important, whether a named or an unnamed source).[1] Of these the most frequently used are the anecdote and the alternative version. Direct speech tends to be kept brief (often it forms part of a telling anecdote);[2] indirect speech can sometimes be used where one might have expected direct reporting; and substantial narratorial interventions directly related to the description of character are not frequent in the main body of the *Lives*. The *sunkriseis*, though, represent another and substantial locus of narratorial comment, even though this is often judged to be simplistic and disappointing compared with the subtlety and sophistication of the main narratives.[3] It is often the case that all these methods overlap and blend with one another, so that the texture of each *Life* is rich and complex. Moreover, narratorial comment can sometimes vary in tone from the highly personal, which produces self-characterization as well as delineating the ostensible subject (e.g. *Cato Major* 5) to the more loftily oblique (which might include the apt use of literary quotations to characterize him). It

* In this chapter I deal only with the *Lives*, Plutarch's narrative works. A discussion of characterization in the *Moralia* would require another chapter of equal length, and would need to include more on self-characterization and Plutarch's subtle use of the dialogue form. Thanks are due to the participants in the workshop in Ghent which launched the project, to the editors, and, as ever, to Chris Pelling for their learned and stimulating comments and discussion.

1 On narratorial comments, see e.g. Pelling 2002: 267–282; on the anecdote Stadter 1996: 291–304; and on the alternative version Mossman 2010: 151–153.

2 See Pelling 1988b on *Antony* 84.4–7.

3 On *sunkriseis* see Pelling 2002: 349–363; Stadter 1975: 77–85 (repr. Scardigli 1995: 155–164) and 1989: xxxii; Duff 1999: 243–286.

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is also the case that metaphor and simile can be employed as characterizing tools; I will deal with these not under separate headings, but as they occur.

The Narratorial Comment: Alcibiades 23.3–6 (transl. Perrin, adapted)

[At Sparta, Alcibiades] was held in high repute publicly, and privately was no less admired. He thus brought the multitude under his influence, and actually bewitched them, by his assumption of the Spartan mode of life, so that when they saw him with his hair untrimmed, taking cold baths, on terms of intimacy with their coarse bread, and supping on black porridge, they could scarcely trust their eyes, and doubted whether such a man as he now was had ever had a cook in his own house, had even so much as looked upon a perfumer, or endured the touch of Milesian wool.

4 He had, as they say, one power which transcended all others, and proved an implement of his pursuit of people: that of assimilating and adapting himself to the customs and lives of others, thereby assuming more violent changes than the chameleon (*oxuteras trepomenōi tropas tou khamaileontos*). That animal, however, as it is said, is utterly unable to assume one colour, namely, white; but Alcibiades could associate with good and bad alike, and found naught that he could not imitate and practice. 5 In Sparta, he was all for bodily training, simplicity of life, and severity of countenance; in Ionia, for luxurious ease and pleasure; in Thrace, for drinking deep; in Thessaly, for riding hard; and when he was thrown in with Tissaphernes the satrap, he outdid even Persian magnificence in his pomp and lavishness. It was not that he could so easily pass entirely from one manner of man to another, nor that he actually underwent in every case a change in his real character (*oukh hauton existas houtō rhaidiōs eis heteron ex heterou tropon, oude pasan dekhomenos tōi ēthei metabolēn*); but when he saw that acting in accord with his nature (*tēi phusei khrōmenos*) was likely to be annoying to his associates, he always took refuge in putting on any counterfeit exterior (*skhēma kai plasma*) which might in each case be suitable for them.

6 At all events, in Sparta, so far as the outside was concerned, it was possible to say of him, ‘No child of Achilles he, but Achilles himself,’ or ‘such a man as Lycurgus trained’; 7 but judging by what he actually felt and did, one might have cried with the poet, ‘’Tis the selfsame woman still!’

Throughout the *Life* Alcibiades, like Demetrius in his biography, is the focus of all eyes. His beauty and flamboyance guarantee the gaze of the text's internal audiences, but here it is his mode of life which is under scrutiny. The Spartans' reported reactions are glossed by Plutarch's own comments, which analyse the interior motives for Alcibiades' mutability. The changes of grammatical subject in this passage are worth noting: Alcibiades is the subject at first, then in the result clause the Spartan people become the subject, Alcibiades the object of their observation and their speculation. As Plutarch moves to describe Alcibiades' imitative skill his power of imitation itself becomes the grammatical subject; then the chamaeleon of the metaphor; then Alcibiades himself once more. So the reportage of public opinion gives way to an authorial comment which decodes the reality of the perception of the Spartans for the reader.

Plutarch goes out of his way to emphasize that there is no real internal change; these alterations in habit (*tropon*) are on the surface. It is also important that Alcibiades out-chamaeleons the chamaeleon: he can imitate anything, the chamaeleon cannot turn white. Paradoxically, though, this stress on the surface nature of the change suggests a constant interior nature—constant in its deceptiveness and also in its contradictions, a point underlined by the closing quotations, the last particularly striking in that it contributes to a strand of passages running throughout the *Life* which characterize Alcibiades as effeminate.[4]

As often in Plutarch, the narratorial comment enriches the characterization by accessing the generic associations of the texts referred to:[5] here the reference to Lycurgus the iconic Spartan law-giver is sandwiched between two quotations from tragedy, the latter said of Helen by Euripides' Electra in *Orestes* (129). For those who know the quotation's context, the implied similarity between the Spartan woman and the Athenian man contributes to the transgressive portrayal of Alcibiades throughout the work: Helen shares both Alcibiades' beauty and his destructive qualities.

Another striking feature is the link between Alcibiades' outward change of personality and his geographical location. There is a historiographical trope which charts the moral decline of Spartans when they leave their city (Pau-

4 Achilles, like Alcibiades, is a character with a feminine side: both wear female dress, Achilles on Scyros and Alcibiades after his death. See *Alcibiades* 1.4–8, 2.3, 16.1 and 39.4 and Duff 1999: 236–237. On the whole of this passage see Verdegem 2010: 263, 269–278, especially on the placing of the passage within the *Life*.

5 On generic enrichment as a tool of characterization in Plutarch, see Chrysanthou and Duff fc.

sanias in Thucydides is a prime example).[6] This topos may build on theories which link character to geography, such as those found in *Airs, Waters, Places*.[7] Alcibiades' alterations are multiple, rather than representing a straightforward decline, and yaw between self-denial and excess according to his company. Another Plutarchan hero whose persona changes according to location is Antony, who (29.4) 'used the tragic mask with the Romans, but the comic mask with [the Alexandrians]'. The mask metaphor there, whilst forming part of an elaborate pattern of dramatic imagery across the pair, also conveys a constant inward character which may be internally contradictory but which does not really change: only the outside changes.

So do characters in Plutarch ever really change internally?[8] It is clear that Plutarch believes in the development of character in childhood and in the possibility of change through education; and there are many *Lives* where, though the processes of alteration may not be consistent or clearly marked, his deployment of comments and, above all, of anecdotes, may suggest a movement within a character. One example might be *Alexander*, where more than one reader has seen a darkening in the character of Alexander as the *Life* progresses, though not all agree on when and how this happens.[9] But is such darkening a genuine change within the character, or an example of an essentially unchanged character responding to different external stimuli? Other *Lives* include less subtle accounts of alteration than Alexander's, usually a moral decline at the end of an otherwise positive life, such as *Demetrius*, whose response to an external circumstance, his captivity, erodes his moral status. Flamininus, however (of whom see more below), is an example where the same quality, *philotimia*, drives first a positive portrayal and then a negative one. Again, has Flamininus really changed? Or has a latent aspect of his character simply come to the fore in response to an external stimulus (here, a frustrating inability to rescue his brother from the consequences of his own folly)? I would argue that the latter explanation is more convincing in most cases in Plutarch, but that this is by no means an unsubtle technique.

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6 Thucydides 1.128–135. Cleomenes in Herodotus is a more complex example, since he only goes really mad once he has been recalled to Sparta, but in fact the roots of his madness lie in his activities abroad (6.74–84); and see also Leotychidas at Herodotus 6.72 and Cleandridas (Plu. *Per*. 22 with Stadter 1989).

7 As, for instance, in the closing anecdote of Herodotus 9, on which see e.g. Moles 1996.

8 On this question see Gill 1983: 469–487; Swain 1989a; and Pelling 2002: 283–288.

9 See Mossman 1988; Whitmarsh 2002; and Mossman 2006: 287–292. Note that in the pair *Cimon-Lucullus*, Cimon's moral stature improves through the life, whereas Lucullus' declines, giving a chiastic effect across the two biographies.

Finally, the context of any narratorial comment is important. *Antony* 24.6–8, where Plutarch as narrator analyses Antony, is not dissimilar to this *Alcibiades* passage, but prompted not by an account of public opinion but by the narrative of Antony's imposition of a second contribution on the Asian cities and the orator Hybreas' reaction to it: the passage, therefore, has some explanatory force in relation to what has gone immediately before, like the *Alcibiades*-passage, since it accounts for his susceptibility to flattery, but its major purpose is to lead into the account of his meeting with the arch-flatterer Cleopatra and to account prospectively for her effect on him.

Public Opinion: Flamininus 10.4–6 (transl. Perrin, adapted)

Flamininus causes Greek freedom to be proclaimed at the Isthmian games after his defeat of the Macedonians. Plutarch continues:

> At first, then, they did not absolutely all hear it or hear it clearly, but there was a confused and tumultuous movement in the stadium of people who wondered what had been said, and asked one another questions about it, and called out to have the proclamation made again; 5 but when silence had been restored, and the herald in tones that were louder than before and reached the ears of all, had recited the proclamation, a shout of joy arose, so incredibly loud that it reached the sea. The whole audience rose to their feet, and no heed was paid to the contending athletes, but all were eager to spring forward and greet and hail the saviour and champion of Greece. 6 And that which is often said of the volume and power of the human voice was then apparent to the eye. For ravens which happened to be flying overhead fell down into the stadium.

The human voice, language and its power is a theme throughout this *Life*,[10] but here the public view of Titus is very clearly used to characterize him from the

10 Note especially the stress on Titus' persuasive skills at 2.2–4, reprised at 12.3; and on his ability to speak Greek at 5.5 (contradicting what the Macedonians have said of him); the verbal details of his interactions with the Greeks are often dwelt on, as at 6.2–3, and note 17.1, where he is said to speak his mind frankly but not to hold a grudge with the Greeks who oppose him; some of his *bons mots* are quoted then at 17.2–5. Attalus has a stroke in mid-speech (6.3); Philip gives his pre-battle speech from a tomb at 7.4, a terrible omen; the words with which the Aetolians celebrate the victory are vexatious to Titus (9.1–

outside in (rather than the 'inside out' type of characterization exemplified by the narratorial comments discussed above). Titus' actions are first motivated by the complaints of the Aetolians, who mobilize public opinion and cause him to resist the suggestion that Corinth and other key sites should be garrisoned. Importantly, the Aetolians order Titus to act, but more emphasis is given to their words of reproach to the Greeks and the effect of that rebuke on Titus. The order of the clauses strongly implies that Titus acts not because the Aetolians have told him to, but because he cares what the Greeks in general think. The latter part of the chapter is thus prepared for, where the importance of Titus' actions and his public character is demonstrated by the reaction of the crowd.

The effect of this passage is unusual. In many other places public report shapes the reader's response to the main character either because the reader is encouraged to endorse the general view or to dispute it (whether because the subject goes along with public opinion or resists it). So here Titus is characterized by his lack of resentment of the Aetolians' actions and his true desire to benefit Greece. But in the second part of the chapter, the public reaction is all the narrative really focuses on: Titus the man is lost, as it were, in the crowd. The shift of focus from Titus to the masses is emphasized because the first announcement cannot be heard properly and has to be repeated for the crowd. It is they who (implicitly) hail Titus as saviour and champion of Greece, but this, while it emphasizes the importance and significance of Titus' actions, reveals nothing of his interior motivation.[11]

Interestingly, in the latter part of the *Life*, where Titus is less favourably portrayed, public opinion is still used as a method of characterization, but here it specifically dovetails with the concept of *to philotimon*, the headline quality of the *Philopoemen-Flamininus* pair. The number of *Lives* where it is possible to point to a keynote characteristic of the subject is limited, but *philotimia* and *philoneikia* dominate this pair.[12] Part of the former obviously demands the idea of an audience, an entity from which honour is gained, and that is emphasized by the contrast between the warm reception of Titus' actions in Greece (20.1)

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3); the present passage continues with a discussion of the science of the phenomenon of the ravens being struck dead by the sound; and the reaction continues into the next chapter. Towards the end of the *Life*, though, when Titus' moral status declines through his dealings with Cato and above all Hannibal, the speech acts described are all those of others: Titus falls silent (see further below).

11 See Swain 1988: 341–342 for illuminating comparisons between this passage and its equivalent in Roman writers (focused on Rome) and in the paired *Life of Philopoemen* (presenting the declaration of liberty as masking domination).

12 See Pelling 2012: 55–67, esp. 60–62, with further bibliography.

and the disapproval engendered by his treatment of Hannibal: he actually becomes 'hateful', *epakhthes tois pollois*. The reader is brought to see his treatment of Hannibal in this way as well, first by the reporting of Hannibal's dying words (20.5), and by the reporting of the public reaction which compares the old man to a bird (21.1).[13] Indeed Titus' action against Hannibal has the effect of snuffing Titus out of the narrative altogether: Scipio is contrasted with him, and even the counter opinion, that Hannibal was indeed dangerous, is an opinion about Hannibal rather than about Titus. The metaphor at 21.6 'subsequent events bore witness for (*emarturēse*) Titus' is the most attention he is given in this part of his own *Life*; these are events in which he bore no part and they lead into another comparison, this time between Hannibal and Marius. Ultimately the possibility is raised that the death of Hannibal was not even his idea; and the man ruled by *philotimia* is dismissed into obscurity at the end of the *Life*: 'Since we have found by inquiry no further action of Titus, either political or military, after this, and that he met with a peaceful death, it is time to consider the *sunkrisis*.' Hannibal has the big death scene, replete with direct speech and alternative versions, which often cluster around deaths in Plutarch. This is the ultimate example of characterization by public opinion. But the very fact that Titus is seen in the end as something of a hole in a doughnut is in itself important and interesting. It is certainly not the case that the omission of the interior is typical of Plutarchan characterization.

Words

Plutarch, as has been noted above, uses direct speech sparingly. Long speeches tend to be reserved for crises, moments of high drama, one might say, when the dramatic medium of direct speech is appropriate. So for all Plutarch's praise of Cleopatra's language, she really only speaks in one-liners embedded in revealing anecdotes until Antony is dead and she laments over his tomb in proper tragic manner in *Antony* 84. It may indeed be helpful to focus here on the speech of women, since there are three passages where comparison can show that characters, even female ones, are differentiated in Plutarch even when they are in similar situations; indeed, it could be argued that such differentiation is all the clearer when the situations encourage comparisons but the participants

13 Perhaps there is a link between that metaphor and the ravens in the passage above. Hannibal's death in captivity with clipped wings and tail represents Titus' moral nadir; the ravens are flying free, stopped in their tracks at the moment of Titus' greatest fame.

react differently.[14] The three examples are: Chilonis in *Agis/Cleomenes*; Licinia in the *Gracchi*; and Cornelia in the *Pompey* (*Agis/Cleom.* 17.5–18.1; *Gracch.* 36.3–4; *Pomp.* 74.5–75.2). All three are involved in their respective husbands' disasters: Chilonis has supported her father Leonidas when her husband Cleombrotus and others drove him into exile, but now that her husband is a suppliant changes sides and pleads for him with her father (transl. Perrin, adapted):

> Cleombrotus, on his part, had nothing to say for himself, but sat perplexed and speechless; Chilonis, however … said: 'This garb, my father, and this appearance, are not due to my pity for Cleombrotus; no, ever since your sorrows and your exile grief has been my steadfast sibling and housemate (*suntrophon kai sunoikon*). Must I, then, now that you are king in Sparta and victorious over your enemies, continue to live in this sad state, or put on the splendid attire of royalty, after seeing the husband of my youth slain at your hands? That husband, unless he persuades and wins you over by the tears of his wife and children, will pay a more grievous penalty for his evil designs than you desire, for he shall see me, his most beloved one, dead, before he is. For with what freedom of speech (*parrhēsia*) could I live and face the other women, I, whose prayers awakened no pity in either husband or father? No, both as wife and as daughter I was born to share only the misfortune and dishonour of the men nearest and dearest to me. As for my husband, even if he had some plausible reason (*logos*) for his course, I robbed him of it at that time by taking your part and testifying to what he had done, but you make his crime an easy one to defend (*euapologēton*) by showing men that royal power is a thing so great and so worth fighting for that for its sake it is right to slay a son-in-law and ignore a child.' 18.1 Uttering such lamentations (*potniōmenē*) Chilonis rested her face upon the head of Cleombrotus and turned her gaze (*blemma*), all marred and melted with grief, upon the bystanders.

Chilonis' appeal stresses the family connection: as many women do throughout Greek literature, she defines herself in relation to her menfolk. In this case that helps to emphasize the impossibility of her position in the light of the collapse of the unity of the family. But it is interesting that she also plays on her dress and appearance: mourning or splendour?[15] She also stresses (over-

14 I owe this suggestion to Koen De Temmerman.

15 Note that in the introduction to the speech the pathos of her appearance is dwelt on by the

stresses, indeed) her responsibility in the conflict, which makes her reproaches to both husband and father more effective. Chilonis' description of grief as her 'sibling and housemate' is reminiscent of the diction of tragedy.[16] It is important that Cleombrotus's silence is emphasized before she begins to speak. Leonidas, too, is muted: he does respond to her, and grants her Cleombrotus' life, after consulting his friends, but does so in indirect, reported speech at *Agis* 18. Chilonis, by contrast, foregrounds the importance of her verbal intervention: she will be judged by the other women by the success or otherwise of her words, and on that success will depend her ability to speak openly in the future (*parrhēsia*). At the same time, she portrays herself as having in previous verbal interventions deprived her husband of the explanation (*logos*) of his actions—just as she is presently speaking where he remains silent, even though she is performing his defence. Both in the spectacle she presents and the way her speech is expressed, she represents a powerful argument in his favour, returning the gaze of the onlookers implied just before the start of her speech at its end. Her speech itself is described with the peculiarly expressive word *potniōmenē*, plausibly derived by LSJ from *ō potnia* (= o queen), an expression found often in emotional appeals to deities in tragedy.[17] This word is used by Plutarch generally of poignant female lamentation,[18] but only here does it refer to an extended passage of *oratio recta*. Chilonis, a real-life *potnia*, is thus given a remarkably apt, indeed self-referential, word to describe her discourse, and one which also evokes, or even, when etymologized, quotes the language of tragedy.

Licinia is trying to prevent her husband from leaving the house because she fears what will in fact happen, his death at the hands of his political enemies (transl. Perrin, adapted):

> As he was going out at the door, his wife threw herself in his way, and with one arm round her husband and the other round their little son, said: 'Not to the rostra, O Gaius, do I now send you forth, as formerly, to serve as tribune and law-giver, nor yet to a glorious war, where, should you die (and all men must die), you would at all events leave me an honoured sorrow; but you are exposing yourself to the murderers of Tiberius, and you do well to go unarmed, that you may suffer rather than inflict wrong;

narrative, the passive *ōphthē* (17.2) emphasizing the (tragic) spectacle of the vicissitudes of her fortunes.

16 Compare *sumphuton* at A. *A.* 153.

17 See e.g. E. *Med.* 160, *Heracl.* 770, *Or.* 174 and many others.

18 See Pelling 1988b on *Ant.* 35.3.

> but your death will do the state no good. The worst has at last prevailed; by violence and the sword men's controversies are now decided. If your brother had only fallen at Numantia, his dead body would have been given back to us by terms of truce; but as it is, perhaps I too shall have to supplicate some river or sea to reveal to me at last your body in its keeping. Why, pray, should men longer put faith in laws or gods, after the murder of Tiberius?' While Licinia was thus lamenting, Gaius gently freed himself from her embrace and went away without a word, accompanied by his friends. Licinia eagerly sought to clutch his robe, but sank to the ground and lay there a long time speechless, until her servants lifted her up unconscious and carried her away to the house of her brother Crassus.

Licinia's body language, embracing husband and son, echoes Chilonis' (this is, after all, a double pairing), but her speech has a different and less personal emphasis, which it is tempting to see as distinctively Roman in context (clearly not all Roman women speak like this, but the *Gracchi* balance *Agis/Cleomenes*, and in the context of the pair it is important that Chilonis speaks the language of royalty, Licinia of Roman democracy).[19] At the same time, there are clear references to (Greek) tragedy entwined with references to Roman constitutional activity: so Licinia starts with references to Gaius' political activity and says 'your death will do the state no good'; but she also uses the 'if only he had died in war' motif both prophetically of Gaius and retrospectively of Tiberius, thus recalling the *Odyssey* and the *Oresteia*;[20] and the reference to supplicating some river or sea to get Gaius' body back recalls Polydorus' body on the seashore at the start of Euripides' *Hecuba*.[21] Licinia is the least successful of the three women in terms of eliciting a response, since Gaius does not respond at all (even in indirect speech), and cannot be restrained from the action on which he has determined. Indeed, she is personally punished after the death of Gaius with the loss of her marriage portion, and forbidden to go into mourning for him.

Finally, Cornelia (transl. Perrin, adapted):

19 *Agis/Cleomenes* can be seen as representing Sparta in a state of decline as compared with Spartan society in the lives of earlier Spartans (*Lycurgus*, *Lysander* and *Agesilaus*): see Pelling fc. and, specifically on speech, Mossman fc.

20 See the same motif used of Odysseus at *Od.* 1. 236–241, 5. 306–312 and 14. 365–371, echoed by Orestes of Agamemnon at A. *Ch.* 345–353.

21 E. *Hec.* 1–58, esp. 28–50.

> The messenger, finding her in this [happy] mood, could not bring himself to salute her, but indicated to her the most and greatest of his misfortunes by his tears rather than by his speech, and merely bade her hasten if she had any wish to see Pompey with one ship only, and that not his own. When she heard this, she cast herself upon the ground and lay there a long time bereft of sense and speech. At last, however, and with difficulty, she regained her senses, and perceiving that the occasion was not one for tears and lamentations, she ran out through the city to the sea. Pompey met her and caught her in his arms as she tottered and was falling. 'I see you,' she cried, 'husband, not by your fortune, but by mine, reduced to one small vessel, you who before your marriage with Cornelia sailed this sea with five hundred ships. Why have you come to see me, and why did you not leave to her cruel destiny one who has infected you also with an evil fortune so great? What a happy woman I would have been if I had died before hearing that Publius, whose virgin bride I was, was slain among the Parthians! And how wise if, even after his death, as I tried to do, I had put an end to my own life! But I was spared, it seems, to be the ruin (*sumphora*) also of Pompey the Great.'
>
> So spoke Cornelia, as we are told, and Pompey answered, saying: 'It is true, Cornelia, you have known but one fortune to be mine, the better one, and this has perhaps deceived you too, as well as me, in that it remained with me longer than is customary. But this reverse also we must bear, since we are mortals, and we must still put fortune to the test. For I can have some hope of rising again from this low estate to my former high estate, since I fell from that to this.'

Cornelia shares with Licinia her faint, though Licinia faints after her speech and so ends the scene with her loss of consciousness, and Cornelia recovers from hers enough to go out to Pompey, her flight through the city perhaps recalling Andromache's rush to the walls of Troy at *Iliad* 6. 388–389, though there are no verbal echoes. Like Chilonis, Cornelia certainly defines herself with reference to her menfolk, but also by her own unhappy past; but the striking difference from Licinia's attempt to hold back Gaius Gracchus is that here at last we have a husband who talks, and in direct speech too. Pompey rejects her claim to culpability, and outdoes her in philosophic acceptance (though his hope is a false one, as it turns out). His magnanimity is all the more striking since Cornelia's speech is rather more centred on herself than either Chilonis' or Licinia's, with its concern for the state as a whole. Her vision of herself as a jinx on successive husbands takes Chilonis' assumption of responsibility for her male relations' quarrel to a different, and more extreme, level: where Chilonis blames herself

for her lack of ability to persuade them, Cornelia sees herself as a curse potent enough to bring down even Pompey the Great. When Cornelia is first introduced in 55, Plutarch notes that she has had some training in philosophy, but it is not much in evidence here, unless we are to suppose that her recovery from her faint is attributable to it. Given that she realizes that lamentation is futile, it is ironic that hers is probably the most negative and irrational speech of the three. Pompey's direct speech rather upstages Cornelia: whereas at the close of this 'scene' our focus is on Pompey, Chilonis and Licinia were foregrounded against their silent or muted menfolk in the other two excerpts.

Anecdote: Solon 29.4–5 (transl. Perrin, adapted)

> Thespis was now beginning to develop tragedy, and the attempt attracted most people because of its novelty, although it was not yet made a matter of competitive contest. Solon, therefore, who was naturally fond of hearing and learning anything new, and who in his old age more than ever before indulged himself in leisurely amusement, yes, and in wine and song, went to see Thespis act in his own play, as the custom was among the ancients. After the spectacle, he accosted Thespis, and asked him if he was not ashamed to tell such lies in the presence of so many people. Thespis answered that there was no harm in talking and acting that way in play, whereupon Solon smote the ground sharply with his staff and said: 'Soon, however, if we give play of this sort so much praise and honour, we shall find it in our solemn contracts.'

Despite not coming with the chronological health warning attached to the encounter between Solon and Croesus which Plutarch reports in detail, this conversation is most implausible: but what it does do is conjure up a milieu, a period. Solon's Platonic-*avant-la-lettre* suspicion of drama, and the reference to 'the ancients', Thespis the *prōtos heuretēs* of Greek drama acting in his own play, all transport the reader back to a remote historical period, a halcyon pre-Persian Wars Athens where the Classical Athens so beloved of Plutarch and his contemporaries is just beginning, and morals are not yet corrupted—or are they? Elsewhere in the *Life* the narrative explicitly foregrounds the reader of Plutarch's own time;[22] this anecdote gives the impression of peopling Solon's

22 On this see Pelling 2002: 280 n. 26.

world with the characters Plutarch's readers would expect to find there (Solon's encounters with Anacharsis, Thales and Croesus are other examples).[23] The Thespis anecdote works a lot harder than that, though: Thespis's play-acting echoes the more sinister, and more convincing, performance of Pisistratus as he prepares for tyranny in the immediately preceding passage (29.2–3, transl. Perrin, adapted):[24]

> Even those virtues which nature had denied him were imitated by him so successfully that he won more confidence than those who actually possessed them … On these points, indeed, he completely deceived most people. But Solon quickly detected his real character, and was the first to perceive his secret designs. He did not, however, treat him as an enemy, but tried to soften and mould him by his instructions. He actually said to him and to others that if the desire for pre-eminence could but be banished from his soul, and his eager passion for the tyranny be cured, no other man would be more naturally disposed to virtue, or a better citizen.

Thespis is sandwiched between this passage and Pisistratus' dramatic entry (pun intended) into Athens having wounded himself, which leads to his being granted a bodyguard, which leads in due course to his coup. Solon's reaction is telling:

> Solon drew near and accosted him, saying: 'O son of Hippocrates, you are playing the Homeric Odysseus badly; for when he disfigured himself it was to deceive his enemies, but you do it to mislead your fellow-citizens.'

For a newcomer to the theatre, Solon has become a very acute critic of acting. The whole sequence of anecdotes characterizes not only Solon but also Pisistratus and their relationship. The fact that there is no historical evidence for Pisistratus' kindly treatment of Solon suggests to me that here historicity is less important to Plutarch than setting up a model of how a philosopher should behave to a tyrant and vice versa. Irwin has rightly pointed out that the two versions of Solon's death given in *Solon* 32 nicely show how tradition sometimes showed Pisistratus and Solon as opponents and sometimes as much closer together (even as lovers—a story making them forerunners of Socrates and

23 Anacharsis: 5; Thales: 6; Croesus: 27–28.

24 See on the whole sequence also Irwin 2005: 263–280, esp. 272–277.

Alcibiades?);[25] Pelling has discussed the 'pointers to Plato' in the closing chapters of the *Life*;[26] it seems to me possible that a version of the Solon/Pisistratus relationship where Pisistratus was receptive to Solon's advice could point forward to the Plato/Dion relationship and might also be seen as having a broader application.

Alternative Versions

These range from small variations assigned to particular sources to the lengthy alternative accounts of the battle of Cunaxa in *Artaxerxes* 8–11 which, although they are attributed to particular writers, are so long and detailed that they create a polysemic account of the battle which contributes to the fractured presentation of Artaxerxes throughout the *Life* (as I have argued elsewhere).[27] One other *Life* where alternatives are particularly prominent is *Themistocles*, and one suspects this foregrounding of alternatives is at least partly because their multiplicity suggests a complex and enigmatic character.[28] It could be said of most, if not all, of Plutarch's more elaborate ranges of alternative versions, especially those which deal with possible motives for action, that this is one of their functions. Conjuring up alternative narratives also encourages the reader to speculate about which is most convincing, thus encouraging a more active participation in the narrative. Even though Plutarch not infrequently sends the reader in one direction or another by openly stating a preference (or indeed sometimes by the order in which the alternatives are given), the roads not taken are still apparent, and may in fact turn out to be as important as the signposted ones.[29] Take *Themistocles* 2.5 (transl. Perrin, adapted):

> But in the first essays of his youth he was uneven (*anōmalos*) and unstable (*astathmētos*), since he gave his natural impulses free course, which, without due reason (*logou*) and training (*paideias*), rush to violent extremes in the objects of their pursuit, and often degenerate; as he himself in later life agreed, when he said that even the wildest colts made very good horses, if only they got the proper training (*paideias*) and breaking (*katartuseōs*). 6

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25 Irwin 2005: 264 n. 3, 268.

26 Pelling 2004: 87–104, esp. 98–103.

27 Mossman 2010: 145–168, esp. 151–153.

28 The quality of being controversial is one which Themistocles shares with Alcibiades (on whom see Russell 1973: 117–129, Duff 1999: 222–240 and Pelling 2002: 125–128).

29 I am most grateful to Evert van Emde Boas for thoughtful comments on these points.

> What some story-makers add to this, however, to the effect that his father disinherited him, and his mother took her own life for very grief at her son's ill-fame, this I think is false. And, in just the opposite vein, there are some who say that his father fondly tried to divert him from public life, pointing out to him old triremes on the sea-shore, all wrecked and neglected, and intimating that the people treated their leaders in like fashion when these were past service.[30]

Themistocles is unstable; so is the narrative, yet it is also highly suggestive: quoting the older Themistocles on the younger one gives a cosy sense that everything will be all right in the end, but the alternative version, even though it is dismissed by Plutarch as false, darkens the picture by suggesting possible consequences for this youthful wildness; the animal imagery here is picked up on later in the *Life* and Themistocles is not always as domesticated an animal as a colt, even an unbroken one;[31] and the second alternative, while apparently more encouraging about Themistocles' morals, in fact points forward to his ultimate fate as an exile in a very graphic manner. The very man responsible for the growth of the Athenian fleet is warned of his ultimate disgrace by means of the ships he will do so much to acquire.[32] This is a more interesting example than 5.1, where there are simply two diametrically opposing views: was he generous or mean?

Somewhat different is 13.3, the remarkable story of Themistocles' human sacrifice before Salamis; here Plutarch's addition of the source of the story at the end of it ostensibly confirms it—or does it? The use of *men oun* to introduce the final sentence of the story perhaps implies a certain neutrality as to its fact. But generally there are few alternative versions in the narrative of the great battles of the Persian War; they return when the narrative focuses on his political activity, first in 19.1, where the majority view is represented as being favourable to Themistocles and only Theopompus holds the negative view of his actions; then in 24–25, when he is in exile, varying accounts of his movements from different authors are given. Version one, attributed to Stesimbrotus, where Epicrates gets Themistocles' family out of Athens and pays for it with his life, stresses the devotion which Themistocles could still inspire, but hints at a ruthlessness towards his loved ones in the cause of

30 On this whole passage see Duff 2008a: 1–26, esp. 3–11 and 2008b: 159–179.

31 See 21.5 (a fox); 26.2–3 (his dream of a snake which changes into an eagle); 29.1–2 (a serpent). On the connection between horse-breaking and the formation of character see Stadter 1996 on the Bucephalas narrative in *Alexander*.

32 Is there also a hint of Jason crushed by the rotten Argo in Themistocles' father's lesson?

ambition which seems often to lurk under the surface with Themistocles; but version two (also in Stesimbrotus but inconsistent with version one), in which Themistocles unsuccessfully attempts to persuade Hiero of Syracuse to let him marry his daughter if he brings the Greeks under Hiero's rule, reboots the account of his exile by recalling his past opposition to tyrants (and specifically Hiero); and version three, attributed to Thucydides, where Themistocles sets sail incognito, and persuades the captain to continue to convey him even when he has disclosed his identity, although Themistocles cuts no very heroic figure, stresses once more his powers of persuasion and bargaining. In the end the narrative validates—partially—the rejection of Stesimbrotus' version two here, since in 31 Themistocles will kill himself at least partly because he does not wish to become involved in attacking Athens. Finally, Plutarch's discussion of his tomb is noteworthy (32.3):

> The Magnesians have a splendid tomb of Themistocles in their market place; and with regard to his remains, Andocides is worthy of no attention when he says, in his *Address to his Associates*, that the Athenians stole away those remains and scattered them abroad, for he is trying by his lies to incite the oligarchs against the people; and Phylarchus, too, when, as if in a tragedy, he all but erects a theatrical machine for this story, and brings into the action a certain Neocles and Demopolis, sons of Themistocles, wishes merely to stir up tumultuous emotion; his tale even an ordinary person would know is fabricated. 4 Diodorus the Topographer, in his work *On Tombs*, says, by conjecture rather than from actual knowledge, that near the large harbour of the Piraeus a sort of elbow juts out from the promontory opposite Alcimus, and that as you round this and come inside where the water of the sea is still, there is a basement of goodly size, and that the altar-like structure upon this is the tomb of Themistocles. 5 And he thinks that the comic poet Plato is a witness in favour of his view when he says:—
>
> 'Thy tomb is mounded in a fair and sightly place; The merchantmen shall ever hail it with glad cry; It shall behold those outward, and those inward bound, And all the emulous rivalry of racing ships.'
>
> For the lineal descendants of Themistocles there were also certain dignities maintained in Magnesia down to my time, and the revenues of these were enjoyed by a Themistocles of Athens, who was my intimate and friend in the school of Ammonius the philosopher.

Even in death, Themistocles is the subject of malice from Athenian politicians and honour from those outside his native land; he encourages a certain

theatricality in those portraying him (including Plutarch himself);[33] and yet it is also a possibility that he has a tomb in Athens, suitably enough in the Piraeus; and Themistocles still matters, right down to Plutarch's own time, with the added bonus of the personal touch in Plutarch's own friendship with Themistocles' descendant. The contrast with the end of the *Flamininus* could hardly be greater.

These, then, are some examples of Plutarch's methods of characterization. More should be said on the purpose of these portraits. Clearly, many of these techniques aim at a moral characterization and there are many examples of these methods being deployed to suggest either an advance or a decline in moral standing through the course of a biography, or, more subtly, to suggest the place of man in the universe. Character for character's sake? Well, perhaps not, but what author (ancient or modern) really in the end creates a character purely for its own sake? Dickens is often cited as an example of an author who does so, yet morality is so important for Dickens that I suggest one would have to work quite hard to find a character in the major novels who really had no moral purpose, who was not somehow used in order to support the moral substructure of the book. Plutarch, too, is creating these portraits for a purpose: desirable or undesirable traits of nature and conduct, if not circumstance, can be generalized from the lives Plutarch recounts to the readers' own circumstances and experience, both moral and (to some extent) practical.[34] In Plutarch one should not look for unnecessary characterization, but nor should one underestimate the subtlety of what he produces. By no means all of the examples I have discussed are portraits of the principal subjects of the *Lives*, or even characters who are set up primarily as foils for those subjects. Even quite minor characters such as Chilonis or Licinia are endowed with moral agency and importance, and elaborated in such a way as to make the reader dwell on their roles. Erasmus spoke of Plutarch's *opus mosaicum*; each character is made up of many small details and component parts. But like a mosaic, the result can be extremely impressive: for 'a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities.'[35]

33 On theatricality in the *Life* see Mossman 2014.

34 See *Per.* 1–2, with Duff 1999, 30–45, and Jacobs fc.

35 *Alex.* 1.2 (transl. Perrin), a very famous passage on which see Duff 1999: 14–22 and Pelling 2006a: 266–268.

CHAPTER 27

Philostratus

Kristoffel Demoen

The first text from the Philostratean corpus that springs to the mind when it comes to characterization is *Apollonius*. The huge work is wholly and expressly devoted to the correct characterization of the man (*exakribōsai ton andra*, 1.2.3), 'correct' implying not only the accurate removal of ignorance, but also the correction of erroneous ideas about Apollonius being a magician (*magos* or *goēs*). The narrator is explicit about these laudatory, informative and apologetic aims[1] and employs a whole array of narrative techniques in order to obtain his objective.

The portrayal of Apollonius is such a central concern of the text that it has been the subject of many previous studies: most discussions of the text *ipso facto* pay attention to it. This is also true for Tim Whitmarsh's chapters in this series' volumes on narrators and narratees, time, and space: all these narratological categories were shown to have important implications for the characterization of the protagonist. I shall, then, inevitably and gratefully build upon the results of his and other previous scholarship.[2]

The second part of the chapter will be devoted to another text of the Philostratean corpus, namely, *Heroicus*.[3] From the point of view of characterization these two texts, different as they may be in genre, theme, and length display striking similarities and a comparative reading can be illuminating for both.

Although *Heroicus* has received considerable attention over the last 20 years in more or less fully commented translations[4] and often ingenuous interpretations,[5] there is still room for an explicit narratological analysis of the dialogue.

1 Compare the opening paragraphs of Xenophon's (→) *Cyropaedia*, discussed by Huitink.

2 The first part of this chapter has been globally inspired by Whitmarsh's contributions in *SAGN* 1–3.

3 I accept the *communis opinio* on the authorship of the corpus (most elaborate discussion in De Lannoy 1997), assuming that its author is the same Philostratus who has written, a.o., *Apollonius* and *VS*. The similar narrative strategies in *Apollonius* and *Heroicus*, which I hope to demonstrate, only confirm their common authorship.

4 Beschorner 1999, Maclean and Aitken 2001, Grossardt 2006, Rusten in Rusten and König 2014.

5 E.g. the essays in Aitken and Maclean 2004, Hodkinson 2011. Recent bibliography in Rusten and König 2014: 71–98.

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As I shall show (and as has been observed before), narration and interpretation are central concerns of the text. Despite its dialogue form it may be regarded as a decidedly narrative text.

Juxtaposing *Apollonius* and *Heroicus* may allow for a kind of general portrait of Philostratus' techniques of characterization across the boundaries of fictional, mythological and historical characters. In both texts I shall discuss the construction of the main narrator (the Philostratean persona / the vinegrower); the main narratee (the covert addressee / the Phoenician); the main source for the narration, who is often present as a reported narrator (Damis / Protesilaus); and, finally, the protagonist(s) of the central narrative (Apollonius / Palamedes, Odysseus and Achilles).

Apollonius

Eis ton Tuanea Apollōnion (traditionally referred to as *Vita Apollonii*)[6] is an exceptionally long (8 books, 2 Loeb volumes) biography/ hagiography/ novel/ travelogue/ apology … of the Pythagorean sage who lived in the first century CE. His story is packed in a notoriously complex narrative situation.[7] Philostratus introduces Damis from Niniveh, the almost life-long companion of the sage, who 'recorded his opinions and discourses and all his prophecies' (1.3.1). These memoirs were handed down to the empress Julia Domna and she commanded the narrator, who 'belonged to the circle of the empress', to rewrite the awkwardly written documents, paying attention especially to the *apangelia* (style/narration). He indeed tells the story of this unusual person from before his birth until after his death. Apollonius travels through the whole inhabited world, visiting India, the Pillars of Heracles and Ethiopia as well as mainland Greece and Rome; he converses with exotic sages (esp. the Brahmins and the Naked Ones) and rulers (from Indian kings to Roman emperors), explores natural marvels and performs miracles, reinstalls traditional cults and holds didactic conversations, is arrested by Domitian and escapes miraculously during the trial, dies (or not), and posthumously convinces an incredulous disciple of the immortality of the soul.

6 On the Greek title, see now Boter 2015.

7 Gyselinck and Demoen 2009 for further analysis and metaliterary interpretation.

The Philostratean Narrator

The introductory paragraphs of book 1 are a kind of frame narrative about the narrator's quest for information on Apollonius. He characterizes himself more or less directly as a highly esteemed writer (the empress' salon and her request) who critically engages with all available sources on and by Apollonius, while having visited himself the many cities and temples where the man was loved (1.2.3). Being both 'an autoptic traveller and learned archivist'[8] he has repeatedly been said to take a historiographical stance, partly Herodotean, partly Thucydidean. This framing of the main story is not limited to the preface (as in the novels by Longus and Achilles Tatius, for instance): the narrator refers to his travels and research repeatedly throughout *Apollonius*.

The narration itself, then, is thematized quite often—unsurprisingly, since the *apangelia* of the story in a text, not the fabrication of the (pre-existent) fabula, was the task commissioned to 'Philostratus'. He frequently comments upon the *dispositio* of his material, the selection from it (sometimes seemingly aiming at completeness, sometimes preferring selectivity), and guides the interpretation (typically introduced by the exhortation *hēgōmetha*, 'we must suppose', e.g. 2.43, 6.1.1, 6.7, 6.35.2). This makes for an almost continuous direct and indirect characterization of the narrator. To summarize previous findings:[9] he assumes the role of an enlightened pedagogue, a well-informed empiricist with an impressively broad cultural and scientific competence largely drawn from the Greek literary tradition. He often supplements his alleged sources with his own knowledge, experience or interpretation, informed by his critical rationality and superior wisdom. The narrator thus aligns himself implicitly with Apollonius. At the same time, all of his (literary, rhetorical and philosophical) competences are, of course, produced by those of the author, Philostratus. The narrator is dependent on the author and also resembles him. However, although it is tempting to call him 'Philostratus', we can only do so in inverted commas. Philostratus' agenda is not the same as the narrator's. The first wants to impress and challenge the reader, the latter to teach the narratee.

The Narratee

The narratee receives also attention from the very beginning of the text. Unlike the narrator, however, the narratee is not a character in either (frame or main) narrative. Can we say they are 'characterized'? At any rate, they are evoked as people who are not yet or not properly informed about the true wisdom

8 *SAGN* 1: 425 (Whitmarsh) and *SAGN* 2: 413–414 (Whitmarsh).

9 See, apart from Whitmarsh, especially Billault 1993.

of Apollonius,[10] who are eager to learn (*philomathesterois*, 1.3.2), who have a certain level of *paideia* as they 'listen to (i.e. read) the poets' (*akouousi tōn poiētōn*, 1.4), yet still often need explanation and a helping hand in recognizing the allusions or assessing the value of what is being told. Here again, the narratee resembles the sophisticated reader addressed by the author, yet they cannot simply be equated.

Damis

First of all, I take Apollonius' sidekick to be a fictional character invented by the author, recognized as such by the clever reader, but presented as the real and authentic source by the narrator and accepted as such by the narratee. Most modern scholars side with the clever reader, few accept the position of the narratee, while some take a middle road and think that the Damis memoirs were a fraud, really—and in good faith—transmitted by Julia to Philostratus.[11] For the characterization of Damis this makes little difference: unlike Apollonius, he is introduced as an unknown person, implying a construction from scratch:

> There was a certain Damis, not devoid of wisdom (*ouk asophos*), who once lived in Old Ninos. This man became a disciple of Apollonius (*prosphilosophēsas*) and wrote up not only his journeys, on which he claims to have been his companion, but also his sayings, speeches, and predictions. (…) the style of the man from Ninos was clear but rather unskilful (*saphōs men, ou mēn dexiōs ge apēngelleto*).
>
> 1.3.1, transl. JONES 2005

From the start Damis is presented as an uncritical recorder of everything he witnessed and heard, even of Apollonius' slightest side-remarks. This is explicitly pointed out in 1.19 when Damis first appears in the main story. Here again his ethnicity is linked to his poor style: 'the Assyrian's Greek was mediocre, for he lacked elegance of style, having been educated among barbarians' (1.19.2). Throughout *Apollonius* Damis appears as a naïve source—and this is by implication an honest one.[12]

10 'I have decided to remedy the ignorance of the public at large' *tōn pollōn agnoian*, 1.2.3; compare 6.35.2, a kind of second prologue directed at 'those ignorant of the man'.

11 Damis as a fictional device to enhance the credibility: Bowie 1978: 1653–1670, Flinterman 1995: 79–88, *SAGN* 1: 426–430 (Whitmarsh), among others; Damis as a historical person: especially Grosso 1954; the pseudepigraphic hypothesis: Speyer 1974: 48–53.

12 *SAGN* 1: 429 (Whitmarsh).

Apart from being the most important source for the primary narrator, often quoted as a reported narrator, he is also a character in by far the largest part of the story (only the birth and youth, and the death and afterlife of Apollonius are not witnessed by Damis). The characterization of Damis as a character is mainly metonymical and focuses on his role as a trustworthy source for the real subject of the work: the portrayal of Apollonius.

Apollonius

Besides being the protagonist of the story, Apollonius is also a minor source: the narrator claims to have perused his works, notably his letters (1.2.3), from which he quotes several times.[13] These letters also, or primarily, serve to characterize Apollonius metonymically as both an accomplished writer in variegated styles (e.g. 4.33; 7.35 with explicit comment of the narrator: he was 'never verbose'), and as someone who had direct epistolary access to kings and emperors.

A summary of the overall characterization of Apollonius cannot be but selective. Some of the most notable features are here subsumed under headings taken from the Introduction to this volume.

Typification or individuation? Apollonius has often been analysed as an exploration of *the* phenomenon of *the* holy man.[14] Although reference is indeed made to the protagonist's divine character (e.g. by Damis, 7.38.2, *phusis theia*), the primary narrator himself avoids the antonomasia *theios anēr* for Apollonius (the expression is used several times with respect to him, but always in character speech or in secondary focalization: 2.17.3; 2.40.3; 8.15.3). 'Philostratus' is more cautious:[15] in his stated objective, for instance, he says he wants to explain how Apollonius acquired the *reputation* of being supernatural and divine:

> I have decided (…) to give an accurate account of the Master, observing the chronology of his words and acts, and the special character of the wisdom (*sophias tropois*) by which he came close to being thought supernatural and divine (*daimonios te kai theios nomisthēnai*).
>
> 1.2.3, transl. JONES, adapted

13 A corpus of letters attributed to Apollonius has been preserved independently (edited in Penella 1979). Tellingly, none of these letters is quoted by Philostratus.

14 *SAGN* 1: 435 (Whitmarsh); *SAGN* 2: 413 (Whitmarsh); *SAGN* 3: 463 (Whitmarsh). Compare Anderson 1994; Jones 2004. The term *theios anēr* has been especially influential since Bieler 1935–1936, see also, with respect to Apollonius, du Toit 1997 and Hanus 1998; for a re-evaluation, van Uytfanghe 2009: 339–342.

15 See also Paulsen 2003: 103–110.

The narrator had indeed assumed a difficult task, since demonstrating the truly extraordinary qualities and exploits of his hero while at the same time acquitting him from the charge of being a wizard or a magician required a delicate balance.

Primacy. From the first introduction of Apollonius in 1.2 (following the surprising opening chapter on Pythagoras and Empedocles), the man is characterized by his *sophia*: he surpassed Pythagoras in the pursuit of wisdom, and people are not fully aware of his true wisdom: *tēs alēthinēs sophias, hēn philosophōs te kai hugiōs epēskēsen*. The words *sophia* and *sophos* are attributed to Apollonius no fewer than nine times in this brief chapter. The narrator, then, is a man with a plan: he will consistently demonstrate Apollonius' wisdom and philosophical superiority. Plot will be subordinated to character, one might say: all Apollonius' deeds and sayings metonymically contribute to this characterization. Many anecdotes have no clear function in the plot or are not precisely situated in time or space: they are merely told in order to exemplify aspects of Apollonius' wisdom[16]—Whitmarsh has aptly labelled this 'paradigmatic' narrative.[17]

A static character. The narrator thus strongly guides the reader's mental image of Apollonius from the very start. Apollonius has, moreover, a consistent and unchanging nature. He himself emphatically states that he is always the same (*emautōi homoios*, twice in 8.7.12) and the narrator also affirms that Apollonius is a true sage because he always remained himself (most explicitly in 6.35.1: *to meinai ton sophon heautōi homoion*, which is said to be even more difficult than to know oneself, *tou gnōnai heauton*). At first sight this is a paradox when compared to another explicit guideline given by the narrator at the start of the biography proper (1.4). Just before his birth, Apollonius' mother is visited by an apparition (*phasma*) of Proteus, who tells her that she will give birth to him, i.e. to Proteus. (This is metaphorical characterization, or, when taken literally, more than that.)[18] The narrator explains, in a preterition,

16 Apollonius lists himself some of these aspects in a witty *khreia* when he and Damis pass the customs service on their way to Mesopotamia. Nothing to declare? 'Yes sir: Prudence, Justice, Virtue, Temperance, Courage, Perseverance, and the like' (*sōphrosunēn dikaiosunēn aretēn enkrateian andreian askēsin*—all feminine nouns, the narrator explains). 'Then write down these female slaves in the register.' 'Impossible, sir, they're my mistresses.' (1.20.1).

17 *SAGN* 2: 418–420 (Whitmarsh). Again, there is a noteworthy parallel with Xenophon's (→) *Cyropaedia*, see Huitink: 'Xenophon *dramatizes* the conduct of the ideal leader'. *Apollonius* may be regarded, to vary on Huitink's subtitle, as 'Wisdom in Action'.

18 In the case of a Pythagorean philosopher, one has indeed to reckon with metempsychosis.

that Proteus was 'versatile and ever changing' (*poikilos … kai allote allos*) and that the reader should bear him in mind as the story advances and shows that Apollonius surpasses him … in prognosis and in the ability to overcome difficulties. The *tertium comparationis* turns out to have nothing to do with protean versatility, after all.

Sunkrisis, intertextuality and internarrativity. The Proteus metaphor is far from an exception. In many instances Apollonius is implicitly or explicitly associated or compared with famous and authoritative figures from the Greek tradition: Pythagoras (the first person mentioned in *Apollonius*), Dionysus,[19] Socrates, Heracles, Alexander and Herodotus, to name but a few from several backgrounds. In some cases specific hypotexts are referred to, as in the case of Proteus; others are examples of 'internarrativity' (Introduction, →). The implication of this manifold metaphorical characterization is clearly that Apollonius embodies all qualities of the Greek heritage, often in the superlative degree.[20]

Apollonius as master of the Greek archive.[21] Interestingly, his characterization by means of all these intertextual links is not exclusively the work of the primary narrator, whom we have described as a highly literate person. Laudatory comparisons of Apollonius with emblems of Greek wisdom are also made by the 'unsophisticated barbarian' Damis, by other characters in the main narrative, and by Apollonius himself. The latter, indeed, resembles the narrator in many respects, including his intertextual self-characterization. Due to his supernatural insight into the past and his prophetic gifts, he becomes a kind of omniscient narrator; he is a connoisseur of Greek literature, discussing and quoting Homer, tragedy, fables …; he is a perfect interpreter (of events, legends, works of art, omens …) and theorist of interpretation;[22] he speaks like a teacher—and repeatedly introduces his wisdom with *hēgōmetha*, 'we must suppose'.

On the importance of the metaphor and the interpretation of the ambiguities concerning Proteus in *Apollonius*, see Miles 2015.

19 See Praet, Demoen and Gyselinck 2011.

20 Compare Kemezis 2014: 150–195, chapter 4 entitled 'Philostratus' *Apollonius*: Hellenic perfection on an imperial stage'. Kemezis reads *Apollonius* as a Severan reflection on the interaction of Greekness with geography, narrative history and elite identity.

21 The term is taken from *SAGN* 3: 468 (Whitmarsh).

22 See Miles 2009. It is typical of Philostratus to thematize interpretation in a text that so openly invites readers to come to their own interpretation of its protagonist.

Heroicus

On Heroes is a 'philosophical-religious dialogue'[23] of medium length (some 110 pages in Rusten's Loeb edition), and hence a completely different kind of text. Or is it?

A Phoenician merchant and a local vinegrower meet at a *locus amoenus*,[24] the sanctuary of Protesilaus in Elaious (Thracian Chersonese), known from the final paragraphs of Herodotus. The vinegrower, who is also the caretaker of the sanctuary, claims to have regular conversations with the ghost of the hero, the first Greek victim at Troy (*Iliad* 2.698–709) and a (largely posthumous) eyewitness of the Trojan War. Once the Phoenician is ready to believe this claim to authentic information, he is eager to hear the true stories of the Homeric heroes. By far the largest part of the dialogue (17–57) is devoted to the vinegrower's *tales of heroes* (*hērōikoi logoi* in 58.2: the final chapter includes a kind of title mentioning), starring Achilles, Odysseus and Palamedes—and co-starring several other Greek and Trojan warriors, Helen, and Homer himself.

The dialogue form might be considered as a literary device to highlight the narrative nature of the stories about the ancient heroes. *Heroicus* has no less (perhaps even more) of a meta-commentary on the narration than *Apollonius*, precisely because both the main narrator (the vinegrower) and the main narratee (the Phoenician) are dramatized as characters.[25] The former has much in common with the Philostratean narrator of *Apollonius*, the latter with *Apollonius*' narratee, I shall argue, and there are more similarities between the two works.

The Vinegrower

Since the interlocutors of the dialogue are unknown—and clearly fictional—characters, the reader must construct their images from scratch, without the help, by generic definition, of an external narrator. It is helpful, however, that they are meeting for the first time: we get to know them as they get to know each other, through what they say, how they say it, where they come from and even through what they look like, for these outer appearances are the first characteristics they mutually observe and comment upon. They start from stereotypes: a Phoenician—dressed in the Ionian fashion—will no doubt be

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23 Elsner 2009: 11.

24 Thorough analysis of the opening scene in Hodkinson 2011: 21–58.

25 In the first part of the dialogue (1–16), which might be seen as a dramatized frame narrative, the two are more or less equal partners; in the *hērōikoi logoi* proper, the Phoenician mainly functions as a 'prompter' and becomes the narratee.

luxurious and greedy and mercantile and treacherous (the vinegrower thinks, probably along with the average ancient reader),[26] and a vinegrower will no doubt be a rustic person (we are led to assume). However, first appearances may be deceptive, as we shall come to learn. Throughout the dialogue and as the character construction gradually refines, ethnic or class prejudices and physiognomic inferences will turn out to be sometimes correct and sometimes mistaken.

At any rate, the two protagonists are good examples of both the progressive development of character (at intradiegetic level) and the dynamic nature of characterization (at the interpretative level). In the introductory chapters, the vinegrower is characterized metonymically and metaphorically by the *locus amoenus* he lives and works in,[27] by his gentle dog, and by his learned way of speaking. The reader gets explicit and implicit clues for the interpretation of these signs. The vinegrower says himself of the dog: 'He is showing you what I'm like' (*toumon ēthos hermēneuei soi*, 2.2, with further explanation; there is also a tacit association with the Odyssean Eumaeus).[28] The Phoenician expresses the reactions expected from an attentive reader: 'are you then a philosopher?' (*philosopheis*, 2.6) and 'Where did you get your education (*epaideuthēs*)? You seem to be quite well educated (4.5).' The vinegrower turns out to have spent the first part of his life in a city, and, indeed, to have studied. He changed his way of life after meeting Protesilaus, who advised him to 'change his dress' (4.8), and has helped him 'becoming wiser than ever' (*sophōteros emautou ginomai*, 4.10). As the reader learns more about the background of the vinegrower, he has to modify, as does the Phoenician, his first impression. This rustic is a *pepaideumenos*.

His liberal education is but the first step in building the authority of the vinegrower as a trustworthy narrator of the tales of the heroes. His main claim to authenticity comes from his direct access to the perfect source on the Trojan War: an eyewitness/hero. Once these credentials are accepted by his interlocutor, the vinegrower turns into an external, overt and self-conscious narrator who will inform his ignorant narratee (*agnoēsas*, 14.3) of things that are unknown to many people (*mēpō tois pollois dēla onta*, 14.2), since most are misguided by the canonical versions of Homer.

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26 The vinegrower alludes to Homer's description of Phoenicians by using the same rare word *trōktai*, 'greedy' (*Od.* 15.416—an 'Alexandrian footnote', Whitmarsh 2013: 112). For the ethnic prejudices against Phoenicians, see e.g. Aitken 2004: 267.

27 Apart from the obvious reference to the *Phaedrus*, the opening scene also evokes bucolic literature and Dio Chrysostom's *Euboicus*, see a.o. Hodkinson 2011: 30.

28 *Od.* 16.162–163. See Grossardt 2006: 48.

This didactic stance of the narrator (exemplified in the repeated use of the first person *hēgōmetha/hēgoimetha*: 17.6, 53.23, 57.6)[29] is not the only trait that sounds familiar. The vinegrower comments on his own narration (he uses several times the verb *apangellō*), its charm and usefulness, its well-considered structure (which is somewhat at odds with the dialogic fiction), its selectiveness—although he also claims exhaustiveness. When relating the information he received from Protesilaus, he switches between reported speech and direct speech, cautiously adds glosses or interpretations of his own, and adduces other sources, sometimes from autopsy or contemporary informants, sometimes from the literary tradition. All in all the vinedresser may be regarded as a relative of the Philostratean narrator of *Apollonius* (both originate from the northern Aegean).

The Phoenician Merchant

Like the vinegrower, he is an unknown person, mistaken for an Ionian in the very first word of the dialogue. He is consistently addressed as *xene*, although the 'stranger' gradually seems to become a 'guest' (the other possible meaning of the Greek term) or even a friend. Unlike the vinegrower, however, he does not unveil the story of his life: he is interested in the tales of the heroes and in his interlocutor as far as his narratorial authority is concerned, but nobody is interested in him. His diegetical role is largely confined to that of the prompter.

In his case also, the first impression changes. The non-Greek outsider appears to be an avid reader of Homer and other Greek poets. In a telling passage he says he has recently had a dream in which he was reading the ship catalogue in the *Iliad* (6.3); he now realizes the dream was prophetic. His literary erudition enables the vinegrower to take his intertextual competence for granted ('you can learn that from the poets', 23.4).[30] Eventually the 'greedy' Phoenician merchant turns out to be a philosophically minded and grateful listener (he is said to be *philēkoos*, 48.2), who prefers antiquarian knowledge and 'cargo of the soul' (*ta tēs psukhēs agōgima*) over mercenary gain (53.3).

While we have to adjust our perception of the Phoenician, he too experiences a progressive development *during* the dialogue[31] (as opposed to the

29 A feature he shares with the Philostratean narrator not only of *Apollonius*, but also of *Lives of the sophists*, see Schmitz 2009: 61, who calls the expression 'almost a mannerism'.

30 The Greek expression, *esti soi kai poiētōn akouein*, once again calls to mind the narratee of *Apollonius* (see above).

31 This leads Maclean 2004: 253 to consider the Phoenician 'the most interesting character of the *Heroikos*'.

character change of the vinegrower, which is presented in an external analepsis). Starting out as a sceptic (*apistō*, 3.1) and a Protagoras-like rationalist ('I find it charming as myth, but when one compares it to the standard of reality [*phusis*] of which the men of today are the measure [*metra*] it seems an incredible falsehood [*pseudē kai apithana*]', 7.9), he gradually comes to believe the stories about and by Protesilaus: 'my ignorance was great, and my disbelief was foolish' (*anoētōs ēpistoun*, 8.18); and the final sentence of the dialogue (58.6) starts with 'I am persuaded by you (*peithomai soi*), vinegrower'.[32]

Is this, then, the staged conversion of the 'implied reader',[33] corroborated by the impression that 'there are no parodic features that undermine the authority of the framing narrative'?[34] Such a serious reading, implying the intended association of the dialogue's audience with the Phoenician, might be reinforced by the latter's exceptional use of the first person plural in the epilogue: 'you have lavished on us (*hēmas empeplēkas*) stories of heroes' (58.2). Yet we must not confuse the narratee with the reader any more than we should identify the vinedresser with the author Philostratus.[35] The latter has conceived his *Heroicus* as an 'emulation of Plato's deliberate ambiguities, ironies, and polyvalency' in *Phaedrus*, another 'text about *logoi*' and one of the dialogue's major hypotexts.[36] I shall come back to these ironies, if not parodic features.

Protesilaus

Protesilaus, the main source for and an important character in the *tales on heroes*, is introduced in the framing chapters (2–8) by the vinegrower, who labels him 'beautiful' (*kalos*, very first appearance, 2.6), and a 'wise (*philosophon*) and truthful (*philalēthē*) hero' (7.8). His accurate knowledge is based on a prophetic wisdom granted to divine souls (*mantikē sophia*, 7.3)[37] … and

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32 Compare the final chapter of *Apollonius* (8.31.2), where a doubting youth is made to exclaim the very same words to the ghost of Apollonius.

33 Whitmarsh 2013: 103, who himself does not follow this line of interpretation.

34 Dué and Nagy 2001: xviii.

35 Compare Grossardt 2006: 48, with references to scholars (a.o. Beschorner, Aitken and Maclean) who have interpreted the vinegrower as the mouthpiece of Philostratus or the Phoenician as the model for the reader. Kim 2010: 181 rightly points at the tradition of pseudo-documentarism and posits that Philostratus must have expected his text to be taken as 'a self-conscious, knowing addition to a genre littered with forgeries, parodies, and literary fictions'.

36 This is the major thesis of Hodkinson 2011. The quotations are taken from p. 7 and 17.

37 In reply to the 'silly question' of the Phoenician, who sensibly wondered how Protesilaus, the first Greek to be killed at Troy, would know about the war.

on a (hyper)critical study of Homer. He is, then, more or less omniscient, and hence the most trustworthy source one may wish. These characteristics, his being physically handsome, intellectually critical and well-read, and morally honest, are construed as a consistent whole throughout the dialogue, and expressly so, not only by the vinegrower but also by Protesilaus himself—at least as quoted by his friend and worshipper.

In order to enhance the Phoenician's belief in the authenticity of the tales to come, the vinegrower gives a full, softly erotic description of the hero's body (10) which is so lifelike that his interlocutor exclaims that he 'has seen (*eidon*) the young man' (10.5). We are also given characteristic anecdotes from Protesilaus' life, and especially from his afterlife (chapters 9–16). They illustrate his gentle character (he is called cheerful, moderate and laughter-loving [*hilaros, sōphrōn, philogelōs*] 11.4) and, even more so, his encyclopaedic knowledge (he gives didactic and technical advice to the vinegrower himself, but also to athletes,[38] ill persons and people in love) and his almost second-sophistic behaviour (he is a severe critic of Homer; much of his knowledge comes from classical literature; he loves wisecracks in his answers to those who seek his advice). At the end of this 'exposition' part of the dialogue a final anecdote is concluded by a maxim in which Protesilaus (quoted in free indirect speech) boasts of his own superhuman knowledge: 'the gods know everything, and heroes have less knowledge than gods, but more than men' (16.4). The Phoenician is convinced—he even swears by the hero: 'I believe you (*peithomai*), vinedresser, by Protesilaus, I do' (16.6). Significantly, Protesilaus and the vinegrower are verbally juxtaposed here: by obtaining the narratee's belief in the reliability of his source the narrator has acquired an authoritative position for himself also.

Throughout the core *tales of the heroes* Protesilaus is staged as the reported narrator (*apangellei, phēsi, legei, phrazei, gignōskei,* even *aidei*, 'he sings', 54.13). His information is often expressly compared with the Homeric version of the heroes' stories, which it contradicts, qualifies or confirms (typically *epainei* or *homologei*). Protesilaus' all-round Homeric criticism is, interestingly, not only based on the 'fact' that he simply knows the 'real' version by autopsy (and because heroes know more than humans, as we have just seen), but also on a rationalist reading of the epics.[39] On several occasions Protesilaus rejects Homeric passages because they do not meet the standards of plausibility, credibility and literary consistency (*pithanon* and *eikos* are used many times).

38 One may recall that Philostratus is also the author of a *Gymnasticus*.

39 Kim 2010: 188–195.

This way the hero may serve 'as a model for the sophistic reader',[40] not only the reader of Homer, but perhaps also of Philostratus himself.

Besides his role as a perfectly informed witness and 'master of the archive', to repeat Whitmarsh' label for Apollonius, Protesilaus appears also as a character in his own *logoi*, reminiscent of Damis' double role in *Apollonius*. Being the first Greek to die on the Trojan shore, one might think that he cannot be staged as a glorious hero of the expedition. Yet, Philostratus has Protesilaus solve this problem in two ways: by inserting a long account of the Mysian expedition that preceded the arrival at Troy (23, six pages), and by associating himself with the greatest heroes. Two passages will illustrate Protesilaus' vanity and the narrative technique to indirectly characterize him as such.[41]

In the story of the battle at Mysia the vinetender states, as always based on Protesilaus' own account:

> Achilles and Protesilaus [...] were the fairest (*kallistō*) and most impressively armed of the Greeks, and to these simple barbarians they seemed like gods (*daimones*).
>
> 23.16, transl. RUSTEN 2014

In this sentence the vinegrower appears as an omniscient narrator, since he focalizes the two Greeks also from the perspective of the barbarians (a kind of paralepsis). Anyway, the whole chapter is meant to show that two heroes excelled equally in this episode: Achilles and Protesilaus.

How proud Protesilaus really was of his handsomeness becomes even clearer further on: whenever another Greek hero at Troy is praised for his *kallos*, he hastens to add that 'this beautiful guy (i.e. Antilochus) made the other Greeks think back to myself more strongly than ever, and some even weep for me' (26.12) or 'that good-looking man (i.e. Palamedes) rivalled Achilles and Antilochus and myself in beauty' (33.39). A touch of irony becomes undeniable when, later on, Protesilaus pokes fun at Paris, who is metaphorically characterized when compared (with due explanation of the *tertium comparationis*) to a peacock that happens to stroll around at the sanctuary:

> Protesilaus says that Paris [...] preened himself on his good looks (*kallei*), and admired himself no less than others did, which led Protesilaus to

40 Hodkinson 2011: 66.

41 See also 32, where the list of heroes who received their education from Chiron includes Asclepius, Heracles, Theseus, Achilles, Palamedes, the great Ajax, ... and Protesilaus himself.

> some clever mockery: for when he saw this peacock here (a bird he enjoys for his ravishing beauty) [...] he said: 'Do you see the man we were recently talking about, Paris, son of Priam?' When I asked him how the peacock was like Paris, he answered, 'In his vanity (*to philauton*).'
>
> 40.4–5, transl. RUSTEN

The Heroes

The focal point of interest in the *tales of heroes* appears to be how they really are/were, including what they look(ed) like, rather than precisely what heroic deeds they performed. Although the treatment of the individual heroes is varied in many respects, two features reappear in many cases: 'compression' (Introduction, →: one specific quality stands out, e.g. Paris' vanity), and physical description, sometimes along with a short discussion of the hero's speech style.[42]

To start with the latter: *Heroicus* is, among many other things, an exercise in *enargeia*, verbal description that makes its object visible to the mind's eye.[43] The heroes are remarkably often compared to statues, *agalmata*.[44] As with the vinedresser's description of Protesilaus (see above), the latter's portraits of his fellow heroes (or the vinedresser's representations of them) provoke repeatedly the same reaction from the Phoenician: he 'sees' the heroes.

> Is it possible to behold (*idein*) Palamedes as I did (*eidon*) with Nestor, Diomedes and Sthenelus? Or does Protesilaus give no interpretation (*hermēneuei*) of his appearance (*ideas*)?
>
> 33.38, transl. RUSTEN

Conversely, the vinedresser is said to 'display' or 'show' the heroes, e.g. Achilles (*anaphainein*, 44.5), so that the Phoenician will 'meet' him (*enteuxēi*, 45.1),

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42 One of the parallels with Philostratus' *Lives of the sophists*, equally a series of portraits with great variation.

43 Philostratus' masterpiece in this respect is *Imagines*, see especially Webb 2006. On 'the erotics of description' in *Heroicus*, Whitmarsh 2013: 116–120.

44 The Greek term seems also to be used for a verbal portrait: 'I can also produce (*paragagein*) Nestor's *agalma* for you, for Protesilaus expresses (*hermēneuei*) him as follows' (26.13). The verb *hermēneuein* appears regularly in *Heroicus*, meaning 'to describe and explain'—as in the physiognomic tradition, which is manifestly presupposed in *Heroicus*, and which makes the physical descriptions directly relevant for the heroes' characterization. One explicit example: 'Protesilaus says Achilles' temperament (*lēma*) was also clear (*dēlousthai*) from his straight and erect neck' (48.4).

which makes the latter jestingly (?) ask whether they will not be frightened by him, like the Trojans were.[45] A verbal invocation, it is suggested, may have the same effect as a physical appearance.

In a text where men are assumed to converse indeed with the ghosts of heroes, this thematizing the 'reality effect' of words triggers all kinds of reflections. In the storyworld of *Heroicus*, the Homeric heroes are not 'just words': they still appear at sacred places, the vinegrower argues in 9–16 of Protesilaus, and in 17–22 of other heroes ('they are still seen today', *horōntai eti*, 18.2). Yet during the dialogue itself they are not present but merely evoked by words *as if* they become present (and of course, the dialogue is 'only' a piece of literature).[46] Interestingly, the term *psukhagōgia* is used in *Heroicus* both for the 'actual' summoning of ghosts and for the illusionist working of literature (passages will be discussed below). The latter, then, is an important theme of the text.

The other recurring technique is compression, which is related to the transtextual character (Introduction, →) of the epic heroes. Their characterization is fundamentally different from that of the vinedresser and the Phoenician in that these are fictional characters created by Philostratus of which the reader cannot have any previous knowledge. The same goes, to a lesser extent, for Protesilaus: there was no really canonical version of his myth and personality, even if we may assume that his name aroused more ready associations for a 3rd century CE audience than for us. In all three cases, however, their characterization is a gradual process developing throughout the dialogue. By contrast, in the case of the great heroes, synoptic characterization prevails and expressly builds upon the pre-existing image, as will be briefly illustrated with the three central characters of the *tales*.

Palamedes

The favourite hero of Protesilaus, not mentioned by Homer, is dealt with in the unusually long chapter 33 (10 pages). He is emphatically characterized as the *sophos par excellence*,[47] the model (and, as the inventor of the alphabet, the origin) of the sophistic and philosophical qualities we also notice in his

45 An allusion to *Iliad* 18.203–231. The same awe for Achilles' stature is felt by Apollonius' followers in a passage that shows many striking parallels with *Heroicus*: *Apollonius* 4.11–16.

46 And yet it has often been taken as a source for the religious history of imperial Greece, more specifically for the hero cult, of which Philostratus has even been said to be a promoter through this dialogue. Brief but lucid discussion in Kim 2010: 195–199.

47 Elsner 2009: 15 sees 'the study of *sophia* in its various forms and widest sense' as the focus of the Philostratean corpus as a whole.

'biographer' Protesilaus, in the latter's spokesman the vinegrower—and, of course, in the latter's creator Philostratus. It is no coincidence that he is also the favourite hero of Apollonius, with whom he is closely related.[48] Palamedes is also associated with truth in his self-characterizing last words, 'I pity you, truth; for you have died even before I do' (33.37).

Odysseus

Immediately following the portrait of Palamedes Odysseus is characterized as the rival and the very antithesis of Palamedes.[49] He is primarily associated with lying (the opposite of truth) and cunning (the negative side of intelligence).[50] Yet he is said to have told the true story of the Trojan War to Homer (who consulted him by necromancy, *psukhagōgia* 43.12), on the condition that the poet would not sing of Palamedes (43.15). Despite this direct information from an eyewitness Homer's representation is often wrong, even in many episodes concerning Odysseus himself. The reader might recognize the situation and consider it to be a *mise en abyme* of the vinegrower's narration based on Protesilaus' eyewitness account.[51]

When dismissing central parts of the *Odyssey* as fabrication, Protesilaus ascribes the Homeric fabulations to his search for literary *psukhagōgia*:

> As for Polyphemus [...] or what happened in Hades and the Sirens' song, Protesilaus does not allow listening to it, but to put wax in our ears and reject it, not because it was not enjoyable and entertaining (*psukhagōgēsai hikana*), but because it was an incredible (*apithana*) series of fictions (*pareurēmena*).
>
> 34.3, transl. RUSTEN

48 See especially *Apollonius* 4.16.6, where the ghost of Achilles asks Apollonius to restore Palamedes' burial place and statue, since 'there is an affinity of the wise with the wise' (*sophois pros sophous epitēdeia*) and 4.13.3, where Apollonius prays to Palamedes, 'source of words, source of the Muses, source of myself' (*nai Palamēdes, di' hon logoi, di' hon Mousai, di' hon egō*).

49 As Hodkinson 2011: 105 observes, this is similar to the juxtaposition of rivals/colleagues in *Lives of the sophists*.

50 In a telling phrase, Palamedes' execution is ascribed to 'the ingenious construction of Odysseus' machinery' (33.31). The pejorative use of *sophōs* here strengthens the disastrous application of his *mēkhanai*—a negative interpretation of Odysseus' Homeric epitheton *polumēkhanos*.

51 Grossardt 2006: 83 calls it a *cave lector*, by which the *Heroicus* undermines itself as a whole. See also Kim 2010: 210–211.

The paradox—and another token of authorial irony—is, of course, that while rejecting the episode of the Sirens as incredible, the rationalist Protesilaus uses the very episode as a metaphor.

Achilles

Although the great Iliadic hero is mentioned several times throughout the dialogue, the full treatment of Achilles (from before his birth until after his death, including his contemporary creepy actions full of wrath) is consciously postponed till the final quarter of the dialogue in order to form its wry climax. Achilles is also the most complex personality—not unlike his portrait in the *Iliad*. He is characterized both in traditional terms (directly, as ambitious [*philotimos*][52] and irascible [often associated with *thumos* and *mēnis*]; metaphorically, as a lion [e.g. 48.3]) and by more surprising qualities (he is, deep down, rather a singer and a poet than a warrior).[53]

Conclusion

Two anecdotes about Achilles may serve as a conclusion to this chapter. They make us once again reflect on our own interpretative activity.

Protesilaus confirms the love story of Achilles and Polyxena.[54] They fell in love when she led Priam to Achilles during the ransom negotiations for Hector. Then Achilles is praised for his self-control (*esōphronei*, the imperfect tense surprisingly pointing at a stable character trait) and his justice, even in matters of love: he has not stolen the girl from her father, even though she was in his power! Is this a serious compliment? As the editors say in the Introduction to this volume, we need to consider societal norms and codes when assessing characters and their ethical choices. But what norms? The heroic code from the *Iliad*, where indeed a girl is an object up for grabs? Or the imperial values of equal love that have been said to lie behind some of the love stories in *Heroicus*?[55] Furthermore, and implying authorial irony: especially in the final

52 45.8: Achilles' ambition undermines the plausibility of the story of his hiding among maidens on Scyros. Remarkably, a character trait is not inferred from a traditional biographical episode, but, inversely, is used to judge (and refute) the trustworthiness of the story.

53 45 and 54: during his youth and after his death, on which see Miles 2005. Of course, a singing Achilles is to be found in the *Iliad* also (9.186–189; verse 189 seems to be explained, with verbal reminiscences, by the scene of Chiron's music lessons in 45.6).

54 51.2–6; similarly in the version of Achilles' ghost in *Apollonius*, see Grossardt 2009: 84–86.

55 E.g. Mestre 2004: 134–141 on the contemporary, 'more humanized' values in *Heroicus*.

chapters of the dialogue, Achilles is not really characterized by self-control (nor was he before, see, for instance, the next passage). He lives a pleasant afterlife on the island of Leuce, in love with Helen, but extensive attention is paid to the gruesome revenge he pays on the Thessalians (53), a Trojan girl (56), and the Amazons (57). 'You speak of a destructive anger', the Phoenician cannot help but reply: *oulomenēn mēnin legeis* (54.1). This obvious quotation from the opening lines of the *Iliad* suggests that the vinegrower (or his informant Protesilaus) is a substitute for Homer, the first singer of Achilles' destructive anger. Is this narrative, based on information from Protesilaus, more truthful than Homer's, based on information from Odysseus? One of the possible conclusions of *Heroicus* is the 'arbitrariness, or at least the historical contingency' of what have become the canonical versions of traditional stories.[56] Informants (like narrators and like authors) by definition give their version of the *fabula*, even when it is that of their own life.

This is also the implication of the final episode, taken from the Palamedes chapter. The wise hero is asked to join (the not-so-*sōphrōn*, lion-like) Achilles on a military mission.

> In battle Palamedes was noble (*gennaiōs*) and restrained (*sōphronōs*), but Achilles was unchecked—his emotions (*thumos*) sometimes led him into carelessness, so that he was glad to have Palamedes beside him in battle, who would prevent him from being carried away, and also instruct him in tactics. For he was like a trainer (*leontokomōi*) alternately calming and rousing a noble lion, …
>
> 33.21, transl. RUSTEN

The ensuing military exploits of the pair are related in two different ways. During the expedition, rumours come to the Greek camp (*apēngelleto*) about Palamedes' glorious deeds (33.23). After his return Palamedes himself reports on the expedition (*apēngeilen*) and ascribes all military successes to Achilles (33.30). The whole episode characterizes Palamedes metaphorically, as a lion tamer, and metonymically, by his way of fighting, but especially—though indirectly—by his way of reporting: both as a modest person … and as an unreliable narrator. This may come as a surprise from someone whom we have seen virtually identified as the personification of truth. It only reminds us that characterization in literature, be it of mythological, historical or fictional figures, is always selective and perspectival.

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56 Hodkinson 2011: 67.

PART 8

Between Philosophy and Rhetoric

CHAPTER 28

Dio Chrysostom

Dimitri Kasprzyk

Introduction

The study of characterization in the work of Dio from a narratological perspective faces two challenges. Firstly, while a brief glance at the *index nominum* of Dio's work suffices to highlight a multitude of characters (mythological, literary, and historical), their status as characters is not self-evident. Dio rarely creates characters,[1] instead borrowing pre-existing ones from epic, dramatic, philosophical and historical literature that he often presents in support of an argument, for example.[2] Such timely appearances impede the construction of these characters, formerly bestowed with a few fundamental traits that are directly stated or deduced from a singular action, whom Dio uses as a moral illustration, rather than dealing with them in depth by means of the tale.[3] Dio is particularly interested in his characters' *ēthos*, or *tropoi*, but from a moral rather than literary perspective: he extracts lessons on human nature from this *ēthos* and even the texts dedicated to literary characters in the broadest sense (e.g. Nestor, Agamemnon, Socrates) first try to understand the construction of the characters in relation to a moral aim, either borrowed from the author or asserted by Dio.

Secondly, narration does not have a central role in Dio's orations and we can even sense 'a degree of reticence' on his in part in this regard.[4] These *orationes* are composed of speeches (of varying lengths and on varying subjects) or dialogues, and often comprise a mix of genres and forms.[5] The speech can be a tale, moral lecture, diatribe, eulogy or (more often) criticism, while the dialogue,

1 Theophilus (32); Charidemus (30; but the matter is debated: see Moles 2000: 199), perhaps Melancomas (28 and 29; also in this case, not without uncertainty: see König 2005: 146), various anonymous characters (a hunter, an old woman, a king, a tyrant), particularly the interlocutors in dialogues (whose characterization is mostly inexistent).

2 E.g. a large number of Homeric heroes, Socrates, Diogenes, Cyrus, Alexander the Great, Nero.

3 The Libyan king who confronts the monsters of the desert in 5.18–20 is deprived of a name and all psychological depth, in a tale to which Dio nonetheless assigns allegorical value (5.2).

4 Anderson 2000: 143.

5 On this matter, see Desideri 1991.

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sometimes inserted into a tale, can develop into a veritable speech in which the conversation (or otherwise the interlocutor) disappears. With Dio, we find ourselves on the edge of narration and, in order to analyse the narrative means of character construction, we need to not only find our bearings in generically multiform texts, but also note, in particular, the co-existence of narrative and rhetorical techniques.[6] However, in order to avoid diluting narratological concepts by applying them to literary forms in which they have not been employed, we have chosen to study characterization processes in texts where the strictly narrative sections are relatively identifiable. We are thus interested in speeches that include large narrative sections[7] or shorter narrative fragments in the form of anecdotes, fables, myths, and *khreiai* that present characters.[8] We will also take into account narratives used as a framework for a speech or dialogue, or that introduce a new development.[9] With a few exceptions, in particular when Dio engages in general observations of epic and tragic characters, the *Bithynian speeches*, the great Speeches addressed to cities and which are sometimes called *Parva Moralia*, will not be considered, as their strictly narrative sections are extremely limited.

Direct Characterization

In the non-narrative sections of his work, Dio regularly resorts to the direct characterization of the characters he discusses: Melancomas is 'a very tall and beautiful young man' (28.2), Heracles was 'self-reliant, zealous of soul, and competent in body' (1.63). A character that appears in support of an argument and then disappears quickly must be immediately defined in the interest of clarity and efficacy. However, in narrative sections, this technique is less common; if a character is defined by the narrator, it is often to signal the importance of a theme that is then developed in the text. From the beginning of *Oration* 4, Alexander is qualified as *philotimotatos kai malista doxēs erastēs* (4.4), a fundamental characteristic, as it is the flaw that Diogenes intends to confront next, and that masks, perhaps, a criticism or warning addressed to Trajan.[10]

6 Whitmarsh (*SAGN* 1: 451–454) recognizes regarding the *Kingship orations* that, due to the inextricable link between dialogue and story, orator and narrator, audience and narratee, he 'adopted generous definitions'.

7 *Orations* 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

8 *Orations* 1, 3, 32, 43, 55, 58.

9 *Orations* 1, 2, 4, 13, 15, 19, 36, 52.

10 Moles 1983.

Equally, in *Oration* 7, when Dio speaks of himself and evokes his own poverty (9), he anticipates the theme of happy poverty[11] that is one of the underpinning threads of the speech. The characteristics he assigns to characters are, of course, at the heart of his interests: when Dio retells an anecdote also told by Pausanias (6.11.5) about the statue of an athlete, he mentions civic virtues not found in Pausanias' version, but that give the anecdote a political and moral resonance, essential for Dio.[12] In this regard, *Oration* 11 presents us with a unique case: in this substantial refutation of the Homeric tradition, Dio defines certain characters in order to correct a version of the Trojan War that he considers to be dishonest and assert the truth of his own version. He thus defines Hector as 'experienced in discerning the critical moment in a fight' to justify his claimed victory against Achilles (11.95). Here, characterization is at the service of argumentation.

Indirect Characterization

Dio extensively exploits various indirect characterization techniques. However, the use of these techniques is also associated with a desire to explain: on the one hand, as orator/narrator, Dio uses characterization techniques on the characters he discusses. On the other hand, as an (notably Homeric) exegete, he analyses these processes, the way in which the characters have been constructed and presented by the poet. In this regard, we can refer to instances of meta-characterization, an example of which can be found at the beginning of the *Chryseis* (*Or*. 61).[13] This dialogue is an examination (cf. *skepsōmetha*, 1) of the way in which the eponymous character is represented. This analysis is contradictory, however, insofar as Homer did not specifically try to emphasize her 'character' (*tropou*, 3), as Dio's interlocutor reminds us, as 'he did not represent her speaking or acting' (*prattousan ē legousan*). In response, Dio states that her mental faculties (*dianoia*) can be divined 'from what happened in connection with her.' Although this attempt at exegesis is a borderline case, as it is almost entirely based on reading between the lines of the text, the interlocutors mention three major traits of metonymical characterization: speech, action and setting. In the same way, Alexander, rounding off, to a certain extent, this initial theorization, states that Homer 'often describes clothing, home,

11 Brenk 2000: 270–275; Krause 2003: 68–69.

12 Anderson 2000: 144–145.

13 On this text, see Kim 2005.

and way of life according to the character (*ēthos*) of men' (2.40). Dio does much the same for his own characters.

He describes his characters' physical attributes: Callistratus, Greek citizen of Borysthenes, is tall and handsome; most importantly, he has Ionian features, but Scythian clothing. This paradoxical juxtaposition reflects the situation of a city on the borders of the Empire, attacked by its Scythian neighbours and at risk of falling prey to barbarity (36.1–8). In this way, Callistratus is a symbol more than he is an individualized character.

Way of life is also regularly described. The places frequented by characters, for example, reflect their *ēthos* and principles. In this way, Dio attributes thoughts on the way in which Homer matches scenery to characters to Alexander (2.37–39) and explains that, while Homer represented the palace of Menelaus as an oriental palace, it was to be 'in line with the character (*tropon*) of Menelaus, […] the only one of the Achaeans to be faint-hearted in battle.' In the same way, describing when Diogenes and Alexander meet, he notably presents the philosopher through the places that he frequents and says jokingly that the king will not attend 'Diogenes' court,' as the philosopher does not have a court, house or foyer, living instead in public buildings (4.12–14). He thus incidentally highlights the similarity between his way of life and Cynic doctrine. The hunter and his family's way of life (7.10–21) is also carefully described in order to highlight the simplicity and honest poverty of the character, close to the philosophical ideal of *autarkeia*.[14] In addition, the feast Dio enjoys with the family follows the Platonic model, asserting the text as part of the tradition of the philosophical utopia.[15]

In the same vein, body language and actions are also an indication of *ēthos*. By hiding his arm under his coat, Callistratus demonstrates his respect for Hellenic good manners (36.7). In contrast, by embracing a citizen, the hunter reveals (and discovers himself through the amused reaction of the public) his ignorance of the city's customs (7.59), all of which constitute elements of indirect characterization. The hunter's hospitality and humanity are evident through the help he offers to shipwrecked sailors on many occasions (7.52). Additionally, actions are sometimes at the service of a biased character portrayal, for example, when Dio describes Achilles in the *Troikos* (11.77–78). After having evoked Troilus' death, Dio provocatively states that 'Achilles was very skilful in laying ambushes and making night attacks.' Here, factual information is combined with a sarcastic tone to highlight the character's cowardice. This is

14 Brenk 2000: 271–275.

15 Bost-Pouderon 2008: 113–116.

then confirmed by actions that are hardly heroic, as Achilles 'captured [only] forts that were poorly guarded'. This characterization contradicts the entire epic tradition and yet Dio goes further, using an episode from the *Iliad* to belittle the character: 'Homer accuses him directly of cowardice' (11.101) for having stayed in his tent instead of going into battle due to a prediction of his death. Not only is the invention of an episode attributed to the poet, but also the negative conclusion that Dio himself draws, in a particularly sophistic way, from sparse information. Rewriting Homer, commenting on the Homeric text and judging the character are inextricably linked.

Speech, as the *Chryseis* suggests, is an important technique of characterization, which, when concerning an orator, is hardly surprising. Naturally, all of Dio's speech is used to characterize the speaker, as, according to the principles of *ēthopoiia*, words reflect *ēthos*, and this fact allows the orator to build his own *ēthos*. In this regard and following the framework of a collection devoted to narratology, we are interested in the speeches that interact with narrative structures. From this point of view, the hunter is a paradoxical case: his answers to questions at the assembly reveal his unfamiliarity with certain customs (7.41), constitutive of the *ēthos* of someone unaccustomed to public speaking. However, as Ma notes, 'our rural Candide is capable of accurately recalling unfamiliar events, surroundings, and words,'[16] revealing himself to be an experienced orator (7.59).

This contradiction is not noted by Dio, who, elsewhere, highlights the correspondence between *logos* and *tropos* by commenting on the words of his characters. He does so either directly, notably within the narrative framework of a dialogue, or by attributing this commentary to another character; such commentary concerns the words, content and tone employed by the interlocutor and used to characterize the speaker. For example, recounting a discussion between Alexander and Philip about Homer, Dio specifies from the beginning that Alexander takes part in the discussion 'in a manly and lofty strain' (2.1). The narrator's observation is supported by that of Philip, who, according to Dio, is delighted with his son's *megalophrosunē* (2.7). The narrator's judgements are thus superimposed on those of the character to highlight the nobility of the young man. In more complex situations, the judgement of the character may not necessarily be correct, reminding us that, in the case of indirect characterization, we could draw false conclusions from body language or speech. In *Oration* 4.18–20, for example, Diogenes questions Alexander on the legitimacy of his birth. This provokes anger in Alexander, who, however, controls himself

16 Ma 2000: 110; cf. Anderson 2000: 147–148.

and judges the philosopher to be an ill-mannered man. Diogenes then states ‘his embarrassment’ (emotion being a characterization element) and changes his tone, evoking Alexander’s filiation with the god Ammon. This is so successful that the king, in a full reversal, believes that Diogenes, far from being ‘rude,’ was ‘the only one who really knew how to pay a compliment’ (as if Diogenes were in the habit of doing so). However, the philosopher’s tone is more sarcastic than Alexander realizes. Indeed, Diogenes asks him:

> ‘Why, I hear that your own mother says this of you. Or is it not Olympias who said that Philip is not your father, as it happens, but a dragon or Ammon or some god or other or demigod or wild animal? And yet in that case you would certainly be a bastard.’
>
> 4.19

In reality, Diogenes’ words confirm his rudeness and Alexander’s misinterpretation highlights his obliviousness as well as his tendency to take a remark as flattery.

Coherence

The principle of metonymical characterization is, in theory, contradicted when characters’ actions go against their character. In practice, this is a literary issue rarely faced by Dio for two partially linked reasons. On the one hand, his characters are integrated into mainly short narratives, in which their character, their potential personality, is not explored in depth and rarely over time. On the other hand, as we will see, the *ēthos* of the characters is often condensed into an essential trait, which can be illustrated in various ways and have various implications, while remaining fundamentally stable. This stability of character can even lead to a certain degree of predictability, as a single passage of a dialogue entitled *Achilles* illustrates with a literary device. This dialogue, which features Achilles as a child refusing to learn archery, finishes with a prediction by his tutor, the centaur Chiron, who recounts what will become of his pupil:

> Yet because of your audacity and fleetness of foot and physical strength men in flattery will call you most valiant of men. However, they will prefer to be ruled by other princes, while as for you, they will compel you by gifts and empty praises to do battle and risk your life for them until you finally meet your death. But I fancy you will not even keep your hands off the dead; on the contrary, you will even stab the corpses and trail

> them in the dust, as if, in sooth, you were doing something grand, just as foolish youngsters drag round and round whatever they kill. But for all your arrogance, you will meet your death, not at the hands of some man of nobility, as you imagine; on the contrary, while you will find it easy to slay those who are like you, brave but stupid, you will be slain by a man of sagacity and military science, and, what is more, without ever having seen him.
>
> 58.5–6

From Dio's point of view, this predictive and allusive episode naturally took place *post eventum*. However, from the perspective of the dialogue, it happened while Achilles, presented in a Lucianesque way like a spoilt child,[17] 'was still a lad' (*eti pais*), not yet an adolescent (2). Chiron announces that he will be killed 'by a man of sagacity and military science'—he is provocatively referring to Paris, the archer—as a punishment for his current stubbornness. He also states that Achilles' attitude is the result of the way in which his mother, Thetis, is raising him, as 'she corrupted him by swelling his pride upon his birth,' while his father does not have the time to attend to his education (3, 5).[18] Achilles' personality is already deeply anchored within him and his actions only confirm it.

This requirement for consistency is particularly respected by Dio, for rhetorical purposes, when it comes to correcting Homeric character construction in *Oration* 11. In this vast *anaskeuē*, Dio relies on the argument of plausibility and possibility (*eikos* and *dunaton*), common to courtroom rhetoric, historiography and literary criticism,[19] to reconstruct the personality, mental faculties and actions of epic characters. Dio therefore believes that there is no 'likelihood' that Hector did not protest when his brother Paris brought Helen back to Troy, while he 'afterwards reproach[ed]' him in *Iliad* 3 (11.56). These different attitudes, separated by many years, constitute a moral inconsistency proving that, in reality, Hector had no reason to reprimand Paris as his marriage to Helen was legal.

In this case, for rhetorical purposes, Dio neglects the issue of possible character evolution. Indeed, characters are, in contrast, defined by a globally stable *ēthos*, of which they are sometimes the paradigm. Thus, the 'improper' behaviour of Ajax the Lesser during the horse race of *Iliad* 23 is linked to his later attitude, as this is the same character

17 Anderson 2000: 154.

18 *Paideia* is an important theme in Dio's thought, although little exploited regarding specific characters. However, for the positive effects of Heracles' good education, see 1.61.

19 Kim 2010: 97; Hunter 2009: 54.

> who also was guilty of impiety toward Athena at the capture of Troy and on that account was himself smitten with a thunderbolt and thereby caused the storm and shipwreck that befell them all.
>
> 32.80

The principle of plausibility advocated by Dio is also based on a correspondence between the emotions, thoughts and actions of a character and those that can be observed in everyday life. It is for this reason that, in the *Chryseis*, Dio relates Agamemnon's attitude towards the young girl to that of 'lovers' (*erōntas*, 61.3). In this dialogue, Dio reminds us that Homer is distinguished by his ability to know 'the passions of men,' (*ta pathē tōn anthrōpōn*, 1). In contrast, in the *Troikos*, such passions are almost completely brushed aside. For example, after having spoken of the legitimate marriage between Paris and Helen, he denounces the 'foolish[ness]' of 'the opposite story':

> Can you imagine it possible for anyone to have become enamoured of a woman whom he had never seen, and then, that she could have let herself be persuaded to leave husband, fatherland, and all her relatives—and that too, I believe, when she was the mother of a little daughter—and follow a man of another race? It is because this is so improbable that they got up that cock-and-bull story about Aphrodite, which is still more preposterous.
>
> 11.54

Dio refutes the idea of a couple enslaved to the passion of love by using the argument of *dunaton*. However, this argument contradicts a fundamental idea of Dio the Cynic: that men are driven by their passions. This characterization of Paris thus involves an extreme rationalization of the epic subject matter[20] that betrays the artificial, sophistic and partly playful nature of this rewriting.

Metaphorical Characterization

Metaphorical characterization in Dio's work relies on, above all, the approximation between or the comparison of characters, according to sometimes complex mechanisms. In *Oration* 54, Dio provides some facts from the life of Socrates and reminds us that even poverty did not lead him to make others pay

20 Kim 2010: 174 speaks of 'psychological and naturalistic realism'.

for his teachings. The tone is close to that of a fable,[21] with the expression 'there was also Socrates', that is incidentally borrowed from the *Apology* (18b), albeit altered: when Plato calls Socrates 'wise', Dio calls him 'poor' (54.3). In this way, Socrates contrasts with the sophists evoked just previously in the speech, who make others pay handsomely for their lessons. While the comparison in this case is explicit, it can sometimes be less direct. In *Oration* 7, Dio describes the hunter easily carrying the deer on his back that he has just killed: such strength, suggested by body language, opposes Dio's physical weakness, recognized by the hunter who guesses he is 'a man from the city' (7.8). As Krause highlights,[22] it is not a matter of using these observations to draw conclusions on the real health of Dio at the time. Instead, such observations are more useful for establishing, between the lines of the speech, the contrast between rural and city life that is fundamental to Dio's social and philosophical thought in this oration.

Oration 4, the tale of a meeting between Diogenes and Alexander, offers a complex mechanism on an enunciative level. The first sentences are mostly devoted to describing Alexander, but the narrator also reveals the sentiments of the king towards Diogenes, based on a comparison between their respective actions, ways of life and glories.[23] The direct characterization elements pronounced by Alexander contribute to his own indirect characterization as he is aware of a 'moral gulf between himself and Diogenes',[24] demonstrating that he is becoming wise. In *Oration* 1, the comparison functions on two levels: the speech opens with an anecdote according to which Alexander was poised to throw himself into combat following a battle hymn played by the aulist Timotheus (1). This anecdote demonstrates the 'passionate' character of the king, which opposes Sardanapalus' depravation (1.2–3). However, Dio draws out the message by vowing that the words he will address to Trajan will charm the king as much as Timotheus' music charmed Alexander. By way of this comparison, he highlights what Whitmarsh calls the 'paideutic' relation that he tries to establish with Trajan, great admirer of Alexander.[25] This comparison is quickly hijacked by the virtues that Dio attributes to the ideal king, of which Trajan must be the incarnation, and that are a far cry from Alexander's kingship. This initiatory and seemingly programmatic anecdote is also a lure, a way of seizing the attention of his illustrious audience and introducing a moral *protrepsis*.

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21 Nesselrath 2009: 113.

22 Krause 2003: 67.

23 On the presentation of the two characters, see Moles 1983: 264–267.

24 Moles 1983: 267.

25 Whitmarsh 2001: 200–216.

The comparison reinforces the characterization of each individual character, which above all functions on a moral level in Dio's case. In *Oration* 55, which comprises the development of various Homeric characters, Dio evokes disobedience in reference to Pandarus and Asius (15–18), who he contrasts with the figure of Polydamas (19). However, Dio does not intend to indulge in a literary-based observation of epic *personnel*[26] here: he aims to show that Homer's characters are in fact incarnations of specific virtues ('wisdom, ability to lead', 19), that is, they are, primarily, character types.

Narrative and Typification

The moral purpose behind the majority of Dio's speeches and dialogues means that the evocation of a character often has the goal of emphasizing a particular characteristic, illustrating an aspect of human nature. Take, for example, the anecdote according to which Nero 'not only castrated the youth whom he loved, but also changed his name for a woman's, that of the girl whom he loved', is an illustration of the idea that 'unlimited power is lawless' (21.6). By giving his characters a fundamentally illustrative value, Dio adopts and adapts a mechanism that he attributes to Socrates—who would have, in his turn, taken it from Homer—that consists in presenting a specific character type to evoke the 'passions and maladies' of men, for example, a 'boastful man' to speak of 'boastfulness' (55.13). Indeed, he believes that such passions and maladies are spoken of more clearly 'by those men who were afflicted' rather than 'if he were using the words by themselves'. The character in the dialogue is thus meant to incarnate a flaw, a vice that literally gives him substance. The consequence of subordinating the character to a didactic and ethical aim is the elimination of the individual traits of the character, who has become a moral or psychological type, and is gradually abandoned alongside the narrative (in the broad sense) to the profit of a dogmatic lecture. This is particularly evident in the overall development of *Oration* 4. Dio starts by recounting a meeting between Alexander and Diogenes (1–15), followed by a dialogue (16–81), recounted by the narrator, that ends with an attack on Alexander's 'demon'. This attack leads to a more detailed development in the last section (82–139) on the three fundamental types of lives adopted by the crowd and that Diogenes

26 I have taken the word '*personnel*' from Hamon's study on *Le Personnel du roman* (Genève 1983) dedicated to Zola's Rougon-Macquart novel cycle.

assimilates to 'demons' (83).[27] Among them features the 'demon' of ambition (116–132), a flaw that directly concerns Alexander. This is not explicitly stated, however, as the initial narration, accompanied by the characterization of a well-identified character, gives way to an anthropological take on the vice, in which all individuals disappear.

This idea that a character does not exist for himself but as an illustration is fundamental in the elaboration and aim of the *Euboikos*.[28] In this speech, the first principally narrative section (cf. *diēgēsomai*, 1) recounts the existence of an Euboean hunter and, in particular, his quarrels with the neighbouring city. Yet Dio states in the preamble that he wants to describe 'a type of man' (*hoiois andrasi*), and his 'life' (*bion*): this tale of a supposedly true adventure[29] has a broader purpose and illustrates a poor way of life, for which the hunter is a social and moral *paradeigma* (81), a statement that justifies an ideological reading of the speech.[30] The speech then becomes more theoretical with a lecture dedicated to 'the life of the farmer, hunter and shepherd' (103).

This speech is characterized by an elaborate construction: two major sections, three narrative levels, and a multiplicity of enunciative voices.[31] This complexity contrasts with the fixity of the hunter's character (despite a sycophant trying to tarnish his reputation: 7.27–32), because this stability ensures that the theory defended by Dio remains clear. Dio presents a character that embodies a *bios*, implying a certain number of social and moral characteristics. Each element of the speech is thus meant to align with the *bios*: his good health (4, 20), financial independence (16), which refers to the Cynic ideal of *autarkeia*, and his honesty and generosity, notably evident in the welcome extended to the tax collector (21–22), and above all in the rescue of shipwrecked sailors (Dio himself in 2–7; Sotades in 52–53 and 55–58). However, this repetition illustrating the virtue of the poor people living in the countryside is excessive and means that the hunter's life is marked not by events, but by the actualization of a certain number of limited characteristics (goodness, naivety, etc.). The hunter's story does not evolve: the partially narrative form hides the absence of a veritable narrative development,[32] which impedes all in-depth psychological and/or moral study of the character. He is a socio-moral type

27 See recent analyses in Pernot 2013: 163–166.

28 Russell 1990: 207–209.

29 On the blend of (supposed) truthful and fictional elements, see Anderson 2000: 146–148; Krause 2003: 64–72.

30 Desideri 2000: 100.

31 See *SAGN* 1: 460–461 (Whitmarsh).

32 See Anderson 2000: 147: 'It is an engaging sketch, but is it really an action?'

rather than an individual and this has a radical consequence on the structure of the speech: the narrative is discarded in favour of a dogmatic lecture. This change in form accompanies the abandonment of the characters, whose destiny is left totally unresolved.[33]

Consequently, although this tale is distinguished by its elegance and naturalness, the character of the hunter is totally deprived of individuality (and those who surround him share the same qualities): he is, quite significantly, deprived of a name and is thus definitively the Hunter identified by the title.

A unique case of typification is found in the portrayal of philosophers, in particular in the *Diogenian orations* devoted to the figure of Diogenes (6 and 8–10). These texts, including tales, dialogues, and speeches are close to what Whitmarsh called, regarding Philostratus, 'paradigmatic narrative', that is, 'selected anecdotes [...] relayed in order to exemplify aspects of Apollonius' wisdom' according to a rather flexible, or indeed, non-existent chronology.[34] On a more modest scale, Dio proposes various vignettes providing a kaleidoscopic portrayal of Diogenes through speech and action. In particular, he attended the Isthmian Games, led there by his habitual interest in observing gatherings of men (cf. 8.6; 9.1) and his usual behaviour (9.7) is illustrated by a series of *khreiai*, some more developed than others.[35] These micro-tales of meaningful but redundant words or actions, reveal his thought and, more generally, Cynic doctrine: the importance of *parrhēsia*, scorn for convention, resistance to passions, the *autarkeia* ideal.[36] The characterization of Diogenes, heir to an entire doxographic tradition, is thus inseparable from the dogmatic message, making him the character type of the Cynic philosopher.

Dio's Masks

In various ways, Dio's thought, as a student of Musonius, was inspired by Cynicism, an influence that can be seen in the sometimes very lively tone of his speeches when he criticizes cities or the vices of men more generally. Consequently, attributing some remarks to Diogenes, but within the framework of his own speech, Dio makes the Cynic his spokesman[37] and characteristics of

33 The tale ends with the decision to celebrate a wedding the following day (80)—a future without textual existence.

34 *SAGN* 2: 418 (Whitmarsh).

35 Jouan 1993: 389.

36 Brenk 2000: 266–269.

37 Moles 1983: 255.

Diogenes are thus also attributable to Dio. Whitmarsh goes as far as creating the name 'Dio/genes'[38] in order to highlight the superimposition of the orator on his character.[39] Identifying with an illustrious character is sometimes completely implicit (although the audience must be sensitive to the message that Dio delivers to them from Diogenes' mouth), and other times more direct. It is even comically unveiled when an anonymous interlocutor reproaches Dio for comparing himself to Pythagoras, Homer and Zeno (47.6). Dio, not hesitating to introduce a criticism of his supposed vanity into his own speech, manages to place himself midway between pride, modesty and self-mockery. He retells an anecdote, taken from Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 4.4.5), according to which the sophist Hippias lost his temper with Socrates under the pretext that the latter would always repeat himself: in the same way, Dio intends to deal with the same subject, namely, the issue of power, before the emperor each time (3.27–28). Yet the reference to Socrates goes further, as Dio, far from speaking words of his own creation, 'will endeavour to set forth the views of Socrates' (29), before launching himself into a lecture that truly belongs to him. The initial anecdote justifies Dio's choice of subject matter and allows the orator to then walk in the footsteps of the illustrious philosopher.

This kind of metaphorical characterization, in which Dio as orator builds his *ēthos* with reference to other characters, sometimes leads to numerous tales in the form of *khreiai* or apologues, notably to symbolize his relationship with his audience.

In a *Political address in his native city* in which Dio defends himself against certain accusations and professes his love for his city, he employs a *paradeigma* and recounts an episode in the life of Epaminondas almost in the form of a tale:[40]

> There was a certain man in Thebes called Epaminondas; he loved his country above all else; and, seizing such opportunities as existed at that period, he performed for it many great services. For, instead of the craven, helpless, subservient people they had been, he made them foremost among the Greeks and contenders for leadership. [...] However that may be, the famous Epaminondas was hated by those who were not like him, and there were some who maligned him, and the common people—as common people will—did not understand and were misled. And on one

38 Whitmarsh 2001: 108.

39 See also *SAGN* 1: 458 (Whitmarsh).

40 On this speech, see Schmidt 2013.

> occasion one of the desperate, disfranchised group, a fellow who had done any and every thing to harm the city when it was in slavery and ruled by a dictator, abused Epaminondas in a town meeting and said many harsh things [...]. Now when Epaminondas himself in turn took the floor, he did not speak regarding the other matters, nor did he defend himself against a single charge, but he merely said to his accuser, speaking in his own Boeotian dialect, 'May Damater be wroth wi' ye!' But the Thebans on hearing that were delighted and burst into laughter, as well they might, recalling, I suspect, the friendliness of Epaminondas toward the people and the scurvy conduct of the man who was trying to vilify him.
>
> 43.4–6

This short narrative, interrupted by some general political observations, is a valuable example because of its conclusion, in which Dio returns to his own situation: 'Well then, me [...]'. Its literary form, which is that of a *khreia*, as Epaminondas contents himself with a very brief word to silence his enemy, also serves as an example. However, while *khreiai* are often self-contained and finish with a striking word or gesture, the Theban hero's one-liner is accompanied with the characterization of both the character and the slanderer as well as a maxim on lying. The often implicit message of *khreiai* clearly brings out the qualities that Dio shares with Epaminondas, and that distinguish him from his political opponents in Prusa, that is, his pursuit of the truth and devotion to his city.

In *Oration* 32, at the end of a series of criticisms and pieces of advice intended for Alexandrians, Dio suddenly stops speaking and justifies doing so with an anecdote that reads like a fable:

> For the story goes that the deity once told that musician in a dream that he was destined to sing into an ass's ears. And for a while he paid no heed and gave no thought to the dream, as being a matter of no consequence. But when the tyrant of Syria came to Memphis, since the Egyptians admired the artist, he summoned him. So the musician gave a performance with all zest and displayed the more intricate phases of his art; but the tyrant—for he had no appreciation of music—bade his cease and treated him with disdain. And the musician, recalling that forgotten dream, exclaimed, 'So that was the meaning of the saying, "to sing into an ass's ears"'. And the tyrant, having heard from his interpreters what the musician had said, bound and flogged the man, and this incident, they say, was the occasion of a war.
>
> 32.101

The musician, who is only characterized by his art, is completely unknown; the tyrant, probably Antiochus IV Epiphanes,[41] is not named as he serves to embody the character type of the uneducated tyrant. This anecdote serves as a comparison with Dio's situation facing the Alexandrians: he, too, addresses an uneducated public, which is compared with the tyrant at the beginning of the speech, and risks unpleasantness by reprimanding his audience, as he has done since the beginning. This idea of the orator of sound advice who is nonetheless despised was already sown with the evocation of a sage named Theophilus, who 'preserved silence toward you' because the Alexandrians were not intelligent enough to heed his advice (97). Theophilus has an evocative name that recalls the preferential relationship between sages and the gods: a name, in this case the bearer of characterization, is also a means of individualization. Yet Theophilus' individuality is in fact immediately refuted, as he is merely the fleeting reflection of Dio, who has come to Alexandria 'by the will of some deity' (12) to speak with people who will likely not listen to him. Consequently, this illusory character, completely unknown elsewhere and undoubtedly fabricated, is merely the symbol of the difficult relationship between the philosopher and the public.

Dio as Character

While Dio gives speeches and write dialogues, he does not hesitate to directly intervene and allow elements from his own life to interfere.[42] This is particularly the case for the crucial moment that he calls his 'exile'. It is well-known that the causes and manners of his exile are discussed at length, to the extent that, far from presenting one version of this event that was a key moment for him, Dio gives many partial, indeed, contradictory pieces of information. This broad issue is beyond the scope of this article, instead we are interested in certain narrative self-characterization methods that build the *character* of Dio in a given context. We reiterate, following Krause, that the 'I' of Dio is a rhetorical construction that should be analysed independently from the biographical 'I'.[43]

41 Lewis 1949.

42 I will say no more regarding oration 7, for which Whitmarsh provides a detailed analysis of the figure of Dio, simultaneously orator, narrator, narratee (internal) and actor: see *SAGN* 1: 460–463.

43 Krause 2003: 31 in particular.

The beginning of *Oration* 13 is thus Dio's philosophical autobiography, in which he talks about the exterior events (exile, consultation with the Oracle of Delphi) and interior development (questioning how to evaluate his exile) that led him to what he was precisely in the process of doing (9): leading a nomadic life and answering the moral questions that men put to him. Different elements participate in Dio's characterization and prepare what is to follow in his speech. Inspired by the Socratic tradition, Dio claims to be made of the stuff of heroes[44] and have the *ēthos* of a wise man by evoking the following: his friendship with a man of virtue (1), the memory of Odysseus (4), mythical figure of roaming and endurance, thoughts on the trials capable of testing 'strength and will-power' (3), and the consultation with the Oracle of Delphi (9). In this way, he also justifies the philosophical speech that he gives next, taken and adapted from Socratic teachings. The web of epic and philosophical allusions suggests that the supposedly autobiographical story is a reconstruction of reality.[45]

Dio recounts episodes relating to his exile several times in his work, without elucidating the immediate link with the subject matter of the speech that follows. *Oration* 36 starts with the tale of a brief trip to Borysthenes, during Dio's exile,[46] allowing for a historical-ethnographic excursus. This is followed by a discussion with a citizen of the town, and then, to finish, a lecture on the 'divine government' of the world (26). The narrative introduction presents a Dio that is keen to make '[his] way through Scythia to the Getan country, in order to observe conditions there': like Solon, he adopts the position of a sage eager to explore and know the world. Dio's self-representation achieves a high degree of notably intertextual sophistication: in the middle of *Oration* 1, he recounts when he met an old woman in the Peloponnesian countryside, who told him a revised version of Prodicus' *Choice of Heracles*, inviting him to repeat it to the emperor; Dio does exactly that at the end of the speech (58–84). The two characters are subject to careful characterization, in which various techniques are employed. Dio explains the circumstances of his arrival: exiled, nomadic, disguised as a beggar, he adopts the way of life of the Cynic philosopher. However, he also identifies with Odysseus, to whom he indirectly compares himself by means of a Homeric quotation (50). He travels through the lands of the Greeks and Barbarians, his route taking him away from cities and into the heart of Greece, into the middle of the countryside: the *khōra*, which houses a sanctuary, is a place conducive to revelations. The portrayal of the old woman,

44 In a general way, as is underlined by Saïd 2000: 167, Dio 'impersonates various mythological characters.'

45 See Moles 2005, for a remarkable discussion on this.

46 On the circumstances of this travel, see Bost-Pouderon 2011: 107–113.

'strong and tall though rather advanced in years, dressed like a rustic and with some braids of grey hair falling about her shoulders', states her proximity to the divine, which is subsequently confirmed by her predictive powers (53–54). It has been noted many times that this narrative framework echoes that of Plato's *Phaedrus*, while the woman's tale reminds Dio of Diotima's speech to Socrates in the *Banquet*:[47] in both cases, the orator and the philosopher are called to listen to a lesson that they then teach others. Dio thus adopts the *ēthos* of the philosopher who learns prior to teaching. Yet, it is not 'without divine intervention' (55) that Dio met the old woman: he is also under divine protection and, therefore, the message that he delivers to Trajan is sanctioned by the gods.

A much more anecdotal self-representation contrasts with this grandiose presentation. Far from the personal myth that he constructs when evoking his exile, and equally far from his political quarrels in Prusa, Dio recounts an apparently banal morning in the introduction of *Oration* 52, devoted to the stark comparison of the tragedies on Philoctetes by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides.

> Having risen about the first hour of the day, both on account of the feeble state of my health and also on account of the air, which was rather chilly because of the early hour and very much like autumn, though it was midsummer, I made my toilet and performed my devotions. I next got into my carriage and made the round of the race-course several times, my team moving along as gently and comfortably as possible. After that I took a stroll and then rested a bit. Next, after a rub-down and bath and a light breakfast, I fell to reading certain tragedies.
>
> 52.1

We can rightly question the purposes of this brief tale and self-representation, which recall Aelius Aristides recounting his large and small ailments in the *Sacred Tales* more than the Dio's usual thoughts, as they immediately precede a speech devoted to a considerably literary issue. The strictly informative value of this side of Dio's private life is of little interest. Yet Dio must have amused himself by playing on the contrast between the literary concerns that feature in what is to come and this tale of daily activities, creating the portrait of a relatively wealthy person of note preoccupied by banal concerns—the weather, health, and so on. The abrupt and unexpected end of this micro-tale also comically demonstrates that Dio has introduced the theme of the speech by creating

47 Anderson 2000: 150.

the portrait of orator as reader. By presenting the reading of tragedies as a relief to illness (*paramuthia*, 3), he also subtly defines himself as a philosopher that finds consolation to his (small) miseries in books—tragedy is, from a different angle, the ultimate cathartic genre. We thus come across a fundamental aspect of Dio's thought: the importance of culture.

Conclusion

Dio, orator and moralist, uses a large number of characters in various discursive situations and often on the border between different genres. Yet these characters are systematically subordinated to moralizing, which imposes an elucidation of the character of characters, paradigms of *ēthē*. Dio relies on characters from the literary tradition, insofar as not only does he evoke their story or retell it highlighting a fundamental trait, but, in taking the same ethical concern that drives him from certain authors, he simultaneously deciphers the principles that supposedly guided such authors in their character construction. We can thus observe the simultaneous development of characterization and meta-characterization, in which narration and exegesis are inextricably linked.

This principle of creative exegesis supposedly teaches a lesson, although the use of such a principle is apparently part of the sophistic game: for example, the anonymous interlocutor of *Oration* 60, after having recalled that Dio tends to take the opposite view of the *doxa* regarding myths (1)—which is abundantly illustrated in the *Troikos*—recognizes that philosophers, like makers of figurines (*koroplathoi*), mould myths in their own way to make them useful and adapt them to philosophy (9). This thus presents us with a new version of the story of Heracles, Nessus and Deianira that is based on a new characterization of the protagonists: Nessus as a corrupting figure, Deianira as the incarnation of female cunning, and Heracles, the fallen hero, who decides to commit suicide from the shame of the *truphē* to which he is resigned. The story of the death of Heracles becomes a moral adventure, in which Dio, while breaking away from the traditional myth, respects the figure of Heracles as a Cynic hero, which has also become traditional.

While Dio demonstrates that he exercises a certain amount of freedom in his reinterpretation of characters, his character reconstruction is simultaneously restricted by the point of view he adopts. Dio's approach, though leading to literary observations,[48] is more ethical than literary, and requires the elimination

48 For example, his thoughts on *Chryseis* approach certain remarks of the scholia: cf. Kim 2005: 616.

of a certain complexity of character, which accompanies the gradual elimination of the narrative in certain speeches. *Oration* 36, for example, presents the meeting with Callistratus, who is subject to a careful depiction. Yet Callistratus is only the first of Dio's interlocutors, a pretext for a discussion on Homer and Phocylides, before, at the request of a certain Hieroson, Dio launches into a lecture on the 'divine city'. Therefore, by neglecting the immediate context, which serves as a narrative framework, and completely forgetting his Borysthentic audience, that is, the characters of his story, Dio stays on the edge of narration, and his characters, on the edge of veritable characterization.

CHAPTER 29

Lucian

Owen Hodkinson

Introduction

As already observed in the first volume in this series,[1] Lucian's large *oeuvre* is extremely diverse and complex in narratological terms, and simple categories that might be used to analyse his corpus, such as dialogue vs. narrative, were observed to be unhelpful for narratological categorization, since narrative texts contain embedded dialogues and *vice versa*, and because the dialogues themselves can be described as either mimetic or narrative (and this distinction itself is 'not entirely clear-cut').[2] It is also the case that in terms of characterization, we can observe patterns in Lucian's practice which cut across such formal categories, but which naturally follow other divisions between his works in terms of their predominant mode or function.

The first distinction is between a substantial number of texts which are primarily concerned with a single figure (1), and those which are not (2). In the former category we find both satirical attacks upon individual targets (1a), such as the narratives *Peregrinus* and *Alexander* and the dialogue *Nigrinus*, and also *prolaliai* (introductions) in which an individual or object is described in order to be compared to Lucian and his works (1b; and since *prolaliai* all serve to introduce a speech by Lucian, they may all come under this category: *Dionysus*, *Heracles*, *Electrum*, *Dipsads*, *Herodotus*, *Zeuxis*, *Harmonides*, and *The Scythian*). It is unsurprising that a great number and variety of instances and means of characterization are found in all types of work in category (1), and far less in category (2); in some of the latter which are least concerned with character, such as *Verae Historiae*, many satirical targets ('poets, historians, and philosophers', *VH* 1.2) are throughout implicitly and allusively characterized as liars, yet there is very little that would conventionally be recognized as characterization in that text.

1 *SAGN* 1: 465 (Whitmarsh). I follow suit in excluding works of doubtful authorship transmitted under his name: *On the dancers* (as opposed to *On the dance*), *Philopatris*, *Charidemus*, *Nero*, *Timarion*, *Halcyon*, *Swift-footed*, *Lucius or the Ass*, and the epigrams.

2 Whitmarsh 2004: 169.

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One character who is always present, being characterized in a variety of ways in both categories (1) and (2), is Lucian himself, or rather 'Lucian', the narrator in narrative texts, or one of his many alter-egos in dialogues. The manners in which he is characterized also cut across both the formal categories of dialogue and narrative and my crude categories in terms of characterization. Since the strategies for characterization cut across rather than being divided along formal/generic lines, and given the primary focus of *SAGN* on narrative texts proper, this chapter concentrates mainly on examples of characterization in Lucian's narrative texts rather than his dialogues. And since Lucian's narrator's strategies of self-characterization are broadly the same across works in my categories (1) and (2), I will focus primarily on type (1), where many more examples are to be found of characterization of others too.

Another ever-present (sometimes more, sometimes less overtly) set of characters are the audience/narratees, both external and internal, who serve to characterize the satirist either by being on his side, praising him, and being complicit in his satire by laughing along with him; or, by contrast with him, being like or being in thrall to the targets of his satire, and defending them against him. Likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, they also serve to characterize the satirist's targets.

Lucian's Genres, the Satiric-Comic Mode, and Characterization

I begin with some general observations on characterization in Lucian's genres and modes. First on genre: though he claims, with some validity, to be innovative in his use and combinations of genres, Lucian's works do of course display their debts to the rhetorical training and sophistic exercises so prevalent in the literature of the day. Given this fact, it is not surprising to find that a wide variety of forms and techniques of characterization are to be found in his corpus; and also that Lucian is frequently more or less explicit about using a particular characterization technique, referring to a term from rhetorical theory (or a phrase synonymous with that term) before going on to use that technique. For instance in *Dipsades* (9) he uses the term *eikōn*, one of the handbooks' terms for a comparison,[3] to describe the comparison he goes on to make between 'Lucian' and one bitten by the dipsad (a snake whose venom causes unquenchable thirst), and between his narratees/audience and that snake: 'I seem to be—and please don't resent the comparison (*eikona*) from animals, for the sake of friendship—like (*homoion*) those bitten by the dipsad …' Or

3 De Temmerman 2010: 32.

again, in *Alexander or the False Prophet*, which contains a lengthy *ekphrasis* of Alexander of Abunoteichos (3–4),[4] he introduces it with a periphrasis which more or less defines *ekphrasis*—word-picture: 'First I shall make a word picture of him for you (*hupographō tōi logōi*), making as close a likeness as I can (*homoiotaton eikasas*).'

Next on literary modes:[5] the predominant mode in Lucian's corpus is the satiric, which owes much to Old Comedy and little (in terms of structure or function) to the realist modes of epic, tragedy, and New Comedy. In this mode, with the exception of individuals (contemporary, historic, or mythical figures who are not 'Lucian' or his alter-egos) whose characterization is central to the text (categories 1a and 1b), realistic and stable character-portrayal is not a concern for the author. Most characters, including the narrator himself, can act and speak in ways that would be read as self-contradictory and 'out of character' in a realist work, at the service of the plot and the humour, which is the author's primary concern. As recent, sophisticated studies of characterization in Aristophanes and in Lucian have acknowledged,[6] character in this mode of literature is not a stable entity but a servant to the changing situations of the comic plot and the changing demands of its author: as Brusuelas puts it, Lucian's characters are 'whoever Lucian needs [them] to be in his comic world'.[7] Neither consistency of characterization nor character development are particularly significant: it is rather the needs of the plot and the desire to create humour which allow many comic characters to shift dramatically in their actions and tendencies, even to their speech patterns and linguistic usage.[8] It is presumably because of this that studies of characterization in Lucian

4 De Temmerman 2010: 40–41 on *ecphrasis*.

5 I use 'mode', a (necessarily) vaguer and less theoretically sophisticated term than 'genre' but preferable to it for these purposes, as denoting an identifiable mood, tone, or similar shared by a large body of literature not necessarily belonging to the same genre: it is clear that Lucian's prose satire has for some kinds of analysis important features in common with satirical drama and other verse satire, which make it more useful to group these together than to distinguish them as belonging to different genres (and to distinguish Lucian's works as in satiric mode or not). Northrop Frye 1957 *passim*, and Bakhtin throughout his works, are examples of critics using concepts of 'mode' respectively alongside or as a more useful concept than 'genre'.

6 Brusuelas 2008: 113–132 on characterization in Lucian and its similarities to Aristophanes; 113–116 for a good summary of the development of studies of comic characterization and Dobrov's (1995, 1997) and Silk's (1990, 2000) contributions on Aristophanes. I am grateful to Brusuelas for a copy of his thesis. See Bowie's chapter on Aristophanes (→) on Strepsiades and Dicaeopolis.

7 Brusuelas 2008: 120.

8 Brusuelas 2008: 114–115, Dobrov 1997: 86–88, Silk 2000: 222–223.

as to a lesser extent in other works in this mode are relatively sparse, compared with the Greek novel, tragedy, or epic.[9] A related observation is that Lucian's satirical alter-egos and narrators are, as Brusuelas argues,[10] very much like the Aristophanic 'comic hero'.[11] As Whitmarsh puts it, 'Lucian's narrators repeatedly foreground and problematize their own identities. Narration, for Lucian, is a self-disclosing, but also a self-concealing, act.'[12] They are shifting, slippery, self-ironizing, frequently undercut by themselves and by others, and take on whatever form best suits their current mode of attack and their target.

In addition, Lucian's fictional characters are often comic types, again as opposed to realistic characters; by this I mean that they belong to stock character-types—most frequently in Lucian the philosopher or wise man (or rather sham-philosopher or fraud)—who need not be individually characterized, but can be marked as belonging to a particular type by a kind of characterization short-hand, which uses only one or two key terms to describe their character or, very often, their physical appearance, including dress. In this, Lucian is in tune with the theories of physiognomy which had currency among contemporary sophists.[13] As Whitmarsh notes, 'Lucian frequently presents external markers as definitive of philosophical identity.'[14] This short-hand using aspects of physical appearance to denote the type of the philosopher or allegiance to a particular philosophical or other mode of life is frequent in Lucian, at least twice exploiting an ambiguity of *skhēma* (way of life or mode of dress)[15] and using the verb *metamphiazō* (to change attire) in close proximity for a similar metaphor: in *Menippus*, the personified Fate (*Tukhē*) fits out humans for different lives in appropriate costumes, and refers to a change of clothing denoting a change of lifestyle which suits the attire (16). And in *Hermotimus*, a change to the appropriate clothes is equivalent to becoming a philosopher (86).

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9 So in Pelling 1990a we find a central role given to epic and tragedy in five of the first six chapters and only one chapter in Silk 1990 on comedy.

10 2008: 127–132.

11 Brusuelas 2008: 113–114 with n. 377 on the term.

12 *SAGN* 1: 465 (Whitmarsh).

13 See Gleason 1995: 55–81.

14 2001: 259 n. 60 with further references; see further Hodkinson 2011: 31–32 with nn. 32, 35–36 for examples of this in Philostratus' *Heroicus* and other works; cf. in this volume also Demoen on Philostratus (→), Kasprzyk on Dio Chrysostom (→), and Morgan on clothing-based characterization in Longus (→).

15 Cf. Mossman in this volume on *skhēma* in Plutarch (→).

Related to the use of comic types is the use of 'speaking names', which sometimes characterize a figure by identifying one particular quality s/he has, or by attributing belonging to a particular group—another version of the characterizing 'short-hand' which is at home in the non-realist, comic mode. Here we can begin with Lucian's own alter-egos. One, 'Lycinus', is merely a thinly-disguised variant of Lucian,[16] while another, 'The Syrian', characterizes Lucian by *ethnos*. Others symbolize the satiric genre and the satirist's social function as critic, free speaker, and outsider: 'Momus', 'Parrhesiades', 'Cyniscus', and 'Tychiades'.[17] Finally, taking on the real name of another, as Lucian takes on the name 'Menippus' (*Bis accusatus* 33), can also characterize someone, in this case as a satirist in the same mould as his predecessor. Other characters also adopt this approach, self-characterizing using a nickname—which is taken up by their followers, and sometimes by the satirist himself. For example, the eponymous character in *Peregrinus* is called 'Proteus' by himself and others throughout, because (1) he changed as often as Homer's Proteus, a shape-shifting sea-god; he also decides, according to the narrator, to call himself Phoenix towards the time of his planned self-immolation, 'because … the phoenix is said to climb onto a pyre when far advanced into old age.' (27) (Compare also Alexander's nickname 'Glycon', *Alexander* 18.) A very different use of the significant name is seen frequently in *Verae Historiae* for the various fictional creatures and characters who are defined precisely by their names: see for instance the various categories of fighter mounted on invented species, Vulture-cavalry, Flea-archers and so on (1.13, etc.), or the individual names on the treaty between the Sunites (Firebrace, Parcher, Burns) and the Moonites (Darkling, Moony, Allbright) (1.20).[18]

A final general observation on characterization in satire is that moral qualities are very much targeted by the satirist: certainly they are far from exclusively targeted, but in building up a picture of a particular character who is an object of satire, many different qualities combine to represent someone as deserving not only of ridicule but also of censure and blame (Greek *mōmos*—often appealed to in personified form by Lucian). The satirist must therefore set himself up as upholding the moral conventions of his society, in defence of the ordinary people (sometimes represented as narratees in Lucian's satires), and in opposition to his target, whom he represents as flouting them. Thus a moral judgement is most certainly implicit and usually explicit in most if not all of

16 As is 'Nigrinus' in the dialogue of that name a thinly-disguised pseudonym for the philosopher Albinus, as at least some believe: see Tarrant 1985.

17 See *SAGN* 1: 468 (Whitmarsh) on all these alter-egos.

18 Names as translated by Harmon 1913.

Lucian's characterizations, and in Gill's terminology we are primarily dealing with *character* as opposed to *personality*.[19] Given Lucian's special concern for liars, tricksters, and charlatans posing as philosophers and wise men, alongside generic morally evaluative terms such as virtuous or wicked, there is in his works a preponderance of characterization in terms of truth-telling and lying, deceitfulness, and trickery. There is also a large amount of characterization in terms of credulity, naïveté, and stupidity and lack of education (often applied to the unfortunate followers of a target of satire, sometimes the audience of a narrative), and their opposites—which are necessarily attributed to 'Lucian' himself, since he is able to spot them, but also to his addressees at times, whether individuals (Celsus and Cronius) or his narratees when making them complicit. And of course, one of the primary set of attributes with which satiric targets are characterized is 'ridiculous', 'laughable', and such terms: for satire to be successful, it is not only scorn or moral reprobation but also laughter which the satirist must elicit from his audience. Targets of Lucian's satire are frequently characterized directly by the narrator, being described by adjectives meaning laughable; but perhaps more frequently, they are indirectly characterized as such by provoking laughter. This laughter is sometimes the satirist's own, when he is an internal narrator telling of a past encounter with the target in which he laughed at him; sometimes that of an internal audience, characters or bystanders witnessing the actions or hearing the words of the target; finally, it is sometimes assumed by the narrator to be the appropriate reaction of his primary narratee, whom he guides by some such phrase as 'you would have laughed had you been there' or 'you will laugh when you read this story' (e.g. *Peregrinus* 2, quoted below; 37: 'I can see you laughing once more, my good Cronius, at the finale of the drama'). Laughter is thus for Lucian his chief satiric weapon, and consequently it is one of the most important ways in which indirect (metonymical) characterization of his targets is achieved.

The Self-Characterization of 'Lucian' and his Alter-Egos

As stated above, the most frequently and extensively characterized figure in Lucian is 'Lucian', usually the primary narrator in his narrative texts and 'narrative' dialogues, or a privileged interlocutor in the 'mimetic' dialogues. He is characterized most frequently by himself, both directly and indirectly, but sometimes he is also characterized by others, when other characters describe

19 Gill 1986, 1990, 1996.

him directly or react to what he says. His self-characterization is primarily achieved by more or less overt comparisons—especially, overtly with the individual subjects of *prolaliai* (texts of type 1b), and covertly (implicitly) with individual objects of satire (1a), but also in all his texts by comparison, negative or positive, with primary narratees (audiences of his speeches and addressees of his epistolary narratives *Peregrinus* and *Alexander*) or other characters including secondary narratees (bystanders and audiences of his direct speeches as a character within his narratives).

Since the primary function of the *prolaliai* is to introduce a performance of a further work by Lucian, and to persuade his audience that it is worth staying to listen, Lucian's qualities as a speaker and his work are indirectly characterized by favourable comparison to the main subject of the discourse (a *paradeigma* when the subject is a person, as is usually the case). So in *The Scythian*, foreignness is the main point of comparison with Anacharsis (9), and the disorientation of the foreigner coming to Greece which both experienced: Lucian was terrified and struck with wonder (characterized by his emotions, which are causally connected with his status as an outsider)—this functions as a *captatio benevolentiae* in Lucian's case. He is not always characterized in positive terms, however: he is subject to mockery himself, even for qualities which are prime targets for his own mockery, such as credulity, as in *Electrum* (3, 5–6), where he is laughed at by the locals for his naïveté as a foreigner in believing myths about the swansong and the origins of amber. As noted above, the satirist's persona frequently undermines and ironizes its own authority in this way.

In the narrative works satirizing individuals, *Alexander* and *Peregrinus*, similar strategies of self-characterization, and by association, often characterization of his narratees and addressees, are found. The narrator compares himself with individuals such as Democritus (*Peregrinus* 45, as often), as a figure who mocks with his laughter; in such narrative texts he also uses anonymous internal audiences to contribute to his self-characterization—the main function of these anonymous characters is to characterize both the narrator and the satiric target by their reactions to them. In *Peregrinus* (2), Lucian speaks for the rest of those who see through Peregrinus, but indirectly characterizes himself by his actions as braver than them, since the satirist is the only one to speak out against Peregrinus at the time, when the latter is surrounded by his supporters.

Having an external primary narratee by using epistolary form also allows further scope for characterization of the narrator by identifying with him (again a technique that serves to characterize both himself and other characters thus compared at the same time), and sometimes additionally enables 'Lucian' to praise himself more modestly than otherwise: 'this trick, to a man like you [Cel-

sus his addressee], and *if it is not out of place to say so, like myself also*, was obvious and easy to see through, but to those drivelling idiots it was miraculous and almost as good as incredible' (*Alexander* 20). In his summary of the same work (61) addressing Celsus more directly once more, he characterizes him as (among other things) wise, and a lover of truth: again, it is implicit that Lucian himself shares these qualities, since he is able to communicate wisdom and truths to him which are not accessible to the 'idiots' who are taken in by such charlatans as Alexander.

Characterization of Other Characters

Lucian's works focusing on an individual person—i.e. the majority of the *prolaliai* and the satirical works against a single target—employ all the modes of characterization discussed in ancient rhetorical theory, collectively; and almost all of them are sometimes used in an sketch of a single character, such as that of its subject found towards the beginning of *Alexander* (1–5), or that of Anacharsis in the *Scythian*.

In the *prolaliai*, we find that most of the modes of characterization recognized by ancient theory are present across this class of Lucian's works, mostly employed by 'Lucian', the external narrator (though in *Heracles* and *Electrum*, since these are autobiographical narratives, the narrator is internal). Taking the *Scythian* as our primary example, we find:[20]

- **Direct attribution:** Anacharsis' mental qualities described by the narrator (3);[21] there follows self-characterization in direct speech by Anacharsis (4), who repeats some of what the narrator says of him in 3.
- **Indirect attribution: comparison:** Anacharsis compared to 'Lucian' (9, discussed above, along with examples from other *prolaliai*).
- **... emotions (*pathē*):** Anacharsis is confused and at a loss, regrets travelling to Athens (3); compare Lucian's own experience (9, discussed above).
- **... membership of groups: Macro-social:** Anacharsis is identified by *ethnos* and language—he is a Scythian (3), as is Toxaris (1, 3);[22] the fact that he is Scythian means that his dress was mocked by those who saw him in Athens

20 Following the typology of De Temmerman 2010: 28–42.

21 Cf. *Dionysus* 1, *Herodotus* 1.

22 Cf. the Garamantes tribe, *Dipsads* 2.

and encountered no one speaking his language there; he also feels out of place and at a loss what to do; he thus regrets making the trip, and resolves to retrace his steps, until he encounters his fellow-Scythian, Toxaris (3). **Micro-social:** he is a member of the aristocracy (3), unlike Toxaris, one of the ordinary folk (1); ***Paideia*, *agogē* / *educatio*:** his education is also mentioned, but more clearly Toxaris is defined as a medical man (*iatrikos*) (2).

- **… action (*praxis*):** Anacharsis is not characterized by his action particularly in *Scythian*; for an example in the *prolaliai*, Dionysius (4) is depicted in battle, routing the Indians.
- **… speech (*ēthopoiia*):** Anacharsis and Toxaris have long speeches in a virtual dialogue (4–7). We are told that they converse, naturally, in their native Scythian tongue—Anarchasis being overjoyed to have found someone with whom this is possible; his Scythian identity is emphasized by his swearing oaths by the Scythian gods Acinaces and Zamolxis, all of which is a realistic touch in characterizing him; the addition of 'our native gods', in conversation between Scythians, however, is less so, evidently identifying the gods named as Scythian for the benefit of Lucian's readers rather than characterizing Anacharsis through his speech in realistic fashion (4).[23]
- **… Speech: Anecdote (*khreia*):** Anecdote about Toxaris' medical skills (2).[24]
- **… Appearance: Physiognomy:** Anacharsis' and Toxaris' physical appearance including dress (3).[25]
- **… Appearance: Ekphrasis:** description of Toxaris (1–2).

In addition to these categories from ancient theory, Anacharsis is characterized by others' reactions to him: he is laughed at by the Athenians for his foreign garb, which contributes to the effect of his outlandish and comical appearance.

Turning to the longer narratives with a single central figure, we find a similarly wide range of characterization techniques. As quoted above, *Alexander* contains an *ekphrasis* of its subject labelled all but explicitly as such (3–4); this then segues into a biography of Alexander beginning with his boyhood (5). The *ekphrasis* begins with his physical appearance and bearing, including how he wore his hair and beard (3)—his physiognomy:

23 Cf. *Harmonides* 1, speech by Harmonides, 2, by Timotheus.

24 Cf. *Herodotus* 1–2, *Zeuxis* 8–10.

25 Cf. *Dionysus* 1.

> … [He was] tall and handsome in appearance, and really godlike; his skin was fair, his beard not very thick; his long hair was in part natural, in part false, but very similar, so that most people did not detect that it was not his own. His eyes shone with a great glow of fervour and enthusiasm; his voice was at once very sweet and very clear …
>
> *Alexander* 3

This leads on to a description of his soul and mind (*psukhē* and *gnōmē*):

> In understanding, quick-wittedness, and penetration he was far beyond everyone else; and activity of mind, readiness to learn, retentiveness, natural aptitude for studies—all these were his … to the full. But he made the worst possible use of them, and … became the most perfect rascal of all those who have been notorious far and wide for villainy, surpassing the Cecropes, surpassing Eurybatus, or Phrynondas …

This passage contains direct characterization by the narrator, complementing those found earlier, e.g. 'imposter … clever schemes, sleights of hand' (1), and later (a list of blameworthy attributes, 4 *fin.*), and ends with indirect characterization through comparison with a list of villains (see also comparison with the brigand Tillorobus, 2). He is also characterized by unfavourable comparison with his namesake, Alexander the Great (1): 'The one was as great in villainy as the other in heroism.' His deeds and works are implicitly compared by the narrator to dung, when he says 'I will essay to clean up that Augean stable' (1), meaning to write about all the exploits of Alexander. He is characterized in terms of *paideia* when his boyhood education is briefly related (5). Lucian allows Alexander some self-characterization within this sketch as well (4): 'he himself … claimed to be like Pythagoras'—the narrator agrees with this statement and goes further, saying that Pythagoras 'would have seemed a child beside him'. This opening of the *Alexander*, then, summarizes his character for its primary narratee/addressee Celsus and of course for the other narratees, the readers, giving them the background and the full picture of the man (especially for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with him). Given this aim, it is no surprise to see so many means of characterization employed in a short space of text.

Elsewhere in the *Alexander*, yet more kinds of characterization are employed, including self-identification using nicknames ('Glycon', 18, discussed above), indirect self-characterization through his dress and through belonging to the family of Perseus (11: he dresses in the manner of Perseus and claims descent from him). He is characterized through his own speech at various points, including in an embedded dialogue with one Sacerdos, in which he

claims 'I am the latter-day Asclepius' (43). And, as very often in Lucian's satire, the target is characterized by his own actions and the reactions they provoke in others, for instance his trick to make himself appear to foam at the mouth, and the amazement of the superstitious and gullible crowd (12); or the reaction of the narrator himself (and the expected agreement of his narratees), e.g. in characterizing his act of burning an Epicurean book as 'most comical/laughable' (*geloiotaton*, 47).

Peregrinus employs many of the same modes of characterization of its subject: the most direct characterization by the narrator is found at the beginning (e.g. 'wretched', *kakodaimōn*, 1) and in the conclusion (42). Peregrinus is also characterized indirectly by the narrator: through his actions (most notably his self-immolation, the subject of the work, 32–36); through his own words (*ēthopoiia*; e.g. 33); by comparison (e.g. 3, where he outdoes Aeschylus and Sophocles for dramatic behaviour or showmanship); by his emotions (*pathē*)—he is afraid and turns pale when his followers urge him to complete his promised suicide rather than saving him (33). He is frequently characterized by the laughter he provokes in 'Lucian' (34), or the laughter that, according to the narrator, he ought to provoke in his addressee Cronius:

> I imagine you're having a hearty laugh at the stupidity of the old fellow, or rather I can hear you shouting out the appropriate comments 'Oh what folly, oh what presumptuousness, oh …' adding everything else that *we* usually say about such behaviour!
>
> 2; see also 37

Besides the narrator, other characters/secondary narrators characterize Peregrinus too, for example Theagenes the Cynic (4) who in a future narrative foretelling Peregrinus' suicide, in turn uses comparison to characterize him favourably as one who has chosen death by fire, as Heracles did, and like Asclepius and Dionysus who died by the thunderbolt, thus elevating him to the status of gods; nor does he shrink from the strongest hyperbole—he is 'more conspicuous than the sun' and 'able to rival Olympian Zeus himself'. Or the anonymous speaker of the extended speech against Peregrinus (7–30), who begins with anecdotes (*khreiai*) to illustrate his character alongside direct statements about his immoral qualities (9). He rhetorically pretends to 'pass over' (10) the immoral deeds of Peregrinus' youth, including being caught in the act of adultery and paying off the parents of a boy he corrupted to escape a charge—which however he has just narrated (9). In these two chapters too he lets a deliberate and humorous inconsistency of sentiment slip past, highlighted by forms of cognate words in each chapter, to allow the audience to form

their own opinions of Peregrinus' character—though there is no doubt which way he is steering them: the adultery happened when he 'had come of age' (*eis andras* ***telein*** *ērxato*), and he is referred to at this point, with heavy irony, as 'this creation (***plasma***) and masterpiece of nature' (9); but next he implies his behaviour might be excused as youthful indiscretions, as he was 'still unshapen (***aplastos***) clay and our 'holy image' had not yet been created complete (***entele-les***) for us.'

Lucian's extended use of direct speech in the *Peregrinus* narrative as in many others (narrative dialogues as well as narratives proper) of course means that he characterizes the other characters too—the speakers themselves—to some extent, especially through *ēthopoiia*. But Theagenes (4) is also characterized by the narrator as belonging to a group—he is called a Cynic; and the anonymous speaker of 7–30 is directly characterized by the approving narrator as a 'splendid fellow' (31) and indirectly by his laughter at Peregrinus (7), and characterizes himself by comparing himself to Democritus. The anonymous speaker of the large central section of the *Peregrinus* thus very closely resembles 'Lucian' as he elsewhere characterizes himself.

Other, less central, characters are characterized in varying degrees of brevity in Lucian's works: for instance in the *Scythian* (5–6) Solon is characterized in a thumbnail sketch in direct speech by another character, Toxaris, using direct attribution (he says that he is wise and good) and several kinds of indirect attribution. An anonymous sophist/'philosopher' type is very briefly sketched in *Peregrinus* (40) on the basis of his appearance and bearing—grey hair, long beard, a dignified bearing—which mark him as authoritative, as well as fitting the short-hand imagery for characterizing a philosopher; in this case, the confidence he inspires is misplaced, but we hear no more about him. In the *Verae Historiae*, the purely fictional characters are not really important *qua* characters, as noted above. Certain well-known figures appear as characters, however, such as Homer and Odysseus, and here the narrator can rely on the reader's knowledge in order not to have to describe them in any way. But he can then exploit this knowledge in order to characterize them in surprising ways which go against their conventional characterizations: e.g. Homer (self-characterizing in direct speech, answering a series of questions put by the narrator) is from Babylon, and (direct attribution by the narrator) is not blind. Odysseus is characterized in his own words in a letter to Calypso (2.35), a familiar literary variant of the rhetorical exercise of *prosopopoiia* in the epistolary form.[26] He is characterized by expression of his emotions in saying 'I am thoroughly sorry to have

26 On this letter and its place in the narrative see Bär 2013.

given up my life with you', thus belying the usual tradition of the happy reunion with Penelope; his action when handing the letter to the narrator to carry 'without Penelope's knowledge' (2.29) confirms this.

Inconsistency of Characterization

A tendency exhibited at times by Lucian's characters of all types is that they are not bound by concerns for realism in the consistency of their characterization: rather, they behave and speak however the plot and the humour of the piece demand, just like Aristophanes' characters do.[27] In *Gallus*, for example, Micyllus would seem to have learned the lesson that the life of the wealthy is not necessarily a happy one by being shown how Eucrates lives (33); but for the sake of comedy, his character then only rejects the life of Eucrates, rather than the life of the wealthy in general.[28]

Characterization of Narratees

Lucian's narratees are also characterized in various ways and for different purposes.[29] In some texts, occasional remarks hinting at the character of the primary narratee(s) serve primarily to help characterize the narrator, as discussed above, because there an implication of sharing in the satirist's views and complicity in his mockery of his target. There is thus usually a flattering characterization of narratees to align them with the narrator and distinguish them from his targets.[30] In the *Ignorant Book-Collector* and *Apology for a slip in greeting*,

27 See above, text to n. 6; Bowie in this volume notes that Aristophanes' (→) last two plays, being more realistic, are likewise more concerned with consistency of characterization.

28 Brusuelas 2008: 118–120 for full discussion.

29 I concentrate here on internal narratees, but it is important to note that for Lucian's speeches, external, anonymous narratees (the imagined audience of the speech) are frequently characterized in the same way as internal and sometimes named narratees, bystanders whose reactions serve to characterize both the satirist and his targets, and act as a foil against which those are portrayed.

30 Flattering characterizations of the narratees are especially important in *prolaliai*, which attempt to win over an audience before a longer speech: contrast the positive characterization of the Macedonian audience (*Herodotus* 7–8) with Lucian's typical estimation of the intelligence of crowds (e.g. *Alexander* 15, 17). See further *SAGN* 1: 472–473 (Whitmarsh) on the construction of Lucian's audience.

the explicit addressee (the secondary narratee) is the target of the satire, so that, exceptionally, we have a negative characterization of a narratee.

In some *prolaliai*, specific individuals are evidently addressed in an attempt to win patronage; in such cases, generic flattery might be replaced by more specific characterization. One such case is the *Scythian*, addressed to two individuals, a father and son (again not identified by name) of noble birth and education (*paideia*, 10). They are characterized in more detail (10–11) and with slightly more specific rather than generic terms of flattery—albeit along with much of the latter, too. The narrator characterizes them primarily through the direct and reported speech of the Macedonians, of whom he had asked 'who were the leading citizens and who might be approached ... as patrons' (10)—the answer being, of course, the two primary narratees. In order to make the flattery more acceptable, they are described by Lucian putting words into their fellow-citizens' mouths, though he says following their 'quoted' praise, 'This by Zeus (if I must swear to it) is what all told me' (11)—humorously acknowledging, with this parenthesis and the unlikely statement before the quotation that 'they have all told me the same thing [about you] *in about the same words*' (10), that the flattering speech is of course his own invention. Among the generic flattery, some facts about themselves must have been recognizable to his addressees in order for it to be convincing: obviously they will in fact have been father and son, as they are characterized, and (allowing for flattering exaggeration) the son will have been at least of average height and looks, since the Macedonians told Lucian that he is tall and handsome (11), and they will have been known for their ability in oratory, since they are described as 'comparable to the ten Attic orators' (10) and other such terms of praise.

Named primary narratees of the epistolary narratives *Alexander* (Celsus) and *Peregrinus* (Cronius) have already been mentioned, and discussed above with regard to the role they play in characterizing others. But they are no doubt to be identified with (fictionalized and perhaps flattering versions of) real individuals to whom Lucian addressed such works, although of course they are 'open letters' and Lucian had in mind a general publication (as made explicit e.g. by the mention of other readers in *Alexander* 61, quoted above). Their characterization is thus more than a matter of portraying a generic ideal reader—though they must serve this purpose too. Celsus has been identified with the writer of the *True Word*, an attack on Christianity, to which Origen's *Against Celsus* was a reply; this identification is disputed, but whatever the truth of the matter, the characterization of Celsus by the narrator is clearly meant to portray a wise and intelligent man, one who loves truth (20, 61), and would enjoy Lucian's exposure of fraud and charlatans; Lucian puts him on the same level as himself, both in singling him out as the addressee and more

explicitly in the passage quoted above (20). But he individualizes him further in very specific terms, as the author of a treatise exposing sorcerers as charlatans, thus identifying Celsus as very much Lucian's kind of person: '… the book which you wrote against the sorcerers, a very good and useful treatise, capable of preserving common-sense in its readers' (21; cf. 61 on the similar utility of the *Alexander* itself).

Mimetic Dialogues

The class of purely mimetic dialogues among Lucian's works (*Dialogues of Courtesans*, *Dialogues of the Gods*, *Dialogues of the Sea-gods*, *Dialogues of the Dead*, *The Judgement of the Goddesses*) which do not feature any kind of 'Lucian' figure or privileged interlocutor can be seen as literary exercises in characterization through *ēthopoiia*. They are not technically narratives as there is no narrator (though they may be regarded as all having a 'suppressed narrator'),[31] but they share the same techniques of characterization with the narrative dialogues and indeed with direct speech and sometimes virtual dialogues within Lucian's narrative texts. The characters are ventriloquized by the author of the mimetic dialogues (or the narrator in the latter cases), put in unusual or comic situations and then characterized mainly through their own speech, and also by what their interlocutors say about them, and by their actions and reactions to one another.

Conclusions

Lucian's works display great variation in their use of characterization techniques, as is to be expected from the variety of genres and modes in his corpus; his approach to characterization does not on the whole divide along broad generic lines such as narrative or dialogue (although see below regarding *prolaliai*). As a sophistic author, he is well aware of ancient rhetoricians' definitions of characterization techniques and sometimes refers to them in terms which display that knowledge, as well as employing the full range. The single most important character across his works is 'Lucian' himself or his alter-egos, the narrator in his narrative texts, who is relatively consistently characterized across the variety of genres as a satirist and parodist, one who censures and

31 Cf. *SAGN* 1: 7–8 (de Jong).

mocks the less educated and the gullible, and exposes liars and charlatans; he is therefore implicitly educated and intelligent (a *pepaideumenos*), a lover of truth and morally superior to the corrupt specimens he targets. He frequently undercuts and ironizes this persona, however, and is free to speak and act in any way that suits the comic-satiric purpose of a given phrase or episode: consistency of characterization and character development (of any of Lucian's characters) are normally not important, and are certainly subordinate to plot and humour. This narrator also does most of the characterization of others: he constructs an audience of primary and secondary external and sometimes internal narratees who share many of his own qualities, and who are complicit in the mockery of and laughter at satiric targets, as well as being the beneficiaries of his useful exposure and censure of them; sometimes he employs a named primary narratee (e.g. an epistolary addressee), in which case there is more specific characterization, but they also normally share the same qualities as Lucian's generalized narratees. Satiric targets are perhaps the most fully characterized individuals beside the narrator, and are sometimes the subject of thumbnail sketches and potted biographies which characterize them in a huge variety of ways including direct attribution by the narrator, before the narrative which shows them in action and often speaking, thus affording some self-characterization and some indirect characterization (by other characters' words about them or reactions to them). There is thus normally a fairly full and technically diverse characterization of the main subject of the text, plus a characterization of the narrator by comparison—explicit at one or two points in the text, but implicit throughout. Primary narratees of *prolaliai* are usually characterized in highly flattering terms, sometimes generic when they are non-specific (a citizen body), sometimes including more specific terms when they are individualized (a potential patron).

PART 9

The Novel

CHAPTER 30

Chariton

*Koen De Temmerman**

A fundamental quality of fiction is what Dorrit Cohn characterizes as its *non-referentiality* or *self-referentiality*: 'a work of fiction itself creates the world to which it refers by referring to it'.[1] It does not need to refer to an extratextual reality but can, in principle at least, be solely self-referential.[2] This fact has implications for characterization. In most narratives discussed in previous chapters, characterization implies, at least to some extent, a re-construction of (a version of) a person amidst preceding and contemporary historical, biographical, mythological and/or legendary traditions. Fictional characters, on the other hand, such as Chariton's Chaereas and Callirhoe, have to be constructed *ex nihilo* by a narrator: they do not exist before their invention in a specific literary work. Consequently, much characterization works through a bottom-up dynamic, where character is built up gradually through the accumulation of (fictional) information rather than through reference to extra-textual realities.

And yet, characterization in fiction is obviously similar in important ways to that in genres such as historiography and biography. The dynamic of re-constructing (rather than constructing) characters, for example, can be present within the fictional universe. The end of Chariton's novel, the oldest extant representative of ancient Greek prose fiction, emphasizes this point. The novel is concluded by a speech in which the hero, Chaereas, recounts to the Syracusan people the preceding events. In it, he reconstructs a version of his former self and Callirhoe—a version in which both receive an unambiguously positive characterization that omits some of the darker aspects that the reader at this point remembers from the preceding chapters. This speech has been read either as a cathartic moment for Chaereas[3] or as an indication of his perfected

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1 Cohn 1999: 9–17 (citation taken from p. 13).

2 See also Margolin 1991: 520.

3 Kasprzyk 2006: 300–301.

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rhetorical control over his audience.[4] In the speech, just as in historiographical and biographical narrative, Chaereas and Callirhoe are narrativized versions of a 'real' version as the reader (unlike Chaereas' audience) knows it from the overarching (fictional) story. The juxtaposition of this version and the version that the reader has been given in the overarching story points up two notions that, as we will see presently, are central to characterization in Chariton: that, within the fictional world, one's character is constructed and performed; and that it is relative: the Chaereas and Callirhoe whom the Syracusan people will go on to remember on the basis of Chaereas' report differ significantly from those the reader of the novel remembers. Even in fiction with its characters constructed from scratch, there is no such thing as one, true character.

Maxims, Historical Characters and Character Types

In what follows, I will discuss various aspects of bottom-up characterization, as well as what is arguably Chariton's most interesting example of this type of character-building (Dionysius). But first, we need to explore briefly another similarity between fictional and non-fictional genres: the idea that fiction too uses top-down mechanisms of characterization. Just like non-fictional genres, it builds on patterns, dynamics and knowledge activated by pieces of textual information and often imported from outside the fictional universe. Indeed, fiction more often than not does make reference to extra-literary reality, for example by appealing to general norms in order to create credibility and recognizability of character among other things. The use of maxims as an explicatory tool of human behaviour is a good example. When Theron's ship, struck off course by storms and drifting aimlessly, is boarded by Syracusans, he pretends to lie dead among the corpses of his fellow brigands, who have all died of thirst. Although 'he fully intended not to utter a sound or move a muscle' (3.3.16),[5] he cries out for water. The narrator explains this behaviour with a maxim ('human beings are born with a love of life; not even in the worst disaster do we despair of a change for the better').[6] A pocket of non-fiction is drawn into the fiction in order to generate patterns of recognizability and, hence, credibility underlying Theron's behaviour.

4 De Temmerman 2009.

5 Here and elsewhere I cite the translation of Reardon 2008.

6 Another example (about barbarians) occurs at 5.2.6.

The Greek novels also use other techniques to anchor the behaviour of characters in extra-literary reality. It is well known that especially their early representatives do so precisely by incorporating historical or legendary characters. As far as we can tell from the fragments that we have, *Ninus* revolves around the legendary Assyrian king and his wife Semiramis. Chariton makes his heroine the daughter of the famous Syracusan general Hermocrates, and (anachronistically) casts the Persian king Artaxerxes in the role of her admirer. From the moment of their introductions, their names come with a number of characteristics and expectations mediated through historiographical, legendary or other cultural traditions.

Take Hermocrates, for example. He is introduced as 'the Syracusan general (*ho … stratēgos*) who defeated the Athenians' (1.1.1). This introduction picks up two important strands known from the historiographical tradition (he is a war hero and political leader)[7] that remain central throughout the novel. His reputation as a war hero surfaces repeatedly and impacts the behaviour of a number of characters (Dionysius 2.6.3, Artaxerxes 5.8.8, the Egyptian leader 7.5.8); and his political leadership is consistently documented through metonymical characterization that highlights the cleverness, cunning, foresight, and strategic and psychological insight reminiscent of his portrait in historiography in general, and in Thucydides in particular:[8] he is sensitive to political danger (he is the first to realize that Chaereas is the victim of a conspiracy in 1.5.6–7); is not swayed by emotions but makes rational decisions with authority;[9] stages his daughter's funeral in a way that can be read as political self-advertisement (1.6.5);[10] is an excellent observer of human behaviour (he detects Chaereas' shame, as highlighted by the verbal echo of *aidoumenos* in *aidesthēs*, 8.7.4); is 'a brilliant semiotician', continually using 'the power of signs and images to reaffirm his position within the state';[11] and displays the chameleonic versatility for which some of the great politicians in the Greek historiographical tradition are famous: when unknown ships approach Syracuse, he acts according to his political duty (*epoliteueto*) by being present at the harbour but at the same time remains hidden (*lanthanōn*) because he is in mourning (8.6.7). From the start

7 On Hermocrates as a political and military leader in Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, see Billault 1989: 541–543. On Thucydidean echoes in Chariton, see Trzaskoma 2011: 61–63.

8 On these characteristics: Billault 1989: 541–543; Fauber 2001: 48; and Shanske 2007: 56–57.

9 One such decision is presented by the narrator as an index of political leadership (*stratēgikos anēr*, 3.4.3). See also Smith 2007: 130.

10 Smith 2007: 57–59.

11 Smith 2007: 74.

until the very end of the novel, Hermocrates-the-politician acts out his role. As in the case of the maxim explaining Theron's behaviour, a pocket of non-fiction is introduced into the fiction in order to activate a behavioural pattern.

Top-down characterization works not only for historical characters but also for fictional ones. In this case, it is usually activated by generic codes. In Chariton's novel, it is difficult to triangulate the precise generic schemas and conventions addressed. The reason is, quite simply, that we cannot establish with precision Chariton's exact place within the novelistic tradition. The text is now dated to one or two decades either side of AD 50[12] and believed by most scholars to be the oldest extant complete representative of the genre.[13] Although Tilg (2010) claims that Chariton was the 'inventor' of the so-called 'ideal' Greek love novel, scholars have long pointed to less-than-ideal elements in Chariton's novel as well as to the possibility that such elements react to an earlier, more ideal tradition.[14]

In any case, an important form of characterization activated by generic codes is typification. Chariton's main characters, like those in other novels, can easily be mapped onto deep-rooted narrative patterns: a love couple separated and eventually reunited, a hero on a quest (Chaereas is in search of Callirhoe for most of the time), helped by a friend (Polycharmus) and opposed by a number of rivals (suitors, Dionysius, Mithridates, Artaxerxes).[15] Once such plot patterns have been evoked through textual cues and connected to certain characters (itself a bottom-up dynamic), they generate expectations in the reader about the behaviour of these characters (a top-down process). In addition, Chariton, again like the other novelists, evokes character types from contemporary and earlier literary and rhetorical traditions, such as cunning slaves (Plangon, Artaxates) and pirates (Theron).[16] Our understanding of all these characters partly depends on our appreciation of their generically prescribed roles and their recognizability is enhanced by more or less fixed, prototypical characteristics.[17] Polycharmus is an excellent example of such compression: he is

12 See Tilg 2010: 36–79 for details.

13 There is no certainty about this date. O'Sullivan 1995: 145–170, 2005, for example, places him *later* than Xenophon, and Jones 2012: 15–16 n. 73, 63 n. 123 interestingly raises the possibility of a 2nd-c. CE date.

14 See De Temmerman 2014: 116–117 for details.

15 For a Proppian analysis, Ruiz-Montero 1981, 1988.

16 See, among others, van Mal-Maeder 2001, 2007: 115–145.

17 See Reardon 1991: 26 on this 'gallery' of 'romance types' in Chariton. On other types (and their plot functions), see Haynes 2003: 101–155 and Anderson 1984: 63–69.

introduced as Chaereas' friend (*philos*, 1.5.2) and all his actions and speech essentially act out this one quality.[18] He prevents or dissuades him from committing suicide (1.5.2, 1.6.1, 5.10.10, 6.2.8, 6.2.11), misleads his own parents in order to accompany him on his quest (an action interpreted by the narrator as an act of friendship, 3.5.7), comforts him (3.6.8, 4.4.1, 5.2.6), encourages him to find a new love (8.1.6), and even expresses a desire to die with him (4.2.12–15, 4.3.1–5).

But even if characters are built around recognizable types, they can be more complex, for example, if the top-down characterization is combined with bottom-up processes. Theron is introduced straightforwardly as a pirates' leader, a scoundrel and criminal (1.7.1). This characterization generates expectations in the reader about how Theron will act and impact the plot (top-down). These expectations are borne out unproblematically by a fair amount of his actions throughout the novel (e.g. 3.3.12). It is also supported by the setting at significant moments: the brigands chosen by him to rob Callirhoe's tomb spend their time in harbours (*tois limesin*, 1.7.1; *ton limena*, 1.7.3, 3.4.11), brothels and taverns (*en porneiois, en kapēleiois*, 1.7.3), which, according to the narrator, makes them 'an army fit for such a commander' (1.7.3).[19] When Theron leaves the novel, the setting is again significant: he is crucified in front of Callirhoe's tomb and 'from his cross he looked out on that sea over which he had carried as a captive the daughter of Hermocrates, whom even the Athenians had not taken' (3.4.18). Theron's entire appearance in the novel, then, is captured between two moments marked by semantics of space that highlight the morally deprived and criminal strands of his character apparent as early as his introduction. And yet, unlike Polycharmus' characterization, Theron's is not an example of compression because instances of bottom-up characterization depict a richer character. We gradually learn, for example, that he is also intelligent (*deinos*, 1.9.6) and apt at securing his own interests: whereas he first wants to kill Callirhoe in order to take gold from her tomb, he quickly (*takheia*) decides to keep her alive because of the profit that she will make (*dia to kerdos*, 1.9.6). This mercantile concern, as the narrator takes care to underline, even makes him act in ways contrary to what we might expect from a brigand: his humane treatment of Callirhoe is the result not of humanity but of rapacity, acting as he does 'as a businessman (*emporos*, 1.12.1) rather than as brigand (*lēistēs*)'.

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18 Brioso Sánchez 1989: 600.

19 For more examples, see *SAGN* 3: 497 (De Temmerman).

Primacy and Other Matters of Timing

Theron's example brings us to bottom-up processes of characterization: the gradual installation of characteristics and behavioural patterns. These processes underlie most of the remainder of this chapter. Since a novelist like Chariton *invents* a plot, the moment when characteristics are (first) conveyed to readers becomes particularly significant. Chariton's narrator explores various strategies to capitalize on this insight. First, introductions of characters often mention the one or two essential characteristics that will determine most of their behaviour throughout the story. Dionysius' introduction is a good example of such primacy (1.12.6): his wealth, nobility and *paideia* form a cluster of characteristics that is foregrounded immediately and associated with him particularly often throughout the novel, both by the primary narrator and by other characters.[20] But sometimes primacy works more subtly. Chaereas' introduction, for example, reads as follows:

> There was a young man called Chaereas, surpassingly handsome, like Achilles and Nireus and Hippolytus and Alcibiades as sculptors and painters portray them.
>
> 1.1.3

The narrator emphasizes the hero's physical beauty and adduces four paradigms to illustrate it. Understandably, then, the passage has been read as an instance of idealization.[21] Indeed, Achilles and Nireus (in this order) were the two most beautiful soldiers before Troy (Hom. *Il.* 2.673–674). Alcibiades and Hippolytus too were paradigms of male beauty in the ancient tradition.[22] But at the same time, I have argued elsewhere, the four paradigms function as implicit 'seeds' (Glossary, →) of Chaereas' character, ominously evoking important inner strands, such as impetuosity, erotic jealousy, divine punishment, and weakness, all of which will be developed in the remainder of the novel.[23]

Second, attributions of individual characteristics, in Chariton as well as in other fiction, have a role to play in plot development and causation. As one scholar puts it, 'the plot itself dictates the characterization and not vice versa'.[24] It is not difficult to find examples: it is because of Chaereas' impetuosity and

20 On Dionysius' *paideia* and associated concepts, see Jones 2012: 50–53, 55–58, 60–64.

21 Morales 2004: 66 n. 93.

22 R.L. Hunter 1994: 1079.

23 De Temmerman 2014: 48–50.

24 Anderson 2014: 19.

jealousy that Callirhoe is kicked into a coma, buried, kidnapped and taken to Miletus. Without these two characteristics of the hero, in other words, it would be difficult for Chariton to get the plot going—there would, indeed, be no novel at all. Chaereas' famous 'character shift' at the beginning of book 7 has also been read along these lines. In the first six books of the eight-book novel, Chaereas is characterized by passive behaviour that sharply distinguishes him from the resourceful heroine Callirhoe. In the seventh book, his behaviour changes dramatically: he joins the Egyptian army in revolt against the Persian king Artaxerxes, turns out to be a brilliant soldier, succeeds in occupying the impregnable city of Tyre, and is appointed admiral of the whole Egyptian fleet. Scholars have questioned the plausibility of this change (although more recently attention has been drawn to instances of continuity in his characterization)[25] and have explained that Chaereas shifts character quite simply because the plot requires him to reconquer the heroine and go back home with her triumphantly.

Another, perhaps more subtle, example of the functionality of specific characteristics for plot development is Dionysius' introduction. He is introduced by the primary narrator as a man in the prime of life (1.12.6), wearing mourning and looking sad in the centre of a large crowd of people in Miletus. These details are both visible and immediately relevant to Theron, who at this point in the story is looking for a buyer for Callirhoe. Leonas makes explicit to him the two vital pieces of information already present implicitly in the introductory description: Dionysius is 'the wealthiest, noblest and most cultured man in Ionia' and he is in mourning for his wife, 'whom he loved'. As soon as Theron has heard this, it is his focalization of Dionysius as being both rich and of romantic disposition that leads him to suggest that Leonas buy her for his master. Theron, in other words, builds on the only information about Dionysius available to him (and to the reader) and sells Callirhoe. It is the fact that Dionysius is rich and of a romantic disposition that makes the plot turn to Callirhoe's sale as a slave.

Chariton not only uses but also plays with the idea that characteristics can be functional for narrators in developing the plot. Plangon is a good example. She is herself an example of functional characterization: she is a clever and cunning slave because the plot requires one in order to make Callirhoe marry Dionysius. Yet, her cunning is fleshed out by behaviour that, in fact, aligns her with the author of the novel. Her characterization of Dionysius as jealous (*zēlotupian*, 2.10.1) provides a good example: she adduces his jealousy as an argument in support of her view that Callirhoe cannot keep her unborn child, unless she makes it pass as his. Although the reader has not heard about

25 Jones 2012: 65–67, 117–119, 139–140.

this characteristic of Dionysius before, its attribution is at the basis of one of the important turns in the plot: Callirhoe acts upon Plangon's advice and marries Dionysius. But since it is Plangon and not the primary narrator who characterizes him, we cannot but wonder: is he really jealous, as she argues, or does she simply make that up in order to persuade Callirhoe, who is, after all, new to Dionysius' household? In other words: does Plangon, like the author of the novel, *invent* details about character as a simple, ephemeral plot catalyzer, i.e. as a tool to turn the course of events in a direction that she judges desirable? Even if Dionysius' jealousy resurfaces in the novel (3.7.6), the mere fact that the question arises shows that, in this episode, plot progression (as constructed by Plangon) has eclipsed Dionysius' characterization to the point where we cannot even be sure to have any information at all about him that is true within the fictional world. On the one hand, the episode takes to extremes the prominence of plot over character(ization), but on the other hand, it thematizes the importance of Plangon's character and its subtle delineation.

Topical and Other Permanent Character Traits

In Chariton, as in other novelists, the hero and heroine are characterized by generically topical characteristics such as beauty, *eugeneia* and *sōphrosunē*. But Chariton goes beyond any simple adoption of such characteristics. First, they are not necessarily static and monolithic but rather polyphonic: they are constructed differently by different voices (that of the primary narrator and those of characters), a strategy that highlights Chariton's interest in psychological aspects of character. Callirhoe's *eugeneia* is a good example. It is referred to particularly often by male characters while concerned with their *own* social or political positions.[26] When she characterizes herself as *eugenēs*, the attribution again makes a psychological point (and combines it with a good deal of ambiguity): she addresses her own *eugeneia* precisely when she is a slave or a prisoner—when, that is, she is *deprived* of freedom and high social status (1.11.3, 1.14.9–10, 2.5.12) and evaluates her present vis-à-vis her former social position.

Another way for Chariton's narrator to go beyond simple adoption of topical characteristics is to complicate them on an indirect level. Callirhoe's *sōphrosunē* provides the classic example. Before her marriage to Dionysius, there could be little doubt about her adamant faithfulness to Chaereas (2.8.2). But because of her pregnancy, she is eventually forced to marry Dionysius, thus

26 On the construction of *eugeneia* in Chariton's novel, see De Temmerman 2014: 42–44.

becoming a bigamous woman for the remainder of the novel. Against this background, Callirhoe is aligned simultaneously with both Helen and Penelope,[27] which is emblematic of the big question that surrounds her *sōphrosunē* all along (is she a Helen or a Penelope?).[28]

In addition to topical characteristics, Chariton also works with a number of other permanent character traits (rather than transient emotions). This is made most explicit for Chaereas' (erotic) jealousy or *zēlotupia*. His inclination towards jealousy dominates the first pages of the novel (1.2.5–6, 1.5.4), where it repeatedly results in uncontrollable anger and causes the apparent death of his wife (1.4.12). The impact of his jealousy on this dramatic turn in the plot resonates throughout the novel.[29] Almost halfway through the story, Chaereas himself in a letter to Callirhoe acknowledges his own jealousy as the origin of her misery and says that he has made amends to her by going through slavery (4.4.9). But, as the reader finds out towards the end of the novel, this self-awareness does not change the fact that Chaereas remains a jealous person: the narrator is explicit that, after Chaereas' reunion with his wife, his natural jealousy (*emphutou zēlotupias*) rises up in him again when he hears about her marriage with Dionysius (8.1.15). Callirhoe too knows Chaereas' innate jealousy (*emphuton zēlotupian*, 8.4.4); she hides her letter to Dionysius from him for precisely this reason.

Some of the permanent character traits thematized by Chariton explore moral issues, particularly through the depiction of moral dilemmas. Usually, moral awareness is a quality unambiguously connected with *eugeneia*. Artaxerxes' morals, for example, are fleshed out by direct contrast with his eunuch Artaxates, a morally inferior slave who advises him to satisfy his desire by having sex with Callirhoe. Since Callirhoe is married (*gunaika allotrian*), Artaxerxes rejects this course of action as lack of self-control (*akrasia*) incompatible with the laws that he himself has established and the justice that he practises (6.3.8).

The usual technique of moral characterization in Chariton is speech (inner monologue) and shows characteristics of what Christopher Gill identifies as the 'objective' strand of ancient character. This involves a presentation of the self and internal decision-making on the model of external discussion (i.e. as a

27 Whereas associations with Helen are explicit, Penelope's presence is evoked only implicitly through a number of Homeric citations (e.g. 5.5.9, 8.1.7).

28 See De Temmerman 2014: 50–61 for detailed discussion.

29 It is evoked times and again, not just by the primary narrator (5.1.1, 8.1.3) but also by Chaereas himself (4.4.9) and, at the end of the story, by Hermocrates in front of a full assembly (8.7.6).

dialogue between internalized voices).[30] Chariton uses this technique nowhere more elaborately than in the depiction of Callirhoe's moral struggle over her plan to kill her unborn child: her monologue is emblematic of her profoundly fissured and morally divided self at this point in the story.[31] But the technique underlies the characterization of other characters as well. In Artaxerxes' case, the juxtaposition in his speech of arguments in favour of and against satisfying his desire for Callirhoe bear out his moral dilemma (6.1.9), which is presented as an internal conflict (*ennooumenos kath' hauton*, 6.1.8) and which he himself experiences as a struggle against himself (*antagōnizomenos seautōi*, 6.3.8). The element of internal struggle aligns his speech with one by Dionysius, who is equally torn between his desire for Callirhoe and a reasoned attempt to oppose it. Like Artaxerxes, Dionysius is presented as fighting a battle, this time between reason and emotion (*agōna logismou kai pathous*, 2.4.4).[32] The qualification of his soliloquy is reminiscent of that of Artaxerxes': it is called a 'dialogue with himself' (*hautōi dialegesthai*, 2.4.6).[33]

Dionysius

In the introduction to this volume, we mentioned Gill's distinction between 'character' (revolving around moral judgement) and 'personality' (revolving around understanding one's characteristics). As the episodes above show, the depiction of both moral and psychological components often go together in Chariton. Callirhoe's moral struggle is at the same time a case of psychological introspection. Most scholars agree that psychological depiction has an important role to play in the characterization of several of the main characters in this novel.[34] Both Callirhoe and Chaereas are depicted in psychologically relevant terms, especially through their behaviour towards each other and others.[35] But as suggested as early as the nineteenth century, another character is even more

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30 Gill 1996: 216–226.

31 See De Temmerman 2014: 61–65 for details.

32 Again in 5.10.6 (*erōtos kai logismou*).

33 See Jones 2012: 55–57 on Dionysius' moral struggle and Montiglio 2010: 27–29 on parallels with Artaxerxes' moral conflict (and on Platonic–Aristotelian imagery of the divided soul in Chariton's depiction of moral dilemma generally, 26–34).

34 See De Temmerman 2007a, 2009, 2014: 61–114 (with further references) on Chaereas and Callirhoe, and Repath 2007 on the novels more generally.

35 De Temmerman 2007a, 2009, 2014.

interesting in these terms: Dionysius.[36] One of his most important qualities is his *paideia*, foregrounded repeatedly throughout the novel and itself often foregrounding a moral dimension.

Dionysius' *paideia* is fleshed out primarily through metonymical characterization. First, through speech. His words are often explicitly labelled by the primary narrator as an index of *paideia*, and they feature multiple references to the literary tradition (2.1.5, 2.4.8), notably Homer (2.3.7). Second, through behaviour. Throughout the novel, his behaviour shows that especially in great moments of crisis it takes *paideia* both to exercise self-control and to mould self-performance: when he has fallen in love with Callirhoe, he tries to hide his feelings from others and again the narrator is explicit that it is his *paideia* (*pepaideumenos*, 2.4.1) that makes him act this way. But ironically, the point of the passage is that, however hard he tries, he *fails* to hide his feelings: his silence, the narrator concludes, gives him away. Love, in other words, is stronger than the most carefully constructed social performance.

His awareness of the necessity to hide emotions from public sight is a constant theme in his characterization (and that of Callirhoe too, in fact). When he has learned, at the end of the novel, that he has lost Callirhoe to Chaereas for good, he shows 'his good sense and excellent upbringing (*paideian*)' (8.5.10) by not collapsing on the spot but instead remaining steady until he is alone in his own quarters.[37] But self-control means more to him than controlling the public display of emotions; it also includes resisting passion itself, which the narrator again presents as an index of *paideia* (*pepaideumenos*, 3.2.6). Resisting passion means, more specifically, letting rational argument take priority over emotions: once he has decided to marry Callirhoe, he urges himself to postpone the marriage so that it can be public, although his passion rages fiercely and makes such a postponement painful. In other cases, his resistance of passion has moral rather than pragmatic reasons. When he falls in love with Callirhoe, he finds that his feelings conflict with the behavioural norms expected to accompany both his moral and noble integrity ('the most virtuous (*aretēs*), the most distinguished (*doxēs*) man in Ionia', 2.4.4), especially because he is still in mourning (2.4.4).

If control over the self is an important marker of *paideia* in Chariton, the (rhetorical) control over *others* is equally important.[38] Again, Dionysius is a case in point. As we have seen, it is the very fact that he is the *object* of

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36 Dunlop 1814: 59.

37 For another such crisis handled in a disciplined way (again presented by the narrator as an index of *paideia*), see 5.9.8.

38 I have developed this point elsewhere (2014: 73–81, 88–107) in relation to the protagonists.

Theron's perception that draws him into the story. Such objectification is a persisting strand in his characterization. In speeches of other characters, he is the object of persuasion particularly often. As a result, he is shown repeatedly acting out scenarios scripted by others. For example, it is only after Leonas persuades him to visit his estate, that Dionysius meets Callirhoe. Leonas' effort is marked as rhetorically significant: he finds a suitable opportunity (*kairos*, 2.3.2, a technical term denoting rhetorical momentum) and does not tell the real reason for his request but instead pretends that Dionysius should visit the estate to inspect his herds and crops. A little later, when Dionysius has met Callirhoe and is blown away by her beauty, Leonas pretends (*prosepoieito*, 2.4.6) not to understand his disposition and feigns (*hōsper*) alarm. But the clearest example of Dionysius acting out a scenario devised by others is of course his marriage to Callirhoe. The whole idea behind it is that it aims to fool him into believing that she is carrying his child. He is misled in more than one way. Plangon, who communicates to him Callirhoe's willingness to marry, purports to literally repeat her words but in fact makes a number of rhetorically significant alterations that make Dionysius react exactly as she envisages. This passage, illustrative as it is for Chariton's interest in human psychology, documents not just Plangon's access to Callirhoe's psyche (Plangon knows exactly how she should credibly represent Callirhoe's character), but also her control over her master's reactions. This, in turn, feeds into a larger theme in Chariton: the reversal of power between master and slave.[39]

Dionysius' rhetorical passivity interacts ironically with his *paideia* on two levels. First, he is rhetorically less versatile and efficient than might be expected from a *pepaideumenos*. At the trial at Babylon, for example, he argues that Callirhoe should not be present; Mithridates, for his part, argues that she should. The narrator is explicit that Dionysius' argument is legally a good one (*dikanikōs*, 5.4.11) but unlikely to persuade anyone because all are desperately eager to see Callirhoe. Dionysius, in other words, has good factual/legal knowledge but is not adequately attuned to circumstances in his environment to control their impact. Similarly, his long speech in the subsequent court hearing (5.6.1–10) is technically persuasive by all handbook standards;[40] as its major stylistic qualities he self-consciously highlights its clarity (*saphēneia*, 5.6.5) and conciseness (*suntomia*)—two important rhetorical qualities associated with Attic oratory, Lysias in particular. Nevertheless, his speech does not

39 In addition to Leonas and Plangon, there is also Artaxates, who equally controls his master psychologically at times.

40 Schmeling 1974: 117 gives an overview of its different parts.

carry any weight simply because it is built on the assumption that Chaereas is dead, which is spectacularly shown to be incorrect as soon as his opponent is given the floor. The irony is given special emphasis by what is arguably the most prominent use of *ēthopoiia* in Chariton's novel: the stylistic qualities of both speeches differ considerably and characterize the speakers accordingly.[41] Whereas Dionysius, as a Greek nobleman, adopts the plain, unembellished and refined sophistication that puts him in the Attic oratory tradition, Mithridates, as a Persian satrap, shows the bombastic, extravagant and theatrical qualities associated with Asianism. Dionysius' Greek rhetorical virtues are overshadowed completely by Mithridates' theatricality simply because the latter builds on information that Dionysius has prevented himself from believing (i.e. that Chaereas is alive; see below). Again Dionysius, for all his *paideia*, cannot win the day.

This contrast between Dionysius and Mithridates feeds into a broader, contrastive characterization of Greeks and Persians in Chariton's novel. The contrast is couched not only in rhetorical but also in moral terms. Artaxates, for example, 'as a eunuch, a slave and a barbarian' (6.4.10), cannot possibly gauge 'the spirit of a wellborn Greek' (*phronēma Hellēnikon eugenes*) and therefore believes that Callirhoe will be persuaded easily to answer the King's sexual advances. In other instances, the contrast is deployed in a context of politics and distribution of power (another big theme in Chariton):[42] the Persian monarchy stands in opposition to the democratic organization of the protagonists' hometown Syracuse.[43]

It is not just that Dionysius is more often persuaded (or rhetorically unsuccessful) than persuasive; another dimension of the irony is that his interlocutors address exactly his *paideia* in order to persuade him. Callirhoe makes him promise that he will send her back to her native country, although he himself is utterly unhappy with this prospect. She appeals to his Greekness, philanthropy, and *paideia*, all of which she has identified as characteristics of which her release would be an index; she presents her release as an action that would align him with Odysseus' Phaeacian host Alcinous—a rhetorical strategy involving an appeal to both Dionysius' and her own *paideia* simultaneously: she aligns herself with her host and makes it virtually impossible for him to keep a *pepaideumenē* woman captive. Dionysius' *paideia*, in other words, is apparent to all (to himself, to Callirhoe, and to the reader) but for all his *paideia* he is rhetorically outwitted and forced to agree with a scenario that is not his.

41 Doulamis 2011b: 31–45 analyses the stylistic differentiation of the two speeches in detail.

42 Smith 2007 analyses it at length.

43 Smith 2007: 80–86.

Instances where Dionysius does take control over others are equally indicative of his character. In these instances, much revolves around the fact that he is suspicious and particularly concerned with fencing off Callirhoe from the gaze of others. As soon as he has met her, he judges it unwise to take her with him to Miletus (2.7.1) and, once they are married, takes her to his house by boat (3.2.11). The reason why he thus hides her from public sight is that 'when people saw her, they would all talk about her, her beauty would enslave the whole of Ionia, and report of her would reach the Great King himself' (2.7.1). Again there is irony at Dionysius' expense: his vision of the future is exactly what will happen, of course, no matter how hard he tries to keep her hidden. Dionysius, in other words, has the intelligence, ability and foresight to see what will happen but not the agency and efficiency to change anything about it.

Dionysius' suspiciousness increases gradually throughout the novel and crystallizes around the figure of Chaereas, Callirhoe's first husband. When he hears about two Syracusans having landed on his estate, he begins to suspect a plot being woven against himself (3.9.4). After having read Chaereas' letter, which he thinks is written by Mithridates, he keeps her under close surveillance to make sure that none approaches her (4.6.1). By the time he is about to leave with her to Babylon, he has become 'afraid of everything' and sees all men as rivals (4.7.1). When he arrives in Babylon, the celebrity of his wife makes him even more insecure and he 'burns still more with anxiety' (5.2.7). Again, his *paideia* has a role to play: he was an educated man and aware of how inconstant Love is (4.7.6). His knowledge knowledge of poets, sculptors, ancient legends fuels his fear of losing Callirhoe.

This interaction between development, psychological characterization and *paideia* also surfaces in other characters in Chariton, for example in Chaereas, whose ability to learn how to control and express his anger develops gradually and appropriately represents his personal growth towards a full adult-male status.[44] But whereas in Chaereas' case this cluster is instrumental in constructing him as a victoriously returning hero, for Dionysius, typically, it highlights one of his eternal problems: his uncertainty, doubts and feeble position in securing Callirhoe for himself. All these issues explain his dedicated effort to establish control over her thoughts about Chaereas. After an armed attack on the Syracusan fleet, Dionysius aims to convince her that Chaereas is dead. He controls, for example, the public account of the attack and makes sure that there is no word in it about survivors, of which he knows there were at least a few (3.10.1); and he advises her to build a tomb for Chaereas, as he thinks that 'it would serve his

44 Scourfield 2003. On Callirhoe and development, see De Temmerman 2007a.

own love if she abandoned all thought of her former husband for good' (4.1.2).[45] He even evokes Patroclus as a paradigm: 'Imagine', he says to Callirhoe, 'that he [that is, Chaereas] is standing over you saying "Bury me so that I may pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible"' (4.1.3). He thus evokes through Chaereas' imagined words Patroclus' request to Achilles to bury him (*Il.* 23.71). Dionysius' choice of this paradigm marks his attempt to establish psychological control over Callirhoe. Both his proposal to organize a funeral ceremony and his evocation of a *dead* paradigm are meant to send her one message: Chaereas is dead (despite the absence of a corpse).

Dionysius' attempt to control Callirhoe psychologically goes together with a self-delusional tendency in his behaviour. After the attack on Chaereas' ship, Dionysius does not know the identity of the survivors (who have been imprisoned) but nevertheless does not believe that Chaereas is among them. The reason of this disbelief, as the narrator takes care to underline, is that he does not *want* (*ēthele*, 4.5.10) to believe it. This unwillingness is connected with one striking pattern in Dionysius' behaviour: he seems to convince not only Callirhoe but also himself of Chaereas' death. When he receives a letter written by Chaereas, his conclusion is not, as would be logical given what precedes, that Chaereas *was* among the survivors after all, but rather that the letter was written by someone else, an idea of which he remains convinced until he sees Chaereas alive with his own eyes two books later. His self-delusion is further fleshed out by his (mis)reading of mythological paradigms. When he approaches Babylon with Callirhoe, he evokes Menelaus as a paradigm in order to illustrate the danger involved in having Callirhoe leave Miletus: 'Menelaus could not keep Helen in security in virtuous Sparta. King though he was, a barbarian shepherd supplanted him; and there is many a Paris among the Persians' (5.2.8). Dionysius, who has by then married Callirhoe, believes Chaereas dead, as we have seen, and again casts himself in the role of the true, legitimate husband (Menelaus). But he does so precisely at the time he takes his Greek wife away from her Greek environment to the east, which conspicuously aligns him, of course, with Paris. This is just one example out of many that illustrate that Chariton often fleshes out character by having characters *themselves* adduce paradigms for strategic or rhetorical purposes: for Chariton's characters, paradigms are performative tools.[46]

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45 See also 3.7.6 for a similar thought.

46 Another example is Chaereas' self-association with Hector, on which see De Temmerman 2014: 90–93.

Conclusion

Scholars tend to see an evolution in the novelistic genre's adoption of *topoi* from more to less straightforward and from less to more sophisticated:[47] the *topos* of *eugeneia*, for example, is said to be merely a given in Chariton's *Callirhoe* (where the heroine is the daughter of the Syracusan general Hermocrates) but fundamentally reworked in Longus' novel *Daphnis and Chloe* (where the two protagonists realize only at the very end of the story that they belong to a social stratum much higher than that of their rustic adoptive parents, while the reader knows this since the first page of the novel) and in Heliodorus (where the heroine's *eugeneia* is made explicit in the opening episode but the reader does not learn until the fourth book just how *eugenēs* she *really* is as the (white!) daughter of the Ethiopian royal couple).

The straightforward handling of this and other topics in Chariton may be clear enough in terms of plot development; at the level of characterization, on the other hand, things are more complex. First, the question of how exactly and by whom Callirhoe's *eugeneia* and *sōphrosunē* are constructed requires more subtle answers. Her *eugeneia* is a multifaceted concept, being constructed through a number of different voices all informed by their own rhetorical and strategic agendas. And her *sōphrosunē* too is not simply a given: it is questioned and surrounded by markers of ambiguity. Second, Chariton develops considerably the notion that character is to be performed (e.g. Dionysius trying to mould his own *paideia*, and Chaereas presenting his former self in front of his Syracusan audience). In this respect too, characteristics are not merely given: they need to be constructed and borne out by the characters themselves.

Chariton tends to build most of his characters on other permanent characteristics rather than transient emotions. The most elaborated example, Dionysius, is constructed through metonymical techniques (thoughts, actions, etc.), occasionally commented upon and/or connected with his *paideia* by the primary narrator. In other cases too, permanent characteristics are generally constructed gradually through bottom-up dynamics and explore the psychology of the characters (Plangon's introspection into Callirhoe's character, Callirhoe's agonizing awareness of her degenerated social position, Dionysius' desire to ban Chaereas from Callirhoe's memory, etc.), an area repeatedly addressed at the same time in terms of moral behaviour and dilemma. Moreover, techniques of characterization—be they direct (attribution of *eugeneia*), metonymical (Plangon's purported quotation of Callirhoe) or metaphorical (Callirhoe's

47 E.g. Whitmarsh 2011.

depiction as Helen and/or Penelope)—are used not just by the primary narrator but also by characters themselves for a variety of rhetorical, strategic or psychological reasons.

CHAPTER 31

Xenophon of Ephesus

*Koen De Temmerman**

Xenophon's novel—by far the shortest in the extant corpus—raises puzzling questions, and not only about characterization. There is debate (and there has been for some time) about whether the version that we have is an original text or the product of epitomization of a now lost original. Even if most scholars now agree that the so-called 'epitome theory' is not defensible in its original form,[1] the novel still appears 'cripplingly bare and undeveloped'.[2] This characterization seems true also if one looks at the limited range of abiding character traits addressed in the novel. Of course, the protagonists are chaste and faithful to each other, a topical characteristic of novelistic protagonists which in this novel is even more prominent than elsewhere.[3]

In addition, as in Chariton's novel, erotic jealousy is installed early in the novel; but unlike Chariton, who explores it as a male quality, Xenophon foregrounds it first and foremost as a marker of female behaviour: Anthia realizes that she is the object of the jealousy (*tēs zēlotupousēs*, 2.7.4) of her mistress Manto, who is in love with Habrocomes and in whose characterization this trait is bound up with uncontrollability. The notion of erotic jealousy is also prominent in the depiction of the relationship between the protagonists. Anthia during their wedding night expresses the wish that no other woman will appear beautiful to Habrocomes and no other man to herself (1.9.8). Her concern with Habrocomes' faithfulness resurfaces in a dream in which he is taken from her by another woman (5.8.6–7)—a dream that she interprets as a reflection of the truth. Indeed, after their reunion, she asks him if he has remained chaste (*sōphron emeinas*, 5.14.3) or if 'another woman has eclipsed

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1 The idea that Xenophon's novel is an epitome was first suggested by Rohde 1876: 401 = 1914³: 429, but more fully explored by Bürger 1892. It has been criticized by Hägg 1966 and O'Sullivan 1995: 69–139 among others. See De Temmerman 2014: 118 for details.

2 *SAGN* 1: 489 n. 1 (J.R. Morgan).

3 See, for example, Schmeling 1980: 116 on *sōphrosunē*: 'This theme is present whenever either protagonist is on the stage, and before very long the reader understands it properly as an obsession rather than as a virtue.'

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me', a phrase echoing her misinterpretation of the dream.[4] But whereas in Chariton (→) the concerns of male characters (Chaereas and Dionysius) with Callirhoe's faithfulness are a major strand in their characterization, fleshed out repeatedly by their speech and adoption of paradigms such as Helen and Penelope, the theme in Xenophon's novel is never developed in any detailed or systematic way.

Top-Down: Introductions, Name-Giving and Character Types

In Xenophon's novel, a relatively big share of the characterization is constructed through a limited number of top-down strategies. The first such strategy involves the introductions of characters. As soon as characters are introduced, Xenophon's narrator often inserts important information about them through overt, direct characterization and/or details regarding physical appearance. The only information about the physical appearance of Corymbus, the pirates' chief who imprisons the protagonists, is provided in his introduction ('a tall young man with a fearsome look; his hair hung loose and unkempt', 1.13.3). Similarly, Araxus' wife is introduced as an inhabitant of Pelusium (Egypt), 'hideous to look at and much worse to listen to; she was amazingly insatiable and her name was Cyno' (3.12.3). The combination of her speaking name (which denotes a bitch (*kunō*), thus underlining her sexual insatiability) and this (only) piece of direct characterization sets the tone from the start. Her evilness is documented indirectly in the next passage: she kills her husband in order to facilitate the satisfaction of her lust and, after Habrocomes' rejection of her advances, accuses him of the homicide, 'put up a great show of grief and persuaded the assembly that she was speaking the truth' (3.12.6).

The protagonists too are confirmed in their generic roles as early as the introduction. In this novel, there are no questions to be answered by the reader about who is who, as in Heliodorus' introduction of his love couple. Anthia's introduction (1.2.5) emphasizes physical beauty and foregrounds, both through direct characterization and through an evocation of Artemis as a paradigm, her one characteristic that will dominate the novel—chastity or *sōphrōsune*. Habrocomes too is firmly cast in his role of novelistic hero from the very first lines through a number of important novelistic *topoi*. He is the son of one of the most influential citizens of Ephesus (an indication of *eugeneia*, 1.1.1), is more beautiful than anyone else in Ionia and beyond, pairs his beauty with excellent

4 See De Temmerman 2014: 129–130 on these passages.

mental qualities (*ta tēs psukhēs agatha*, 1.1.2), and is cultured, as can be deduced from the variety of arts practised by him (hunting, riding, fighting under arms). As in the case of Chariton's Callirhoe, the renown of his beauty resonates far beyond his native city ('and in the rest of Asia as well', 1.1.3), and people treat him as a god (*hōs theōi*).

The one characteristic that does set Habrocomes apart from other novel heroes is his initial, extreme contempt for and rejection of Eros. It is given prominence at the outset, both through careful registration of his behaviour and through the (implicit) paradigm of Hippolytus. When Habrocomes falls in love with Anthia, he cannot cope with the feeling of being in love. This makes things more complex than simple top-down characterization; rather, it is the seed of a (limited) bottom-up dynamic. It sets him apart not only from other novelistic heroes but also from the heroine, who also experiences her love for Habrocomes as problematic but only for circumstantial reasons (her age, Habrocomes' arrogance, and her limited freedom).[5] But again, this situation will soon be shown to be ephemeral, when Habrocomes abandons his initial position and embraces his love for Anthia (1.4.4–5).

The second top-down strategy frequent in Xenophon is the use of etymologically significant names, which convey important qualities of characters from the moment that they are introduced.[6] As I have argued elsewhere, these names can be subdivided according to the three main techniques of characterization (direct, metonymical, and metaphorical).[7] Eudoxus ('having a good reputation') is an apt, directly characterizing, name for an old and experienced physician (3.4.1), and Euxenus ('the good host') is an ironically charged name for a brigand who falls in love with Anthia from the moment that he imprisons her (1.15.3). Habrocomes (1.1.1) and Aegialeus (5.1.2) are examples of metonymically significant names: the former refers to the hero's beautiful hair (mentioned by Anthia in 1.9.5; *habro-* 'luxurious', *komē* 'hair'), and the latter is a suitable name for a fisherman living on the seashore (*aigialos* means 'seashore'). Other names are metaphorically significant: Anthia's and Hyperanthes' names, for example, contain the word for 'flower' (*anthos*) or 'flowery' (*antheios*), thus echoing the oft-mentioned physical beauty of these two characters—a point hinted at by the narrator in the case of Anthia, when in the beginning of the novel he plays on her name to visualize her beauty ('her body blossomed [*ēnthei*] with beauty', 1.2.5).

5 De Temmerman 2014: 134–135.

6 See Hägg 1971b and Bierl 2006: 90–92 on name-giving in this novel.

7 De Temmerman 2014: 146–148.

The third top-down strategy frequent in this novel is activated, as in the other novels, by the presence of character types, who in the case of Xenophon's novel essentially act out their generically prescribed roles without much (if any) individuation. There are, first of all, love rivals, whose number in this novel is relatively high. To be sure, these are not all identical—some are humane and take pity on the lamenting hero/heroine, or even help them to escape danger; others are prone to violence and even contemplate or commit homicide as to facilitate the satisfaction of their desire. But nevertheless, they all behave similarly, as novelistic love rivals do: they fall in love with the hero/heroine, threaten their chastity to a higher or lesser degree, and are either rejected or led astray by ruses. A similarly stereotypical pattern underlies the behaviour of other characters such as a brothel keeper or *pornoboskos* (5.7, 5.9.4), a type familiar from declamations, who in this novel makes a cameo appearance and about whom we learn almost nothing, except that he is interested in the financial profit that Anthia will make, forces her to exhibit herself, and eventually sells her when he thinks that she is afflicted by an illness.

Arguably the most interesting and complex character in Xenophon's novel is built on a combination of character types: Hippothous is a brigand (his first action in the novel is to capture the heroine and almost kill her; 2.13.1–3) who is also a love rival (he later falls in love with her; 5.9.11), and a novelistic friend (he befriends and helps Habrocomes and ultimately facilitates his reunion with Anthia; 2.14.2–4, 5.9.13, 5.10.6–12.6). He is also what scholars have labelled as a 'good bad guy':[8] he has a noble origin, took to brigandage, so we learn (3.2.1–15), after a tragic love experience, and abandons this way of life to re-integrate into society at the end of the novel.[9] Since, of course, the reader learns all of this gradually, Hippothous is constructed through a combination of top-down (each generic type installs a set of behavioural patterns) and bottom-up strategies (different generic types are associated with this character cumulatively throughout the narrative).

Bottom-Up Characterization

Bottom-up characterization in this novel is limited, both in terms of characteristics provided and in terms of the time of narration needed to provide them. A number of characters have spectacularly short 'life spans' in this novel and

8 Scarcella 1995.

9 On Hippothous in detail, see Watanabe 2003; Alvares 1995.

disappear from sight only a few pages after having been introduced. This of course precludes any kind of sustained bottom-up development, leaving more room for the top-down processes already discussed. This is not to say, however, that there is no bottom-up characterization at all. Aegialeus and Hippothous, the narrators of embedded narratives (3.2.15 and 5.1.4–9 respectively), are among the (few) examples of such characterization. Logically enough, part of their characters are built indirectly throughout the story that they themselves narrate, which by definition implies gradual construction. Hippothous is introduced as 'Hippothous the brigand' (2.11.11) whose band capture Anthia in a dark wood and successively aim to sacrifice her (2.13.1–3). When he befriends Habrocomes, we still see him essentially enacting his role as brigand (he intends to recruit young men to reconstitute his murdered band). It is only when he tells the story of his life to Habrocomes that some depth is added to this character, as we then learn how he became a brigand (see above).

The characterization of Manto is another good example of (limited) bottom-up characterization. She is essentially defined by three strands already present in her introduction (her love for Habrocomes, her barbarian nature and her emotional uncontrollability) but how exactly the combination of these three plays out is explored in some detail throughout the subsequent pages. Her introduction immediately casts her as a barbarian (she is the daughter of a Phoenician brigands' chief who has captured Habrocomes and Anthia) who falls uncontrollably (*akataskhetōs*, 2.3.2) in love with Habrocomes and does not know what to do. But as we learn immediately afterwards, her first approach is, in fact, a reasonably controlled one: she does not dare to speak to Habrocomes directly, as she knows that he has a wife and does not expect him to persuade him to answer her advances. Although she is a barbarian, in other words, she is able to read correctly the nature of the love between the protagonists. This insight puts her apart from, say, Heliodorus' (→) Arsace, who, as a Persian, is depicted as the moral antipode of the heroine to such an extent that she cannot even begin to conceptualize the kind of love that binds the protagonists. Manto initially *is* able to read this love correctly and therefore bears her infatuation silently.

When she cannot contain herself any longer (*ouketi karterousa*, 2.3.3), she changes strategy and decides to mobilize Rhode, Anthia's companion enslaved together with her, who, she hopes, will help her to satisfy her desire. Her approach is twofold: she promises rewards if Rhode cooperates and at the same times threatens her if she does not. As part of her threat, she self-consciously brings to the table her own barbarian nature, which for the reader has been implicitly present since her introduction, and connects it explicitly to her susceptibility to anger ('the anger of a barbarian woman', *orgēs … barbarou*, 2.3.5).

This is a first cue for the reader of the wickedness that is to come (when she later orders Anthia's death, she is motivated by the same emotion: *orgēi*, 2.11.2). When Rhode keeps her waiting, she changes strategy again and approaches Habrocomes directly with a letter. This letter uses the same combination of promise and threat but at the same time indicates her increasing despair and rashness, as it aims to persuade Habrocomes by the prospect that they 'will get rid of' Anthia (*aposkeuasometha*, 2.5.2)—a strategy that she herself knows will never work (as we know from her initial, more cautious attitude).

Motivating Behaviour

Character types come with their own, predictable sets of behaviour. In Xenophon's novel, the narrator capitalizes on this fact to an extent that psychological motivation of behaviour often boils down to typified, recognizable and predictable patterns. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches. First, Xenophon's narrator motivates behaviour in an individualized key: by descriptions of inner feelings. When Manto has fallen in love with Habrocomes, for example, her behaviour is documented in some detail:

> She knew that he had a wife, and never expected to win him round; nor did she dare to tell any of her own household for fear of her father. Because of all this her feelings were all the more inflamed and she was in a bad state. Unable to control herself any longer, she decided to confess her love to Rhode … she was the only one she thought would help her attain her desire.[10]
>
> 2.3.2.–3

Here, the narrator, in order to explain Manto's behaviour starts from her own, individual emotions as she experienced them at that moment in the story. This approach is logical enough for an omniscient narrator of fiction, who has access to his characters' thoughts and feelings. The second approach, on the other hand, starts from universal patterns of behaviour and identifies them as relevant for specific characters. In this case, the narrator adduces general truths in the form of maxims in order to motivate behaviour—a well-known technique of realism also in other novels.[11] When Psammis wants sex with

10 Here and elsewhere, I cite Anderson's (2008) translation.

11 Morgan 1993: 202–204. And see also the previous chapter on Chariton (→).

Anthia, she fools him into believing that, since her father has dedicated her at birth to Isis, she is under the protection of that goddess, who will therefore take a terrible revenge on Psammis if he forces her to have sex with him (3.11.4). The narrator adduces a maxim to explain why Anthia has good reason to assume that this stratagem will work: 'barbarians are superstitious by nature'. Psammis' credulity, in other words, is typical of barbarians in general and Anthia's trick, consequently, would work not just with him but with all barbarians. In this case, psychological motivation does not individualize but rather universalizes.

A similar dynamic is operative elsewhere, even if there is no maxim involved at first sight. Corymbus and Euxenus are pirates who fall in love with the hero and heroine respectively. 'Since he is in love' (*erōnta*, 1.15.6), Euxenus is easily persuaded by Corymbus that they will be able to win them over. As Gareth Schmeling notes, this narratorial comment aims to explain Euxenus' behaviour in rational terms;[12] it again does so, I may add, by subsuming Euxenus to a category of people whose behaviour is well-delineated and, therefore, predictable. Even if his behaviour is not simply part and parcel of his characterization/typification as a pirate (not all pirates can be expected by definition to be easily persuaded), it is not an indication of his individual character either; rather, it is an indication of how all people in love behave and, thus, part of another 'type'. Unlike in the case of Psammis, the narrator now does not introduce a maxim to drive the point home, but the same enthymematic reasoning—maxims are compressed enthymemes according to Aristotle[13]—is nevertheless clear: the major premiss is that those in love are optimistic about their chances to win over the beloved; the minor premiss is that Euxenus is in love ('Since he is in love'); and the conclusion that logically follows is that he is optimistic about his chances. Again, a general pattern of deductive logic is installed to underpin the behaviour of characters.

Techniques

Xenophon's narrator has rightly been characterized as 'impersonal',[14] 'neutral'[15] and less perceptible than Chariton's.[16] The reason for such labels is that Xenophon's narrator usually registers events without providing interpretation

12 Schmeling 1980: 38–39.
13 Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.2.
14 Fusillo 1988: 25–26.
15 Hägg 1971a: 316.
16 See *SAGN* 1: 489 (J.R. Morgan).

or overt comments.[17] The covertness of the primary narrator is part of and contributes to a more general absence of a fixed narratorial authority. As I have argued elsewhere, such absence resonates with guidelines of *apheleia* or 'simple discourse', one of the main stylistic categories in Greek literature.[18] *Apheleia* was fashionable in Xenophon's days in literature and rhetorical education alike and has been recognized to underlie Xenophon's writing style more generally.

For the construction of characters, Xenophon's narrator does not use many explicit narratorial comments (except, as we have seen, in introductions). A brief comparison with Chariton (→) drives the point home. When Habrocomes and Anthia have been captured by Phoenician pirates, two of these, as we have seen, fall in love with them and hope to win them over without difficulty (*rhaidiōs*, 1.16.7). In Chariton's novel, the Persian eunuch Artaxates similarly miscalculates Callirhoe's susceptibility to (his master's) sexual advances, thinking that it will be easy (*rhaidian*, 6.4.10) to persuade her. But unlike Xenophon's narrator, Chariton's immediately adds the reason of Artaxates' misjudgement: 'he was a eunuch, a slave and a barbarian' (6.4.10). Xenophon's narrator does not add any such overt characterization: he merely registers assumptions and behaviour, without narratorial interpretation, and leaves it to the reader to interpret.

A second pattern underlying characterization in this novel, and one concomitant with the narrator's tendency to leave to the reader the interpretation of the bare facts recorded, is the relatively high number of instances of metonymical characterization. Characters are often anchored in their familial, ethnic and/or professional groups.[19] The high number of direct speeches, and lamenting monologues in particular, is another example—one that I have discussed elsewhere.[20] Often, such characterization through speech serves to confirm characteristics foregrounded as early as a character's introduction. At the same time, it also shows these characteristics as being part of the character's

17 Schmeling 1980: 88. In fact, there is not much metaphorical characterization either: De Temmerman 2014: 141–148.

18 De Temmerman 2014: 118–151.

19 Habrocomes is introduced as the son of one of the most influential citizens of Ephesus (1.1.1), Anthia's high social position may be implied by her leading position in the procession that opens the novel (*ērkhe*, 1.2.5), Hippothous belongs to one of the leading families of Perinthus, Aristomachus is one of the leading men of Byzantium, Anchialus is a native of Laodicea (4.5.1), etc. Eudoxus is a physician from Ephesus (*iatros*, 3.4.1), and Aristomachus is (or rather says he is, according to the narrator) a teacher of rhetoric (*logōn tekhnitēs*, 3.2.8).

20 De Temmerman 2014: 133–135.

self-definition. Anthia's concern with her own chastity, for example, is explicitly and pervasively present in her lamenting monologues (1.4.7, 5.5.5, 5.7.2), prayers (4.3.3, 4.3.4, 5.4.6) and speech to Habrocomes (5.14.2).

Another example of the importance of metonymical techniques of characterization is the emphasis on transient dispositions. This emphasis is visible, for example, in the high number of instances where characters are explicitly said to act impulsively.[21] Again, comparison with Chariton (→) is instructive: if this author grounds, as we have seen, in permanent character traits rather than transient dispositions, the opposite seems to be true for Xenophon. Habrocomes' initial rejection of and subsequent submission to Eros are significant in this respect. He first refuses to recognize his love for Anthia, but once he has succumbed to love, he retrospectively identifies his initial dismissive attitude as an instance of arrogance and rashness (*huperēphania* and *thrasutēs*). He reiterates this self-characterization when he laments, after his imprisonment by pirates, that 'Eros is taking his revenge on me for my arrogance' (2.1.2). The scene is reminiscent of a scene in Chariton where Chaereas (in a letter to his wife) is similarly critical of one of his qualities that was established early in that narrative—his jealousy (4.4.9). But as we have seen in the preceding chapter, this self-awareness does not change the fact that Chaereas remains a jealous person. In Xenophon, things are different: from the moment Habrocomes succumbs to his passion for Anthia, he abandons his previous position and embraces Eros as the most powerful god. His initial rejection is transient—indeed, the joke made at his expense is that it is easy enough to be chaste and reject Eros until one falls in love—and does not surface again in the remainder of the narrative as an active strand motivating his behaviour (or, indeed, influencing that of others, such as Callirhoe's secretive behaviour in Chariton's novel).

Xenophon's tendency to build on transient dispositions is widespread. In some cases, it is true, it is difficult to read such dispositions as instrumental to characterization at all. At the end of the novel, Leucon and Rhode inform Habrocomes that they have seen a dedication from Anthia at the temple, which suggests her presence in the immediate vicinity. Although Habrocomes has

21 Manto confesses her love for Habrocomes because she 'cannot control herself any longer' (*ouketi karterousa*, 2.3.3); she 'flies into a rage' (*en orgēi genomenē*, 2.11.2) when she finds out about her husband's infatuation with Anthia; Cyno, like Manto, falls in love with Habrocomes and 'cannot contain herself any longer' (*ouketi kateikhe*, 3.12.3); Apsyrtus decides to torture Habrocomes as a result of his loss of self-control (*ouketi anaskhomenos*, 2.6.2); Hippothous' loss of self-control (*ouketi karterōn*, 3.2.10) results in the homicide of his boyfriend's lover in a fit of rage (*orgēs plēstheis*); etc.

been in search of Anthia since the second book of the novel, he now does not even join the two on their way to the temple, but stays at home 'since he was depressed (*athumōs*)'[22] (5.12.3). Here, the emphasis on emotional response seems so predominant that it eclipses any behavioural consistency in order to manipulate plot development and privilege suspense (Habrocomes is about to find Anthia, but not quite yet). The idea that emotions are an apt plot catalyzer is made explicit in the case of Perilaus, who takes pity (*ēleēsen*) on Anthia as soon as he sees her when she is about to be sacrificed by brigands—an emotion foregrounded by the narrator as bridging this episode with the next ('his pity for her was the beginning of another terrible calamity', 2.13.5).[23]

But of course, it is rarely the case that temporary dispositions are *only* plot catalyzers. Indeed, they usually are plot catalyzers precisely because they logically motivate behaviour, an observation that invites us to conceptualize them as techniques of characterization. Mental and emotional dispositions are often among the few things that we learn about characters. The anonymous 'prefect of Egypt', for example, sentences Habrocomes to death two times, and the second time he is 'even more angry' than the first (*eti mallon orgistheis*, 4.2.8). This is all we learn about him, which makes him a character entirely defined by his anger (an example of what the introduction to this volume labels as 'compression'). The characters who are most systematically defined by their temporary dispositions (and by little else) are the parents of the protagonists. Again, Chariton's (→) novel provides comparative material. Whereas in Chariton it is Chaereas' innate jealousy that initiates the novel's plot (and, indeed, is picked up at the end, both by the primary narrator and by Callirhoe), in Xenophon that role is taken up by temporary dispositions (both cognitive and emotional ones) experienced not by the protagonists themselves but by their parents. When Habrocomes and Anthia have fallen in love, his parents, ignorant (*ouk eidotas*) of his condition, are 'very despondent' (*en pollēi athumiai*, 1.5.5) and afraid, like

22 There are textual variants as to why exactly he is depressed (either 'for the same reasons as before', *tois autois*, or 'for the things that had befallen him', *tois hautou*).

23 Throughout the novel, there are many other instances where behaviour is motivated by transient dispositions. Other examples include Eudoxus, whose pity for Anthia, together with his desire for his homeland, make him provide to her what she thinks is a lethal drug (3.5.9); Rhenaea sends Anthia to Italy because she is afraid (*phobētheisa*, 5.5.1) that her husband will prefer her to herself; and when Anthia fakes an epileptic fit in order to save her chastity in a brothel, the bystanders feel pity and fear (5.7.4) and no longer want to satisfy their desire. This dynamic persists in the embedded narratives, which build on the same logic. Hippothous' story, for example, takes a tragic turn when he is filled with anger (*orgēs plēstheis*, 3.2.10) when he sees another man sleeping with his boyfriend.

her parents (*dedoikotas*; *phobōi*, 1.5.6). They consult an oracle, which they are unable to understand (*en amēkhaniai* … *ēporoun*, 1.7.1) but which nevertheless leads them to marry the two and send them on a trip abroad. This decision kicks off their adventures. The parents then disappear from the novel until the very end, when we learn that they have died. The narrator provides an explanation of their deaths and again temporary dispositions take centre stage: they were 'in great distress' (*en pollōi penthei*, 5.6.2) about their children's fate and took their own lives, 'unable to endure, given their despair and old age' (5.6.3). The systematic depiction of the parents through their temporary dispositions perhaps points to a more permanent strand underlying their character: parental love and vulnerability in their continuous efforts to monitor and control their children's lives.

A third technical pattern in how Xenophon's narrator characterizes characters is his offloading overt judgement onto them: he tends to register, without narratorial qualifications, their points of view, either through direct speech or through focalization. When Anthia has fallen in love with Habrocomes, her parents focalize her condition as a terrible affliction (*tou deinou*, 1.5.6). This label plays on the traditional trope of representing sudden, passionate love as a disease (picked up by the primary narrator in 1.5.9: *tēs nosou*). But at the same time, through its position in personal focalization, it underlines the ignorance of Anthia's parents about what is really affecting her. Parental ignorance is similarly conveyed when Manto has falsely accused Habrocomes of intended rape and her father Apsyrtus tortures him assiduously, 'demonstrating (*endeiknumenos*) to his prospective son-in-law that he would be marrying a chaste (*sōphrona*) virgin' (2.6.4). The reader, however, knows that Manto has been trying to seduce Habrocomes and has invented the accusation in order to take revenge after having been rejected by him. Manto's characterization as 'chaste', therefore, can only be true in her father's focalization. Again, then, focalization is a metonymical technique for fleshing out a parent's ignorance of what is happening in his own house.

In other cases, the relegation of direct characterization to personal focalization generates a different dynamic of how characterization impinges on the knowledge of readers. The goatherd Lampon, for example, is introduced when Manto has taken Anthia with her to Antioch and out of jealousy devises a plan (*enenoei*, 2.9.2) to deliver her to 'one of her meanest servants' (*tōn atimotatōn*), whom she orders to make her his wife and use force if necessary. However, this servant soon turns out not to be mean at all; in fact, he takes pity on Anthia (*oikteirei*) and swears an oath to respect her chastity (2.9.4). Later, when ordered by Manto to kill Anthia, he cannot bring himself to do so (2.11.6). The narrator juxtaposes Manto's initial characterization of Lampon and his actual behaviour,

without overt narratorial assessment, leaving it to the reader to find out both Manto's miscalculation and Lampon's true morals.

Xenophon also capitalizes on the technique of juxtaposing diverging points of view, most notably when exploring Habrocomes' attitude towards love in the beginning of the novel. As we have seen, Habrocomes first refuses to recognize his love for Anthia. He initially identifies this attitude as an indication of his own *sōphrosunē* and manliness/courage (*andreia*) but later criticizes it as an instance of arrogance and rashness (*huperēphania* and *thrasutēs*). This in itself may be read as an embryonal form of character development: Habrocomes needs to *become* a novel hero receptive to love. Anthia, for her part, calls his initial rejection of it an indication of unmanliness and cowardice (*anandre kai deile*, 1.9.4). This polyphonic juxtaposition of voices plays with the Aristotelian conceptualization of *andreia* as a mean virtue between the two vices of *deilia* and *thrasutēs*. Whereas cowardice results from a deficiency of courage, rashness results from its excess.[24] Habrocomes' initial rejection of Eros is successively identified as an instance of all three qualities. Even if the narrator, once again, is nowhere explicit, the passage raises the question of what *sōphrosunē* really is.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, characterization in Xenophon builds on abiding traits only to a limited extent. It starts promising in some respects (e.g. Habrocomes' initial depiction and Anthia's jealousy) but is not further developed. Bottom-up dynamics too are observable to some extent but remain limited, both in number (Hippothous, Aegialeus, Manto) and in depth provided in each case (which in some cases is arguably due to the short 'life span' of the characters within the story). Rather, most characterization is built around top-down dynamics generated mainly by the introductions of characters, their names and typification (which in one or two cases involves a combination of types rather than a straightforward adoption of one type).

Behaviour is motivated either by addressing individual emotions or by observing general patterns of human behaviour and applying them to individual characters. The latter strategy creates an effect/illusion of realism, as it imports extra-textual patterns of deductive logic into the story. Another tool used by

24 See De Temmerman 2007b: 86 and, for a more detailed reading of this passage in Xenophon's novel, De Temmerman 2014: 126–129.

Xenophon's narrator to create this effect is the relative dearth of direct characterization in primary narrator text. Rather than overtly depicting characters himself, he tends to offload judgements to characters, thus making less visible his own presence as a narrator of the story. In addition, he prefers metonymical characterization: he registers their behaviour, refrains from overtly commenting on it and lets the reader interpret it. Both the (relatively many) speeches (e.g. lamenting monologues) and the emphasis on the transient (emotional and cognitive) dispositions of characters are good examples.

CHAPTER 32

Achilles Tatius

*Koen De Temmerman**

Like everything else in Achilles Tatius' novel, characterization is inextricably bound up with narrative lay-out. As is well known, this novel consists of an ego-narration embedded in another ego-narration.[1] In the prologue (1.1.1–1.2.3), an anonymous narrator tells how in Sidon he met a young man (who will turn out to be Clitophon, the novel's hero) and invited him to tell his story. From 1.3.1 right through to the end of the novel, he cites the account as (he says) it was told to him then and there by Clitophon. The frame narrative is never resumed.

This narrative configuration impacts (the analysis of) character(ization) in a number of ways. It implies, firstly, that from 1.3.1 onwards every depiction (of characters and of everything else) is doubly distanced from the reader: it is (or can be) filtered both by Clitophon and by the anonymous narrator—and there is really no way for the reader to tell which of the two filters what. Secondly, it invites the reader to read Clitophon's ego-narration as one long *ēthopoiia*, one long instance of gradual, indirect bottom-up characterization through speech. Read along these lines, everything narrated by Clitophon is a potential index of his character: every word he uses, every stylistic choice he makes, every narrative strategy he develops and, last but by no means least for the purposes of this chapter, every depiction he gives of other characters. At the same time, Clitophon's character is exceedingly difficult to pinpoint: as a character (like any other character in the story) he is depicted, both directly and indirectly, by his later self (and, possibly, the anonymous primary narrator). At the same time, Clitophon's reliability as a narrator (and, therefore, the reliability of his depiction of characters in his story, including his former self) can only be inferred from his own narration of the story (including, of course, both his own characterization as a character and that of others therein).

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1 *SAGN* 1: 493–502 (J.R. Morgan).

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Thirdly: unlike the (external) narrators in the other novels, neither the primary narrator nor Clitophon, as ego-narrators, are omniscient. As in any ego-narration, the heuristically limited position of the narrator(s) activates questions regarding truth(fulness) and reliability. In this novel, such questions are highlighted from the start, where Achilles Tatius, as the author (of what every reader recognizes to be a fictional story), has a fictional character narrate a story which, according to himself, is fact (*logōn*) that *resembles* fiction (*muthois eoike*) (1.2.2).[2] If Clitophon's story is indeed true, as he claims, his depictions of characters should depend, in theory at least, on logical, heuristic procedures, such as having seen these characters act and/or speak himself, or having been filled in later by themselves or others. More than in the other novels, then, we would expect characterization in this novel to be intrinsically connected with performance and observability.[3] Notions such as permanence of character, habituation, innateness, shapeability and character change, on the other hand, are not straightforwardly clear to Clitophon-the-narrator as they would be to an omniscient, external narrator. As we will see, one of the paradoxes underlying this novel is that, although it installs questions of truth(fulness) and reliability from the start, depictions of characters infuse Clitophon's narrative with fictionalization to a degree unprecedented in the Greek novelistic tradition.

Names, Intra- and Intertextuality

Some of the basic features of characterization in Achilles Tatius are broadly similar to those in other novels. As in most novels (and, indeed, other narrative genres),[4] there are characters with speaking names which are either

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2 On this opposition and its Platonic resonances, see Repath 2001: 139–145. The themes of fictionality and truth are picked up by the setting of Clitophon's narration: it famously evokes the *locus amoenus* of the opening of Plato's *Phaedrus* and thus again foregrounds the question, so important in that dialogue, of how to read stories, especially their truth value (Ni'Mheallaigh 2007: 237–238).

3 This point is made most tangible in the story itself, when Leucippe reflects about the role that she is then playing and doubts whether she should reveal her true identity: 'Do not think I am a slave, Thersander! I am the daughter of the general of Byzantium, the pre-eminent woman in Tyre. I am no Thessalian, and my name is not Lacaena' (6.16.4–5). Eventually she decides 'to reassume my dramatic role, to wear once again the costume of Lacaena' (6.16.6). Here and elsewhere in this chapter, I cite translations of Achilles Tatius from Whitmarsh 2001.

4 See also the chapters on Hesiod (→), Callimachus (→), Theocritus (→), Aeschylus, (→), Sophocles (→), Euripides (→), Aristophanes (→), Xenophon of Ephesus (→), and Longus (→).

etymologically or intertextually significant. The name of the seductive Melite, for example, evokes *meli* (honey) or *melitoeis* (sweet, sweetened with honey) and that of her husband Thersander points to his insolence and rashness,[5] frequently externalized by his violent and impulsive behaviour. Some other names are familiar from New Comedy (Chaereas, Sostratus, Gorgias, Clinias, and Clitophon), which occasionally seems to contribute to their characterization.[6] Chaereas, for example, is a young man (*neaniskos*, 4.15.2) who falls in love with Leucippe, postures as the protagonists' friend but eventually abducts her violently. These details resonate with characters of the same name in New Comedy (attested in at least seven plays), who are usually young, secondary characters, whose negative qualities provide a foil to the principal characters, and who in some cases fall madly in love and are associated with intrigue and deceit.[7]

Another prominent intertextual background for name-giving is Plato. In a novel that from the start cries out its intellectual debt to this author (see note 3 above), it is tempting to read the hero's name as reminiscent of the Platonic dialogue of the same name, although it is less than clear how this association impacts his characterization in any way.[8] The name of the heroine may be reminiscent of the white, good horse (*leukos-hippos*) of the soul in a particularly famous passage in Plato's *Phaedrus* (246a6–253d5).[9] A number of other names also feature in Plato and in one or two cases the Platonic counterparts seem to provide a significant paradigm *e contrario* for the novelistic characters:[10] whereas the Platonic Charmides is associated prominently with self-control and restraint (*Chrm.* 157d1–8), his novelistic namesake shows himself to be significantly different when he falls in love with Leucippe—which is exactly when his name is first mentioned (4.2.1); and the novelistic Clinias, as a

5 *Tharsos* or *thrasos* and *anēr*, 'man'; the Aeolic form of the former part, *thersos*, appears also in other compounds, such as in Homer's Thersites. See LSJ s.v. *thersos*. For a different interpretation of the name (as 'Beast-Man', *thērion—anēr*), see Morales 2004: 83–84.

6 In other instances, it is more difficult to see how comic namesakes could be relevant to characterization. The Clinias in Terence's *Heauton timoroumenos*, for example, has been a friend since childhood of a character called Clitipho (as Repath 2001: 99 rightly remarks) but the similarity does not go much further than this.

7 Mason 2002: 25–26.

8 Repath 2001: 153 argues that the name of the novelistic hero establishes a similarity between the relationship of Plato's *Clitophon* and *Republic* on the one hand and the novel's prologue and Clitophon's subsequent narration on the other.

9 Repath 2001: 163–200.

10 I here paraphrase observations from Repath 2001: 58–112.

praeceptor amoris interested mainly in sex (1.7.1, 1.10.1–11.1), advocates the opposite of what the Platonic character with the same name has to say in the *Laws* about sexual morality (*Lg.* 835b5–842a10).

In comparison with Xenophon of Ephesus and even Chariton (who, as we have seen, adopts quite a bit of psychological subtlety), Achilles Tatius has received a slightly better press for characterization. One reason is his playful and versatile engagement with generic conventions in general[11] and markers of characterization in particular. He draws a number of colourful characters whom scholars have traditionally labelled as more realistic than those in his predecessors.[12] Some of the well-known novelistic character types, it is true, are semantically richer and more elaborate than those in Chariton's and Xenophon's novels. Menelaus is characterized as a novelistic friend, not only through his actions (he saves Leucippe from human sacrifice, 3.17.4–18.5) but also through his own self-presentation (e.g. 3.22.1) and his ability to employ it strategically as a ruse (e.g. *vis-à-vis* Charmides in 4.6.3). The latter strand adds a dimension to his character that is absent in, say, Chariton's Polycharmus. Satyrus, for his part, combines several character types: he is one of Clitophon's *praeceptores amoris*, his servant (he calls Clitophon his 'master' in 3.20.1)[13] and at the same time incorporates important characteristics of novelistic friends,[14] which complicates the traditional view of novelistic friendship as simply following social boundaries.[15]

Clinias too is Clitophon's *praeceptor amoris*; his own interest in the bodily aspects of love is particularly prominent in his characterization.[16] The point is highlighted by the juxtaposition of his own lament over his dead boyfriend, who has been killed in a horse accident, and that of the boy's father (1.14.1–3 and 1.13.2–6 respectively).[17] According to his father, Charicles has been so

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11 E.g. Chew 2014: 62: 'Of all the "ideal" novels, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* is the most real. Filled with lurid scenes that would make Chariton blush and Heliodorus click his tongue, Achilles' novel pushes the boundaries of the genre.' See also Chew 2012 on Achilles Tatius' play with generic conventions outside the realm of characterization.

12 See, for example, Reardon 1994: 88; Rojas Álvarez 1989.

13 See Billault 1991: 145 on Satyrus as a *servus callidus*, a stock type known from New Comedy.

14 Mitchell 2014: 48–52.

15 As, for example, in Brioso Sánchez 1987: 62–63, 1989: 614 n. 48.

16 When Clitophon consults Clinias about his love for Leucippe, it is Clinias who reduces the issue to sex (1.9.5); it is he who then adds guidelines on how to kiss (1.10.5) and how to obtain sex with her (1.10.6). On Clinias as a *praeceptor amoris*, see also Morgan 1997: 180–181.

17 As Birchall 1996: 9 observes, two lament monologues on the same topic pronounced by

cruelly mutilated that he has died a 'double death, both in body and in soul'. He reasons that, unlike other dead people, of whom at least the body remains recognizable, 'your soul has fled, and not even in your body do I see you' (1.13.4). The consistent attention paid to both body and soul in the father's lament stands in sharp contrast with Clinias' lament. He essentially approaches Charicles' death as the destruction of bodily beauty ('you dashed his beauty to the ground', 1.14.3; 'beauty … of such a body', 1.14.2–3) at the hands of a savage horse insensitive to it. To enhance the bitter irony of the accident, Clinias blames himself for enhancing the horse's beauty before giving it to his boyfriend as a present ('I even beautified that wretched beast … I decked your murderer with gold', 1.14.2). The lament thus opposes artificial beautification of an uncontrollably savage beast to the natural, bodily beauty of the boy. This consistent emphasis on bodily beauty as the main parameter used to make sense of the death of his beloved resonates with Clinias' overall interest in the physical aspects of love.

In addition to intratextuality, intertextuality too contributes to characterization. This is well known,[18] but Achilles Tatius seems to be innovating in singling out as paradigms not only figures from previous literary traditions, but also from his novelistic predecessors. As I argue elsewhere, Leucippe's depiction in the Ephesian episode is moulded on Callirhoe's in Chariton's Milesian episode (both in broad plot lines and in details), and Clitophon's articulation of his own love for Leucippe recycles and perverts Habrocomes' behaviour in Xenophon of Ephesus.[19]

Topoi

Another area where Achilles Tatius takes characterization further than his novelistic predecessors is the relatively elaborate pieces of direct characterization and lengthy descriptions of lives. We will deal with (part of) Sostratus' long description of Callisthenes later in this chapter, but particularly noteworthy

different speakers provide the writer with 'an opportunity to write parallel laments in different characters, displaying not only the *pathos*, but also the contrasted *êthê* of the speakers'. In the case of Clinias and Charicles' father, the point is given especial emphasis because the narrator labels the scene as 'a competition in lamentation' between the father and the lover (1.14.1).

18 For details, see De Temmerman and Demoen 2011: 5–9 on (some) intertextual paradigms in Achilles Tatius and their importance for characterization.

19 De Temmerman 2014: 191–194 and 162–165 respectively.

in this context are the long stretches of characterization of Thersander: Sosthenes' (6.12.1–2) and Sopater's encomia (8.10.1–12), and a priest's invective (8.9.2–5). These speeches extensively draw on the *topoi* of praise and blame as described in the *progumnasmata* (Sosthenes, for example, addresses Thersander's *eugeneia*, wealth, inner virtue and youth, 6.12.1–2), which in some cases is clearly advertised by the presence of rhetorical terminology (6.12.5, 8.10.1).

But it is in the topical characterization of his protagonists that Achilles Tatius most drastically reworks the novelistic tradition. Love at first sight in this ego-narration is rehearsed in a profoundly asymmetrical key: Clitophon instantly falls in love with Leucippe but whether she feels the same for him is a question never resolved. Virginity is another example: Leucippe's preservation of it is a theme right through to the end of the novel[20] (where it is tested, 8.13.1–4) but she would happily have lost it in the second book of the eight-book novel if her mother had not suddenly caught her in bed with Clitophon (2.19.2, 2.23.4); and Clitophon is chaste enough to adamantly reject the advances of the beautiful Melite, only to agree to a one-off sexual adventure with her (5.26.10) when he finally discovers that Leucippe is not dead, as he had thought she was.[21] But he is an atypical and problematic novelistic hero for more than one reason. He does not become a warrior-hero (like Chariton's Chaereas) nor does he excell in athletics (like Heliodorus' Theagenes)[22]—the closest he comes to both is his performance on horseback in order to impress an Egyptian general (3.14.2). In addition, he is characterized by a reductive understanding of love and does not seem to show any emotional or rhetorical development towards adulthood of the kind that has been noted in other novelistic heroes.[23]

Ethnic characterization similarly inverts a traditional pattern. Straightforward ethnic differences, it is true, are difficult to find in this novel,[24] but the fact that the novel's hero is Phoenician[25] inverts a literary tradition of associating this provenance primarily with barbarian stereotypes.[26] Thersander, on

20 On this theme, see Ormand 2010.

21 On the complex and ambiguous depiction of Clitophon's *sōphrosunē*, see De Temmerman 2014: 158–176; Kasprzyk 2009.

22 Faranton 2011: 62–64.

23 On the absence of development in Clitophon, see Morgan 1997: 182–185.

24 As Morales 2001: xvi rightly observes, all the characters, whether they come from Phoenicia (Clitophon), Byzantium (Leucippe), Egypt (Menelaus), or Ephesus (Melite and Thersander), speak Greek and seem culturally Greek, the only exception being the *Boukoloi*, Egyptian brigands roaming the Nile Delta, who are characterized as wild savages.

25 See Morales 2001: xvii–xix on cultural associations of this ethnicity.

26 See De Temmerman 2014: 154–155 for details.

the other hand, the most important 'bad guy' of the story, is not barbarian but a Greek from Miletus. Attention is drawn to this by the fact that Clitophon depicts him, exactly, as a barbarian: 'Is this [i.e. using violence in the temple of Artemis] not what goes on among barbarians? Among the Taurians, in the case of the Scythians' Artemis? No temple other than theirs is bloodied in this fashion. You have turned Ionia into Scythia!' (8.2.3) Thersander, as a Greek, in Clitophon's view 'barbarizes' Greek territory; he incorporates fluidity of ethnic borders. This depiction feeds into a wider inversion of Thersander's identity at the hands of the protagonists. Leucippe, while herself being his slave, ambiguously characterizes him at the same time as master and slave.[27] And when Clitophon has sex with Melite, Thersander is cast not as the adulterer (*moikhos*), a role nevertheless suited to the 'bad guy' in the narrative ideology of the novel, but as the legitimate husband whose marriage is endangered by the novel's hero (who, in fact, now becomes a *moikhos* himself).[28]

Clitophon-The-Narrator and Clitophon-The-Character

Achilles Tatius is unique among extant ancient Greek novelists in that the story's hero, Clitophon, is also its narrator. As is well known, the novel plays with this situation in order to generate suspense and/or surprise. Clitophon twice describes in gruesome detail how he saw Leucippe being murdered before his own eyes (3.15.2 and 5.7.4–5), only to explain later (how he found out) that he had misinterpreted what he had (thought he had) seen and that Leucippe was, in fact, still alive. Another example of such focalization by Clitophon-the-character is Clitophon's reunion with Clinias: Clitophon narrates that 'someone walking behind me in the marketplace suddenly grasped my hand, pulled me around, and, without a word, embraced me and began to kiss me profusely' (5.8.2). He then describes the astonishment that he experienced at the time due to his ignorance about the identity of this person, and subsequently reveals this identity no earlier than when he narrates how he recognized him ('I saw his face: it was Clinias!', 5.8.3).

The distinction between Clitophon-the-narrator and Clitophon-the-character is also crucial to characterization. As is only logical, how characters are dealt with by Clitophon-the-narrator depends, at least in part, on how he viewed

27 'You are not acting like a free man, nor like a nobleman. You are doing nothing more than imitating Sosthenes: the slave is suited to his master.' (6.18.6).

28 On Clitophon's complex sexual identity, see Brethes 2012. On Clitophon as a *moikhos*, see Schwartz 2001.

them as a character. This is visible, first of all, when characters enter the story. Clitophon introduces Clinias in the narrative when he narrates that, as a character, he was looking for help regarding his love for Leucippe (1.7.1)—a timing itself illustrative of Clinias' role as Clitophon's erotic advisor. Equally relevant is when characters are first named. Most are named simply as soon as they are introduced, but the few exceptions are significant. Charmides is introduced by Clitophon-the-narrator as 'the general' (3.14.1) who asks Clitophon-the-character to tell of his adventures and invites him to dinner. Yet he is not named until 4.2.1, where he falls in love with Leucippe—a turn in the plot that directly impacts Clitophon-the-character since, as Ian Repath rightly observes, it casts Charmides in the familiar generic role of the love rival.[29] Another example is Thersander. He is introduced by Satyrus, who advises Clitophon to marry Melite and specifies that 'her husband' (*ho anēr*) has died at sea (5.11.6). He is first named in 5.23.3, where after Melite's marriage with Clitophon, and much to the surprise of Clitophon-the-character, he suddenly turns out not to be dead after all. Like Charmides, then, Thersander is named by Clitophon-the-narrator at the moment when he becomes part of a love triangle that crucially redefines the position of Clitophon-the-character—ironically perhaps, in the latter case it is not Thersander but Clitophon himself who at this point is cast in the role of love rival.

How the position of Clitophon-the-character impacts Clitophon-the-narrator is also visible when characters leave the story. Menelaus, for example, is a total stranger to Clitophon-the-character when he meets and befriends him, but becomes such an important help (he saves Leucippe's life, warns Clitophon of Charmides' infatuation with Leucippe, etc.) that by the time he returns home, Clitophon-the-narrator marks his final occurrence in the story with a concluding, flattering vignette of direct characterization ('He turned back, filled with tears: an excellent young man, worthy of the gods themselves', 5.15.1), which unambiguously reflects how he experienced him as a character throughout the preceding narrative.

More often than not, the ego-narration impacts characterization in more complex ways, especially when it involves a configuration of different levels of knowledge. Usually, Clitophon depicts characters with the help of *ex eventu* knowledge (i.e. knowledge that he did not have as a character but does have as a narrator in retrospect).[30] In these cases, his depictions often highlight the

29 Repath 2001: 60.

30 In fact, he takes care to point out in the final book how he was filled in by Leucippe, Sosthenes (8.15) and Sostratus (8.17) about events until then unknown to him.

constructedness of his own narration. Chaereas, for example, is carefully constructed by a (retrospective) narrator who purposefully plays with the knowledge that he had as a character. The main aim of this strategy is to generate suspense. We read, for example, how Chaereas became 'a friend' of the protagonists (*philos genomenos*, 4.18.1)—a statement that reflects not what Clitophon-the-narrator knows but what Clitophon-the-character assumed at the time. Soon thereafter, however, the narrator provides information that was inaccessible to him as a character: that Chaereas had, in fact, fallen in love with Leucippe, had therefore snared (*thērōmenos*, 5.3.1) them into his friendship, had arranged a plot and mobilized a group of brigands. These (and other)[31] narratorial interventions prepare the reader for the moment when Chaereas eventually showed himself to Clitophon-the-character as what he really was: a rogue who ambushed the protagonists and abducted Leucippe (5.7.1–2). In other words, different levels of knowledge, accessible to Clitophon-the-character and Clitophon-the-narrator respectively, are alternated as to the effect that the reader first thinks (like Clitophon-the-character) that Chaereas was Clitophon's friend, later learns that he was not but nevertheless has to wait until Leucippe's abduction to see how exactly his plans materialized.

In one or two cases, focalization of characters by Clitophon-the-character is instrumental in depicting his emotional involvement. But the point may well be that even in these cases attention is drawn to the constructedness and artificial character of his narration. Melite, for example, is introduced by Satyrus, who explains that she has already been aflame for Clitophon for two months. This anachronic introduction draws attention to the fact that Clitophon-the-narrator until then has omitted her presence from the story. The focalization changes when Clitophon narrates that he agreed to marry her and saw her at a dinner party: Clitophon-the-narrator then describes her beauty as he beheld it as a character:

> When she saw me, she leaped up and flung her arms around me, filling my face with kisses. She truly was beautiful (*kalē*): you would have said that her face was daubed with milk, and that roses grew in her cheeks (*rhodon ... tais pareiais*). Her brilliant eyes (*to blemma*) scintillated with erogenous sparkle, and her hair (*komē*) was thick, long and golden in

31 In addition, Clitophon-the-narrator interprets an event as a bad omen (*oiōnos ... ponēros*, 5.3.3), gives away what will happen the next day ('This is how we escaped from the plot on this occasion, but it bought us only a single day.', 5.6.1) and reads Chaereas' behaviour differently than Clitophon-the-character could have done (Chaereas had gone away 'citing his stomach as an excuse' (*prophasin poiēsamenos*), 5.7.1).

> colour (*katakhrusos*). It was not without a certain feeling of pleasure that I beheld the woman.
>
> 5.13.1–2

Clitophon in this description foregrounds the impact of Melite's beauty on him at the time. The description has a number of aspects in common with Leucippe's description,[32] inserted into the story at the moment when Clitophon first sees her (1.4.2–3). It is not just that both women are beautiful (*kalē*—*kallos*) and blonde (*xanthon*—*xanthē*); it is also that their descriptions very much resemble each other from a formal point of view. Like Melite's, Leucippe's description is clearly focalized by Clitophon-the-character ('she appeared to me', 1.4.2); both descriptions focus on the face (*to prosōpon*—*tōi prosōpōi*) and comment on the same parts of it: cheeks (*tais pareiais*—*pareia*), hair (*komē*—*komē*), and eyes (*to blemma*—*omma*); and both adopt the same imagery to describe female beauty (that of a rose resembling both Melite's cheeks and Leucippe's mouth). All these similarities, to be sure, tell us where Clitophon's emotional priorities lie: with female beauty in general rather than with love for one of the women specifically. And even in these instances, where his focalization foregrounds his own emotional involvement, his narration draws attention to its own artificiality: appreciating female beauty for Clitophon seems to be a matter of box-ticking and assessing pre-fixed categories.

In other cases, Clitophon's depiction of characters raises questions of fictionalization. Conops is a good example: he is introduced as one of the slaves of Leucippe and her mother ('Among their slaves was a fellow who …', 2.20.1). This means that he had come with them from Byzantium to Clitophon's house in Tyre shortly before and that Clitophon could not have known him at the time. And yet, he introduces him with remarkably overt and negative characterization:

> Among their slaves was a fellow who was interfering (*polupragmōn*), garrulous (*lalos*), gluttonous (*likhnos*), and anything else you might want to call him, by the name of Conops. It seemed to me that he was observing our actions from afar. He particularly suspected that we might be up to some nocturnal intrigue … and so he stayed awake well into the evening with the doors of his room wide open, and as a result it was difficult to avoid his attention.
>
> 2.20.1

32 On one similarity, see Morales 2004: 222.

The introduction presents itself as a clear-cut case of typification: the *lalos* is a character type well-known from Theophrastus (*Char.* 7), the glutton is a type familiar from comedy,[33] and *polupragmosunē* was a broad, social term, dealt with by Plutarch as a vice and usually translated as 'busybodiness' or 'meddlesomeness'.[34] Conops' name, meaning 'gnat', resonates with this last characteristic. The easiest way to read this passage is as a clear, omniscient vignette provided by Clitophon-the-narrator at Conops' introduction: typification is a way to generate realism; and Conops, indeed, wholly lives up to his characterization in the remainder of the story: his three main characteristics (meddlesomeness, garrulity and gluttony) carefully reflect and prepare the plot line to which he is instrumental. His characterization as meddlesome resonates with the fact that he is an obstacle to Clitophon's own agenda (having sex with Leucippe in secret); and both his garrulity and gluttony have a role to play in Satyrus' efforts to remove this obstacle. First, Satyrus tries to befriend him, which results in a long dialogue between the two in which Conops tells a fable to warn Satyrus that 'there is no room for rapprochement' (2.20.2); next, Satyrus, who knows that 'Conops was a slave of his belly', invites him to dinner in order to administer him a sleeping potion. Clitophon is explicit that Conops accepts 'under the compulsion of that excellent belly of his'.

But on such a straightforward reading, the reader is invited to wonder how and with what authority Clitophon can characterize Conops so firmly, given the fact that he has just presented him as a newcomer to the house. Clitophon may very well claim that the plot of his story develops as a result of Conops' character but the reader in retrospect is tempted to reconstruct Clitophon's hermeneutic process the other way around: Clitophon-the-narrator arguably builds on (his reading of) the development of the plot (Conops interfers in his plans; uses story-telling to block Satyrus' first approach; and is eventually knocked out by a sleeping potion in his wine) so as to bypass his lack of omniscience and (re)construct Conops' characteristics in retrospect (meddlesomeness, garrulity and gluttony).

About other characters Clitophon-the-character had even less knowledge. Callisthenes, for example, was a young man from Byzantium who, after hearing about Leucippe's beauty, decided to abduct her but by mistake abducted Clitophon's sister, Calligone, instead. At that time, Clitophon had never heard about Callisthenes; indeed, he only discovered his identity when he was filled in by Sostratus, Leucippe's father, at the end of the novel (8.17.2: 'He began

33 Wilkins 2000: 69–70.

34 On *polupragmosunē*, see Morales 2004: 85–87.

by telling everything that I have already related'). All information provided by Clitophon about Callisthenes, therefore, is *ex eventu* knowledge traceable to his encounter with Sostratus. Clitophon's communication of this information again draws attention to the potentially fictionalizing character of his narration, albeit differently than in Conops' case. Callisthenes' characterization is limited to two parts that deal with consecutive periods in his life, are placed apart by almost the entire length of the novel (2.13.1–2 and 8.17.3–10), and are narrated by two different narrators (Clitophon-the-narrator and Sostratus respectively). At Callisthenes' introduction, Clitophon-the-narrator unambiguously depicts him, just like Conops, in emphatically negative terms: he was prodigal, extravagant (*asōtos … polutelēs*), wanton (*hubris*), licentious (*tois akolastois*), wallowing in erotic pleasure and leading an uncontrolled lifestyle (*tou biou tēn akolasian*) that evoked nothing but disgust (*bdeluttomenos*) in Sostratus (2.13.1–2). Much to the reader's surprise, Sostratus himself in the second episode adds that Callisthenes, after abducting Calligone, had fallen in love with her and had undergone 'a sudden, miraculous transformation': he had treated her as a gentleman would and had respected her virginity; and he had shown himself decent, proper and moderate.[35] At this point, the reader realizes that Clitophon in the first episode has selected some of this information and shared with his narratee only those qualities of Callisthenes that straightforwardly resonate with the sexual uncontrollability of which his abduction of Calligone is an index; in other words, he has narrated only what is relevant to one plot line. This activity too borders on fictionalization: not in the sense that Clitophon himself, as in Conops' case, reconstructs character (which he does not: he simply reiterates what Sostratus has told him), but in the sense that the reality about Callisthenes is more complex than he (initially) communicates.

In the cases of Conops and Callisthenes, as we have seen, there is a logical explanation as to why Clitophon-the-narrator knows more about them than Clitophon-the-character. But the novel does not always respect the heuristic limits of ego-narration. As Bryan Reardon observes,[36] Clitophon's narration includes instances of paralepsis: events at which he himself was not present at the time and about which it is difficult to see how he could have been informed in any detail afterwards (e.g. the events that happen in his cell after he has escaped from it, 6.2.2–6). What is more, his story offers many

35 Morgan 1997: 186 interprets Callisthenes' character shift as an authorial device highlighting Clitophon's lack of comparable transformation.

36 Reardon 1994: 85.

instances of psychic introspection: direct, unlimited access (which Clitophon, as an ego-narrator, logically speaking cannot have) to emotions, thoughts, dispositions and motivations of characters.[37] Reardon explains such instances as the product of an incompetent author, who is unable to meet the high artistic standards of ego-narration. More recently, others have explained such instances as pointing to Clitophon's unreliability as a narrator (see also the section on maxims below). A closer look at Leucippe's characterization drives the point home. As Reardon observes, she starts out as an atypical novelistic heroine (who runs away from home rather than being carried off as a result of the intervention of gods, Tyche or pirates) but becomes more conventional in the latter half of the novel.[38] As I have argued elsewhere, it is tempting to read this transition as another instance of fictionalization by Clitophon.[39] Although the earlier books narrate episodes where the two were together, they hardly convey any substantial information about Leucippe's character—indeed, Clitophon seems interested almost exclusively in her (stunning) beauty. It is only in the Milesian episode, where Leucippe was separated from Clitophon most of the time, that he invests her with a number of qualities that, according to all generic conventions, cast her as the perfect novelistic heroine. One possible explanation is that this is exactly how Leucippe has filled in Clitophon afterwards about her own behaviour in his absence (i.e. that she presented herself to him as an ideal novelistic heroine) and that Clitophon is only too happy to believe it and present it as truth in his version of the story. The other possibility is that Clitophon-the-narrator simply does not know how Leucippe behaved during his absence and fills this gap with an account of how he assumes (or hopes?) she has.[40] Both possibilities make Clitophon a (more or less consciously) fictionalizing narrator, a *fabulator*.

37 When Thersander meets Leucippe, for example, he starts to cry but his tears, Clitophon says, are merely a performance (6.7.3–7). Of course, even if we assume that Leucippe informed him later about Thersander's tears, there is no way for Clitophon to know whether these tears were genuine or not. See Cohn 1999: 19–30 on psychic introspection (in biography) as a marker of fiction.

38 Reardon 1994: 86.

39 De Temmerman 2014: 187–202.

40 Repath (2013: 259) similarly observes that 'it is surely no coincidence that in all of her direct speech which Clitophon did not hear at the time, Leucippe is defending her reputation and/or virginity'—as good novelistic heroines do.

Maxims

As scholars have observed, much characterization in this novel is of a general type: general truths about the behaviour of certain groups of people (Egyptians, lovers, women, barbarians, slaves, etc.). More than in any other novel, clusters of maxims are part of long theoretical considerations (6.19, for example, is a long paragraph theorizing about fury and desire, two emotions experienced by Thersander). In addition, maxims are sometimes elaborated extensively: they are paraphrased and their validity is illustrated with examples and/or supported by authoritative voices or *e contrario* reasoning—all of which echoes a well-known exercise (gnomic elaboration or *ergasia*) in the *progumnasmata* handbooks. Maxims are relevant to characterization in a number of ways.

First, a number of maxims deal prominently with psychological matters and their outward manifestation.[41] When Clitophon-the-narrator describes Leucippe's imprisonment and the impact of her beauty on Thersander, he revises a Euripidean verse about the invisibility of character ('It is my opinion that the saying that "the processes of the mind are completely invisible"[42] is not sound', 6.6.2) and adds his own theory about mental processes being visible in the face as if in a mirror: 'If the mind is pleased, it beams forth the image of joy through the eyes; if it is saddened, it contorts the face into a vision of calamity.' Characters too offer similar theorizations: when Leucippe is struck by a fit of madness, for example, Menelaus foregrounds a piece of gnomic wisdom (which has been read as a parody of contemporary medical theory)[43] in order to explain to Clitophon why her affliction is not permanent.[44]

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, maxims (and their elaborations) function as heuristic strategies that allow Clitophon to bypass his restricted knowledge as an ego-narrator. One such strategy is deduction.[45] Clitophon-the-narrator often draws upon what he considers to be general truths in order to provide access for himself to the attitudes, minds and emotions of others. Charmides, for instance, in response to hearing Clitophon's adventures, experiences all emotions typical of 'a man who listens to another's troubles'. Clitophon is explicit that 'this was the effect of my story upon the general' (*houtō*

41 See Scarcella 1987 for an overview of maxims in Achilles Tatius and their content.

42 E. *Hipp.* 925–927, *Med.* 516–519. On these passages, see also the chapter on Euripides (→).

43 McLeod 1969.

44 'When the blood, which is everywhere young and fresh, bubbles up to a great climax, it often bursts out of the vein and swamps the brain, submerging the faculty that inspires reason' (4.10.1).

45 De Temmerman 2014: 178–179.

… *diethēka*, 3.14.4). The pattern of identifying general truths and claiming their applicability to a specific person at a specific point in time underlies much of Clitophon's psychological depiction of characters. Thersander, for example, talks nonsense to Leucippe because, as Clitophon explains, 'this is what lovers are like (*toioutoi*), whenever they seek to chat with their beloveds' (6.18.3); Charmides agrees to summon a doctor for Leucippe (who is struck by madness) 'for (*gar*) lovers rejoice in the duties assigned them by Eros' (4.10.2); and one of Clitophon's inmates is interested in another inmate's story 'for (*gar*) a man who is down on his luck is an inquisitive being, curious to hear about the problems of another' (7.2.3). In all these cases, Clitophon allows himself access to the psyche of others through maxims: if something is true for lovers/unhappy people in general, then it must also be true for Thersander/Charmides/the inmate.

But is it? The paradox is that at the same time the possibility is open to the reader to read all these instances the other way around: as instances not of deduction but of induction. When Clitophon tells his interlocutor in Sidon that Leucippe asks him to tell the story of Andromeda and Procne because (*gar*) 'the female species is rather fond of myths' (5.5.1), the logic at work is apparently again deductive: although Leucippe is not explicit to Clitophon about the motivation of her request, he knows it because he knows what women in general want. But at the same time, it is possible, of course, that Clitophon-the-narrator (claims to) know(s) what women want precisely *because* he has seen it, as he tells us, in Leucippe (who asks him to tell a story) and extrapolates from that observation. This would turn the episode into an instance of inductive (not deductive) logic. It would mean that Clitophon is enriched by his own experiences and as a narrator formulates insights accordingly. Such logic, to be sure, features prominently in Clitophon-the-character's narration (to Leucippe) of the story of Andromeda and Procne that follows immediately afterwards: he tells that, as revenge for Tereus' rape of Andromeda, his wife Procne kills their own son; and he continues: 'Thus (*houtōs*) do the pangs of resentment vanquish even the womb' (5.5.7). Here, Clitophon is explicit about the induction underlying his own (embedded) narration: he indicates that he builds on (his reading of) one specific case (Procne) in order to formulate a general insight (resentment can eclipse motherly love). The narrative about Procne, his message seems to be, has important truths to teach Leucippe (his narratee). Perhaps Clitophon uses the same logic in the narrator text, which would mean that what he presents as a deductive argument is, in fact, based on induction. The result is a hermeneutic crux: we cannot tell whether Clitophon is narrating fact or fiction about Leucippe and/or about 'what women want', nor where he gets it from.

When used in the character text, maxims also contribute to the characterization of individual characters. Melite uses maxims that align her own position with that of her different interlocutors. When addressing Clitophon, she uses maxims that apply both to herself and to him, thus uniting them conceptually as part of her attempt to persuade him to reciprocate her amorous feelings for him (5.16.3, 5.26.3). When confronting her jealous husband, on the other hand, she uses a maxim that casts her interest in Clitophon as nothing more than mere gossip ('Rumour and Slander are two evil sisters', 6.10.4) and at the same time takes care to associate Thersander with herself: 'these two (i.e. Rumour and Slander) are the enemies who wage war against **me**: it was they who captured **your** soul, and barred the way for **my** words to enter the gates of **your** ears' (6.10.6). The maxims in Melite's speech, therefore, are clear indices of rhetorical versatility and manoeuvrability.

The same can be said of Sosthenes, Thersander's cunning slave: maxims adopted in his conversation with his master, who is in love with Leucippe, aim to convince him that she will soon forget Clitophon and answer his love.[46] The one maxim in his conversation with Leucippe aims to persuade her to have sex with Thersander (by warning her for his reaction if she does not).[47] In other words, Sosthenes uses maxims in order to manoeuvre his interlocutors into each other's arms—which adds to his own depiction of both a cunning slave and a go-between aiming to satisfy his master's desire. Leucippe, for her part, is often the *object* of gnomic utterance[48]—not only in Sosthenes' speech but also in Clinias',[49] who equally sees her first and foremost as a sexual object of his interlocutor (Clitophon in his case). At the same time, there are no *second*-person maxims in this novel that apply to Leucippe: Achilles Tatius' characters, in other words, do not use maxims applicable to Leucippe in face-to-face conversations with her, but rather display their wisdom *about* her (and women in general) in her absence. They regard Leucippe not only as a sexual object, but also as an open book.

46 'An old desire wilts when new desire arises' and 'a woman loves best what she has to hand, and only remembers what is absent for as long as she has found no replacement' (6.17.4).

47 'When integrity meets with compliance it is increased still further, but when it is scorned it is roused to anger' (6.13.4).

48 See Morales 2000: 77–78, also on the objectification of women in Ach. Tat. more generally.

49 E.g. 1.9.6, 1.10.3.

Conclusion

Scholars have argued that Achilles Tatius' characters are among the most interesting ones in the novelistic corpus. It is true that some characters are semantically richer than most in his predecessors. In Menelaus' and Clinias' characterization as Clitophon's helpers and friends, for example, typification is combined with bottom-up dynamics, which sets them apart from, say, Polycharmus in Chariton. In other cases, characters combine different character types rather than embodying just one such type (Satyrus). And in terms of characterization through intertextuality, Achilles Tatius at times builds on associations with characters from the novelistic tradition (Leucippe and Callirhoe, Clitophon and Habrocomes). It is, however, in the many inversions and perversions of topical novelistic characterization that Achilles Tatius most clearly pushes the boundaries of the genre (as is evident from his handling central character markers such as virginity, chastity, ethnicity, and the role of the *moikhos*).

An important assumption (explicit or implicit) of those reading Achilles Tatius' characters as interesting is that these characters are depicted more realistically than in the older novels. This may be true in some sense (semantically richer characters are more real). On the other hand, in this chapter I have also developed the idea that, (realistic or not) characterization is first and foremost a strategy of Clitophon-the-narrator; and, secondly, that his characterization of other characters often activates questions about fictionalization that make it difficult to refer to them straightforwardly and unproblematically as realistic. More specifically, the distinction between Clitophon-the-narrator and Clitophon-the-character crucially impacts characterization. It accommodates a sophisticated play with different levels of knowledge which often infuses characterization with fictionalization of sorts: reconstruction of a character by Clitophon-the-narrator based on observations of Clitophon-the-character (Conops); selection and partial representation of *ex eventu* knowledge (Callisthenes); focalization by Clitophon-the-character of the physical appearance of characters that suggests a description in terms of generic, pre-established categories rather than an accurate depiction of what he really saw (Melite and Leucippe); transgression by Clitophon-the-narrator of heuristic possibility and substitution of a dearth of actual knowledge by generic conventions (Leucippe's behaviour in Ephesus); and the development of deductive, heuristic strategies that allow Clitophon-the-narrator access, so he claims, to the motivation, emotions, attitudes, and minds of characters (e.g. Charmides) but at the same time lead to a hermeneutic crux for the reader.

CHAPTER 33

Longus

J.R. Morgan

If the cast-lists of the Greek novels are, on the whole, populated by figures who are individuated against a background of generic character-types, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* enriches the mix by hybridizing two distinct genres: ideal romance and Theocritean pastoral. Here we find versions of the romantic hero and heroine, of their parents, and of love-rivals, who are constructed as surprising and often humorous pastoral variants of romantic norms. Underlying the pastoral strand of the generic combination is a broad characterizing antithesis between the affluent and materialistic city and a simple countryside constructed as its prelapsarian ethical antitype. Although the novel as a whole complicates the simple equation of city with bad and country with good,[1] this categorization nevertheless provides a base setting from which individuals may be calibrated. Part of the process of complication involves the differentiation between the idealized 'soft' intertextually pastoral characters (principally the two protagonists), who seem to inhabit a golden-age landscape of leisure and plenty, and a more realistic set of rustic individuals engaged in grubbing out a subsistence-level existence of grinding poverty and labour.[2]

Before we move to details of Longus' techniques of characterization, we must say something about the narrator and narrative structure of the novel. A prologue features an internal narrator who relates how, while hunting on Lesbos, he came across a grove of the Nymphs where he saw a captivating image. The body of the novel purports to be an *ekphrasis* of that image, as expounded to the narrator by an otherwise unidentified local exegete. In the prologue the narrator is himself characterized as a pleasure-seeker from the city, and his perspectives on the countryside and its inhabitants are character-determined.[3] One element of the narrator's characterization of himself (which at his level is unintentional) is a sentimental and nostalgic idealization of the country's noble simplicity, while another is a sophisticated disdain for 'rusticity'. Neither is an adequate tool for fully understanding the story he tells.

1 See Morgan 2004: 15–16.
2 Particularly the protagonists' foster-fathers.
3 See Morgan 2004: 17–20.

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This clear differentiation of narrator from author means that the reader of the novel must learn how to 'read through' the narrator to find the implied author's intended viewpoint. To put it crudely, what the narrator tells us about his characters may not be the 'truest' reading of them, and there will be places in this survey where we can see that the narrative hints at a subtler and deeper characterization than it actually expresses.

Names

Every name in the novel is carefully chosen. Some are straightforwardly 'speaking' names, such as that of the messenger Eudromus (literally 'good at running'). The transmitted text includes a comment on his name (4.5.2, 'because running was his job').[4] Daphnis' elder brother Astylus ('City Boy') is first named, without comment, at 4.10.1, though he has previously been referred to as the 'young master'. His name is more or less the sum total of his character, setting him up in contrast to Daphnis (to the connotations of whose name we shall return shortly).[5] Astylus' 'city-ness' governs his function in the plot: like the narrator and the young Methymnaeans within the story, he comes to the countryside for sport; he rides a horse (which none of the country folk does), and he blames it for the devastation of his father's ornamental garden, in a patrician gesture of sympathy for his underlings; he has a parasite and flatterer with whose homosexual (and thus anti-rural) designs on Daphnis he is prepared to connive.

The case of the parasite Gnathon ('Jaws') is a little more complex. His name, at a literal level, inscribes his gluttony and his natural habitat at his master's table. The narrator expatiates on the aptness of the name in an explicit characterization (4.11.2: 'whose accomplishments comprised eating, getting drunk, and drunken fornication, and who consisted of nothing more than jaws [*gnathos*], a stomach, and the parts below the stomach'). The name also carries an intertextual load, however, as that of the archetypal parasite of Athenian New Comedy.[6] As well as signalling the plot's transition from pastoral to urban comic mode, the name imports a ready-made characterization and set of motivations, which Gnathon duly enacts. His role in bringing the story to its proper conclusion by rescuing Chloe from her ruffian abductor, Lampis, is motivated

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4 This clause is excised in Reeve's edition, following Piccolos, but it is not out of character for this narrator to draw attention to the artificiality of the naming process.

5 For possible intertextual implications of the name Astylus, see Morgan 2004: 229.

6 Morgan 2004: 229 for details.

by his desire not to be alienated from his new master's table. Similarly complex is the naming of Lycaenion ('Little She-wolf'), the seductive neighbour who initiates Daphnis into sex. The literal meaning of the name casts her as a metaphorical predator (though this is not the whole story, and the narrator does not tell the whole story), and as a link in the chain of wolf-imagery that denotes the animalistic aspect of sexual love. This name too has a literary heritage: prostitutes and courtesans are frequently named with cognates of *lukos* ('wolf'), and the diminutive form aligns Lycaenion with the stereotypical courtesan of New Comedy (Menander, →), the urban intertext underlining her urban background.[7]

Other names work more generally. The rustic characters often have vegetal or animal names: Myrtale ('myrtle'), Dryas (connected with *drus* 'oak-tree', but also alluding to the Nymphs who play such an important role in the story), Dorcon (from *dorkas* 'deer'),[8] Nape ('Woodland Glen'). Urban characters likewise bear socially marked names: Cleariste ('Best Fame'), Megacles ('Great Fame') are stereotypically aristocratic. The name of Daphnis' true father, Dionysophanes ('Dionysus Manifest') hints at an allegorical religious function, but also aligns him with a god whose worship in the novel is confined to the urban characters; its length and grandeur further denote elite status.[9]

The narrator draws particular attention to the naming of the two protagonists by their foster-parents. After discovering a baby boy abandoned with recognition tokens signifying a noble origin, Lamon and Myrtale decide to bring the child up as their own and to name him Daphnis 'so that even the name should appear pastoral (*poimenikon*)' (1.3.2). Chloe's foster-parents also give her a pastoral name (1.6.3, again *poimenikon*) to make their parenthood credible. In Daphnis' case, at least, the point is not just that the name (cognate with *daphnē* 'laurel') has vegetal and rustic connotations, but that it is that of the archetypal shepherd-hero of pastoral poetry (Theocritus, →). In one sense, the name encapsulates Daphnis' characterization and life-style, and obviates the need to recreate the conventions of the pastoral hero from scratch, though the joke is that within the story the characters are ignorant of the literary models in whose steps they tread. Features such as his amorousness and musicality are nominatively predetermined. At the same time, the Theocritean Daphnis is mysteriously unhappy in his love, and so provides an antithetical point of

7 For her urban background, see 3.15.1. On the name and her character see Morgan 2004: 208–210.

8 Dorcon's name is also cognate with the verb *derkomai* ('I see'), figuring his role as a male gazer; see Morgan 2004: 163.

9 There may be realistic connections with Mytilene; Morgan 2004: 231–232.

reference against which the reciprocal and successful love of Longus' protagonists can be more fully appreciated. Chloe's name (literally 'Green Growth') looks as if it is repeating the joke of illiterate foster-parents unwittingly giving a name with a significant literary pedigree, but, annoyingly, it does not occur in extant pastoral. Philetas' name marks him out as specially qualified to give advice in matters of love, and the narrator stresses this with a series of puns on the verb *phileō* ('love' or 'kiss') and its cognates. But he also functions as a further link to Alexandrian poetry, sharing a name with the influential poet Philitas of Cos. Details become controversial here, but it may be that Philetas' role as *erōtodidaskalos* and some details of his back-story (particularly his love for the beautiful Amaryllis) echo elements of Philitas' poetry now unfortunately lost to us.[10]

Character-Types

This is not the occasion to re-open the vexed question of how novels were conceptualized and categorized in antiquity. However, there are sufficient similarities between the five extant novels to allow us to talk of typical, if not generically determined, characters. Stories of love by definition require a pair of lovers, and those lovers tend to be young, attractive and upper-class, and their relationship one of mutual and faithful love. Stories of any length require some sort of adversity before a happy ending is achieved, and thus antagonists. These include love-rivals, as well as disruptive persons with other motives, such as pirates. The figure of 'hero's friend' or wise adviser is also a frequent one (Chariton, →), and sometimes the protagonists receive advice and guidance from an older or more experienced mentor. It is not too difficult to map these typical roles onto *Daphnis and Chloe*. The eponymous protagonists are obviously the lovers. The parts of love-rivals are taken by Dorcon and Lycaenion, who interestingly double up as friends and helpers. Pirates duly make an appearance, and are closely paired with a bunch of intrusive urban holidaymakers from Methymna. Philetas and Lycaenion share the role of *erōtodidaskalos*.

The romantic roles are crucially coloured with pastoral overtones. Daphnis and Chloe possess the nobility (*eugeneia*) of the typical romantic hero and heroine (Chariton, →), but are brought up by rural families, after being exposed at birth by their biological parents with recognition tokens that signify their *eugeneia*. Their nobility manifests itself metonymically in their physical beauty.

10 The argument is developed in Morgan 2011.

This is first presented through one another's focalization in a symmetrical pair of episodes where their love is awakened, first by the sight of Daphnis bathing naked (1.13.1–1.14.4) and second by a kiss from Chloe which Daphnis wins in a beauty contest with Dorcon (1.15.4–1.18.2). The mismatch between Daphnis' appearance and that of his ostensible parents is noted by Dryas, as he begins to suspect that Lamon's son may in fact be a good match for his foster-daughter (3.32.1). Their affective world is dominated, of course, by their exclusive mutual attraction, whose development forms the basis of the plot. However, although their foster-parents ensure that they receive a basic education,[11] Daphnis and Chloe's perspective is a rustic one, marked by an unrealistic naivety and ignorance about love and sex. For example, as Chloe watches Daphnis bathing, the narrator comments that she was 'but a little girl with a rustic upbringing, who had never so much as heard anyone speak love's name' (1.13.5). She manifests the traditional literary symptoms of love, like sleeplessness and loss of appetite, but relates her emotions to her rustic experience:

> 'I am in pain, and I have no wound. I am sad, and I have not lost any of my sheep. I am burning up, and I am sitting in the coolest shade. Brambles have often scratched me, and I never shed a tear. Bees have often stung me, and I never cried out. This thing that pricks my heart is more painful than any of those. Daphnis is beautiful, but so are the flowers; his pipes make beautiful sounds, but so do the nightingales; and I do not give them a second thought. I wish I could be his pipe so he could blow into me; I wish I could be a goat so I could have him for my shepherd.'
>
> 1.14.1–3

Her simplicity is expressed by the paratactic sentence-structure, by the rustic imagery, and even by the unwitting double entendre, which she is too innocent to notice, but which the narrator and his more sophisticated narratee certainly understand.

The innocence of the protagonists is, of course, the base point from which their erotic education must begin. Their first educator is Philetas, from whom they learn the name of the emotion they are experiencing, and who tells them the remedy of love: 'a kiss, an embrace and lying down together with naked bodies' (2.7.7). At first they hesitate to put this advice into effect, because the

11 The reasons are not specified by the narrator, but the author's implication is that they hope their foster-children will one day be lucratively reunited with their natural families.

third part of the suggested remedy seems 'too forward (*thrasuteron*), not just for maids but for young goatherds as well' (2.9.1). This unexplained sudden access of modesty reflects the concern for chastity that, with some variation of degree, is typical of novelistic protagonists, but the way that it is focalized contributes to the characterization of the protagonists as rustic and naive. It is obviously inconsistent for Daphnis and Chloe to feel moral inhibitions about something of which they are completely ignorant, and the narrator proceeds to have fun with their willingness but inability to have sex before marriage. They eventually pluck up the courage to try the third remedy, but in their innocence do not understand Philetas' euphemism and suppose that lying down together is all that is involved (2.11.3). Eventually Daphnis is initiated into sex by Lycaenion, who exploits Daphnis' naivety to lure him to a lonely place in the woods, and then warns him of the blood and pain that will occur when he tries out his new skills with Chloe (3.16.1–19.3). So Chloe's virginity is preserved, as it must be for a novel heroine, until her wedding night, but whereas other novel heroines are characterized by *sōphrosunē* (Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesus, Heliodorus, →), this concept has no meaning for one as innocent as Chloe. She has no idea what virginity is, and preserves it only by luck. Similarly, Daphnis is restrained not by any sense of sexual propriety but by clumsiness and a reluctance to cause Chloe physical pain. The narrator partly misses the point here: Daphnis' sexual initiation not only equips him for the act of love but also instils a new sense of responsibility and guardianship towards his beloved.

The rival figures are similarly adapted to the rustic setting. Whereas in Chariton the rivals for Callirhoe's love include the foremost of the Greeks of Ionia and the Persian king himself, Dorcon is a cowherd on a neighbouring farm, whose first function in the plot is to help Chloe pull Daphnis out of a pit using her breast-band (1.12.3–5). Although this is not made explicit by the narrator, it is apparently the sight of Chloe's breasts that inflames his desire for her. On that occasion he is not named, but when he re-enters he is introduced as 'a lad with his beard just on his chin' (1.15.1, *artigeneios meirakiskos*). He knows the 'name and deeds of love' (1.15.1), and hence has the two items of knowledge in which Philetas and Lycaenion will instruct the protagonists. His social superiority to Daphnis is only that of a cowherd above a goatherd in the generic pastoral hierarchy, and he is only slightly older. He sets about trying to win Chloe with pastoral courtship gifts which characterize him metonymically: a set of pipes, a fawn-skin (the pastoral equivalent of sexy lingerie perhaps, and revealing his designs on Chloe), cheese, flowers, apples, and a nest of birds, together with an 'ivy-cup' (*kissubion*, 1.15.3), a generic pastoral marker from Theocritus 1. However, the recipients of these gifts lack the knowledge of cultural codes of courtship to understand their true purpose (1.15.3). He then has

a contest with Daphnis (1.15.4–16.5), which adds to his characterization in several ways. Firstly, he compares himself to Daphnis and draws attention to his social superiority, lack of body odour, and general handsomeness. That these are important factors for him underlines his complete rusticity. Secondly, in the contest as a whole, he is easily outclassed by Daphnis, who inverts all of Dorcon's sneers and emerges as the better rhetorician; Dorcon, in vaunting his sophistication, demonstrates his lack of it.[12] Dorcon's next move is to attempt an assault on Chloe. For reasons unexplained he dresses in the skin of a wolf, using it to cover his body completely. Metonymically this denotes the animal and predatory aspects of his desire, and the narrator confirms this by describing Dorcon as 'having beastified (*ekthēriōsas*) himself to the best of his ability' (1.20.3). The metonymical characterization is extended when he conceals himself in a place where even a real wolf could have lurked unseen, overgrown with thorns, brambles and thistles. Again, however, reality does not bear out the fantasy that Dorcon is enacting. Instead of attacking Chloe, he is himself set upon by her dogs, and needs rustic poultices for his wounds. Eventually, Daphnis and Chloe, whose innocent interpretation of his actions as 'a pastoral prank' (1.21.5) both characterizes them and belittles Dorcon, walk him home. Dorcon has comically failed to enact the character type in which the romantic plot has cast him: in being transferred to a pastoral setting, the rival figure has been reduced in every way.

Dorcon's role in the plot is not yet over, though. The countryside of Lesbos is invaded by a crew of pirates, who beat Dorcon up and leave him for dead, abducting his cows and Daphnis. With his last breath, Dorcon gives Chloe his pipes and tells her that his cows are trained to respond to them. When she plays, the cows capsize the pirate vessel just a short distance from the land, and the pirates in their heavy gear sink straight to the sea-bed. Here again Longus is playing with a romantic character-type—the outlaws who threaten the protagonists (Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, →)—and, as with Dorcon, reducing them to comical ineffectiveness. At the same time, Dorcon briefly enacts the part of hero's friend, who, like Polycharmus in Chariton (→), saves the protagonist from death. It is an important part of Longus' pastoral vision that there are no real villains in his world, and to this extent Dorcon's characterization involves another complication and qualification of conventional stereotypes. It would be overstating the case to talk of character change or development; it is rather that at the last Dorcon is given the opportunity to display aspects of his character—magnanimity and compassion—that the story

12 Details in Morgan 2004: 165–166.

had hitherto occluded. At the very end of his life, he asks for, and gets, a kiss from Chloe (1.29.3), but this is no longer the erotic kiss he had tried to win before, but an ennobling and transfiguring gesture of profound gratitude and comradeship.

The corresponding female antagonist, Lycaenion, is equally ambiguous. As noted above, her name inscribes her nature as sexual predator, and her city origins (3.15.1, 'a little lady [*gunaion*] … from the city, young, pretty, and by country standards rather glamorous [*habroteron*]') mark her out as in some way antithetical to the pastoral characters. Initially she is interested only in enjoying Daphnis, but after witnessing the young lovers' unsuccessful attempt to imitate the mating of the animals, she takes pity on them and sees herself thenceforth as both satisfying her own desires and effecting their salvation (3.15.5). She inveigles Daphnis into accompanying her into the wood by means of a lie about an eagle stealing one of her geese;[13] and when she has got him to a conveniently deserted spot, tells a further untruth about having been told by the Nymphs in a dream to instruct him in physical love. This directly contradicts what the narrator has just said, but the narratee can see that Lycaenion is, unwittingly, furthering the Nymphs' purpose. The sexual act itself is described by the narrator as an 'erotic tuition' (3.19.1, *erōtikē paidagōgia*), in line with Lycaenion's own claim to be teaching Daphnis as her pupil. Although the narrator has explained her motivation for having sex with Daphnis, he is silent when she cautions Daphnis about the pain and blood that will result when he tries out his new skills on Chloe (3.19.2–3). The silence leaves an unresolved ambiguity: is she giving sincerely well-meant advice, or duplicitously using Daphnis' fear of hurting Chloe to keep him exclusively for herself? The indeterminacy of the narrator's vision of Lycaenion is yet further complicated by a hidden story implied by the 'facts' of the narrator's narration but not actually accessed by him.[14] Lycaenion is trapped in a spent sexual relationship with a rich farmer called Chromis, and a casual sexual adventure is all that life now holds. However, Lycaenion and Chromis appear together as guests at the wedding of Daphnis and Chloe (4.38.2). Her brief fling in the forest has turned out to be a life-changing experience for her as well as for Daphnis, and perhaps we are intended to see the agency of the Nymphs at work in this untold secondary story as well as in that of the protagonists.[15]

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13 This evokes Penelope's dream at *Odyssey* 19.536–553, and so provides a metaphorically contrasting characterization; see Morgan 2004: 211.

14 Morgan 2004: 208–210.

15 This reading is argued more fully in Morgan 2004: 210.

Direct Characterization

On a few occasions the narrator introduces a character with a short character-sketch. We have already seen examples of this in connection with Dorcon, Lycaenion, Gnathon,[16] and Eudromus. Another example occurs at the first appearance of Philetas: he is described as 'an aged man (*presbutēs*), with a goat-skin cloak (*sisura*) round his shoulders and raw-hide shoes (*karabatinai*) on his feet, and a bag hanging at his side, and the bag was ancient too' (2.3.1). The characterization here is partly direct: the use of the dignified word *presbutēs* immediately distinguishes Philetas from the run-of-the-mill rustic old men (*gerontes*), and prepares for his roles as *erōtodidaskalos*-in-chief and sage rural judge. His clothing is unique and obviously characterizes him metonymically, though the precise semiotics of his exotic cloak and shoes are elusive: probably they denote a noble and ancient rusticity untouched by materialism.[17] Lycaenion's partner Chromis is afforded a characterizing introduction, as 'a neighbour who farmed his own land ... now past his best physically' (3.15.1). This leads directly into the introduction of Lycaenion, quoted above. Chromis has no direct part to play in the story of Daphnis and Chloe, but the mere fact that he is named and given an introduction at all suggests that he has an importance (as part of Lycaenion's unwritten back-story and redemption that elude the narrator) beyond his minimal plot-function. Lampis, a ruffian and rival to Daphnis who tries to cause Daphnis trouble by vandalizing the master's ornamental garden and later abducts Chloe after Daphnis is recognized as the master's son, is introduced as 'a cowherd and a hothead' (4.7.1, *agerōkhos boukolos*), which is sufficient explanation for his actions. The master Dionysophanes is introduced on his first entrance as 'already middle-aged, but tall, good-looking and capable of holding his own with any young man. He had few equals for wealth and none for goodness' (4.13.2, *khrēstos hōs oudeis heteros*). His first action is to sacrifice to the gods of the countryside, Demeter, Dionysus, Pan and the Nymphs, a demonstration of piety that makes up part of his overall characterization as a good man. This is the only occasion when Demeter is named in the novel: despite her function as goddess of fertility and crops, she is an urban goddess, and Dionysus is associated with the festivities of the wine vintage that townsfolk come to the country to celebrate. Pan and the Nymphs, on the other hand, are genuinely rustic deities: Dionysophanes' sacrifices thus characterize him

16 Gnathon is also described by the narrator as 'a born pederast' (4.11.2, *phusei paiderastēs*).

17 Bowie 1985: 71–72 sees a resemblance to the clothing of Lycidas in Theoc. 7, who may be a cipher for the poet Philitas.

as urban but in tune with the natural countryside. Later this simple characterization is qualified by the realization that he exposed his youngest child in order to avoid dividing his estate. Dionysophanes' wife, Cleariste, is given no introduction at all: she is named as arriving at the country estate with Dionysophanes (4.13.1), and reappears to be impressed when her as yet unrecognized son puts on a show with his goats (4.15.1). Her characterization is limited to being a loyal appendage to her husband, and to experiencing maternal joy on cue. Chloe's father Megacles is not given a narratorial introductory characterization, other than the fact that he is one of the leading men invited to the banquet thrown by Dionysophanes on his return to Mytilene, and occupies a place of honour at the table by reason of his age (4.35.1). However, when he sees Chloe's recognition tokens and realizes that she is his daughter, he is allowed a brief narrative of her exposure, which shows him in a rather better light than Dionysophanes: at a time when he was not wealthy he hoped that an adoptive parent would be able to give her a better life than he was able to afford himself. His wife Rhode is not characterized at all: she is simply named twice.

In its way, this occlusion of the female characters is a form of characterization. Except in the case of Lycaenion (and of course Chloe) they are not capable of independent action and exist only in relation to their husbands, so embodying an ancient ideal of womanhood. Otherwise, the brief introductory characterizations that we have been discussing belong to secondary characters of some importance, and serve as markers of that importance. They are broad-brush and in most cases are subject to modification as the action proceeds; but they do provide a base-line calibration that allows the characters to be assigned to basic stock types.

On occasions, the narrator makes a directly characterizing comment which confirms his own limitations in understanding the story he is telling, and his tendency to patronize the rusticity of his characters. This can be illustrated in the Lycaenion scenes. Apart from failing to register that, despite her untruths, Lycaenion is serving the purpose of the novel's presiding deities, the narrator sees Daphnis only in terms of his ignorance and innocence. The narrator explains his enthusiasm to learn the sexual lesson Lycaenion is offering by stressing that Daphnis is a rustic goatherd, young and in love (3.18.1), and comments 'as if he was about to be taught something important, something truly heaven-sent' (3.18.2), the focalization implying, with a sophisticated smirk, that sex is the most ordinary thing in the world; but in this novel, and in the truest vision of reality, as the word 'heaven-sent' (*theopempton*) reminds us, Love really is humanity's greatest good.

Metonymical Characterization

As the editors explain in the Introduction, there are many techniques of metonymical characterization, and I shall return to some of them more explicitly. However, the broad categories of city and country underlie the novel's primary grouping of characters. It is not easy to separate metonymy and metaphor here, and the two often co-exist in a single passage. The seasonal changes of the countryside, for example, stand in a metaphorical relationship to the affective maturation of the characters, but the focalized presentation tells us something about the characters of the protagonists metonymically. And, if in the broadest sense the countryside is a metaphor for simplicity and purity and the city for sophistication and corruption, the opposition of the two entails a series of secondary cultural codes—such as dress, diet, worship—which express character metonymically.

We have already seen how Philetas' introduction includes an emphasis on apparently eccentric clothing, and how Dorcon dresses up as a wolf when he attempts to rape Chloe. However, we are told very little about 'normal' rustic clothing: Daphnis and Lamon both wear a *khitōniskos* ('shirt') as their normal daily wear (1.13.1, 4.7.5). Philetas' son Tityrus has a garment called an *enkombōma*, which he throws off when called upon to run an errand (2.33.3). Exactly what an *enkombōma* is is not clear: apart from entries in lexica, the word does not occur elsewhere in extant Greek texts, and may have come to Longus from erudite Alexandrian pastoral.[18] Predominantly, however, Daphnis and Chloe's interest in clothes centres on taking them off: their readiness to undress is an element of their characterization as sexually interested but naive and ignorant of polite convention. As they mature, they become more modest and reluctant to display their bodies to one another. Nevertheless, the importance of dress and appearance as a signifier distinguishing between rustic and urban is made clear after Daphnis is recognized by his natural parents. Almost his first action is to change into expensive clothes (4.23.2, *esthēta … polutelē*), and shortly afterwards he dedicates his pastoral clothes and bag to Dionysus, in a symbolic transition to the urban world. Even more strikingly, when it is revealed that Chloe is Daphnis' beloved and also emanates from a city family, she is scrubbed up and dressed by Cleariste in a way appropriate to her son's wife: her natural beauty is enhanced and transformed by ornament (*kosmos*), so that she is barely recognizable as the same person. The function of appropriate dress as a marker of *eugeneia* could hardly be clearer.

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18 Morgan 2004: 135. If this is the case, it is appropriate for a character whose very name marks him out as an intertextual cipher.

Similarly, dietary codes serve as metonymic markers of country and city. The country folk live off their flocks, and their diet consists largely of bread, milk, cheese, fruit and wine, with occasional meat meals for special occasions or small birds in winter. The eating habits of the city people are quite different. As well as breakfast and an evening meal, they have a meal in the middle of the day, which consists of a pretentiously denominated 'urban cuisine' (4.15.4, *astikēs opsartusias*), and the celebratory dinner following Daphnis' recognition includes a range of comestibles not associated with the rustics: fine wheat flour, marsh fowl,[19] sucking pigs and honey-cakes (4.26.1). Gnathon's status as a parasite (i.e. table companion) is a product of urban social institutions, and cemented by urban gastronomy.

The social organization of town and country is another signifier of difference. Daphnis' foster-family is of servile status, and Lamon has to (or at least plausibly pretends to have to) ask his master's permission before he can marry. Chloe's family is of free status, and can tout her around suitable suitors. Although this is felt as an important differentiation in the country (3.26.4), there is in practice little distinction between free and slave labour in Longus' countryside. Lamon and Dryas are engaged in almost identical work as goatherd and shepherd, are both able to adopt a foundling and both have the resources to raise him or her without marked hardship. The country people themselves subscribe to a literary hierarchy that ranks cowherds above shepherds and shepherds above goatherds; Dorcon tries to make cruel use of this in his contest with Daphnis (1.16.1). However, there is no sign of social friction and every sign of communal cohesion. Above all, although there is time for singing and dancing, the life of the country people is one of hard labour, implicitly on the edge of starvation (3.30.3; although Daphnis and Chloe are, as idealized constructs, to some extent immune to such hardship). In the city, by contrast, the narrative focuses on a wealthy elite, clearly distanced from the slaves who constitute their household; there is no trace in the novel of free urban poor. The luxury of the urban rich is demonstrated through activities such as hunting for sport (Astylus' reason for coming to the country, 4.11.1), a sort of sanitized participation in the grape-harvest (4.5.2, a few select bunches are left on the vine for them to pick), and, iconically, the non-functional pleasure-garden (*paradeisos*) of Dionysophanes, which is engineered to present an artificial urban ideal of nature (4.2.1–3.2).[20] The centrepiece of the garden is a temple of Dionysus, decorated with images of violent scenes from his mythology, which characterize at

19 Compare the geese, ducks and bustards hunted by the young Methymnaeans (2.12.4).

20 On the *paradeisos* and its significance, see Morgan 2004: 223–225.

least one aspect of the city. As noted above, Dionysus and the other Olympian deities do not feature in the lives of the country people, whose religion centres on rural nature gods, particularly the Nymphs and Pan.

Emotions

It is almost superfluous to say that the emotion of love is central to the entire genre of the novel. As noted above, the central character-types are two beautiful and faithful lovers. Daphnis and Chloe obviously fill these roles. However, whereas in the other novels hero and heroine fall in love at first sight near the beginning of the story and their love, though tested, remains the one constant in their lives, *Daphnis and Chloe* thematizes the development of love as the nucleus of its plot. Love in this novel is not a monolithic entity, but one subject to subtle gradations. Daphnis and Chloe do not exactly undergo character-change, but they move from childhood to adulthood in a process of education and discovery. This process is articulated by the cycle of the seasons, which thus stand as metaphorical characterization of the stages of maturation. Love begins in the spring (1.9–22), becomes more heated in the summer (1.23–27), and reaches a first goal in the autumn (1.28–3.2), when Philetas reveals the name and nature of love to the young couple; winter (3.3–11) is a time of separation and frustration, but the second spring (3.12–23) heralds a rebirth of love and Daphnis' initiation at the hands of Lycaenion; the second summer (3.23–34) introduces the possibility of marriage; and finally a second autumn (4.1–40) brings the fruition of love and the first love-making of the protagonists. The following paragraphs survey the way that the protagonists' erotic emotions develop over the course of the novel's seven seasons. Here again, a strict separation of metonymical and metaphorical characterization is not feasible; indeed each stage is defined in essence by an intratextual metaphorical comparison with the preceding one. And each affective stage is expressed through a whole range of metonymies, including speech, actions and focalizations.[21]

When the narrative proper begins, Daphnis and Chloe are innocent and inseparable children. They imitate the sights and sounds of the natural world (singing like the birds, skipping like the lambs), and play childish and pastoral games together (1.10.2, *athurmata ... poimenika kai paidika*). Chloe is the first to experience feelings she is unable to name, when she watches Daphnis taking

21 For a more detailed discussion, see Morgan 2004: 10–14.

a bath in the spring after falling into a wolf-trap. The description of his body is presented through her focalization, and, in her innocence, she thinks the bath itself must be the cause of this new beauty. The narrator comments in his patronizing way (1.13.5) that she is 'but a little girl with a rustic upbringing, who had never so much as heard anyone speak love's name'. She experiences symptoms of love-sickness, which coincide with those familiar from love poetry, particularly that of Sappho (one of the novel's principal intertexts): loss of appetite, sleeplessness, loss of interest in other things, sudden mood-swings and changes of complexion. Again, her rusticity is presented through a focalized comment: 'no cow tormented by a gadfly ever suffered so' (1.13.5, though the sexual overtones of the gadfly (*oistros*) are ironically clear to the narratee). The next chapter consists of an *ēthopoiia*, in which Chloe voices her perplexity in a suitably rustic and innocent manner (quoted above). There follows a symmetrical sequence, in which Daphnis' emotions are aroused by the metonymically 'untutored and artless' (1.17.1, *adidakton kai atekhnon*) kiss from Chloe which is the prize in his contest with Dorcon, and which she is only too pleased to award him. As with Chloe, the narrator gives us first a rustically focalized description of Daphnis' emotions:

> that was the first time he noticed with wonder that her hair was golden, that her eyes were as large as a cow's,[22] that her face truly was even whiter than goat's milk, as if now for the first time he had acquired eyes, and had been blind before.
>
> 1.17.3

He suffers a similar set of symptoms, including the clearest possible allusion to Sappho: 'his face was sicklier green (*khlōroteron*) than summer grass' (compare Sappho 31.14 LP, 'I am sicklier green [*khlōrotera*] than grass'); and he has a similar *ēthopoiia*, voicing his puzzlement about what is happening to him. Like Chloe, he conceives his emotions as the symptoms of a disease. The characterizing effect of all this is clear, but the technique is difficult to describe. The emotions described, the focalizations, and the speech acts are straightforwardly metonymical, but they are overlaid by a double metaphorical effect. First, the intertextual references to Sappho evoke a whole repertoire of love poetry, whose clichés Daphnis and Chloe are apparently reinventing; but second, the precise symmetry of the two inamorations enforces an intratextual

22 The joke here is that although Daphnis reaches for a comparison within his experience as a goatherd, he unwittingly hits on the Homeric formula *boōpis* ('ox-eyed').

comparison of the two lovers, emphasizing that at this stage their emotions are identical: their instinctive *homonoia* complies with the generic reciprocity of romantic love, and provides the starting point of a process of increasing gender differentiation.

The first summer is introduced by description focalized through a hypothetical observer:

> one might have thought (*eikasen an tis*) the rivers were softly singing as they flowed, the winds were piping as they blew through the pines, the apples were dropping to the ground from love, and the sun was making everyone take their clothes off because it loved beauty so.
>
> 1.23.2

The eroticization of the landscape is thus distanced from the protagonists, who are still ignorant of love: a metaphorical characterization of them. The behaviour of the young couple changes, in response to the physical heat of the season and the figurative heat of their passion. Daphnis bathes in rivers, and there is a series of erotically charged scenes, in which Chloe is melted by the sight of Daphnis bathing in the nude and he imagines that he is looking at one of the Nymphs; she tries on his clothes while he is bathing, and he reinvents one of the standard motifs of erotic poetry by using the pipes to pass her a kiss. This relatively short section culminates in a scene that inspired many later painters: Daphnis is fixated by the sight of Chloe sleeping, and in another *ēthopoiia* voices both his desire to kiss her again and his fear of doing so: he even adopts an anti-pastoral stance to emphasize that his still uncomprehended love overrides all his previous loyalties and concerns:

> 'those noisy cicadas, they will stop her sleeping with their din.[23] And the billy-goats are banging their horns together as they fight:[24] those wolves are worse cowards than foxes not to have carried them off.'
>
> 1.25.3

23 A metaphorical characterization by means of an intratextual comparison with the childish games of spring, when Chloe made a cricket-cage so that she could enjoy the entomological music (1.10.2).

24 His naivety prevents him, but not the narratee, from understanding that the he-goats are fighting over the she-goats; compare the more explicit description of their activity in the second spring (3.13.2–3).

As he speaks, a cicada being pursued by a swallow drops into Chloe's bosom. When she wakes up, Daphnis has the excuse to put his hand inside her dress; but no sooner has he retrieved the cicada than Chloe kisses it and replaces it between her breasts, indicating that she would be pleased for him to repeat the fondling. The actions express emotions of desire and pleasure that the characters are as yet unable to name, let alone articulate verbally.

At the grape vintage at the beginning of Book 2 each of the protagonists is the object of suggestive behaviour from other workers, and a new emotion, jealousy, enters their world. In their state of ignorance, however, they do not understand their feelings. Their incomprehension is expressed through focalization: the narrator conspicuously avoids naming jealousy, and instead uses vague terms for unpleasant feelings. Nevertheless, this new sense that the relationship is exclusive marks an increase in its intensity, and makes them ready for the first of the novel's didactic episodes, in which Philetas narrates an encounter in his garden with the child Eros, instructs them in the nature of his divinity, and finally offers them a remedy for love. Their naivety is carefully inscribed through the various stages of this scene. They receive Philetas' narrative as simply a story (2.7.1, *muthon ou logon*), and ask whether Eros is a child or a bird. The subsequent theology is received with equal blankness, and it is only when Philetas speaks of his own love for Amaryllis that they are able to make a connection to their own condition. With the knowledge of the name of love comes a new but apparently instinctive sense of modesty, which prevents Daphnis and Chloe putting the third part of Philetas' remedy—lying together with naked bodies—into effect: 'this was too forward not just for maids for young goatherds as well' (2.9.1). From this point, however, also arises an apparently natural male dominance on the part of Daphnis, as he accidentally ends up on top of her in a particularly passionate cuddle (2.11.1–2). He takes the part of Pan and she of Syrinx in a mime following Lamon's narration of the myth (2.37). The second book ends with the lovers exchanging vows of fidelity, but by different gods, Chloe by the Nymphs and Daphnis by the aggressively masculine Pan. These figures connect with the series of three myths to which we shall return shortly. Chloe is aware enough by now to realize that Pan would be all too likely to condone rather than punish infidelity, and compels Daphnis to swear again, this time by his flocks. In the first chapters of the next book he takes the initiative in trudging through the winter snow to visit her.

When the second spring arrives, it is described rather differently from the first, with an awareness of the animals' courting and mating. In terms of characterization there are several things going on; in fact, the passage illustrates the symbiotic inseparability of the forms and techniques of characterization. The countryside is, as throughout the novel, a metaphor for the emotional con-

dition of the protagonists. At the same time, the new sense of nature's erotic aspects indicates that the description is focalized metonymically through the perceptions of Daphnis and Chloe. Furthermore, the description of the second spring only has its full significance when compared to that of the first. The intratextual comparison metaphorically registers the development that Daphnis and Chloe have undergone in the intervening year. Daphnis' dominance accelerates. His sexual arousal is now made more explicit, and connected by a series of verbal echoes to the florescence of the natural world. He presses her to imitate the behaviour of the animals, and she rejects his suggestion that this might be the third remedy with arguments that combine naivety and sophistry: the animals do whatever it is they do standing up, and they do not take their wool off to do it. Daphnis' escapade with Lycaenion leaves him with a knowledge of the mechanics of sex that Chloe does not share. He can now control Chloe's transition from childhood to womanhood, but power brings responsibility as well. In the face of Lycaenion's warnings, he subordinates his physical desire to a loving concern for her welfare. This distances him both from the animals and from Lycaenion, who apparently, in following up her warning with advice to go to a quiet place where no one would hear Chloe's screams, never envisaged that he would not immediately graduate to sex with Chloe.

The second summer is largely taken up with questions of courtship and marriage, but it ends with an iconic scene in which Daphnis' masculinity and Chloe's femininity are demonstrated. Daphnis ignores Chloe's fears and, much to her annoyance, climbs a tree to pick a splendid apple from the highest bough.[25] Throughout the final book, Chloe is a fundamentally passive figure, who shyly avoids the visitors from the city, and is even subject to a violent abduction. On the wedding night that concludes the novel Daphnis finally teaches her 'some of the things' that he had learned from Lycaenion, and, although their shared pleasure is clear enough, it is also clear that they are settling into the conventional modalities of married sex, where an experienced man initiates his virginal partner.

A brief word about speech:[26] we do not know what Greek as spoken by farm labourers on Lesbos would have been like, but it is certain that Longus makes no attempt to imitate it, or to distinguish rustic characters from urban on the basis of their speech. We have already noted the *ēthopoiiai* given to Chloe and Daphnis in Book 1. The style is far from primitive, but there is arguably

25 This is an intertextual act of daring: Longus more or less quotes an epithalamium of Sappho in which the unpicked apple symbolized the bride's virginity.

26 More detailed discussion in Bowie 2006.

some characterization inherent in the simple sentence structures; though the faux-naive epigrammatic effect is quite sophisticated in its way. Perhaps the salient point for characterization is that, whereas Daphnis speaks in a variety of situations, Chloe is only ever allowed direct speech addressed to him.

Metaphorical Characterization

We have already seen several times in passing how Longus uses intertextuality as a means of characterization. This is in large part through assimilation to and differentiation from the character-types of other novels. But many of the characteristics of pastoral figures are drawn from Alexandrian poetry, certainly that of Theocritus and probably that of Philitas of Cos. Here too the differences within broad similarities are important, particularly in relation to the figure of Daphnis, a victim of tragic love in Theocritus but, eventually, the paradigm of love as a good in its own right in Longus. We have also seen that New Comedy furnishes some character patterns, such as the parasite and the courtesan (Menander, →). The love poetry of Sappho, appropriately enough for a story set on Lesbos, furnishes much of the characterizing psychology of love. In this final section, I want to draw attention to two intratextual features of the novel.

The first is the much discussed series of myths presented as secondary narratives:[27] the story of the wood-dove, told by Daphnis in Book 1; the myth of Pan and Syrinx, narrated by Lamon and subsequently acted out by Daphnis and Chloe in Book 2; and the myth of Echo, narrated by Daphnis in Book 3. The first of these includes a reference to the story of Pan and Pitys. Taken together they demonstrate an increase in male sexual aggression, embodied by Pan, and female victimhood, which keeps pace with the erotic development of the protagonists in the primary narrative. It is widely agreed that the figures of Pan and the Nymphs in these myths stand in some sort of analogical relation to Daphnis and Chloe. The exact nature of that relation is ambiguous: on the one hand, the myths may expose sexual dynamics of aggression and destruction which the main narrative sentimentally occludes; or the myths may be read as antithetical to the main narrative, examples of the sorts of sexual behaviour to be avoided and highlighting the positives of the main narrative by contrast; or, finally, they may be both of these things at one and the same time.

27 On these myths, see Morgan 2004: 171–172, 195–196, 213–216, and the bibliography cited there, particularly MacQueen 1990.

The second is the number of significant symmetries and parallelisms that Longus has built into his narrative. Perhaps the most obvious is that between Philetas and Lycaenion as the novel's two educators, in the name and deeds of love respectively, but also as representatives of the novel's cardinal concepts of nature and art, *phusis* and *tekhnē*, and in some sense of masculinity and femininity. Philetas' apparent benevolence is qualified by the comparison with Lycaenion: does he perhaps have selfish motives in telling the young couple to lie down together naked? Certainly, Lycaenion's selfish duplicity is redeemed when she is seen as counterpart to Philetas. But Lycaenion is also paired with Dorcon through a series of verbal echoes and most obviously by the wolf-imagery connected to them both, but also by the fact that Dorcon, strangely, is white-skinned like a woman from the town (1.16.5). Here too differences are as important as similarities: Dorcon turns from nominal deer to wolf, and is punished for his aggression by becoming the only named character in the novel to die. Lycaenion moves from nominal wolf to perhaps unwitting benefactress, and seems to win healing of her own life. Similarly, Philetas has another pairing: with Gnathon, who like him, delivers a speech on the nature of love, and may thus count as a third *praeceptor amoris*. Philetas' speech is perhaps Longus' finest moment, virtually a prose poem, whereas Gnathon's is vacuous rhetorical buffoonery. The comparison defines each of the characters more clearly. And to close the circle, Gnathon and Lycaenion are paired as representatives of the deviant or unnatural sexuality of the city, sexual predators who both end up as saviours.

The parallels do not end here. The novel contains two elaborate descriptions of gardens, symmetrically placed near the beginning of Books 2 and 4, each of which books is devoted entirely to an autumn: Philetas' *kēpos* and Dionysophanes' *paradeisos* which is tended by Lamon. Each of these gardens is, among other things, a metonymic characterization of its owner and/or cultivator. So Philetas' is productive, regularly cultivated, filled with birdsong, and fertilized by Eros bathing in its spring; Dionysophanes' is, for all its luxurious beauty, ornamental, regimented, silent and sterile, neglected in its master's absence, and fertilized with dung. Each of the gardens has an intruder: in Philetas' it is Eros, who does no harm, despite Philetas' fear that he might break some of the plants; in Dionysophanes' it is Lampis, who spitefully trashes the flowers in order to put Daphnis in his master's bad books. The parallel prompts us to see that Lampis is not just a nasty person, but represents the antitype of 'good' Eros. These examples do not exhaust the list of significant parallels that provided metaphorical characterization. There is much more to be said about the interpretation of each of them, but my purpose here has been primarily to draw attention to the presence of the technique.

Conclusion

In his proem, the narrator sets out the educational function of this novel, and hints that the story of Daphnis and Chloe is that of every human being; in other words that it is an allegory concerned with the universal not the individual. We cannot, therefore, expect profound psychological individuation of its characters: they are not 'real people'. On the other hand, its thematic of love and growing up requires a focus on emotions, which necessarily generates characterization. The range of techniques employed is remarkable, as is the finesse with which they are handled.

CHAPTER 34

Heliodorus

J.R. Morgan

Introduction

Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* is narratologically the most sophisticated of the extant Greek novels. In sheer density of plot incident it does not rival, for example, Xenophon's much shorter work, but, rather, develops its material with far greater richness and complexity. These qualities extend to its characterization. I shall not attempt to survey the whole range of techniques and character types within this chapter, but instead I shall concentrate on a single episode. The protagonists, Theagenes and Chariclea, have recently been discussed in detail by De Temmerman,[1] and the important secondary narrator, the Egyptian priest, Calasiris, has featured largely in the scholarly literature.[2] My focus will be on some of the Persian characters who take centre stage in Books 7 and 8, and my approach will be somewhat different from most of the other contributions in this volume. Rather than approaching characterization through categories of technique, it may be interesting to consider the experience of reading, and how a first-time reader[3] is made to construct and adjust his understanding of a character progressively, following the sequence of the text.

The Persian Characters in Books 7 and 8

When Book 7 begins Theagenes and Chariclea have been separated; Theagenes has been seized from the Persian phrourarch Mitranes by Egyptian bandits led by Thyamis (the son and rightful heir of Calasiris as high-priest of Isis at Memphis), who after defeating a Persian detachment, is marching on Memphis to reclaim his office; Chariclea and Calasiris are in pursuit of Theagenes. Book 7 opens with the arrival of Thyamis and his men at Memphis. When the inhabitants realize that Thyamis' force is a small one, they prepare to go outside the

1 De Temmerman 2014: 246–303.
2 Most recently Billault 2015.
3 I use this term deliberately here, in distinction to 'narratee'.

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walls and fight, but are restrained by an elderly man who suggests that, in the absence of the Persian satrap, Oroondates, approval should be sought from his wife, Arsace, who is here named for the first time (7.1.4).[4]

Arsace's name is the female version of Arsaces, the eponymous founder of the Arsacid dynasty of Parthia. Although, strictly speaking, it is anachronistic in Heliodorus' dramatic setting in the sixth or fifth century BCE, it is recognizably evocative of Persian names in Herodotus and other historical texts, and certainly carries a cachet of oriental royalty (the distinction between Persia and Parthia was not a watertight one in the ancient imaginary). It combines with the reference to the office of satrap to activate the semiotic charge of Persia (Herodotus, →). Whenever we encounter Persians in Greek literature we can expect them to be the products of absolute monarchy (either tyrannical or servile), forming an emblematic antithesis to Greek liberty: the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus at the crossing of the Hellespont in Herodotus (7.101–105) is a universal hypotext. From Herodotus onwards, we also have a stereotype of Persian wealth and luxury, archetypally contrasted with true Greek austerity and disdain for material riches. Luxury carries connotations of effeminacy: the antinomy of hard Greek and soft oriental. Effeminate men are often conjoined with gender-busting dominant women (Semiramis, Artemisia) as a further antitype to Greek ethical norms. Sexual indulgence is an aspect both of luxury and of permeable gender categories: the ambiguous figure of the eunuch embodies gender indeterminacy, as well as inscribing a hierarchy of absolute power over the bodies of subordinates, and being generically a component in harem intrigues. Within the novel genre itself, Chariton is already working with (and against) these broad stereotypes (Chariton, →). Thus, before Heliodorus' Arsace is individuated in any way, she is already, as a Persian noblewoman, broadly pre-characterized intertextually by an extensive literary tradition, in a clear example of the 'top-down' cognitive processing of character discussed in the Introduction. There is a whole set of ethnically determined character traits waiting to be activated: confirmed, modified or even contradicted by the ensuing narrative.

Heliodorus likes to work with such ethnic stereotypes, which provide useful short-cuts in his multi-cultural fictional world. Calasiris, for all the ambiguity of his characterization, fits into—even deliberately acts up to—conventional stereotypes of Egyptian cunning, religiosity, and magic practice.[5] The Ethiopian

4 Oroondates' name has been in the public domain since 2.24.2, as Mitranes' commander-in-chief, and as Theagenes' immediate destination before being sent to the Great King himself.

5 See his charades for the benefit of Theagenes (3.16–17) and Chariclea (4.5).

characters prominent in the two final books similarly emanate from historical and geographical traditions about the piety and justice of a mythical Ethiopia (superimposed on selectively perceived realities of the Meroitic kingdom).[6] So even in the first reference to Arsace, beyond the effect of her naming, the fact that she apparently has governmental authority, however informal, in her husband's absence casts her in the role of dominant female and primes a set of secondary charges associated with that role. The Memphitic crowd hastens to the palace where the satrap resides in the absence of the King: the palace itself is a form of metonymic characterization blurring the distinction between the King and his viceroy; its function as such will be elaborated on as the narrative proceeds.

The narrator now gives a direct and explicit characterization of Arsace, unfocalized and with narratorial authority:

> Arsace was a beautiful, tall woman, quick of understanding, immoderate in pride of her noble birth, naturally enough for one who had been born the sister of the Great King, but in other respects reprehensible in her way of life, and subjected to illicit and intemperate pleasure.
>
> 7.2.1

This is followed by a narratorial analepsis explaining her responsibility for Thyamis' banishment after directing 'unchaste eyes upon him and gestures suggestive of the most shameful things' at a religious ceremony. Thyamis, who 'by nature and from his earliest years ... was congenitally inclined to the path to virtue ... was far from suspecting the true meaning of her actions' (7.2.2–3), but his wicked younger brother Petosiris informed Arsace's husband of her infatuation, and (falsely but clearly plausibly) suggested that her desire had been consummated. Thus the 'pleasure' of the introductory characterization is identified specifically as sexual.

Several aspects of these sentences invite comment. First, the explicit narratorial introductory characterization is not Heliodorus' usual practice. The first half of the novel in particular is narrated in a radically anachronic way that ambiguates the character and the identity of the protagonists.[7] Information is withheld from the primary narratee and presented piecemeal by characters within the narrative frame; characters, provisionally recognizable as generic character-types, are constructed through speech and action. Most of the fab-

6 See Morgan 1982: 234–250 for some of the important details.

7 These aspects are discussed in Morgan 2004 and 2007.

ula preceding the beginning of the text is filled in by the secondary narrator Calasiris, who does not enjoy the primary narrator's potential access to the interiorities of the characters, and is in any case of problematic veracity. Only when the mode shifts to (relatively) straightforward primary narration does it become narratologically or strategically possible to include direct character-sketches like the one introducing Arsace. By this point most of the important secondary characters have already made their first appearance, and although the primary narrator can now make statements about their thoughts, emotions and personalities, he does not need to introduce them. However, in Arsace's case, the direct characterization not only establishes the main facets of her personality but passes moral judgment on her through condemnatory vocabulary such as 'reprehensible' (*epimōmos*) and 'illicit and intemperate' (*paranomou kai akratous*). The modalities of the ensuing narrative are clearly set in terms of good and bad persons, and by extension ethnic groups.

Second, the direct characterization identifies the elements of the Persian paradigm that will be especially important in the episode beginning here: immoderate pride deriving from royal status and sexual excess. To take the pride first: the word *huperonkos* ('excessive') used here becomes a *leitmotif*, in relation to both Arsace and things that characterize her metonymically: the same adjective is applied to her bodyguard (7.8.6), her palace (7.12.1, 7.12.3), and, in character focalization, to her pride (*phronēma*, 7.17.4).[8] As for her sexual proclivities, the phrasing 'subjected to' (*elattōn*, literally 'less, or weaker than') introduces a theme of superiority and inferiority that will play out through the succeeding chapters; even in this first sentence, Arsace's character is dichotomized between socially 'above' (***huper**onkos*) and morally 'below' (*elattōn*).

Third, a whole range of intratextual metaphorical characterizations is brought into play. The protagonists are well established as proponents of pure, chaste love. Earlier sections of the plot make play with the antithetical but somehow interchangeable figures of the heroine Chariclea and the slave-girl Thisbe.[9] Any new female character will inevitably also be characterized by comparison with Chariclea: Arsace's introduction squarely positions her as the heroine's opposite. The contrast of *sōphrosunē* and sexual unrestraint reinforces a larger ethnic opposition between the Persian princess and a heroine combining Ethiopian birth and Greek upbringing, each of which contributes

8 Note that at 7.2.1 Arsace is *huperonkos* as to her *phronēma*, whereas at 7.17.4 she has a *huperonkon phronēma*. The coincidence of vocabulary is hardly accidental, and creates a syntagmatic identification of Arsace and her pride.

9 See Morgan 1989 for this intratextual antithesis.

stereotypical elements to her characterization. Moreover, the presentation of Arsace as *elattōn* than pleasure exactly reverses an earlier formulation that Theagenes is 'weaker (*elattōn*) than love but stronger than pleasure' (5.4.5) in a context where he displays mastery of his desires. As an immoderate and dominant (that is, masculine) woman, Arsace is defined by her opposition to both the chastity and the gender propriety of the protagonists. Furthermore, in the brief analepsis that follows her introduction, Arsace is set in opposition also to Thyamis: she looked at him with 'unchaste (*ou sōphronas*) eyes', whereas he 'from his earliest years was congenitally inclined to *sōphrosunē*.' To some degree this rewrites Thyamis' character: he appears in Book 1 as a bandit-chief and unwelcome love-rival, an odd mixture of infatuated ruffian and gentleman. In Book 7 he takes over the office and obligations of his father Calasiris, and acts as a third characterizing contrast to Arsace, in his sexual continence and in his respect for proper procedure.

As the narrative resumes, Arsace begins to enact the characteristics the narrator has just ascribed to her. First, she displays her authority by forbidding the people of Memphis to take on Thyamis' men before she has herself assessed the situation, and she proceeds to parley from the city-walls. Second, in order to conduct the parley she has erected 'a pavilion … beneath purple and gold-woven hangings', and 'adorning herself in costly array' takes her seat on an elevated throne and surrounds herself with a bodyguard resplendent in golden armour (7.3.2). All the details here contribute metonymically to her characterization, stressing the luxury, wealth and ostentation stereotypical of Persia in the Greek tradition. As Thyamis puts forward his demands, he urges her to punish Petosiris 'for the wicked slanders which he had falsely made to Oroondates, so imposing on her a suspicion of an illicit and shameful passion (*paranomou kai aiskhras epithumias*) in her husband's eyes'. The narrator does not say whether Thyamis really believes that the slanders were false, or knows that they were true but is diplomatically pretending to believe they were false. The precise verbal echo connects this section to the narrator's direct characterization, confirming the truth of the slanders, but the focalization is complicated and enigmatic: Arsace's illicit passion is doubly focalized through Thyamis' perception of Oroondates' suspicion. The narratee is left in no doubt about her culpability, but is also implicated in the game of deceptive appearances and truthful untruths that surround her and underline the precariousness of her position.

Arsace's reaction is described at some length. She is caught in a storm of mixed emotions:[10] anger against Petosiris, but primarily a double sexual desire:

10 The 'mixed-emotions *topos*' is a staple of the novel genre; see Fusillo 1990.

> as she looked first at Thyamis and then at Theagenes, her thoughts were pulled in different directions, and she was divided into desire for each of them: she felt love for both, in one case renewing it, in the other being newly and more painfully struck in her soul, so that even the bystanders could see her distress.
>
> 7.4.2

The plurality and one-sidedness of her desire sit in sharp contradiction to the exclusive and reciprocal love of the protagonists. Although the narrator calls her emotion 'love' (*erōs*), the first word to be applied to it is 'desire' (*epithumia*), and there is no doubt that what she is experiencing is physical arousal, and that her distress is caused by delayed sexual gratification. This scene is a perverted doublet of that (in Calasiris' narration) where Theagenes and Chariclea fall in love at first sight (3.5). That was also at a public occasion, at Delphi, but Calasiris was the only person to understand what was happening, whereas here Arsace's responses to visual stimuli are so blatant that everyone can see them. Her emotions are both shallow and excessive: the narrator comments that she regained her composure like someone recovering from an epileptic fit, the first hint of another *leitmotif* of the episode, the degeneration of desire into madness.

As the single combat commences, Arsace's eyes are fixed on Theagenes, and she is characterized by her focalization of him: she 'luxuriate(d) in the sight of him while she observed him from every angle and allowed her eyes to indulge their desire awhile' (7.6.1). The conjunction of luxury and desire brings together two of her leading characteristics. A new element is added when the duel between Thyamis and Petosiris is brought to an abrupt conclusion by the arrival of Calasiris and Chariclea, and a scene of reunion between the two protagonists, which causes Arsace to swell with jealousy (7.7.7). The emotional dynamics of her actions are now established: desire for Theagenes and jealousy and hatred of Chariclea's place in his affections. As the populace joyfully celebrates the cessation of hostilities, the return of their High Priest, and the love-interest of the protagonists, we are given a little tableau that encapsulates Arsace's character and position: ostensibly she takes part in the general celebrations, forming a grandiose procession of her own bodyguard and making ostentatious dedications of gold and jewels in the temple of Isis (repeating motifs of her metonymic characterization), 'though in fact she had her eye fixed on Theagenes alone and feasted on the sight of him more hungrily than on anything else, not that her pleasure was unalloyed' (7.8.6), since Theagenes fixes a 'bitter sting of jealousy' in her heart by taking Chariclea on his arm: a narratorial statement of her interiorities, emphasizing the discrepancy between appear-

ance and reality. The words the narrator uses to describe her pleasure, *ou … katharon*, can denote impurity in both a physical sense (i.e. contaminated with other matter), and a moral one, conveying negative judgment on her character. She rushes back to her palace and passes a night of grotesque sleeplessness:

> she rushed straight to her bedroom and, hurling herself on to her bed, lay speechless in all her finery, a lady (*gunaion*)[11] who was generally disposed to ignoble pleasure but was now inflamed more than ever before by Theagenes' peerless beauty, which surpassed all countenances that had ever come into her experience. All night she lay there, ceaselessly contorting her body from one side to the other, ceaselessly sighing deeply, at one moment sitting bolt upright, the next sinking back on the mattress, partially divesting herself of her clothing and then suddenly collapsing on her bed again, and occasionally, summoning a maidservant for no apparent reason, she would send her away without asking her to do anything. In short, her love was degenerating imperceptibly into insanity.
> 7.9.2–4

The final sentence makes explicit what the body-language implies. This exaggerates conventional literary erotic symptomology: it expresses the opposite of mastery of one's passions, and a complete loss of self-control (*sōphrosunē*). The techniques of characterization are again entangled in a complex way. At a surface level, the actions are straightforwardly metonymical expressions of emotions and the personality experiencing them. At the same time, the description has its full significance only in, first, an intertextual perspective that allows it to be related to descriptions of love from Sappho onwards, including previous novels; and, second, in an intratextual perspective. The length and emphasis of the description prompt comparison with another sleepless night of love-sickness, experienced by Chariclea (3.18.2–19.1): whereas the heroine is a victim of love but sick with shame, Arsace has surrendered to a foul and perverted

11 The diminutive can suggest both social and moral inferiority: it is used by the narrator of the old necromancer (6.12.2), of Chariclea by Cybele to Arsace when suggesting she is Theagenes' strumpet (7.10.4), by Cnemon of his stepmother (1.9.1), by Calasiris of the courtesan Rhodopis (2.25.1), by Arsace of Chariclea (8.9.17), and by the narrator but with Cnemon's focalization of Chariclea mistaken for Thisbe (5.4.2). Its application to a Persian princess in the narrator's focalization strikingly conveys her degradation, and hints at the dialectic of erotic power and enslavement that is to come (for which see Morgan and Repath fc).

passion and is sick with sexual frustration.[12] As noted above, the whole portrayal of Arsace resides on implicit comparisons with the 'good' characters of the novel, but this is a particularly emphatic icon of such metaphorical characterization.

At this point a new character is introduced: an old woman called Cybele. She is described as one of Arsace's chambermaids (*thalamēpoloi*) 'who customarily procured sex' for her mistress. This phrase makes explicit what has been only implied: that Thyamis and Theagenes are just the latest in a long line of casual liaisons that have been physically consummated, and then discarded. The antithesis between the virgin Chariclea, who has never loved before and militantly defers consummation of her love until a properly conducted marriage, and the casually and superficially promiscuous Arsace acquires another dimension. Although the narrator supplies no more details about Cybele, she is immediately given a direct speech which establishes important aspects of her character:

> What is this, mistress? What new or different pain is hurting you? Who is it this time the sight of whom disturbs my nursling? Who is so conceited and crazy as not to succumb to your beauty and think amatory intercourse with you bliss but to ignore your nod and wish? Just tell me, my sweetest baby. No one is so steely that he cannot be taken by my spells. Tell me and you could not achieve your heart's desire any quicker. You have often had proof by results, I think.
>
> 7.9.5

The references to 'nursling', and 'sweetest baby' identify her as Arsace's wet nurse. In reply, Arsace addresses Cybele as 'mother', and twice uses affectionate but condescending diminutives. A special intimacy clearly exists between them that qualifies Cybele to be her mistress's sexual confidante. Despite notes of maternal pride in Cybele's words, however, the predominant impression is of insincere flattery: there is no attempt to dissuade Arsace from her immoral course, and the battle-lines are clearly drawn. Cybele affects to believe that anyone opposing Arsace's wishes is 'conceited and crazy'. These dynamics between the two women are reinforced in their focalizations of the protagonists in the ensuing conversation; here focalization is used as a form of metonymic characterization. First, Arsace describes Theagenes as one who 'like a lightning flash … eclipsed the others in beauty by no small interval' (7.10.3), so expressing

12 Morgan 1998: 65–66 explores the comparison in more detail.

her sexual susceptibility. Cybele responds with a more detailed description, engineered to reinforce Theagenes' attractions, and full of verbal echoes of his appearance at the Delphic procession, the scene of Chariclea's inamoration: the parallel reinforces the metaphorical characterization of Arsace in contrast to Chariclea. She also speaks disparagingly of Chariclea as a 'little foreign lady, not lacking in charm', which is a deliberate cue for Arsace to vent her true hatred and jealousy, describing Chariclea as a 'blot in the margin … some brothel-worker with big delusions about a meagre, commonplace and artificial beauty' (7.10.5). The characterizing point here is Arsace's utter failure to understand the heroine as she is presented to the narratee throughout the novel.

Cybele demonstrates her servility by 'whining and fawning' at her mistress's feet (7.10.1). Heliodorus uses a very rare and highly coloured word here: the verb *prosknuzaomai* is only attested once elsewhere in pre-Byzantine Greek,[13] of a dog fawning on its master. Heliodorus may be punning on the first element of Cybele's name (***Kubelē*** cf. ***kuōn***, 'dog') to characterize her dog-like and self-servingly exaggerated devotion. However, her name is rich in other connotations: it primarily suggests Cybele, the Anatolian Great Mother goddess, and it cannot be coincidental that Cybele's position in Arsace's household, *thalamēpolos*, is also a grade in the clergy of the Great Mother. In the Greco-Roman imaginary the cult denotes oriental fanaticism and decadence. Its primary myth is that of Attis, driven to self-castration and the archetype of her eunuch priests; eunuchs are also a conventional marker of Persian absolutism, present in numbers in the satrap's palace. Arsace is a dominatrix, and the namesake of a dominant and sexually voracious female power who un-mans her devotees is an apt presence in her palace.

After Calasiris' death, Cybele moves Theagenes and Chariclea into the palace, under the pretence that Arsace is a 'Greek lover' and 'clever at receiving strangers' (7.11.7). This coheres with the dialectic of contrast between Greek liberty and Persian autocracy, but in a perverted way, hinted at by the sexual innuendo. The implication is partly that Arsace is not satisfied by the effeminate Persian men who surround her and that as sister of the Great King she is pursuing the conquest of Greece, but erotically not militarily. But there is also a characterizing contrast with the royal court of Ethiopia, particularly Chariclea's mother, Persinna, also a Greek-speaking philhellene (2.24.3): the royal women's differing attitudes towards Greece and Greeks are an element of the overarch-

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13 Philostr. *Her*. 2.2. The uncompounded form and its cognates are more frequent, and denote precisely canine servility. Heliodorus intends a perverted version of *proskunēsis*.

ing antithesis of Persia and Ethiopia[14] central to the novel's moral economy. The entry into the palace is a graphic moment: the building and its accoutrements are presented partly directly by the narrator (7.12.1, 'the tragic nature of the residence, its swollen pride that was to cause them such harm'), but principally through the focalization of the protagonists:

> The moment they arrived in the satrapal palace, where they were confronted with a massive entrance, exalted beyond the measure of a private dwelling, and packed with a mind-boggling display of spearmen and an ostentatious retinue of other servants, they were amazed and dismayed, for they could see that the residence was far above their present fortune.
> 7.12.3

The proleptic function as metonymic characterization of the Persians as a group and Arsace in particular is clear.

A new element is now added to the picture of Cybele. Hitherto, there have been no details about her history: her oriental name and her participation, real or feigned, in Arsace's Persian values, may have suggested that she is herself oriental. However, in singing Arsace's praises as a lover of refinement and things Greek, she reveals that she is from Lesbos: she was taken prisoner in war and has, in her view, fared much better than those who stayed on Lesbos, having become 'everything to my mistress: she virtually breathes and sees through me, and I am mind, ears and everything to her, making the acquaintance of the right sort of people on her behalf, and keeping her trust in all her secrets' (7.12.6).[15] The Lesbian origin connects with a tradition, emanating from Sappho perhaps, which endows the island with a distinct sexual semiotic, not of female homosexuality but of promiscuity and lack of inhibition. We soon discover that Cybele herself has a lively sexual history which further qualifies her to be her mistress's confidante and procuress. She has a son called Achaemenes, whose father is never mentioned, though the royal name suggests that he was a Persian noble, perhaps even a member of the royal household. Achaemenes and Arsace suckled at the same breast, indeed may even be half-siblings.

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14 Deriving ultimately from Herodotus' account (3.20–24) of the meeting of Cambyses' spies with the Ethiopian king.

15 The historical background alludes to Hdt. 6.31–32: the Persians 'drag-netted' the island, and carried the prettiest girls off to the royal court—where Cybele plausibly becomes wet-nurse to the King's daughter.

Achaemenes' name is dropped casually into a conversation between Cybele and an attendant at 7.14.3, and he first appears in the narrative, without further introduction at 7.15.1. He peers through the keyhole of the locked door of his mother's apartment, behind which the protagonists are lamenting. He is struck by Chariclea's beauty and, unawares, his wonder turns to love. He is, of course, just one of a series of men who fall in love with Chariclea at first sight, and is *ipso facto* characterized metaphorically in relation to them. His primary function in the plot now is to use his knowledge of Theagenes' real identity (the Greek captive seized from him by Thyamis) as a bargaining chip to secure Chariclea as his wife. The plot here throws up a number of syntagmatic relations which characterize metaphorically. Achaemenes desires to replace Theagenes as Chariclea's partner, and indeed the plot soon throws them into direct and culturally symbolic confrontation. At the same time Arsace (although she believes that Theagenes and Chariclea are siblings) is seeking to take Chariclea's place in Theagenes' affections, and she is established quite quickly, as we have seen, as the heroine's antitype: again there will be a crucial confrontation between the two of them. Perhaps more tenuously, but potentially more profoundly, Calasiris' place as the protagonists' father—in the sense of their loving protector and abetter of their true love—is taken by the Great Mother figure of Cybele, malevolent and in opposition to the novel's romantic values. Calasiris is an Egyptian who moved to Greece and can be taken for a Greek; Cybele has moved in the opposite cultural direction, and Medized. The transition occurs when Cybele uses the occasion of Calasiris' death to succeed him and establish her hold on the lovers: she makes this explicit in her callous comments about Calasiris at 7.17.3, reminding the lovers that he was only a fictitious father, an old man who has died as old men do. All these relationships are characterizing, not in the sense of saying anything about the individualities and psychological interiorities of the actors, but in setting up an almost geometrical play of analogies and antitheses.

Plot and characterization are symbiotic. Apart from direct introductory characterizations like that given to Arsace, an actor's early actions and speech-acts serve to establish his or her character in broad terms. There comes a point, however, where at least the outlines are firmly set. That is not to say that new, possibly surprising, elements cannot be added, or that fine adjustments cannot be made, or even that changes in character might not be plotted. But imperceptibly the balance shifts from plot constructing and defining character to character explaining and motivating plot. We have reached a point in the middle of Book 7 where the major players in the episode are in play, and the parameters of their motivations and objectives are reasonably clear. The broad

outlines are reinforced in several of the succeeding scenes, and Heliodorus has at least one major surprise up his sleeve.

Cybele begins by instructing Theagenes in Persian protocol: crucially he must perform *proskunēsis* to Arsace (7.17.3). This ritual act of self-abasement before the sovereign became in Greek thought the central symbol of Persian despotism, and refusal to perform it the distinguishing symbol of Greek liberty.[16] Cybele does not scruple to spell out the implications: Arsace can bestow unimaginable riches and pleasure, but she demands subordination and obedience, and has the immoderate pride of a queen.[17] In light of Cybele's dog-like fawning, inscribed in her name, Heliodorus must have seen *proskunēsis* as a symptomatically canine action, and the Persian insistence on it as signifying the dehumanization of the King's subjects and, political and erotic domination being identified, of Arsace's lovers. In the next paragraph, Arsace feeds the protagonists scraps from her table, again treating them like dogs. These scraps, however, are served on golden dishes carried by eunuchs, and are of unimaginable delicacy. The use of food as a characterizing element (Longus, →) of the Persian stereotype derives from the iconic scene in Herodotus, when Pausanias orders a humble Spartan meal to be set alongside the captured Persian *haute cuisine*:[18] Heliodorus is again activating an extensive intertextual tradition to confirm the characterization of the ethnic groups in his novel.

Theagenes is ushered into the royal presence by eunuchs at the beginning of 7.19. Through his focalization we are given a detailed picture of Arsace replete with motifs of metonymic characterization:

> He entered and found her enthroned on high, resplendent (*phaidrunomenēn*) in a gown of purple shot with gold, flaunting the conspicuous value of her jewellery and the majesty of her crown, her bodily charms accentuated by all the means at the disposal of cosmetic art, with her bodyguard flanking the throne and her noble counsellors sitting in state on either side of her.
>
> 7.19.1

He makes the expected gesture of existential Hellenic freedom, by greeting her as an equal and observing none of the prescribed protocol. Arsace's reaction,

16 Alexander's demand for *proskunēsis*, for example, was the sticking-point for his Macedonian and Greek followers.

17 See note 7 above on the words used.

18 Hdt. 9.82.

however, is complaisant: she excuses him as a Greek ignorant of Persian ways, and returns his greeting by removing her crown. The narrator tells us nothing of her thoughts, but the narratee will supply them: her desire for Theagenes is stronger than her Persian pride, and this is a move in the game to win him. We can also see that his lack of servility is part of what makes him attractive to her; there is, after all, no fun in extracting servility from someone who is servile by nature.

This encounter advances two motifs in the characterization of Arsace and those around her which become important in the following chapters. First, love can reverse the modalities of despotism.[19] Although Arsace is a dominant lady, in every sense, and wishes to enslave those she loves, she is metaphorically enslaved by her desires: here, as a first step, she strategically abandons some of her privilege. Second, the characteristic of insincerity or duplicity comes into play. We have just seen that Arsace acts 'out of character' in order not to repel Theagenes, and in her elation she invites the leading Persians to a banquet: here the narrator makes an explicit contrast between her apparent and her real motivation: 'ostensibly as the customary mark of honour to them, though, truth to tell, it was her meeting with Theagenes that she was celebrating' (7.19.5). At the same time, the pain of unsatisfied desire is growing more acute, and she presses Cybele to secure Theagenes' acquiescence quickly. Without any direct speech, the narrator informs us of the chess-game that is then played out, with Cybele praising Arsace's beauty and accessibility, and Theagenes pretending not to understand her hidden intentions. Cybele is caught between a rock and a hard place, and begins to find her mistress's incessant pestering intolerable. Now her true feelings, which she has to hide from day to day, begin to be revealed: what seems like unquestioning devotion is really hatred concealed out of self-preservation. In desperation she speaks openly to Theagenes, enticing him with the prospect of risk-free pleasure and adding none too veiled threats, presenting a focalized view of Arsace's character, 'richly endowed with wealth and power and thus able to reward devotion and punish opposition at will' (7.20.4). She also suggests that Arsace deserves pity, for her insane infatuation. The focalization says as much about Cybele as about Arsace: it is contrived to secure compliance, not to tell the truth, but even so betrays the old woman's experience of her mistress's anger and the fear so engendered, while the idea that Arsace deserves pity can be advanced only from a moral position antithetical to that of the novel as a whole. She follows up with an attempt to win Chariclea's support, holding out the

19 This is argued more fully in Morgan and Repath fc.

prospect of honour, wealth and a splendid marriage (presumably to a Persian), if she collaborates in persuading her 'brother' to submit. Although Cybele is unaware of the protagonists' true relationship, her offer nonetheless inscribes the superficiality of her world-view, in which love is a commodity, merely a mercenary and self-serving transaction. Chariclea's reply conveys a focalized, though tactful, condemnation of Arsace, which makes implicit comparisons with her own behaviour in love: it is best not to be subject to such feelings at all, and second-best to bear the *pathos* ('emotion', or 'pain') with self-control, which is exactly what Chariclea is doing. She describes Arsace's present position as a defeat, and being 'weaker than desire' (7.21.1), picking up exactly the narrator's words from the introductory character-sketch: this authorizes her judgment, in contradiction of Cybele's suggestion that Arsace deserves compassion.

After a night's deliberation, Theagenes refuses Arsace's proposition point-blank. This tips Arsace into madness: in a doublet of the scene at the beginning of the book, she runs into her bedroom, and lies on the bed, clawing at herself (7.22.4). Now Achaemenes can enter the equation in earnest. As a last resort, Cybele tells him of Arsace's love, which she claims is 'too strong to resist ... not of the ordinary kind ... has no cure' (7.23.2), though he knows, and she knows that he knows, that Theagenes is just the latest in her series of toy-boys, that she does not have any permanent arrangement in view, and all that is different is that Theagenes is better looking and harder to get than her previous amours. Achaemenes has a solution, but in return he wants a guarantee than he can have Chariclea as his wife, and will reveal nothing without Arsace's binding oath. Although Achaemenes has some positive qualities—he wants to marry Chariclea and not simply enjoy and discard her, and he values love above position and material goods—he is fully part of the mercenary deceptiveness endemic in the palace, prepared to trade for Chariclea rather than win her consent, and he obviously does not trust Arsace to keep a promise. He knows too that she will not trust him and that he needs documentary corroboration for his claim that Theagenes is *de facto* already enslaved to the Persians: he has the forethought to bring Mitranes' letter to the satrap with him when he has his audience with Arsace (7.24.2). His characterization does not go much beyond these two elements of love and deceit, but they suffice to motivate his actions.

His revelation shuffles the pack. Arsace enforces her mastery of Theagenes by assigning Achaemenes to teach him to perform a slave's duty of waiting on her table, and obey her every nod. In the same breath she betroths Chariclea to Achaemenes, whom she professes to hold in high esteem, and briefs Cybele to tell Theagenes that any further resistance will have dire consequences:

> 'Go to our haughty friend and tell him that if he obeys me and behaves as I wish, he will enjoy a measure of freedom and live a life of ease and plenty. But if he persists in a contrary course, he will incur the combined wrath of a lover slighted and a mistress displeased, and find himself reduced to a condition of the most abject and contemptible servitude and subjected to punishments of every imaginable variety'.
>
> 7.25.2

The discourse of slavery reflects Arsace's erotic predilections, but also embodies the dynamic of Persian monarchy, suggesting a close causal connection between the institutional and the personal. Theagenes' resistance will thus signify both his own fidelity in love to Chariclea—an affective model validated by the story and directly opposed to that of Arsace—and also an assertion of liberty at an ethnic level. But his first move is to ask for a midnight rendezvous with his new mistress, in which, in Cybele's presence, he discloses that Chariclea is not his sister but his betrothed, and that thus Arsace is not bound by her oath to affiance his sister to Achaemenes (7.26.5). As before, Arsace feels jealousy, but, with no more ado, promises to find Achaemenes another wife. Although there exists a close intimacy, possibly even a blood relationship between them, Arsace has no scruples about disappointing Achaemenes' dearest hopes, and the suggestion that he could be consoled by another engagement betrays an utter failure to understand the sort of love which Chariclea can arouse in a man. She is distanced by her position of privilege from empathizing with those to whom she should have a close affinity. While Theagenes knows nothing of the personal dynamic between Arsace and Achaemenes—and indeed the narrator himself occludes it—he understands well enough the tendency of 'a man subject to a master ... to hate the master to whom he is subject' (7.26.10), and is relying on Achaemenes' hatred to lead him to form hostile designs against Arsace. In this he is a shrewd judge of character, and in the next scene acts in such a way as to kick-start those hostile feelings, as well as to create an existential icon of the differences between Greek and barbarian.

When the time comes for him to wait at table, he must dress in sumptuous Persian apparel, with gold bangles and collars studded with precious gems (7.27.1). The metonymic characterization of Persian luxury is familiar by now, and Theagenes' mixture of delight and disgust at his costume signifies both its genuine value and beauty and his archetypal Greek contempt for the display of wealth and power. Achaemenes attempts to give him a brief tutorial in the science of cup-bearing: it is a mark of Persian effeminacy to assume that anything so menial needs to be taught. Theagenes serves the wine with untaught grace and raises Arsace to Bacchic frenzy (7.27.3, the idea of love as madness

again). As Achaemenes complains in fury about how he has been humiliated, his mother informs him that he is not to have Chariclea after all. The way she speaks of her mistress exposes the contempt beneath the mask of devotion, and confirms the insincerity of her dealings with Arsace. Achaemenes' reaction contributes a further detail to his characterization: as well as the expected emotions of anger, jealousy, love and disappointment (which act with particular potency on a barbarian, the narrator comments at 7.29.1), he refuses to believe that Theagenes and Chariclea are lovers rather than siblings. If she truly were his bride-to-be, he argues, Theagenes would sleep with her, as other men do. His perspective on love is a limited one, and his failure to see the possibility of a self-controlled love that awaits the sanction of marriage defines him metaphorically by comparison with the protagonists. The intensity of emotion combines with his barbarity to lead him to irrational action, and he slips away to make his way to the satrap, who is with his army in Thebes.

At the beginning of Book 8 the scene moves to Oroondates' camp. We had been told at the beginning of the previous book that Oroondates had already formed suspicions about his wife's infatuation with Thyamis, and Achaemenes' revelation of events in Memphis seems to come as no surprise to him. But then Achaemenes describes Chariclea and lights the fire of desire in the satrap's heart (8.2.1). This characterizes both of them. Oroondates is typically Persian in his lack of *sōphrosunē*, and takes his place in the list of 'other men' who have aspired to the heroine. Achaemenes' expectation is that the satrap will proceed to bed her, and then pass her on. The superficiality and disrespect inherent in such an arrangement, even though the satrap's participation in it is only Achaemenes' wishful thinking, sets both of them in contrast to the reciprocal and lasting commitment of the protagonists.

Back in Memphis, Thyamis confronts Arsace and demands the return of the young Greeks his father had committed to his care. The exchange is highly rhetorical and legalistic, centred on issues of justice, propriety and expediency.[20] This is an intellectual chess-game in which Arsace displays her intelligence and education, but also allows herself to be trapped in the role of tyrant. In response to Thyamis' argument that 'while it is in the nature of war to make slaves, it is in the nature of peace to set them free; the former act is a tyrant's whim; the latter shows the judgment of a true king' (8.4.1), her guilty conscience gets the better of her. The characterization here is cast in the form of a sententious generalization in the narrator's voice:

20 There is a good discussion of the rhetorical principles at work in this scene in Grammenidis 2003: 138–143.

> Her reaction was one typical of lovers: as long as they think that no one knows of their love, they blush with guilt, but as soon as they are found out, they lose all sense of shame: the lover undiscovered lacking boldness, the lover detected having rather too much. So it was with Arsace.
>
> 8.5.1

The technique of characterization here is unlike any that we have discussed hitherto. The *sententia* gives the sense of the narrator deducing the character's motives on the basis of a general truth external to the fiction. This is part of a characteristic pose of uncertainty on matters beyond physical observation, a technique less in evidence in these books than elsewhere in the novel for reasons already discussed.[21] Assuming that Thyamis knows her predicament, Arsace loses her temper, and throws him out of the palace, exclaiming:

> You can make all the fine speeches you like, with your meaningless definitions of equity, propriety, and expediency. He who holds absolute power needs none of these things: his will serves for them all.
>
> 8.5.3

This naked declaration that might is right sets Arsace, and by extension the whole Persian empire, in opposition to Thyamis, who, as robber-chieftain, declined to use his authority to appropriate Chariclea for himself, preferring to defer to the decision of his subjects and to win her free consent (1.19–20): intratextual metaphorical characterization. It also prepares for an important theme of the final two books, where the conflict between Ethiopia and Persia is characterized as an opposition of kingship and tyranny.

Thyamis' departure leaves Arsace in a complex situation. Her desire for Theagenes is increasing in proportion to his intransigence: she herself uses the metaphor of fuel to a raging fire (8.5.6). More importantly, her suspicions about Achaemenes' disappearance and Cybele's responses throw into sharp relief the regime of deception, fear and coercion that prevails in the palace. Cybele invents a series of lies to convince her mistress that her son has not gone to the satrap, and Arsace regrets that she has not the opportunity to use her sexual power over her husband: 'One caress, one tear from his darling Arsace, would finish him! The eyes of a woman, of a wife, possess a powerful

21 Compare the similar effect at 8.6.1: 'a love that has been thwarted in its hopes shows no mercy to its beloved, and failure very often turns to a wish for revenge'. On the technique in general, see Morgan 1982: 227–234, and 2004: 526–533.

magic of persuasion against her husband' (8.5.7). The narrator has occluded the domestic life of the satrap and his wife, but these words lift the veil on Arsace's exploitation of her sexuality for political power, and reinforce the picture of Oroondates' erotic susceptibility presented by his long-distance infatuation with Chariclea. At the same time, the narratee's view of the satrap is subtly modified: he is his wife's victim, not least because he surely would not be satrap if he were not married to the Great King's sister, and risks losing everything should he exercise marital authority. Arsace follows through with threats to Cybele: 'if I despair of my own life, there will, of course, be no possibility of my sparing others. You will be the first to enjoy the fruits of your son's schemes' (8.5.8).

In response Cybele urges action on Arsace:

> 'When your own approach to your love is so supine, when you really are behaving like a woman, you must not try to throw the responsibility on to others who are not to blame. You are not acting like a mistress with the power to make the young man do her will; you treat him with as much consideration as if *you* were *his* slave.'
>
> 8.5.9–10

This makes explicit the now familiar theme that love as metaphorical slavery can reverse the institutional hierarchies of real slavery, enslave the master and empower the slave. It also emphasizes that normally Arsace behaves more as a man than as a woman, taking the initiative in both political and sexual arenas.

Reluctantly Arsace agrees that Theagenes should be handed over to her chief eunuch, Euphrates, for punishment. As throughout, the figure of the eunuch is a metonymic expression of Persian tyranny, and, naturally, the Greek Theagenes endures the rack with strengthened resolve: another icon of Persian and Greek identities. Cybele visits Theagenes in his cell, and deceitfully affects a sympathy born of their former intimacy, though in reality she is merely monitoring his resistance. Realizing that the attempt to reduce Theagenes to submission is failing, she persuades Arsace to a plan of last resort, to eliminate Chariclea. Her assumption that he would quickly agree to Arsace's wishes in the absence of his beloved again betrays her and Arsace's inability to understand true love. Arsace is eager to give the order for Chariclea's execution, but, as Cybele points out, even her absolute power is constitutionally circumscribed. Instead, the old woman will use a witch's poison, another piece of metonymic characterization. The poisoning misfires, with Cybele herself drinking from the poisoned cup and dying horribly. Even with her last breath, she deceitfully serves her mistress, accusing Chariclea of being the murderer. The nar-

rator comments, with a characteristic pretence of uncertainty about the inner thoughts of his characters, that 'the treachery in her heart was, I think, even more vicious than any lethal drug' (8.8.2).

The episode moves towards its closure as Arsace acts as prosecuting counsel in a show-trial, again encroaching on the masculine arena of public speaking. She affects grief for her nurse—the narratee will remember that she was herself threatening to kill this same person—and presents herself as one whose kindness has been foully repaid. Her manipulative power is manifest in her rhetoric, but Chariclea paradoxically shows her superiority by not defending herself. She is spared the full cruelty of a Persian execution (more metonymic characterization of Persian tyranny), and instead is sentenced to be burned alive. This is another iconic scene, recalling contemporary martyr-acts, with a vision, focalized through the crowd, of Chariclea surrounded in the radiance of righteousness.[22] The intertextuality with Christian narrative equates heroine and saint, and casts Arsace in the combined role of the sensual heathen who is outraged by the virgin-martyr's chastity and the Roman magistrate who sentences the martyr to die in a public spectacle. The scene is, of course, centred on Chariclea; nevertheless, the conscription of a generic intertext with a clearly demarcated ideological opposition between good and evil contributes a new dimension to the characterization of the Persian princess. Her role as torturer continues as she has Chariclea rearrested and shackled in the same cell as Theagenes. Her intention was to increase the suffering of both, but again her limited conception of love has lead her into a serious miscalculation, as the lovers find consolation in proximity to one another.

From here the plot spirals out of Arsace's control, but we are allowed some focalized perspectives on her character as Oroondates' messenger, the eunuch Bagoas, arrives and delivers the satrap's letters to Euphrates. Euphrates' reply reveals that overnight Arsace has developed a desperate fever, from which she stands little chance of recovery (8.13.1). He sees this as divine punishment, but adds that even if she had been in the best of health he would not have given her Oroondates' letter commanding her to send the young Greeks to him, as she would sooner have died herself and taken everyone else in the palace with her than agree to release them. These comments, passing moral judgement, acknowledging the extreme emotional state of the mistress, and even expressing pity for her victims, are telling, coming as they do from a eunuch, who was earlier said to be temperamentally afflicted with jealousy, typically of eunuchs, and nursing a smouldering hatred of Theagenes (8.6.1). The nature of Arsace's

22 Discussion in Morgan 1998: 68–72.

illness is not specified by the narrator (feigning incomplete information), but the narratee can hardly read it as a chance infection: it is the terminal stage of love-sickness (or rather thwarted desire), something beyond the eunuch's comprehension.

On the way to Oroondates, they are overtaken (in a *locus amoenus* recalling the opening of Plato's *Phaedrus*)[23] by a rider bringing news of Arsace's suicide. As he translates the message, Bagoas expresses his detestation of Arsace's excesses and his joy at her death. Although he is said by the narrator to speak poor Greek (8.15.3), there is no trace of linguistic imperfection in his words: Heliodorus slyly draws attention to his own lack of interest in characterization through language. The words attributed to the eunuch even manage to include a near quotation from an Attic tragedy not yet composed at the novel's dramatic date: 'She hanged herself in a choking noose' (8.15.2, *tethnēken Arsakē* ***brokhon ankhonēs hapsamenē***); compare Euripides *Hippolytus* 802, (***brokhon*** *kremaston* ***ankhonēs*** ***anēpsato***), where a messenger reports Phaedra's suicide.

This allusion assimilates Arsace to Phaedra, the archetypal lustful woman from the Athenian stage. Indeed the narrative trajectory of the episode as a whole rewrites several elements of the *Hippolytus*. The Phaedra story is also exploited intertextually in the embedded narrative in the first book when Cnemon relates the infatuation of his step-mother, Demaenete, for him, and there too the intertextuality is explicitly indicated, when Demaenete calls Cnemon her 'young Hippolytus' (1.10.2).[24] There are clear implications for characterization. Arsace is metaphorically characterized by intertextuality with Phaedra; she is also characterized metaphorically by the intratextual connection through Phaedra with Demaenete; and both of them are characterized metaphorically by the intratextual antithesis with the protagonists, as we have noted for Arsace in many specific instances.

What has been less remarked is the effect of the placing of the allusion to the *Hippolytus*. While the story of a lustful woman pursuing a virtuous young man with the assistance of her nurse points unmistakably to the Phaedra analogue, it is only at the very end of the Arsace episode that the intertext is made explicit.[25] This is typical of Heliodorus' technique of constructing riddles and only supplying belated answers to them.[26] For the narratee, however,

23 On the importance of this intertext, see further Morgan and Repath fc.

24 On the importance of Cnemon's story see Morgan 1989 [1999]; the allusion to Phaedra is discussed at 112–113 [282–283].

25 The only other clue has been the description of Arsace resplendent (***phaidr****unomenēn*) on her throne (7.19.1, quoted above).

26 See Morgan 1994 for other examples.

the allusion comes as a cue to think again. Meaning flows backwards from the quotation from the *Hippolytus*, adding a dimension to what has already been read. We can think of this as a technique of retrospective metaphorical characterization, both intertextual and intratextual.

Phaedra became a paradigm of a woman lacking self-control, and at one level that is the paradigm to which Arsace (and Demaenete) are assimilated. However, in the extant *Hippolytus*, Phaedra is a sympathetic character, ashamed of her passion, which is revealed to Hippolytus without her knowledge by her nurse.[27] While Arsace does not try to suppress her desire, and indeed does everything she can to achieve its consummation, at the end of the episode she is sick unto death, and there have even been focalized suggestions that she is as much to be pitied as condemned. Her failure to control her passion is a facet of her status which hitherto has guaranteed that she gets whatever she wants. If the text constructs her as the heroine's antitype, does it automatically condemn her for being that? Does the allusion to a sympathetic Phaedra at the end of the episode hint retrospectively that the whole apparatus of Persian autocracy—and as the sister of the Great King she sits at the very top of the pyramid—has prevented her from ever getting more than immediate gratification of her desire, from even imagining that there are better things in human life than immediate gratification of desire? Is she, like Phaedra, as much victim as villain? The contrast with Chariclea, herself the daughter of a king, and the contrast between the royal system of which Arsace is a product and the true kingship of Ethiopia to which Chariclea will succeed are ideologically central to the erotic values of the novel.

Conclusion

By tracing details of characterization through a single episode, I hope to have demonstrated what a complex and difficult business it is. Heliodorus exploits a wide range of techniques, from explicit narratorial direct characterization, through metonymic characterization by deed, speech, setting, display, focalization and so on, to metaphorical characterization both intertextual and intratextual. In places the narrator even feigns ignorance of what is going on 'inside' a character. However, these things are not clearly distinct from one another,

27 Rocca 1976 argues, unnecessarily, that Heliodorus was working with the first version of the play, in which Phaedra was a shameless woman. The allusion is specifically to the canonical version. We do not know that the quoted words occurred in the first version, or that it was still in circulation in Heliodorus' time.

and are intertwined in a very complex fashion: a detail may be simultaneously metonymical and metaphorical, for instance. The construction of character within a text is an essentially linear thing, and we must be alert to the way in which details accumulate and interact sequentially. Analysis by category inevitably traduces the actual experience of reading. In particular, the relationship between characterization and the forward movement of the plot is a delicate one. Except at moments where narrated time stands still for direct characterization, the two are symbiotic. It is the details of the plot that form the building-blocks of characterization. At some moment impossible to define, a character may be 'complete', but the work of characterization continues, details continue to accrue, to confirm that the character is continuing to act 'in character', and also using established character facets to motivate action.

In the episode we have been examining ethnic categories are of fundamental importance: Persians are characterized as a group, through metonymical details, through engagement with a whole literary tradition, and through antithesis and confrontation with the non-Persian characters. At the same time, within the structure of a fictional plot, every character is defined in relation to all the other characters, in an intricate intratextual web. We have dwelt on the opposition of modes of sexual behaviour between the protagonists and the people with whom the story brings them into contact, and even analogies and antitheses between characters in widely separated parts of the novel. In this sense, I want to suggest that characterization is inseparable from structure, and hence from the ideological thrust of the work as a whole. It is thus inevitable that Heliodorus' characterization has more to do with character types, both of persons and of ethnicities, than with individuated psychologies.

The interest of this volume lies more with techniques of characterization than with the actual characters revealed or constructed by those techniques. However, at the end of the episode of the satrap's palace, there seems to me to be a powerful effect of reversal. This is not one of character change, but rather of changing the narratee's perspective on a character retrospectively. There is an analogy to this in Book 9 where Oroondates is reassessed, and, from being focalized through Ethiopian eyes as treacherous and deceitful, is brought into a different focus as loyal to his own king, and generous in defeat. Arsace's case is less clear-cut, and the narrator's characteristic avoidance of intrusion leaves the narratee with questions rather than answers, but by that very fact with a truer understanding of the complexities and ambiguities of human beings and their depiction in literature.

Epilogue

Koen De Temmerman and Evert van Emde Boas

The final chapter in this book (on Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*) provides the perfect 'bridge' to our epilogue. It nicely teases out how a limited number of (fictional) characters are gradually built up from their introduction into the story right through to their last appearance. It shows that a subtle close-reading of techniques of characterization is crucial to come to grips with characterization in narrative but at the same time demonstrates that characterization is always more than the sum of individual techniques; rather, it is a dynamic process in which the reader continually acquires, evaluates and re-evaluates a multiform body of information (new or known). Characterization, in other words, is to an important degree a readerly competence. As other chapters in this book also have highlighted, part of the fussiness and fluidity of a concept like literary character(ization) has to do precisely with the fact that it is continually 'in progress': it involves constant, often simultaneous, readerly activities of interpretation, comparison, negotiation, balancing, compilation, accommodation, assessment, and re-assessment of multiform (and often diverging) cues.

At the same time, our volume has addressed not only the importance of readerly competence but also, and mainly, the construction of characters *by narrators*—thereby focusing on the important questions of who, when and, mainly, how. More often than not, characterization is sensibly analysed as a complex, narratorial strategy. As the underpinning in ancient rhetoric of techniques of characterization central to this book suggests, and as many chapters of this book show, the way in which character is constructed is not neutral; it is a rhetorical phenomenon involving strategies of (c)overtness, implicitness/explicitness, and (intertextual, intratextual or 'internarrative') association/dissociation.

Readers familiar with earlier volumes will have realized that we have followed some but not all editorial policies underlying the *SAGN* series. (For our take on the notions of genre and narrative in this context, we refer to the introduction to this book.) We have followed (more or less) the previous editorial line in the chronological delineation (starting from Homer and ending with the novels) and selection of authors/texts, even if those are (inevitably) open to debate to some extent. The chronological delineation is, as always, porous: Heliodorus (probably mid-third or mid-fourth century CE) is included, for example, but Quintus of Smyrna (probably third century CE) is not. And

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within the period of eleven or twelve centuries (depending on when exactly we date Homer and Heliodorus), exhaustive coverage has of course been impossible. Absent authors who could have made very fine and interesting chapters in this volume are Isocrates and, of course, Theophrastus (although in the latter case the inclusion of his *Characters* would have stretched the definition of narrative even more than we have already done). That said, we have aimed primarily to preserve the continuity built over the first three volumes. The fact that the same authors are analysed throughout the series has the advantage that readers are provided through the different volumes with insights into different narratological matters in these authors and can more easily detect patterns in the use of individual concepts and narratorial strategies by them. This is arguably how a thematically organized series such as *SAGN* works best.

In other instances it was more difficult to adhere to editorial choices made in previous volumes. The diachronic merit of large-scale narratological analyses as discussed in the epilogues of *SAGN* 1 and 2, for example, has been less our focus than that of previous editors. One reason for this is obvious enough: it is much more difficult to establish diachronic lines tracing evolutions for a compound, multiform and fluid concept such as character(ization) than for concepts that are more delineated and more tangible such as, say, narrators and narratees. Another reason is that the individual chapters aim first and foremost to contribute to the micro-level of literary analysis: they mainly explore how a detailed and subtle in-depth narratological analysis of characterization can help to take stock of the characteristics of and tendencies in individual authors (or better: narrators in individual authors) and enrich the interpretation of individual texts.

This epilogue is not the place to summarize all these readings of individual texts or to group them in general (and, no doubt, generalizing) observations. Rather, we briefly address some of the questions that in our introduction we have identified as central to this volume. In respect to our question of 'what', various chapters have drawn attention (unsurprisingly) to the moral aspects of character; at the same time, they have done their fair share to complicate straightforward readings of such aspects. The notion of morality itself is bound up, often in complex ways, with psychological introspection and other aspects of 'understanding' rather than 'assessing'—to use Gill's terminology. More generally, this and other notions evoked by the concept of character (performance/observability, permanence, shapeability/external influence, habituation) have in a number of cases been seen to be not simply a given, but rather constructs themselves consciously designed and used by narrators and/or characters in larger rhetorical agendas.

As in the previous volumes, the totality of the chapters suggests that a profound analysis of narrative techniques (of characterization, in our case) is bound to question and challenge existing boundaries between genres. Although the relative importance of different techniques of characterization, for example, varies in different authors, it is difficult to see how these differences coincide with different genres—rather, indeed, the predominance of certain techniques seems to be directed differently (e.g. prominent metaphorical characterization is bound up with more elaborated literary refinement in general). There are also no clear-cut qualitative differences between genres as to how detailed the narrator's access to the minds of characters is or can be. Narrators of historiographical and biographical narrative, it is true, in some cases show doubt about the precise motifs underlying the behaviour of a given character, or present alternative versions existing alongside their own, tropes which serve to validate the truthfulness of their account, while also being suggestive of inscrutability or ambiguity. But the same strategies are also used by Pindar, Apollonius of Rhodes, and Heliodorus—with (as is clear from our contributors' careful assessment of each of these authors) varying aims and effects.

Obviously, this book is not (and cannot be) the last word on characterization in ancient Greek literature. Rather, it is the first systematic study of a set of questions that help to conceptualize and illuminate the complex concept of characterization from a narratological point of view in a broad and generically diverse corpus of ancient Greek narrative. As the chapters in this book have shown, characterization is not only a complex but also a dynamic phenomenon, involving different aspects continuously building on each other. Addressing in detail the questions of 'what' and 'how', we have argued, is an important first step to understand this complexity in each case. In this respect, we hope that the book will stimulate further research into characterization in narrative. It is not just that the model of techniques of characterization provided in this book can be used to analyse other narrative texts (Greek and other); it is also that it foregrounds a number of techniques (direct, metonymical and metaphorical) each of which can be studied and examined in its own right: a study of how exactly a technique like *ēthopoiia*, for example, is used in different genres and throughout different eras could considerably enhance our understanding of narrative practice and rhetorical texture in literary history. And of course, our approach can stimulate and enrich comparative studies of how individual characters are represented in different authors/genres/literatures. Books about, say, Themistocles in Herodotus and Thucydides exist, of course, but perhaps not about how exactly differences and similarities in techniques and strategies of characterization contribute to different or comparable portrayals. There is, in short, ample room for further work on this complex

topic. If this volume does anything to spur on such work, or adds anything to the growing understanding of Greek narrative that the *SAGN* series has as its aim, we will consider it a success.

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Index

Many of the phenomena/techniques listed in the index are discussed implicitly *passim* throughout the book: typically only (more or less) explicit discussions are then catalogued in the index. However, in the case of individual techniques of characterization, instances have occasionally been listed if thematized or otherwise particularly relevant in the text, even when the exact term is not used (e.g. references to the characterizing force of 'deeds' or 'behaviour' under 'action, characterization by').

action, characterization by 19–20, 22, 32, 33–34, 40, 43–44, 45, 59–60, 63, 65–66, 67–71, 88, 91–95, 95–99, 111, 114, 117, 129–131, 131, 147–148, 152, 157, 168–169, 176, 179, 180–186, 189–190, 196, 204, 213, 215–216, 219, 225–228, 232–235, 237–238, 243–246, 248, 252–254, 259, 260, 262, 266, 268–269, 270, 276–277, 293, 308–309, 327, 340n14, 348–354, 359n11, 369–373, 373–374, 414–416, 417–421, 422–424, 426–427, 429, 430–437, 437, 469–470, 473–477, 477–484, 498, 508n17, 514, 516, 519–520, 525–527, 528–530, 531, 534, 544, 547, 550–552, 554, 556, 557, 562–565, 566–568, 571–572, 576, 580, 581, 585, 589–590, 594, 616–617, 618, 630, 632–635, 638–639, 648–649

adikia/*-os* 259, 413–414, 416

advice/adviser figure: see influence

agathia/*-os* 42, 58n39, 83, 89, 138, 140–142, 169, 174, 178, 257, 259, 276, 425, 580

age 10–11, 30, 36, 40–41, 68–69, 83, 90, 91–92, 96, 97, 104, 109–111, 115, 117, 118–119, 121, 123–124, 130, 143, 146–147, 158, 163, 173, 181–182, 186, 187n36, 193, 198, 201, 204, 208, 210, 213, 214, 216, 217, 234–235, 239n5, 240, 241, 246–248, 255, 257, 258, 259, 297, 302, 307n57, 307–308, 322, 328–329, 333, 338–339, 346, 349, 358, 366–367, 367–368, 375, 376, 383, 384–387, 390, 392–393, 395, 398, 399, 400, 402–403, 404, 448–449, 450, 460, 462–463, 468, 473–477, 489, 499–500, 528–529, 538–539, 546, 551, 552, 553, 574, 580, 593, 596, 601–602, 611, 613, 616, 617, 620–624, 635, 647. See also group membership, characterization by

aidōs/*aideomai* 58, 98, 265, 429, 475, 563

aiskhros, *aiskhunō* 150n48, 212, 413–414, 416–418, 424, 632

akrasia/*akratēs* 569, 631

altero-characterization 5, 30–31, 77, 95–96, 114, 115, 125–128, 129, 131, 182, 189–190, 194, 195, 198–199, 204–205, 216, 224, 230, 232, 234, 255, 269, 276, 304n50, 322–323, 324, 325–327, 327, 336, 344, 346, 355, 360–361, 368, 371, 372n44, 380, 382, 391, 394, 397n11, 406, 428, 434, 441, 451–452, 456, 486, 490–492, 549–554, 557, 566, 591, 600–603, 607

amēkhania/*-os* 81, 90, 92–93, 97–98, 588

analepsis 183n26, 210, 269, 473, 512–513, 630, 632

anandria 260n32, 431, 433, 436, 589

andreia/*-os* 252, 508n16, 589

antonomasia 20, 23, 28, 49, 295, 507. See also name/naming, characterization by

aphrōn, *aphradia* 77, 480

appearance, characterization by (incl. body-language and clothing) 19, 23, 35, 45, 51, 58, 66, 71–77, 84–85, 87, 95, 97, 99, 104–105, 112, 121–122, 125–128, 137n4, 189, 195, 199, 208–209, 212–213, 229, 231, 240–241, 250, 252, 293, 297–298, 305, 307–308, 310, 314, 323, 329–330, 336, 346–347, 350–351, 368, 369, 371, 375–376, 376–377, 391, 400, 428–430, 430–437, 441, 447–451, 457–458, 480, 481, 493, 495, 510–511, 513–516, 516–517, 524, 526–527, 531, 545, 550–551, 553, 555, 566–567, 579, 580, 599–600, 604, 607, 611–612, 614, 618, 630, 632, 634–635, 636, 639–640, 642

aristeia/*aristos*: see *agathia*/*agathos*

aretē 8, 41–42, 45, 88, 91, 97n45, 161, 164, 181n25, 182, 190, 199, 218, 220, 223–224,

228, 232, 252, 257, 258n27, 259, 260–261, 263, 265, 267–268, 269–270, 287, 297, 306, 310, 339, 365, 437, 449, 457, 464, 469, 470n15, 472–473, 475, 477, 477–484, 484, 498, 580n16, 525, 531–533, 538, 571, 573, 578n3, 589, 596, 630
athemis 301–302, 309
auto-characterization 36, 58n39, 61, 65, 97, 121, 125–128, 131, 135, 139, 152, 162–163, 164, 166, 170, 172, 186–190, 213, 216–217, 242, 245, 249, 251–252, 253, 255, 272–274, 297, 311–314, 323, 324–327, 333–334, 336, 344, 359, 362, 366, 369–370, 381, 404, 406, 417, 418–419, 420–421, 424, 428, 429–430, 433–436, 451–452, 453, 454, 456–457, 461, 476, 486, 493–494, 496–497, 505, 509, 514, 515, 518, 525, 527, 531, 534–537, 537–540, 543, 547–549, 551, 553, 557, 561, 568–569, 575n46, 576, 582, 586, 589, 591, 594, 597–603, 606, 608, 612, 614, 641, 646

bōmolokhos 390, 458
bottom-up characterization 16–18, 337–339, 561, 566–568, 568–570, 576, 581–583, 589, 591, 607. See also top-down characterization

change (of character): see dynamic vs static character
class 13, 22–23, 29, 31, 34–35, 64–65, 69–70, 75–76, 86n14, 90, 96, 101, 102, 108, 112–113, 117, 124, 127, 130, 136, 146, 154–158, 168, 173, 175, 176–180, 188, 197–199, 203, 214, 232, 240, 273, 310, 314, 332n48, 328–329, 338, 339, 343, 346–348, 357, 358, 367–368, 386–387, 389, 415–416, 422, 429, 431, 445, 447, 451–452, 453, 457, 460, 475, 493, 496, 509n20, 510–511, 538, 548, 550, 568, 574, 576, 581, 585, 594, 610–611, 613–614, 619, 629, 631, 634n11, 636–637, 648. See also *eugeneia*/*eugenēs*; *douleia*/*doulos*; group membership, characterization by
coercion: see influence
cognitive narratology 12, 15–19, 203, 243, 319n11, 328n32, 337–338, 340n14, 357–358, 376, 412, 445, 484, 629. See also primacy; bottom-up characterization; top-down characterization
comparison, characterization by 5n9, 20, 21, 23, 36, 38–39, 45, 53–55, 63, 85, 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101n5, 104–105, 115, 137, 141, 142, 142–147, 150–151, 164–165, 167, 169, 170, 209, 214–217, 219, 220, 233n25, 234, 242, 244, 246, 249–250, 252–253, 255, 259, 262, 266n47, 298, 305, 332–334, 350n57, 366, 429, 436, 447, 449, 452–453, 456–458, 474–476, 478–479, 486–487, 492, 509, 515–516, 530–532, 535, 537, 538, 542, 543, 548, 549, 551, 552–553, 555, 557, 569, 573, 575, 606, 610, 614, 620–622, 624, 626, 631, 634–635, 641, 643, 652. See also contrast, characterization by; foil, characterization by; intertextual characterization; intratextual characterization; *paradeigma*, characterization by
compression 9, 516–517, 564–565, 587
contrast, characterization by 19, 20, 23, 64, 81–82, 84–85, 88–90, 94, 99, 105–111, 115, 119, 120, 130, 142, 143–145, 155, 157–158, 160–161, 164–166, 167, 170, 178, 181, 184–185, 189, 190, 193–194, 197, 202–203, 209, 211, 213, 214–216, 217, 228, 229, 233, 234, 240–242, 243, 244, 246, 248, 249, 255n20, 257n25, 259, 295, 298, 299, 321, 323, 330, 332, 334, 340, 343, 345, 346, 348, 350, 353, 366–367, 384, 392–393, 394, 395, 416–421, 421–426, 426–427, 428, 433, 438–439, 447, 449, 450, 451, 474, 478–479, 481–482, 491–492, 494, 502, 526, 531, 532, 533, 539, 543, 569, 573, 594–595, 609, 615n13, 629, 631–632, 636, 643, 648. See also comparison, characterization by; foil

deinotēs/*deinos* 148n43, 153, 178, 255n19, 260, 267, 413, 438, 565, 588
description (only explicit references to descriptions/vignettes/etc. of characters are listed; references to descriptions of places, objects, actions, etc. are ignored) 19, 27, 29, 30–32, 35, 48, 51, 56, 58, 61n48, 66n7, 77n29, 84, 88, 95–96, 99, 103, 114, 118–119, 127–128, 130, 138, 157, 164,

description (*cont.*) 165, 167–168, 182, 182–183, 192, 193, 194, 197–198, 201, 211, 216, 224–225, 226, 236, 244, 246, 245, 246, 261–263, 266, 276, 279, 281, 287, 289, 293–294, 297–300, 303, 308, 310, 322, 324, 326, 330, 334, 335, 341, 343, 347, 350–351, 372–373, 380, 382, 384, 399, 400, 415, 419n24, 423, 426, 428–430, 430–437, 437–442, 447–451, 456, 458, 469n8, 478, 488, 511n26, 514, 516, 517, 525–526, 531, 533, 534, 538–539, 542, 545, 547, 549–551, 555, 567, 595, 598, 599–601, 607, 614, 616, 621, 635–636, 643. See also direct characterization

development (of character): see dynamic vs static character

dianoia 22n73, 525

dikaiosunē/dikaios 140–142, 162, 252, 258n27, 259, 263–264, 266, 268, 304, 372, 413, 414n14, 416, 483, 508n16

direct characterization 20, 22, 23, 28–30, 30–33, 42, 45, 50–52, 57, 61, 64–66, 84, 99, 102–104, 115, 125–128, 129, 130, 131, 140–142, 153, 157, 162, 170, 176–179, 180–181, 183n27, 197, 207, 226, 235, 237, 252–253, 254, 268, 276, 285, 287n52, 297, 299, 314, 323, 324–327, 335, 336, 343, 344–345, 361, 370–371, 379–383, 391–392, 392–394, 406, 411–412, 413–416, 429, 433, 450–451, 467n2, 469, 472, 473n32, 477, 478, 486, 487–490, 505, 506, 507–508, 519, 523, 524–525, 531, 533, 546–547, 547–548, 549, 551, 552, 553, 557, 568–570, 571, 576, 579–580, 582, 584–586, 588–589, 590, 591, 595, 598, 600–601, 609, 616–617, 630–631, 632, 637, 638, 648–649, 650, 652

douleia/doulos 9, 29–30, 39, 61n47, 87, 91, 96n39, 101, 107, 124, 147, 169, 173, 212, 254, 330–332, 358, 363–364, 375, 379, 381–382, 384, 393–396, 398–400, 402–405, 415, 432–433, 441, 476, 508n16, 536, 564, 567–569, 572–574, 585, 592n3, 594, 597, 600–601, 604, 606, 619, 631, 634n11, 640–643, 645

dunamis, dunasis/dunatos 159, 161, 167, 211, 293, 529–530

dynamic vs static character 2–3, 9–11, 16, 17, 27–28, 28–29, 39, 40–42, 44–45, 51–52, 56, 67–71, 94, 106, 115, 119, 138–139, 192–193, 204, 221–225, 238, 242, 253, 256–258, 262, 264n37, 265–266, 269–270, 287, 294, 306, 308, 320, 321–322, 337, 338, 350, 352–353, 355–356, 368, 372, 376–377, 385–387, 388–389, 390, 394, 397–398, 435, 467, 471, 473–477, 477–478, 487–489, 508–509, 511, 512–513, 528–530, 538, 544–545, 557, 567, 568, 569, 574, 586–587, 589, 592, 596n23, 614, 615, 618, 620, 622–624, 625, 631–632, 638, 649, 651

education/educative-intellectual group 10, 22–23, 40, 130–131, 166, 181–182, 200–201, 234–235, 252–253, 256n22, 273, 352, 427, 436, 437–438, 441–442, 445, 467–468, 470, 473–477, 477, 480, 489, 497, 499, 506, 511, 515n41, 529, 537, 547, 550–551, 555, 556–557, 566, 571–574, 576, 585, 612, 620, 626, 627, 643. See also class; dynamic vs static character; group membership, characterization by; influence

ekphrasis: see description

eleutheros 432, 474

emotion, characterization by 22, 23, 27, 32, 36–39, 41, 57–59, 63, 81, 98, 112, 114, 118–119, 153, 169–170, 189, 252, 256–258, 261, 262, 264–265, 269, 280, 293, 296–297, 297, 299–300, 302–303, 320, 323, 332, 334, 338, 348–349, 351, 355–356, 357, 360, 361–362, 368, 405, 410, 435, 449–450, 454, 474–475, 477, 482, 520, 528, 530, 548, 549, 552, 553, 569, 570, 571, 576, 580, 582–583, 583, 586–588, 589–590, 594n17, 596, 599–600, 603, 604, 606, 607, 612, 620–625, 627, 631, 632–634, 640–643, 646–647

emphutos 192–193, 223, 569

enkrateia 252, 257, 263, 475, 478, 482

epieikia/epieikēs 260–261, 263

ethics: see moral evaluation of character

ethnicity/*ethnos* 31, 56, 59, 63, 85, 87, 98, 136, 151–152, 153, 155, 174–176, 179, 180, 186, 192–197, 218, 219, 224–225, 236, 237–238, 238, 241, 243, 250, 251–252, 258, 266, 271,

272, 274, 285–286, 288, 299, 301, 310–311, 311–312, 314, 329, 330–331, 353, 385, 418, 461, 468, 471, 506, 509, 510–511, 512–513, 515, 526, 530, 538, 546, 549–550, 562n6, 573, 575, 582–583, 584, 585, 596–597, 604, 607, 619–620, 628–649. See also group membership, characterization by
ēthopoiia: see speech, characterzation by
ēthos 7, 10n28, 21–22, 32, 153, 237, 252, 256–257, 267, 352, 361, 410, 511, 523, 456, 467–468, 520, 526–527, 528–529, 535, 538–539
eugeneia/*-ēs* 22–23, 31, 35, 52, 106, 127, 140, 159, 208–210, 246–247, 254, 262, 311, 332, 334, 370, 394, 439, 469, 471, 474–475, 527–529, 566, 568–569, 520, 555, 567, 571, 573, 576, 579, 581, 596–597, 608–609, 610–611, 616, 618, 629–630, 637, 639. See also class; family/lineage; group membership, characterization by
eusebeia/*-ēs* 137, 251–252, 259, 264, 266, 268, 327, 401

family/lineage 22, 38, 48, 54, 55, 59, 71, 84, 96, 98, 101n2, 104, 112, 127, 130, 149, 156, 174, 196, 208–210, 214, 230, 231–232, 234, 237, 238, 243, 247, 250, 252, 261, 274, 279, 294, 296, 299, 306, 311, 314, 328, 333–334, 347, 349, 353, 364, 367–368, 393, 417, 419n24, 423–424, 430, 440, 451, 467, 474, 493, 526, 551, 585, 587–588, 608, 610–611, 611–612, 619. See also *eugeneia*/*ēs*; group membership, characterization by
first appearance/mention of a character 16, 28, 31–33, 35, 45, 84, 97, 118–119, 141, 146, 153–159, 160, 160–161, 163, 167, 169, 170, 172–180, 187–189, 195–196, 197–198, 203–204, 207–212, 212–213, 226, 227, 231–235, 238–239, 243, 246, 258–259, 260, 261, 266, 267, 324, 341–343, 349, 379–380, 390, 392–393, 395, 448, 479, 497, 504, 506, 508, 513–514, 563, 564–566, 567, 579–580, 581–582, 585, 585n19, 588–589, 593, 598, 599–601, 602, 613, 616–617, 629, 631, 635, 650. See also primacy
fixedness at birth/innateness (of character traits) vs shapeability: see dynamic vs static character; education; influence
focalization, characterization by 22–23, 44, 170, 231–232, 233–234, 235, 239, 248, 254–255, 323, 327–328, 330, 346, 350, 360–361, 469, 515, 567, 588, 597–603, 607, 612–613, 617, 618, 620–624, 632, 633, 635–637, 639–641, 649
foil 53–54, 63, 83, 85, 88–90, 105n13, 143–144, 197, 327, 334, 339, 345, 397n11, 502, 554n29, 593. See also contrast, characterization by
frame (cognitive): see top-down characterization

gender 51, 81, 173–174, 294, 329, 331, 346–347, 360n15, 367, 431, 578–579, 622, 629, 632. See also group membership, characterization by
gnōmai: see speech, characterization by
group membership, characterization by 17, 22–23, 48, 49, 55–57, 63, 89, 112, 154, 170, 172–173, 192, 195, 197–198, 201n14, 209–210, 214–215, 225, 237, 298, 310–311, 314, 328–329, 338n3, 347, 358, 423, 426, 429, 546, 549–550, 553, 585, 604, 618, 631, 637, 639. See also age; class; ethnicity/*ethnos*; education; family/lineage; gender; religious group; wealth

hamartēma/*hamartia*/*hamartanō* 372, 413, 414n14
hosios 372, 413
hubris/*hubristēs*/*hubrizō* 43, 52, 60, 62, 84, 106, 109, 149, 287, 304, 309–311, 321n15, 413, 418, 419n21, 424, 458, 602
huperēphania/*-os* 309, 586, 589

indirect characterization 20–23, 33, 36, 45, 53, 82–83, 84, 94, 99, 103–104, 115, 118, 129–130, 131, 174, 184–185, 187n38, 254–255, 257, 270, 272–273, 276, 295–297, 299–300, 303, 307, 314, 323, 327, 335, 336, 345, 361, 366, 379–383, 392, 411, 412–413, 429, 447, 457, 472, 473–474, 476, 477n41, 491, 505, 515, 520, 525–528, 531, 536, 538, 542, 546–547, 547–548, 549–553, 557,

indirect characterization (*cont.*) 567–568, 579, 582, 585–586, 591, 650. See also action, characterization by; appearance, characterization by; comparison, characterization by; contrast, characterization by; emotions, characterization by; focalization, characterization by; group membership, characterization by; metonymical characterization; metaphorical characterization; *paradeigma*, characterization by; setting, characterization by; speech, characterization by
individuation: see typification vs individuation
influence (of characters on each other's behaviour; i.e. advice, persuasion, coercion, etc.; also resistance to advice, etc.) 10, 30, 42–43, 60, 74, 87, 110, 124, 125, 137, 140–141, 144–146, 148–149, 150–151, 157–158, 167, 178, 184, 185, 187, 188, 194, 201–202, 205, 210, 217–218, 224, 227, 236–237, 245, 254n17, 256, 266, 319–320, 326, 327, 329, 332, 339, 359–361, 377–378, 381, 382, 390, 417, 424, 450n15, 453, 484, 490n10, 496–497, 499, 501, 504, 511, 513, 514, 552, 565, 568, 568–569, 572–575, 581–585, 586, 598, 606, 611, 612, 623, 624, 632, 635, 641, 644–645. See also dynamic vs static character, education
intertextual characterization 5n9, 21, 23, 82–83, 91, 93, 99, 100, 105–111, 115, 120, 122, 146, 167, 182, 185, 243, 282–285, 300, 323, 334, 370, 475n35, 509, 512, 538, 592–595, 607, 608, 609–610, 618n18, 621, 624n25, 625, 629, 634, 639, 646–648, 650. See also metaphorical characterization
intratextual characterization 21, 23, 88–90, 91, 99, 146, 167–168, 198, 285–287, 592–595, 620–622, 624, 625–626, 631, 634, 644, 647–648, 648–649, 650. See also metaphorical characterization
introduction: see first appearance/mention of a character

kakia/kakos 107, 113, 193, 197, 326, 331, 361, 363, 425, 438, 552
kallos/kalos 107, 276, 294, 307, 325, 366, 468, 471, 473, 480, 513, 515, 599, 600
katharos 226, 634
khreia (anecdote) 508n16, 524, 534, 535, 536, 550, 552. See also speech, characterization by
khrēstos/khrēsimos 145, 177, 202, 245, 260n32, 263–264, 616
kinaidia/-os 431, 433, 435
kosmios 399, 401–402

lamprotēs/lampros 158, 210

macro-social group: see ethnicity/*ethnos*; group membership, characterization by
malakos 162, 304, 431
megalophrosunē/megalophrōn, *mega phroneō* 84, 254, 527
megalopsukhia 263, 267
mēnis 43, 520
metaphorical characterization 20–21, 23, 36, 53–55, 56, 82–83, 99, 100, 104–111, 115, 130, 142–147, 153, 167–171, 181–182, 185, 187, 198, 202, 214–217, 241–242, 249, 258, 283–284, 303, 320, 323, 332–334, 335, 336, 343, 345, 366, 393, 395, 412–413, 429, 431, 436, 438, 445, 450, 456–458, 459–460, 486–487, 488–489, 492, 508–509, 511, 515, 519, 520, 530–532, 535, 545, 576–577, 580, 585n17, 610, 615n13, 618, 620–624, 625–626, 631–632, 635–363, 638, 640, 643–645, 647–648, 648–649, 652. See also comparison, characterization by; contrast, characterization by; *paradeigma*, characterization by; setting, characterization by
metonymical characterization 20–23, 33–35, 55–62, 64–67, 85, 87, 94, 99, 111–114, 115, 118–120, 125, 130, 131, 147–152, 153, 167–171, 214–215, 237, 241–242, 247, 346–348, 426, 428–429, 431, 435, 438, 441, 447, 457, 507–508, 511, 520, 525, 528, 547, 563, 571, 576, 580, 585–586, 588, 590, 611–612, 613–614, 616, 618–625, 626, 630–635, 637, 639, 642, 645, 646, 648–649, 652. See also action, characterization by; appearance, characterization by; emotions, characterization by;

focalization, characterization by; group membership, characterization by; setting, characterization by; speech, characterization by
metriotēs/metrios 162–163, 252, 257, 260–261, 263
miaros 429, 435
micro-social group: see age; class; family/lineage; gender; group membership, characterization by; religious group; wealth
mokhthēria/-os/mokhthos 161, 215, 293
moral evaluation of character 2, 6–8, 8–9, 11, 13, 22–23, 35, 41–42, 42–45, 51–52, 53–54, 56, 58, 77–78, 84, 99, 103, 105, 108, 110n19, 113, 115, 142, 159–167, 185–186, 188, 190, 205–206, 215, 224, 251–252, 254, 255, 256–258, 259, 263n36, 264, 266–267, 269–270, 276–278, 305, 306, 309–310, 313, 319, 325–326, 327, 336, 344, 351–352, 354, 355, 366, 368, 376–377, 387, 400, 410, 412, 413–414, 416–417, 423, 426, 431, 436, 437–439, 440n30, 445, 447, 460, 464, 473n32, 481, 483, 488–489, 491n10, 492n13, 497–498, 500, 502, 514, 519, 523, 525, 529, 531–532, 532–533, 538, 540, 546–547, 552, 557, 565, 569–570, 570–571, 573, 576, 582, 589, 594, 608, 613, 629, 631, 634–635, 637, 640, 646, 651

name/naming, characterization by 5, 19–20, 23, 28, 31–32, 45, 48–50, 55n30, 61–62, 62, 63, 85, 86n15, 101–102, 115, 117–118, 128, 153–159, 172–173, 174–175, 209, 211, 213, 215–216, 227, 231, 274, 287–288, 294–296, 303, 335, 340–341, 362n18, 375, 378–379, 390, 391, 431, 433, 440, 463, 479, 517, 523n3, 532, 534, 535, 537, 546, 551, 555, 557, 563–564, 579–581, 589, 592–595, 598, 601, 609–611, 615, 616–617, 618n18, 626, 629–630, 636–639
necrology: see obituary
nobility/noble: see *eugeneia/eugenēs*. See also class; group membership, characterization by

obituary 29, 83–84, 157, 161, 163, 164, 178, 180–186, 204, 208, 233, 248, 258–260, 262, 265–267, 492
ōmotēs 215, 242, 482
other-characterization: see altero-characterization

paideia/pepaideumenos: see education
paradeigma/exemplum/paradigm, characterization by 21, 23, 43–44, 167, 181, 190, 244, 304, 305, 365, 452–453, 467, 470–472, 508, 529, 533, 534, 535, 540, 548, 566, 575, 579, 579–580, 593, 595, 625, 631, 648
paralepsis 515, 602–603
paranomia/-os 163, 259, 418, 631–632
parrhēsia 263, 493–494, 534
pathetic fallacy: see personification
pathos: see emotion, characterization by
periphrōn/periphronēsis 31, 258n27
permanence (of character traits): see dynamic vs static character
personification 47, 55–56, 57–58, 63, 64, 294, 343, 520, 545–546
persuasion: see influence
philanthrōpia 468, 471–473, 476, 478
philomathia/-ēs 468, 471, 473, 506
philonikeō, philoneikia/-os 163, 263, 491
philotimia/-os 267, 367, 468, 471–473, 475–476, 478, 489, 491–492, 519, 524
phthonos, hupophthoneō 261, 482
phronēma 137n4, 163, 349, 573, 631
phronēsis, periphronēsis, kataphronēsis 252, 258n27, 264
phusis/phusikos 10, 137n4, 160, 192, 194, 196, 198, 201, 222–223, 237, 255, 256–257, 258n27–28, 260n32, 262–267, 269, 352, 361, 410, 467, 473, 478, 487, 507, 513, 616n16, 626
physiognomy: see appearance, characterization by
pistos 262, 296
poikilia/poikilos 68–69, 256, 260, 509
polumētis 33, 81
ponēria/ponēros 256, 259, 413, 414n14, 418, 424n30, 424n32, 425–426, 429, 599n31
polupragmosunē/polupragmōn 260, 600–601
polutropos 245, 260
praotēs/praos 194, 480
praxis: see action, characterization by

primacy 16, 18, 32, 59, 103, 144, 203, 243, 300, 324n23, 337, 373n48, 508, 566–568
prolepsis 56, 61, 161, 176, 183, 188, 234, 239, 245–246, 296, 300, 392, 474, 637
psukhē (and compounds *megalopsukhia, eupsukhos, psukhagōgia*) 89n45, 169, 193, 252n9, 263, 267, 269, 306, 307, 349, 468, 480, 512, 517–518, 551, 580

realism (lifelikeness) 11, 35, 99, 115, 307, 310, 337–339, 356–363, 380, 388, 389, 390, 473, 484–485, 530n20, 544–546, 550, 554, 583, 589, 594, 601, 607, 608
religious group 8, 140, 252, 288, 307, 313, 348, 422, 610, 620, 629–630. See also group membership, characterization by

schema (cognitive): see top-down characterization
script (cognitive): see top-down characterization
seed 566, 580
self-characterization: see auto-characterization
setting, characterization by 19–21, 23, 32, 34, 45, 62, 63, 87, 99, 101n5, 113, 114, 118, 119–120, 129, 130, 131, 168–169, 230, 288, 294, 295, 323, 330, 346, 398, 435, 436, 438, 441, 446, 451–452, 525–526, 565, 592n2, 608, 613–614, 630, 631, 641, 644, 648
silence 30, 37, 38, 45, 61, 77, 85, 89, 95n38, 114, 129, 200, 209, 294, 302–303, 317–320, 324, 331–332, 359, 411, 419, 425, 437, 482, 483, 490, 491n10, 494, 497, 482, 536–537, 571, 615, 626. See also speech, characterization by
slave(s)/slavery: see *douleia/doulos*
sōphrosunē / sōphrōn, sōphroneō 161–162, 252, 257, 258n27, 262, 344, 402, 475, 480, 482, 508n16, 514, 519–520, 568–569, 576, 578–579, 588–589, 596n21, 613, 631–632, 634, 643
sophia/sophos 140–141, 252, 361, 480, 506–508, 511, 514, 517, 518n48, 518n50
speaking name: see name/naming, characterization by
speech, characterization by 20, 22–23, 32, 33–34, 35n29, 37–38, 60–62, 65, 84, 87–88, 91–93, 95–96, 98, 99, 112–113, 114, 116, 119–125, 129–130, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 148–152, 154–155, 160, 162, 164–166, 167–168, 169, 175–176, 178, 185, 186–187, 189, 214–215, 216, 228–232, 235, 244–245, 248, 254, 255n19, 275–276, 278, 296, 297, 299–304, 310, 312–313, 314, 323, 325–327, 330–332, 335, 336, 340–341, 341–343, 347–348, 350, 352, 356, 358–363, 366–368, 370, 372–373, 377, 392–394, 396, 399–400, 403, 406, 409–413, 417, 419, 419n21, 425–426, 426–427, 445–446, 454–456, 460–462, 470, 473, 475n35, 476, 477–484, 486, 489, 492–497, 497–499, 507, 580, 512, 514, 519, 525, 527–528, 531, 532–534, 535–537, 539, 544, 550, 551–553, 556, 561–562, 562–565, 569–570, 571, 572–573, 579, 583–584, 585–586, 588, 590, 591, 594n17, 603, 604–606, 620–625, 624–625, 626, 630–631, 634, 635, 638–640, 643–644, 648–649, 652. See also silence
static character: see dynamic vs static character
status (social): see class
stock character: see typification vs. individuation
sunkrisis: see comparison, characterization by

thrasutēs/thrasos 418, 586, 589, 593n5, 613
thumos (and compounds *euthumia, epithumia, epithumeō, enthumeomai*) 183, 293, 299, 363, 475, 480, 482, 483, 519–520, 632–633
tolmē/tolmēros, tolmētēs, tolmaō 165–167, 264, 269, 413–414, 416, 418, 475
top-down characterization 16–17, 18–19, 298, 328, 337–339, 339–340, 340–341, 341–343, 347, 348, 353, 357, 412, 413, 477, 562, 562–565, 566, 579–581, 582, 589, 629. See also bottom-up characterization
training: see education
transtextual character 5, 517
tropos 137, 164, 175n11, 178, 182, 245, 254n17, 255, 256, 263–264, 372, 377, 395, 399, 402, 487–488, 507, 523, 525–527
typification vs. individuation 7, 8–9, 17, 18, 27–30, 33–34, 35, 45, 103, 116–117, 119, 123, 128, 138–139, 143, 144n34, 150–151, 154, 168–170, 179, 197–199, 202, 205,

225, 236, 253, 258–259, 262n34, 263, 268, 300, 309–310, 312, 314, 320n15, 327–328, 331n45, 332, 336, 338, 342, 350, 352–353, 359n11, 367–368, 370, 371, 380, 391n1, 406, 410–412, 419n23, 422, 424n31, 429, 437, 440n30, 440n31, 445, 447–448, 451, 453, 458–459, 461, 462–463, 477, 478–481, 507–508, 510, 526, 532–534, 537, 545–546, 553–554, 556–557, 562–565, 568–570, 579–581, 583–584, 589, 594, 595–597, 601, 603, 604, 607, 608, 609–610, 611–615, 617, 620, 625–626, 627, 628, 629–630, 632, 636, 638–639, 642–644, 646–648, 649. See also bottom-up characterization; top-down characterization

vice 45, 224, 252, 263, 267, 269, 395–396, 471, 478, 482, 532–534, 589, 601

virtue: see *aretē*

wealth 22, 58, 59n40, 68, 114, 146, 215, 223, 232, 261, 273, 367–368, 375, 381, 384, 386–387, 389, 390, 393–394, 395–396, 398, 401, 417, 420, 421, 431, 448, 451, 469n10, 484, 531, 533, 539, 554, 566–567, 596, 615, 616–617, 619, 629, 632, 639–642. See also group membership, characterization by

xunesis/xunetos 159–162

zēlotupia, zēlotupeō 567, 569, 578